The American retreat from the Middle East signals weakness, and encourages an Iranian quest for regional hegemony that was bolstered by the P5+1 nuclear deal. The most dangerous consequence of current American foreign policy in the region is the likelihood of nuclear proliferation. Moreover, the current American approach allows for Russian encroachment in the region, which enhances the power of the radical axis led by Iran. It also opens the way for the ‘Finlandization’ of the Gulf and the Caspian basin by Iran. US weakness in the Middle East inevitably will have ripple effects in other parts of the globe.
By Prof. Efraim Inbar
Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies
Image Attribute: U.S. Army / Creative Commons
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY:
The American retreat from the Middle East signals weakness, and
encourages an Iranian quest for regional hegemony that was bolstered by the
P5+1 nuclear deal. The most dangerous consequence of current American foreign
policy in the region is the likelihood of nuclear proliferation. Moreover, the
current American approach allows for Russian encroachment in the region, which
enhances the power of the radical axis led by Iran. It also opens the way for
the ‘Finlandization’ of the Gulf and the Caspian basin by Iran. US weakness in
the Middle East inevitably will have ripple effects in other parts of the
globe.
The US, under
President Barack Obama, has signaled its intent to reduce its presence in the
Middle East. The US fought two unsuccessful wars in the region – a frustrating
lesson about the limits of its power. At the same time, US dependency upon
Middle Eastern energy has been reduced thanks to domestic progress in fracking
technology. Moreover, Washington has decided to “pivot” to China, an emerging
global challenger, and also to cut defense expenditures, leaving fewer military
assets available for projecting power in the Middle East. (For a while during
President Obama's tenure, the US had no aircraft carriers in the eastern
Mediterranean or in the Gulf at all, an unprecedented situation.) In addition,
the American campaign against ISIS has been extremely limited, and has met with
little success.
Unfortunately,
this disengagement signals both fatigue and weakness.
Washington
also has desisted from confronting Iran, and has gone to great lengths to
accommodate it. President Obama's contention is that by completing a nuclear
deal with Iran, he resolved one of the outstanding security issues in the
region before leaving office. However the deal legitimizes a large nuclear
infrastructure in Iran, and ignores the cardinal national security interests of
at least two US allies: Israel and Saudi Arabia. The subsequent removal of
international economic sanctions – with no reciprocal requirement for any
change in Iranian regional policy – positions Iran to reap great financial
benefits at no cost. President Obama's Iran policy has occasioned a dramatic
change in the regional balance of power, yet Washington appears largely
unperturbed.
Whereas US
policy on Iran has been guided primarily by wishful thinking, the apprehensions
of regional actors with regard to Iran's hegemonic ambitions have multiplied in
response to the nuclear deal. While Washington claims to be confident that Iran
will play "a responsible regional role," leaders in Ankara, Cairo,
Jerusalem and Riyadh see Iran as almost entirely unaltered from its pre-deal
state in any meaningful political sense, with the potential to produce nuclear
bombs in a short time.
The gravest
consequence of the US policy of disengagement from the region is the increased
probability of nuclear proliferation. Powers contending for regional
leadership, such as Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia will not stand idly by in
the nuclear arena, particularly as the US is no longer seen as a reliable
security provider. US attempts to convince regional powers to rely on an American
nuclear umbrella in an attempt to prevent nuclear proliferation are likely to
fail. The emergence of a multi-polar nuclear Middle East, which is a plausible
consequence of the American nuclear accommodation with Iran, will be a
strategic nightmare for everyone.
An emboldened
Iran, which traditionally acts through proxies rather than through military
conquest, might intensify its campaign to subvert Saudi Arabia, possibly by
playing the Shiite card in the Shiite-majority and oil-rich Eastern province.
The loss of that province would considerably weaken the Saudi state and might
even bring about its disintegration.
Iran could use
subversion, terrorist attacks and intimidation of the Gulf states to evict the
thinning American presence completely from the Gulf. In the absence of American
determination and ability to project force, Iranian superior power might
‘Finlandize’ the Gulf countries. We could also see also the ‘Finlandization’ of
the Caspian basin, where Iran shares the coast with important energy producers
like Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. The Caspian basin and the Persian Gulf form
an “energy ellipse” that contains a large part of the world’s energy resources.
Azerbaijan and
Turkmenistan are very fearful of growing Iranian influence. It is possible that
those countries, which adopted a pro-Western foreign policy orientation after
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, might decide to return to the Russian
orbit, because Russia appears at present to be a more reliable ally than the
US.
Russia is
fully alive to the potential for a reassertion of a Russian role in the region
in the wake of an American retreat. To that end, it has taken the major step of
intervening militarily in Syria to assure the survival of Assad’s regime. The
Syrian littoral is a vital base for enhanced Russian naval presence in the
eastern Mediterranean, and this preceded Russian air participation in the
Syrian civil war. In addition, Russia wants to protect energy prospects that
depend on Assad's survival. It already has signed exploration contracts with
the Assad regime with regard to the recent gas discoveries in the Levant basin.
Syria has been
an ally of Iran since 1979 – the longest alliance in the Middle East. The
preservation of the Assad regime is critical to Iranian interests because
Damascus is a linchpin to its proxy, the Hezbollah in Lebanon. Russia's efforts
on Assad's behalf thus directly serve the interests of the Iranian regime. If
successful, those efforts will further Iranian influence in the region.
Outside Syria,
we may see Iran join Russia in supporting Kurdish political ambitions in order
to weaken Turkey, Iran's rival for regional leadership. The Kurds are a thorn
in Turkey’s side. Iran and Turkey are supporting opposing sides in the civil
war in Syria, where the Kurds are carving out autonomous regions. Depending on
how the war transpires, Kurdish national dreams might benefit from the power
vacuum created by the disruption of the Arab statist structure and the American
exit from the region.
As to Egypt,
American reluctance to support the al-Sisi regime plays into Russian hands. The
Russians are selling weapons to Egypt, negotiating port rights in Alexandria,
and supplying Egypt with nuclear reactors. In Iraq too, we see the harbingers
of a Russian presence in coordination with Iran, as American influence in that
state continues to wane.
The rise of a
more aggressive Iran – a direct consequence of the US retreat – may bring about
greater tacit cooperation among Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Israel. The big
question is whether Turkey will join such an anti-Iranian alignment.
US weakness in
the region inevitably will have ripple effects in other parts of the globe.
American credibility is now subject to question, and allies elsewhere may
determine that it would be wise to hedge their bets. Greater challenges await
the US beyond the Middle East.
About The Author:
Efraim
Inbar, director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, is a professor
of political studies at Bar-Ilan University and a fellow at the Middle East
Forum.
BESA Center
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Perspectives Paper No. 331
This article
was first published at BESA Center Website, February 24, 2016 and is
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