This article aims at discussing the impact of the OBOR on the relations between China and the European Union and its consequences in terms of regional integration and unity.
By Simona Picciau[1]
PhD Candidate at Université Paris Diderot,
Researcher & Project Coordinator of the Center for European Strategic Research (CESR)
Abstract:
This article aims at discussing the impact of the OBOR on the relations between
China and the European Union and its consequences in terms of regional
integration and unity. The first part of the article describes the One Belt One
Road strategy and its proposals. Sequentially, a short historical account will
be presented on the EU-China cooperation since the establishment of diplomatic
relations in 1975, characterized by contrasts, but at the same time, the
necessity to build a solid partnership. The third part includes an analysis of
the EU response to the OBOR, specially focussing on the issues concerning the capability
of EU to produce a regional strategy and utilize the opportunity to improve its
regional connection and strengthen its relations with the Asian giant. Finally,
we will consider the OBOR as an opportunity to strengthen the EU-China
relations not only in terms of trade and economy exchange (Hard Connection) but also in terms of Soft Connections necessary to reduce the cultural distance, in
order to establish a strong strategic partnership based on mutual understanding.
The article will also discuss the opportunity to negotiate the modality of the
OBOR implementation not only at a bilateral level but also in multilateral
instances that already exist, such as ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting).
Keywords: China, European Union, One Belt-One Road, New Silk Road
Introduction
The
development of China since the opening reforms promoted, especially at the
beginning of the 1980s by Deng Xiaoping, has transformed the nation from a poor
country to the second strongest economy in the world. But today the Chinese
leadership faces a difficult transition from an essentially export-based economy
to one based on domestic consumption and innovation, in a scenario of a diminished
GDP and issues related to an increasing social inequality, the internal
migration from the countryside to the urban area and a high degree of
pollution, etc.
In order to guarantee social stability
China needs new markets for its products and a favorable international
environment. Through the concept of pacific
ascensions the Chinese government seeks to assure its partners regarding
its commitment to accept more responsibilities and obligations through a
greater contribution to peace and global development.
In
this context China adopted the One Belt
One Road (OBOR) project, also named the New
Silk Road, a China-led initiative that aims to expand and deepen its
integration into the world economic system, strengthen its cooperation with the
countries in Asia, Europe, Africa and the rest of the world through improvement
of the connectivity in terms of infrastructures, trade exchanges and people-to-people
interactions. OBOR is an ambitious project through which China intends to shape
the structure of the international economic order and confirm its position as a
global actor.
This
article aims at discussing the impact of the OBOR on the relations between China
and the European Union and, in particular, its consequences on the issues that are
related European regional integration and unity.
In the first part of the article we discuss
the One Belt One Road strategy and
its proposals. Next, a short historical account of the EU-China cooperation is
presented since the establishment of the diplomatic relations in 1975, characterized
by contrasts and simultaneously the necessity to build a solid partnership. In
the third part, the EU response to the OBOR will be analyzed emphasizing the issues
concerning the ability of the EU to deliver a regional strategy and accept the
opportunity to improve its regional connection and strengthen its relations
with the Asian giant. Finally, the OBOR is presented as an opportunity to
strengthen the EU-China relations, not only in terms of trade and economy
exchange (Hard Connection) but also
in terms of Soft Connections, to
reduce the cultural distance in order to establish a strong strategic
partnership based on mutual understanding. This article will also discuss the
opportunity to negotiate the modality of implementing the OBOR, not only at a bilateral
level but also in the multilateral instances that already exist, such as ASEM (Asia-Europe
Meeting).
1. The One Belt One Road project
For a long time the West and East
have been connected by a network of trade and cultural routes via Central Asia that
enabled interaction and exchange between the people of Europe, Asia and Africa.
Centuries after its decadence, the
Chinese government, in 2013, presented the One
Belt and One Road project (commonly termed the New Silk Road), an ambitious and mega interconnection plan of the
21st century that aims at linking infrastructures, coordinating policies,
promoting trade and commerce, circulating currency, as well as connecting
people’s hearts and minds.[2]
During his keynote speech titled Promote Friendship between Our Peoples and
Work Together to Create a Bright Future delivered at the Nazarbayev University
(Astana, Kazakhstan) in September 2013, the Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed
the initiative of jointly building the Silk
Road Economic Belt (SREB). One month later, during a speech made at the
Indonesian Parliament he raised the initiative on a joint construction of the
21st-Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR),
presenting China’s willingness to strengthen maritime cooperation with the ASEAN
countries. SREB and MSR are jointly termed One
Belt and One Road.
The project reflects the Chinese
ambition to affirm itself as a global player, by re-discovering its
“centrality” as a great power and represents an important step in the
realization of Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream,
an extensive development project of the Chinese nation and as a consequence of
the world’s people, in order to pursue a common development strategy.
As indicated by Yang Jiechi, State Councillor
and former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China: “The Chinese dream requires a peaceful and
stable international and neighbouring environment, and China is committed to
realizing the dream through peaceful development. Since the Chinese dream is
closely linked with the dreams of other peoples around the world, China is
committed to helping other countries, developing countries and neighbouring
countries in particular, with their development, while achieving development of
its own.”[3]
From an economic perspective, the nation is moving from an
export-oriented economy model to one based essentially on consumption and
outward investment. Post the 2008-’9 global financial crisis that affected
especially the United States and European countries, China has strongly
intensified its investments in the developing countries as well as in developed
economies. China is imposing itself at a very fast pace as a finance source for
the South nations towards building critical infrastructures, which will reduce developmental
progress.[4]
Through the concept of peaceful ascension, China desires to
assure its partners that its ascension is an opportunity for all the nations of
the world and not a threat, as it is often understood worldwide. This was the
reason for the Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s statement that OBOR should not be viewed
as an out-dated Cold War mentality;[5] thus,
in order to avoid any association with the Marshall Plan, the project has been
presented as Beijing-led, neither as a one-way export initiative nor as a
project with an ideological connotation or against a nation or a group of them.
Zhang Yesui (China’s Executive Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and former Ambassador
to the United Nations and to the United States) highlighted that OBOR is not
directed against any specific nation and can be considered a useful complement
to the existing international and regional institutions.[6]
The Chinese leadership views the OBOR as representing a significant opportunity
for the development of the nations involved: poor, developing countries as well
as the developed regions of Europe, which experience a considerable gap in
terms of infrastructures between the western and the eastern countries.
In promoting the New Silk Road, China aims to satisfy,
first of all the needs of its own economy; China GDP being the lowest since the
1990s. China needs new markets for its manufacturing sector and new economic
engines. Infrastructure constructions in Central, South and South East Asia are
important, guaranteeing the furnishing of natural resources for its economic
needs and in its territory to sustain the growth and development of China’s
less-developed areas, by linking the north-western and north-eastern Chinese
regions with the Central, South and West Asian countries. China’s south-western
regions will be connected more intimately with the Southeast Asian countries.
The Chinese government has already
established a $40 billion Silk Road Fund (SRF), focused on infrastructure
investment. The Fund, already active, has already signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) with the Russian state development bank, the
Vnesheconombank, and with the Russian Direct Investment Fund in Beijing (in September
2015) witnessed by Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir
Putin in order to plan joint investments in infrastructure construction and
industrial cooperation projects, especially in the electricity and energy
sectors.[7]
In
order to respond to the initial accusation of the lack of transparency and the
necessity for clarity, the OBOR has politically and officially presented in
March 2015 the paper, Vision and Actions
on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road
issued by the National Development and Reform Commission of Foreign Affairs
and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China. Here, particular
emphasis has been placed on the “Silk
Road Spirit of peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual
learning and mutual benefit."
OBOR
can be considered a global project because it involves strategic areas and 65
countries. This article therefore focuses upon the European Union region,
positioned in one of the two extremities of the Road and considered, by the
Chinese leadership, a strategic actor for its realization.
2. EU-China relations
While scholars and political leaders
question the future of the European Union as a global actor, it is called upon
to decide on which aspect its role in the implementation of the OBOR strategy could
be, and China is exerting pressure on the EU in order to have it involved.
Europe has played a historical role in the ancient Silk Road and of course its
involvement is essential for the realization of the project.
The imminent crisis that EU has to
face at this point in time, such as the refugee crisis, the war on terrorism
and the UK in-out referendum entails that it is hard to imagine that the EU’s
engagement in the OBOR will be the center of the discussions in the near
future. Nevertheless, the rapidity with which China is engaging herself globally
and implementing concrete actions (for example, we can mention the establishment
of new international financial Institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB) in the framework of the
cooperation of the BRICS’s group) with the objective of shaping international
development not only in its own region but also, by now, in each region of the
world (Europe, Africa, Latin America) cannot leave Europe indifferent,
especially considering China’s growing influence as an emerging power and a global
player. That the Chinese are willing to realize a Eurasian connectivity with a
long-term strategy is not insignificant for the EU.
But before continuing with the
analysis of a possible EU involvement in the OBOR, it is necessary to frame the
status of the bilateral relations between the EU and China because it is within
this framework that the new co-operation should be realized. Primarily, it is
important to state that EU began its relation with the PRC since 1975, and the years
of diplomatic relations established between them have progressed very slowly
and been characterized by a substantial mutual mistrust, that represents till
today, the hard core of the relationship.
Since 1975 many changes have
occurred. At that time the European Community had been an association of only nine
nations; today EU is an organization composed of 28 countries representing the
main economic bloc of the world. China, from a former position of isolation in
international affairs, is quickly becoming a global power, regaining its
centrality in the new global order and representing an unavoidable partner for
all the actors.
The Tiananmen Square incident in
1989 and the consequent European embargo on arms sales have undoubtedly represented
a point of rupture in the bilateral relations, even if it has been circumvented
by bilateral trade between individual European countries and China. Generally
speaking, although an internal discussion developed concerning the possible cut-off
of diplomatic and trade issues with China, pragmatism and economic interest prevailed,
proven by increasing bilateral relations that tripled between 1985 and 1994.[8] The European
refusal to give to China the status of Market Economy (MES) presented another difficulty
in the bilateral relations between China and EU, especially because their
relation has, since the inception, been focused on economic interest. China is
the second European partner after the United States and EU is the first Chinese
partner. The lack of a European hard power, and substantial security interest
in the Asian region, contrary to the USA, has normally brought the EU to
establish a relationship with China focused mainly on trade issues.
In the mid 1990s, following the
first Communication of the European Commission dedicated to Asia, Towards a New Asia Strategy, published in 1994, EU elaborated in
1995 the first strategy paper A Long-Term Policy for China-Europe Relations focused mainly
on the establishment of a dialog with China, the integration of China in the
world economy, the rising of the EU’s profile in China and the promotion of
human rights and rule of law. The inclusion of the promotion of human rights
and rule of law, the core of the European values and union’s construction, in
the first common political approach is part of the normative attitude of the EU
on which its soft power is fundamentally based.
The successive period, especially
the years 2003-2005, defined as the “honeymoon” period, has been characterized
by a general positivism and enthusiasm diffused both in Europe and in China.[9] In
the first European Security Strategy
of June 2003, the Solana Report, China was regarded as one of the Strategic
Partners of the EU, a concept reaffirmed in September of the same year in the European
Commission’s document A maturing
Partnership: Shared Interests and Challenges in EU-China relations, where it
affirmed that China and EU have greater interests to work together as strategic
partners. In China, the first EU policy
paper was published in October 2003, in which EU is described as a major
force in the world and as an actor that will play an important role in both
regional and international affairs. This mutual consideration was reaffirmed in
the EU-China summit, held in Beijing in October 2003, during which the
bilateral relationship was defined as a strategic partnership, underlining the
increasing maturity of the relationship. The EU-China Comprehensive
Strategic Partnership in
2003 has since deepened
and broadened the cooperation in a wide range of
areas. The bilateral trade relations was confirmed
to be very strong and the two parties signed the Galileo Program and other cooperation agreements in different
sectors, such as climate change, peaceful use of nuclear energy, etc.
All these advancements in the
bilateral relations reinforced the idea that China and the EU could establish
functional cooperation despite the differences in terms of the values and
political approaches. But very soon the honeymoon started to show signs of
ending, bringing up the idea, once again, that the difficulties concerning
mutual perceptions and mistrust could represent a barrier difficult to
overcome. The EU started to exercise its normative power on China putting
pressure on issues like human rights, trade restrictions and intellectual
property. China refused these advances and began feeling feel frustrated
because of the European requests, its insistence in the lifting of an EU arms
embargo and the granting of MES to China continued to remain unheard.[10]
Despite
all these points of friction and the fact that in reality neither China nor the
EU treated each other as the most important partners, it was nevertheless clear
that the international environment placed all the actors in a situation of
interdependence, making them perceive the bilateral relations as being of
strategic importance.
Europeans
often accuse the Chinese of bureaucratic infighting and not being transparent
in their negotiations. Furthermore, China perceives the European insistence on
issues concerning the rule of law, good governance and human rights as a
tentative to assume a tone of “moral superiority.”[11] The huge sum of money invested by the EU over
the last two decades and the establishment of the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue in 1995 has been considered by the
EU institutions themselves as not having culminated in any significant result.[12] Some
authors have pointed out that the ability “to get China to be more respectful
of the human and civic rights of its own citizens is equally very limited.”[13]
The economic cooperation remains
till today, the most developed area of collaboration. In 2014, the EU and China
registered a two-way trade worth 467 billion euro, configuring a reciprocal
interdependence.[14] On
the contrary, the other two pillars of dialog, the political and the people-to-people
dialogs remain largely underdeveloped. Nevertheless, the economic ties have
raised the point of contrasts too. European companies complain about the
limitation of access to the Chinese market. Moreover, European companies are
facing stronger competition from the Chinese products that are becoming more
and more sophisticated and with a higher technological content and level than
in the past.
The European Union has lost its
credibility in its capacity to deliver common answers and to show a strong
European diplomacy, weighing heavily on its image as a global player. This has
led China to increase its negotiations with individual state members, starting
with Germany which alone accounts for 30% of the total trade between China and the
EU, followed by other strong states such as UK and France. Recently, China has furthermore
started to strengthen its relationships with the central and eastern European
countries inaugurating the so-called 16[15]+1
format in Warsaw in 2012, a framework of cooperation in which China has offered
credit lines and know-how in infrastructure building after the global financial
crisis.
Despite the numerous failures of
tentative attempts to collaborate together in a concrete and successful way on
many occasions, the potential for strategic cooperation remains enormous. The
issue of an EU-China 2020 Agenda for Cooperation adopted at the 16th EU-China Summit in
November 2013 and Xi Jinping’s visit to
Brussels in 2014 to the EU headquarters for the 40 years of the diplomatic
bilateral relations demonstrate that both parties are aware that their
cooperation is not only necessary for them but for the international community
and a common agenda of discussion and concrete dispositions have become an
absolute necessity and are no longer an option. Xi Jinping called for forging
four major China-EU partnerships for peace, growth, reform and civilization and
to strengthen cooperation at different levels: China-EU, Asia-EU and global
level.[16]
As China is a developing nation and the
EU is a post-industrial society, it therefore becomes evident that
expectations, norms, standards and interpretation of common challenges, cannot
converge in the short-term but only in the medium- and long-term.[17] Nevertheless,
considering that the difficulties and contrasts resulting from the two
different systems of thinking and acting, or what the German ambassador Volker
Stanzel called “cultural dissonance”[18]
appear to be an endemic characteristic of the relationship, therefore, China
and the EU are called to strengthen their cooperation in a mature manner.
3. What are the consequences for EU?
The implementation of an efficient
policy towards China seems difficult for the EU, mainly due to a lack of
cohesiveness among its members and, as we have already affirmed, the imminent
crisis that is affecting Brussels. Nevertheless the determination through which
China is pursuing its objective in the realization of the New Silk Road cannot leave the European Union indifferent, and in
any case its realization will affect the EU in different ways.
From the time the Chinese leadership
announced its intention to initiate the OBOR, it has been largely ignored by
the European Union and this reaction has been perceived by China as a turning
away, leaving Beijing’s leaders with a sense of frustration and irritation that
invested energies in order to get Europe to engage in the project. In
particular, Vice-Premier Zhang Gaoli, chairman of the OBOR Small Leading Group
and the Premier Li, have been active in promoting the OBOR in Europe. Zhang
Gaoli visited Russia, Lithuania, Serbia and Kazakhstan (between 17 and 26 June)
in particular, while Li visited Belgium, France and the headquarters of the
OECD and co-chaired the 17th China-EU Leaders meeting.
In whatever specifically concerns
the interconnection with Europe, China has already been active and taken a
series of actions. Even before the announcement of the OBOR’s project some cargo
railways have been built connecting Europe and China and passing through
Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus and Poland: in 2011 the Yixin’ou railway has been
inaugurated linking Chongqing (China) and Duisburg (Germany) and in 2012 the
line has been extended to Antwerp (Belgium). In April 2013 the fastest line
between China and Europe was launched connecting Chengdu (China) and Lodz
(Poland) in 12 days and the Zhengou railway that links Zhengzhou (China) and
Hamburg (Germany). In 2014 the Hanxinou railway was inaugurated linking Wuhan (China)
with Lodz (Poland) and the Yixin’ou railway that links Yiwu (China) and Madrid.[19]
From the European side, since 2015 the
situation appears to be slowly changing. More and more the EU is debating on
its role in the implementation of the OBOR. Of course, the EU is interested in elaborating
a long-term strategy with the aim of strengthening and building infrastructures
in the southern, eastern and central European countries and in the Balkan.
As expected, during the last
EU-China Summit both parties discussed the mutual benefits of a common strategy
in the implementation of the OBOR. In particular, the two parties discussed the
benefits that could arise from the synergy between the OBOR and European
Commission President Juncker’s Investment Plan (IPE) which is intended to
finance the re-launch of the EU’s economy.
The Investment Plan focuses on
removing the obstacles to investment, providing visibility and technical
assistance to the investment projects and making wiser use of the new and
existing financial resources. To achieve these goals, the plan was activated in
three areas: mobilizing investments of at least €315 billion in three years, supporting
investment in the real economy and creating an investment-friendly environment.[20]
The decision taken during the EU-China summit to set up a “connectivity platform” gave the
assumption that the EU was seriously considering the debate concerning its
participation in the One Belt, One Road project.
Junker referred to the New Silk Road
as: “an ambitious plan that will call for substantial resources, saying the
most significant need is to have an environment enabling large-scale,
transnational investment in Asia.”[21]
Of course, the EU’s response to the
OBOR will be strategically very significant because it puts at least three main
aspects on the line: the first and most important, because it is the essential
element of the other two aspects, is the EU’s unity in elaborating a concrete
action in response to the OBOR, viz., the modalities through which the EU will
engage itself. The second dynamic is the future of the EU-China relationship
that will be strongly influenced by the manner in which the EU will participate
in the project. The third aspect is its image in the global scenario, a strong
regional strategy will of course contribute towards ameliorating its image as a
global actor; conversely a fragmentary strategy based mainly on the national
interest of the member states will reinforce the idea of the Chinese leadership
(and of the other international actors) of an EU weakness in terms of foreign
policy.
The attractiveness of China and its
economic opportunities has driven the EU members to develop their own strategy beyond
that of the European Union. China has developed a very strong relationship with
Germany, in particular, and its chancellor Angela Merkel who visited China
seven times since the beginning of its mandate. According to some scholars the
economic crisis that occurred in Europe commencing in 2008 pushed Germany to
strengthen its relations with the most dynamic markets, especially those in Asia.[22] This
has led China to identify Germany as its main European interlocutor; Angela
Merkel has been for China the main interlocutor concerning the European crisis.[23] A
Chinese officer has affirmed: “If you want to obtain something from Brussels,
you have to talk with Berlin.”[24]
Like Germany, other countries like France and UK, are strengthening their
relations with China and seeking a privileged relationship with her. For example,
in 2015 France signed an agreement with China for cooperation in third-party
markets.
This attitude raised the question regarding
the possibility of their trying to take advantage from the OBOR through a
national strategy, and about their will to elaborate a regional strategy based
on the real interest of all the members that could bring real effectiveness to the
EU peoples in terms of infrastructure development, mobility, connectivity and
people-to-people dialog.
Another important issue that the EU needs
to consider is the recent strengthening of China’s relations with the CEE (Central
and Eastern Europe) region that has led to the institution of the 16+1 group,
fundamental for the realization of the OBOR because, as mentioned by the former
Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, in 2011: Central Europe will play the role of a
“bridgehead” in the expansion of Chinese companies in Europe. This privileged
relation that China is building with this region and especially the enthusiasm
with which the region is welcoming the Chinese investments is spreading the
idea in EU that China is putting in place the “divide and rule” strategy.[25] During
the third Meeting of Heads of governments of China and the 16 central and eastern
European members that was held in Belgrade in December 2014, the Chinese
Premier Li Keqiang highlighted the important role that this region would play
in the OBOR project.[26] Hungary
is the first EU country to have signed an MoU with China in order to integrate
OBOR in Hungary’s Opening to the East
and Opening to the South strategies.
Greece, because of its geographical
position, occupies a very important part in the OBOR. China is working on a
land-sea route project, financed with 2.5 billion dollars by the China
Export-Import Bank, that will link the port of Piraeus, one of the key
container ports in Europe with six or eight Eastern European countries in order
to make it a Chinese hub for trade with Europe. The Chinese shipping company
COSCO has already won 35 years concession in the Greek port.[27]
The ability of the Chinese to deal
with nation groups is growing rapidly, for example the China-CELAC[28] Forum inaugurated
in Beijing in 2015. The decision to establish a Secretariat for the group of
16+1 is a demonstration of the importance for China’s interest in this region. As
a group composed of EU and non EU-members, the EU desires that all the
activities be conducted according to the standards and regulations set up by
the European Commission.
One of the main instruments instituted
by China in order to realize the OBOR project is the establishment of the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) with the objective of financing the
project, especially with respect to the infrastructures, and spread connectivity
in the developing countries mainly situated in the Asiatic region. With a
starting capital base of US $ 100 billion, the bank has the potential to play
an important role in the multilateral development finance. The decision to
establish the AIIB, together with other two important financial institutions,
the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA),
both created as a BRICS’s initiative but in which China plays a central role,
shows on the one hand China’s disapproval of the existing international
financial institutions where it feels that itself and the other emerging powers
(especially the BRICS members) are under-represented, and on the other hand its
ability to contribute towards shaping the new global order, that appears as an
important objective of its foreign policy strategy.
Surprisingly, 13 European countries
(Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) following UK (together with
some African and Latin America nations) and despite opposition from the USA, have
joined the AIIB as Prospective Founding Members (PFMs). By joining the AIIB,
European members certainly expect to have returns of economic benefits,
especially after the long economic crisis that continues to persist in Europe; however,
their participation can also be interpreted as a strategy to demonstrate their
support to China in its process toward its engagement in the multilateralism,
encouraged by the European countries since a long time.[29]
The decision to join the bank was not coordinated; in reality there is no
representation of any European institution, for example, the European
Investment Bank. This makes the question regarding the participation of the European
region in the OBOR project even more legitimate, and specifically if it will be
developed at the European or national level sanctioning a de facto disunity of the EU members in this project but more in
general before the Chinese ascension on the international scenario.
Wang Yiwei, a well-known Chinese
scholar, claims that the OBOR will provide Europe with “a historic opportunity
to return to the centre of the world through the revival of Eurasia” and to
balance its “asymmetric position” within the transatlantic relationship.[30]
According to him the OBOR will offer to Europe seven great opportunities viz.,
an opportunity to build a greater Eurasian market and to revive European
civilization; an opportunity for Europe’s regional integration: Poland, Greece,
the Balkans, Hungary’s railway, the port of Piraeus have become competitive
products in the 16+1 cooperative projects, as well as bridges to link the overland
and maritime silk roads; an opportunity for EU-Russia conciliation; an
opportunity for the EU to participate more easily in the Asia-Pacific Affairs,
an opportunity for the EU to enhance its global influence: it would also be an
opportunity for China and the EU to cooperatively develop and operate on
third-party markets like West Africa, the Indian Ocean and Central Asia; an
opportunity to transform and upgrade the China-EU comprehensive strategic
partnership and an opportunity to balance the development of the trans-Atlantic
relationship.[31]
The
OBOR implementation and especially the modality of the engagement of the EU represent
a challenge for the future of the EU-China relations because it concerns their
capacity to establish a win-win cooperation making their strategic partnership
a reality.
In order to have the EU involved in
the project, China is emphasizing the benefits that Europe can gain from its
participation in terms of infrastructure and improvement of the intra-regional
connectivity; however, if a synergy between IPE and the OBOR is found it will
require lengthy and detailed discussions on the leadership and management of
the projects and funds. EU will, of course, place as a condition of its
engagement, the respect for high standards of governance and technical issues,
for example environmental requirements.
If
it is true that both parties will be advantaged by the OBOR in terms of
bilateral trade, an in-depth discussion is necessary. The Bilateral Investment
Treaty (BIT) is still on-going, and China is, of course, looking to increase
its opportunities to sell its products in Europe while Europe is seeking to
create new opportunities for its companies in order to facilitate a more
balanced trade. But the EU is also concerned that a hypothetical lack of
transparency rules and opaque financing deals may threaten the competitiveness
of the European enterprises.[32] This
is the reason for China’s assurance to the EU regarding its willingness to
respect certain principles such as joint discussions, sharing, openness and
tolerance and compatibility with the local frameworks of cooperation.
3.1. What about Soft Connections?
Definitely, the New Silk Road represents an ambitious project that involves opportunities
not only in terms of trade and infrastructure development, but also in terms of
social development and people-to-people relations. As the Chinese scholar Jing
Men has clearly stated, OBOR is not only a question of hard connectivity but also of soft
connectivity.[33]
Beyond the opportunities that the New Silk Road can bring in terms of
trade and investments through the improvement and construction of the infrastructure
structures (hard connections), it can
also be considered for its potential in terms of strengthening the relations
between the European and Chinese societies and those situated along the Road (soft connections).
In order to be a really effective
strategy, able to face the challenges of the XXI century, OBOR has to be
thought of as a broader strategy for enhancing the exchanges between people through
the inclusion of the non-state actors, such as the business community, ONGs,
students, cultural actors, etc.
Europe and China now have a new
opportunity to strengthen the bridges between their cultures and establish a
win-win model of mutually agreed cooperation.
Considering the number of nations
involved and the wide sectors of cooperation that the project engage, it will
be necessary to engage several channels of cooperation, not limited to the
bilateral cooperation but extending to multilateral instances. The European
Union and China could, for example, develop the discussion regarding the implementation
of the OBOR in the ASEM framework (Asia-Europe Meeting), an inter-regional
forum of cooperation that engages numerous nations involved in the OBOR project
and that disposes of the instrument that could sustain OBOR to become not only
a mere project of hard connectivity (trade, investments and infrastructures)
but a broader multicultural and multilateral project of development, including
social and cultural issues.
ASEF (Asia Europe Foundation),
created within the ASEM in 1997, in order to promote greater mutual understanding
between Asia and Europe through intellectual, cultural and people-to-people
exchanges, could for example serve as the platform to enhance the relations at a
societal level. The TEIN (The Trans-Eurasia Information Network) project, another important
instrument realized within the ASEM framework, a high-speed international
research network provided for the use of researchers and research institutes,
rather than for commercial use, could be engaged in the OBOR in order to
improve the soft connectivity between the two continents. Today, many
international joint research projects have resulted in addressing issues like
climate change, remote medical service, remote cultural performance,
agriculture, etc., thus contributing to the share of knowledge and transfer of
know-how from the developed nations to the poor and developing ones.
Certainly, the ASEF and TEIN need
economic support in order to continue to develop their work. If investments in
roads and even more in general infrastructures are fundamental for the
development of nations constituting the physical bridges to build closer
relations between economies, the investments in research, culture and education
represent a fundamental complement required for human development and social
inclusion, which represent an important challenge for the XXI century.
Conclusions
The One Belt One Road strategy announced by the new Chinese government
and its leader Xi Jinping appears as an ambitious project that aims to mark the
ascension of China as a global actor in a changing, and more and more
multi-polar world. The realization of the OBOR is part of a broader objective,
the realization of the Chinese Dream in which China realizes the development of
its society and discovers again its centrality in the international system.
In order to avoid suspicions and mistrust
in its partners about the real intentions of China, the government has coined
the concept of a “pacific ascension” based on the principles as cooperation,
friendship, mutual respect and development for all nations.
The engagement of the European Union
in the New Silk Road project appears to
be of fundamental significance, although the modality of its involvement still remains
uncertain. After an initial period of indifference, the European Commission is
appearing to start to evaluate the manner in which the EU can be involved in
the OBOR and benefit from the opportunities that it can offer in terms of trade
exchange, better connectivity and infrastructure structure within the EU. In
particular, it is seeking whether the possibility of a synergy between OBOR and
the Juncker’s Plan Investment can be found.
At the national level, European
leaders, on the contrary, driven by the continuing economic crisis, have
already become members of the AIIB and are attempting to utilize all the
opportunities that the OBOR can offer. The uncoordinated decision to adhere to
the AIIB raises the question regarding the capacity of the EU to elaborate a
regional strategy for its engagement in the OBOR. It is of even more concern,
if we consider the member states’ interest in the OBOR, including the central
and eastern European countries that are strengthening their relations with
China in the framework of the 16+1 group.
Finally, in order to be able to face
the challenges of the XXI century, the OBOR has to be considered as a broader
strategy, including both hard and soft connections through the inclusion of non-state
actors from those like the ONGs, the business community, students, cultural
actors, etc. EU and China are both key players in global governance and the establishment
of a strategic partnership pass by mutual understanding and cooperation that cannot
be limited to economic exchanges. The cooperation is based on the realization that
the OBOR can be an opportunity to once again discuss the establishment of a mutually
agreed upon win-win model of economic, political and cultural cooperation.
About The Author:
Simona Picciau, (C-4503-2016) PhD Candidate Université Paris Diderot, Researcher and Project Coordinator of the Center for European Strategic Research (CESR). E-mail: simona.picciau@cesr-eu.com.
Cite This Article:
Picciau , S. "THE
PAPER | The "One Belt One Road" Strategy Between
Opportunities & Fears: A New Stage in EU-China Relations?" IndraStra
Global 002, no. 02 (2016): 0066. http://www.indrastra.com/2016/12/PAPER-OBOR-Strategy-Between-Opportunities-and-Fears-EU-China-002-02-2016-0066.html
|ISSN 2381-3652| https://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.2752708
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Endnotes:
[1] PhD Candidate Université Paris Diderot,
Researcher and Project Coordinator of the Center for European Strategic
Research (CESR). E-mail: simona.picciau@cesr-eu.com.
[2] Wang
Y. China’s “New Silk Road”: A Case Study in EU-China Relations. In Amighini,
A., Berkofsky, A. Xi’s Policy Gambles: The Bumpy Road Ahead, ISPI Report, 2015,
p. 100.
[3] Yang,
J. Innovations in China’s Diplomatic Theory and Practice
Under New Conditions. English
Edition of Qiushi Journal,
Vol.6 No.1 January1, 2014.
Available from: http://english.qstheory.cn/magazine/201401/201401/t20140121_315115.htm.
[4] Contipelli,
E., Picciau, S. China’s Global Order: A New Paradigm in South–South Relations.
Croatian International Relations Review, XXII (73), 2015, p. 58.
[5] Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. Foreign Minister Wang Yi
Meets the Press, 8 March,
2015. Available from: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1243662.shtml.
[6] Zhang Y. The ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative is not a geopolitical tool.
Speech at China Development Forum, Xinhua, 21 March, 2015.
[7] Chen,
J. China’s $40b Silk Road Fund signs MoU with Russian firms. China Daily, 3
September, 2015. Available at:
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-09/03/content_21785297.htm.
[8] Sutter, R. G. Chinese Foreign Relations. Maryland:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2008, p. 340-342.
[9] Shambaugh, D. Europe-China relations: a delicate
dance. Lanham, Md: Tiersky and Van Oudenaren (eds.). 2010, p. 99.
[10]
Rémond, M. The EU’s
refusal to grant China ‘Market Economy Status’ (MES)’, Asia Europe Journal,
2007. 5: 345-356.
[11] Brown, K., Crossick, S. The EU and China: Time for a change? Asia Programme Paper: ASPPP 2009/03, London:
Chatham House, 2009 p. 6.
[12] Report to the European Parliament on trade and economic relations with
China, 17 January, 2009.
[13] Godement, F., Fox, F. A power audit of EU-China relations. European
Council on Foreign Relations. London: European Council on Foreign Relations,
2009 p. 61.
[14] Prodi, R., Gosset, D. The European Union and China on
the New Silk Roads, 16 October 2015. Available at:
http://www.romanoprodi.it/articoli/the-european-union-and-china-on-the-new-silk-roads_12159.html.
[15] Albania, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Czech, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia.
[16] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic
of China, Xi Jinping Holds Talks with President Herman Van Rompuy of
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[17] Grevi, G.
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[18] Stanzel Volker. The EU and China in the global system,
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[19] Jing, M. China
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[20] Website
of the European Commission:
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[21] Shuai, R., Yan, L. Interview: Europe to benefit from
China’s One Belt, One Road initiative: EC chief”. Xinhuanet, 7 May 2015.
Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-
05/07/c_134218780.htm.
[22] HEIDUK,
A.C. Conflicting images? Germany and the rise of China.
German Pol, vol 23 (1-2), 2014, p. 118-133.
[23] Pedroletti,
B. When it comes to China, which side is Germany on? The Guardian,
12 September,
2013. Available at:
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[24] Kundnani,
H., Parrello-Plesber, J. En quoi la relation Chine-Allemagne est-elle si
importante pour l’Europe? Le monde, 16 Avril,
2012. Available at:
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[25] Ju,
W. Developing China’s Relations with CEE Countries with the Silk Road Economic
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[26]
Casarini, N. China’s inroads into the West,. In: The World Today Chatham House,
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5.
Available at:
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[27] Ibidem.
[28] The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.
[29] Renard,
T. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB): China’s new multilateralism
and the erosion of the West. Security Policy Brief, No. 63, April 2015. p. 5.
[30] Wang,
Y. Op cit, p. 103.
[31] Wang,
Y. Op cit, p. 107.
[32] Zhao,
M. China’s New Silk Road Initiative. IAI Working Papers15/37-October 2015, p.
9.
