Syrian Crisis Resolution - This report considers agreements made, outlines the main principles of agreement and includes the original text of both the 6 point peace plan and the agreement known as the Geneva Communiqué. It emphasises why, after five years of bitter conflict the Geneva Communiqué remains the main framework for driving a peaceful resolution to the problem.
By Phillip Paul Dennis BA (Hons) LCGI
Abstract
The question of resolving conflict within the Syrian
Arab Republic has recently been diverted toward overcoming and defeating the
self styled Islamic State: or Daesh. The emergence of Daesh has indeed added
extreme complications to any plans or processes aimed at seeking a resolution
between the Syrian government and rebel opposition who engage in civil war. When considering Daesh as an existing element
within Syria and Iraq, one could ask if the conflict would end when the Islamic State is defeated ? The
answer is of course no. Removing the
Islamic State would still leave a situation whereby fractious rebel groups, and
protesting Arab Spring, oppose the
ruling party: a party which led by the Bashar Al Assad regime has vowed to
crush any rebel uprising. It is
therefore argued that resolution will come, eventually, in the form of
political change which can only be derived from the political will of the
Syrian people. The main principles for
this were set out in Geneva in 2012 following a collapsed Ceasefire agreement
between all concerned. This report considers
agreements made, outlines the main principles of agreement and includes the
original text of both the 6 point peace plan and the agreement known as the
Geneva Communiqué. It emphasises why,
after five years of bitter conflict the Geneva Communiqué remains the main
framework for driving a peaceful resolution to the problem. A situation of
which will require time and patient negotiation.
1. Introduction
In 2012 reported escalation of violent acts in Syria
prompted the need for urgent action to be taken for the benefit and wellbeing
of the Syrian population, the stability of the Syrian Arab Republic and the
international community in the wider context.
Proposals for agreement of terms emerged with a 6 point peace plan and
offered an appropriate course of action with
the sole purpose of a peaceful resolution to end the violence and enter into a negotiation
of terms for all concerned: under a supervised cease-fire. The plan, set out by
the United Nations joint envoy (Kofi-Annan), offered a framework for progress., which was
initially accepted but soon became the subject of dispute. With allegations
that all sides had breached the terms of ceasefire, the agreement broke down
within a matter of weeks. As debate
intensified, the situation in Syria moved toward the Geneva conferences,
whereby all concerned attempted to debate and format a structured direction to
end the conflict. These conferences, it
could be argued, reached an end point document at the third Geneva convention in
June 2012 with the “final communiqué. This document set out the principle stages of
implementation for change within Syria. Today the communiqué remains the main platform
for developing stability and peace through driving the inclusive political will
of the those within the Syrian Arab Republic. It is an agreement which is
recognised by many, including the current UN Special Envoy (Staffan Domingo de
Mistura), as the only withstanding non-discrimitory and non-sectarian rationale
to include the contribution of the Syrian populas, enhance structural political
change, and invoke a peaceful resolution to a fractious and complex situation.
Six-Point Proposal of the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations
and the League of Arab States
2.1 Agreement to
the Peace Plan.
On 23 February 2012, a joint UN–Arab League special
envoy was appointed in Syria in an effort to end an increasingly violent
uprising that began in March 2011. The appointment, awarded to Koffi
Annan, produced the 6 point peace plan which was submitted to the United
Nations on 16 March 2012. Efforts to secure support from the Russian Federation
for a ceasefire were then made in a meeting in Moscow on March 24th.
By March 27th it was announced that the Syrian Government had agreed
to accept the peaceful proposal and attempt to implement it. To this end, the
envoy sought assurances from the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, and
informed the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that the Syrian government
would withdraw and cease-fire by 10th April 2012. Subsequently, this
could allow the U.N. monitoring mission of some 200 to 250 observers to monitor
compliance of the agreement. The Syrian Government did indeed at this point
declare a ceasefire date of April 12th 2012.
2.2 Breaches to
the 6 point peace-plan
Despite the assurances given by the President of the
Syrian Arab Republic. The peace plan did, however, remain contentious. Indeed,
the Syrian ambassador to the United Nations told the UN on April 5th
that the Syrian Government would not abide to the terms of the agreement until
all outside countries had agreed in writing to stop assisting the rebel
opposition. Moreover, it was reported
that the withdrawal of troops from urban areas did not include government
police, and a loophole in clause 2 of the peace plan allowed a government
police regime to remain and/or replace military troops within days of
agreement. The ceasefire was
implemented, but only in part, on the ground, causing sporadic clashes across
Syria beyond April 14th. By early
May 2012 the UN Peacekeeping Under-Secretary-General reported that both sides had violated the
terms of the 12th April ceasefire agreement.
Continued fighting came to a head on 25th May
2012 in the town of Taldou in the Houla region. Pro government Shahiba militia
and Syrian troops massacred 108 residents and critically injured more than 300.
The subsequent outrage led to protests amongst Syrians, and resulted in the
main rebel opposition (The Free Syrian Army; FSA) delivering an ultimatum to Bashar
Al Assad. The FSA stated they would not
honour the peace agreement as civilians had been killed during the war. The FSA
announced that it was resuming operations, and the response from Bashar Al Assad
comprised a statement of vowing to crush any anti-regime uprising. This led to
the collapse of the peace plan and by the end of May 2012 the FSA declared the
agreement dead. In August 2012 Koffi
Annan had concluded that both sides of the conflict were guilty of “ intransigence” and resigned his position as
envoy.
However, the denial of both sides to adhere to ceasefire
through the 6 point plan did not alteatther render it redundant, as the plan in
its entirety offered a platform toward a solution, and a foundation for talks
at the Geneva conventions on Syria.
2.3 Text of the 6
point plan
As annexed to
Security Council resolution 2042 (2012) of 14 April
(1) commit to
work with the Envoy in an inclusive Syrian-led political process to address the
legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people, and, to this end,
commit to appoint an empowered interlocutor when invited to do so by the Envoy;
(2) commit to
stop the fighting and achieve urgently an effective United Nations supervised
cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties to protect
civilians and stabilize the country;
To this end, the
Syrian government should immediately cease troop movements towards, and end the
use of heavy weapons in, population centres, and begin pullback of military
concentrations in and around population centres;
As these actions
are being taken on the ground, the Syrian government should work with the Envoy
to bring about a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all
parties with an effective United Nations supervision mechanism.
Similar
commitments would be sought by the Envoy from the opposition and all relevant
elements to stop the fighting and work with him to bring about a sustained
cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties with an effective
United Nations supervision mechanism;
(3) ensure
timely provision of humanitarian assistance to all areas affected by the
fighting, and to this end, as immediate steps, to accept and implement a daily
two hour humanitarian pause and to coordinate exact time and modalities of the
daily pause through an efficient mechanism, including at local level;
(4) intensify
the pace and scale of release of arbitrarily detained persons, including
especially vulnerable categories of persons, and persons involved in peaceful
political activities, provide without delay through appropriate channels a list
of all places in which such persons are being detained, immediately begin
organizing access to such locations and through appropriate channels respond
promptly to all written requests for information, access or release regarding such
persons;
(5) ensure
freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists and a
non-discriminatory visa policy for them;
(6) respect
freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully as legally
guaranteed.
2.4 Analysis of
the six point peace plan
When considering the terms of the 6 point plan it is
also important to consider the elements of State and political will. The Syrian constitution, for example, has
been pivotal, in the development of State and governance. The political will of the people is also
another key factor in resolving the problem.
The Syrian constitution was indeed altered in 1973. This was born from the wake of the Islamic
uprising during the 1970’s and Syrian state government today would expect to
uphold relating to its’ position as Arab State – a paradox in the context of
governance, as the leadership of Bashar al Assad has been protested by the Arab
Spring, yet the Muslim Brotherhood had failed to materialize as a coherent form of effective government. In such circumstances it could be argued that only the
political will of the people can move toward a constitutional change.
One of the most notable, reasons given for the
breakdown of the Syrian 6 point peace plan was the argument of “ external
influences as a driving force behind both sides of the civil way. The Syrian government clearly have the
support of the Russian federation on the issue of external influence, and in
supporting Bashar al Assad, has since taken preference to veto any form of
action against the Syrian leadership. In 2013, for example, the need to take
action on the tactics employed in Syria came to a critical point when chemical
weapons were deemed to be used and the Syrian government was identified as the
aggressor. Reports of chemical weapons use is a violation of human rights
coupled with further violations for which session 22 (2013) UNHR had previously
condemned.[1]
Intervention would now be required by either member-states of the UN under
Chapter 7, or by the UN as an entity to promote the wellbeing of a civilian
population which is unable to defend itself. And, the population as a whole
which is being harmed or displaced as non-military civilians. Concern was also
expressed in the report from the 6893rd meeting of the United
Nations Security Council to note that efforts in the region are being
deliberately hampered: events which were documented in UNSC resolution 2084. Even in these circumstances the
leader of the Russian Federation refused to allow intervention from the
international community as a whole, indeed at the United Nations, chose to
again veto. The argument, It was suggested, is Syria consists as a Civil War
and outside intervention could not be expected.
These events have now led to a situation whereby the
fate of Syrian governance lay in the hands of the consent of the Syrian people,
for whom millions have chosen to flee
into neighboring countries for their own safety. With no ceasefire in place and settlement of leadership at the
hands of political will, the concept of developing a framework for future
stability and governance both the 6
point plan and the Geneva communiqué have
become time-consuming formats for conflict resolution.
When taking all the factors into consideration it is
clear that neither side are willing to give ground on a ceasefire, and the
driving forces behind each side in the conflict have little intention to change
their stance relating to the Syrian civil war.
There are, subsequently a number of key contradictions and/or points which need to
be highlighted before considering the Geneva communiqué as a viable framework
for stability.
2.4.1 Arab/Islamic context for cease-fire plan.
a) The single most
important factor is the issue of leadership as stated in the Syrian
constitution. This states that the
leader must be Islamic. Thus, the
Syrian government is unlikely to accept a peace-plan which gives direction or
leadership to a non-Islamic envoy.
Any coalition for supervision/ or peace council would
need to have an Islamic chairperson.
b) Previous
conflicts, in a contextual sense, would give rise to difficulties reaching
agreements from outside influence of neighbouring countries; Lebanon, Jordan,
Iraq, Iran, Turkey, but not to the extent of impossibility. Syria
would be more likely to accept an Envoy appointed by the Arab League to oversee
any negotiations as they appear dedicated to the laws of Islam: yet promote
freedoms of culture and democratic Islamic stand-points.
c) Outside
influence, as determined to be the Western World are only objected to in the
Syrian Regime as those who wish to perpetrate a break in the in Syrian view of
Islamic law, their economic and social view does seem to contradict their
current political stance at International level.
d) Freedom of
movement for journalists is already widely accepted by the Syrian government as
it is part of the 1973 bill of constitution, but the massive civil
demonstrations in Damascus in previous anti- government campaigns, particularly
those arising from the Brotherhood has
led to the state “imposing” without official restriction. Mr. Anan addressed
this in the 6-point peace plan, but did not include the words” for the best
interest of the Syrian People.”
e) The state has
been identified as the aggressor, to which end has breached the humanitarian
rights of its people, breached the rights of the 1925 agreement on chemical
warfare attacks, and breached the resolution in UNHR session 22 : 2013 to
protect and/or not direct violence at UN personnel/inspectors.However, the aggressing party within this
civil state was and has control of weaponry, and faces opposition from
unpredictable groups of militia, as well as combining their effort in a
stabilised armed unit which could also comprise of unpredictable personnel.Thus, removal of the regime and an
interim government would only be viable if it fitted the constitution of an
Islamic/Arab state. Any other scenario could cause further destruction and
further fatalities.A peace-plan
would need to take this into consideration.
f) A suggested
cease-fire would need to be overseen by a coalition force made up of Arab based
UN representatives and Arab league members.
A peace council which helps Syria integrate within the Arab state and
yet adhere to international law, could possibly be welcomed by the Syrian
regime and the opposition, as both sides seem constituted to the Islamic
community and the freedom of its people within that as part of an international
community overall.
g) The introduction
of Aid workers and aid distribution to flow freely within Syria (without attack
or aggression) is a must in the formulation or amendment to any plan. Syria is an existing beneficiary of the
United Nations Development programme (UNDP), the facts of this are previously
published in the UNDP Fast Facts Document regarding UNDP response to the Crises
“Supporting Humanitarian Livelihoods and Community Resilience in Syria, Lebanon
and Jordan”. The safe keeping of all
concerned in this project is of paramount importance.
h) The Human Rights
Council Independent report dated 18 July 2013, clearly lays out a cause for
concern as reaching “New levels of brutality”.[2]
These are also highlighted in Annex of the report (annex 1 correspondence with
the Syrian Arab Republic from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights). (Ref;Human rights Council, 23rd session agenda item 4)
i) The notion that military action should always
be the last option. If such action were to be required it should only be aimed
at a strike on military and/or armoury sites within the boundaries of the
Syrian nation. It should also only be used as a necessary function to disable
future stockpiling of any weapons which may cause serious harm or fatality to
the civilians of Syria and the civilians of other nations. [3]
3. The Geneva Convention
In June 2015 the special envoy to Syria (Stefan de
Mistura) suggested the overall plan has moved away from the national
peace-framework to discussions within the Syrian Arab Republic to attain an
inclusion persuasion to accept political reform. This places a strong emphasis
on placing the results of the Geneva conventions in 2012 as the direction take,
and has remained adornment that the Geneva Communiqué is the existing road map to
end the conflict.
The Geneva Conventions are a set of treaties regarding
humanitarian issues of civilians and combatants in wartime. There are four
Geneva Conventions, last revised in 1949, and three additional Protocols - two
from 1977, and one from 2005. (Council for Foreiegn affairs ) In June 2012, the concern over issues
occurring within Syria was such that the international community called for the
Geneva convention to be convened in an attempt to develop a protocol where the
structure of governance is the key. (
All plans exclude ISIS and extremist groups from the inclusion of a consented
Syrian agreement). Even though there
was strong opposition from certain fractions within the conflict, the
convention did convene for three
conferences and the subsequent convenings led to a definitive final communiqué
on 30th June 2012.
3.1 Opposition
to the Geneva Convention
Given the call for a political reform was in the first
instance non-discriminatory and non-exclusive in the executive power, it was
almost ineviatable that objectors woud emerge to the Geneva framework. The head of the Supreme Military Council of
the Western-backed rebel Free Syrian Army said that forces aligned to him would
not go to Geneva because it had not been made clear that the talks would result
in President Assad stepping down. Other groups also objected and announced they
too would not attend any conference. This was particularly the case with the
National Co- ordination Committee (NCC), an officially tolerated internal opposition
alliance. Its leader, Hassan Abdul Azim, said he had refused to participate as
part of a single opposition delegation led by the National Coalition without
lengthy preparations. Objection has
been such that the call to convene and implement any agreement were rejected by
the Syrian Kurdish leadership, a group
who comprise just over 10% of the population. They rejected the calls to attend
any further conference as part of a
united opposition group (NCC) and
expressed a desire to send their own representatives and not be part of the
National Coalition delegation. In essence, each fraction had their own agenda
for terms to attend. Arguably, the
biggest condemnation came from the Islamic Front, a powerful alliance of
Islamist rebel groups, who warned it will consider participation in Geneva 2 as
"treason".
3.2 Geneva Conference 1 – Syria
Having agreed to convene, the first Geneva conference outlined
political solution and called for the establishment of a transitional governing
body that would “exercise full executive powers.” It stated that the solution
lay within political reform and the executive powers could include members of
the present government and the opposition, other groups and shall be formed on
the basis of mutual consent.
3.3 Geneva Conference 2 – Syria
At the second Geneva conference doubt was expressed that any significant
traction will be made quickly on the political front and only small
confidence-building measures such as prisoner exchanges, localized cease-fires
or improved humanitarian access, will could be achieved. A scenario which later proved be true, when an
agreement formulated to ceasefire was observed in Aleppo whereby fighting
ceased for a short period to allow the Syrian Arab Red Cresent to enter and
distribute aid to helpless civilians. Further to this, at a later point in time
a set of localised ceasefires were briefly adhered in the Idlib region (2015). However brief the ceasefires, the significance does shine a
glimmer of hope on the process as a workable framework for future reference,
and championed a small victory in the humanitarian context.
3.4 Geneva
Conference 3 – Syria
The third Geneva conference, placed strong emphasis on
stability. The grave concerns expressed by all suggested the need for working
parties to enter Syria and engage immediate talks with the government and rebel
groups calling for the implementation of transitional change within the
republic. The Final communiqué set out 12
points to achieve coherent dialogue and requested the appointing of a
government innocular to work with the envoy in order to implement the 6 point
peace plan and the communiqué, whilst at the same time remaining integrated to
informing both the United Nations and the Arab League to the progressing
situation.
3.5 Text of The
Final Communique:
Action Group for Syria
Final
Communiqué 30.06.2012
1. On 30 June
2012, the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the League of Arab
States, the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United
States, Turkey, Iraq (Chair of the Summit of the League of Arab States), Kuwait
(Chair of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the League of Arab States) and
Qatar (Chair of the Arab Follow-up Committee on Syria of the League of Arab
States), and the European Union High Representative for Foreign and Security
Policy met at the United Nations Office at Geneva as the Action Group for
Syria, chaired by the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League
of Arab States for Syria.
2. Action Group members came together out of grave
alarm at the situation in Syria. They strongly condemn the continued and
escalating killing, destruction and human rights abuses. They are deeply
concerned at the failure to protect civilians, the intensification of the
violence, the potential for even deeper conflict in the country, and the
regional dimensions of the problem. The unacceptable nature and magnitude of
the crisis demands a common position and joint international action.
3. Action Group members are committed to the
sovereignty, independence, national unity and territorial integrity of Syria.
They are determined to work urgently and intensively to bring about an end to
the violence and human rights abuses and the launch of a Syrian-led political
process leading to a transition that meets the legitimate aspirations of the
Syrian people and enables them independently and democratically to determine
their own future.
4. To secure these common objectives, the Action Group
members (i) identified steps and measures by the parties to secure full
implementation of the six-point plan and Security Council resolutions 2042 and
2043, including an immediate cessation of violence in all its forms; (ii)
agreed on guidelines and principles for a political transition that meets the
legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people; and (iii) agreed on actions they
would take to implement the above in support of the Joint Special Envoy’s
efforts to facilitate a Syrian-led political process. They are convinced that
this can encourage and support progress on the ground and will help to
facilitate and support a Syrian-led transition.
Identified steps
and measures by the parties to secure full implementation of the six-point plan
and Security Council resolutions 2042 and 2043, including an immediate
cessation of violence in all its forms
5. The parties must fully implement the six-point plan
and Security Council resolutions 2042 and 2043. To this end:
5.1 All parties
must re-commit to a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms and
implementation of the six-point plan immediately and without waiting for the
actions of others. The government and armed opposition groups must cooperate
with UNSMIS with a view to furthering the implementation of the above in
accordance with its mandate.
5..2 A cessation of armed violence must be sustained with
immediate, credible and visible actions by the Government of Syria to implement
the other items of the six-point plan including:
Intensification of the pace and scale of release of
arbitrarily detained persons, including especially vulnerable categories of
persons, and persons involved in peaceful political activities; provision
without delay through appropriate channels of a list of all places in which
such persons are being detained; the immediate organization of access to such
locations; and the provision through appropriate channels of prompt responses
to all written requests for information, access or release regarding such
persons; o Ensuring freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists
and a non-discriminatory visa policy for them; o Respecting freedom of
association and the right to demonstrate peacefully as legally guaranteed.
In all circumstances, all parties must show full
respect for UNSMIS’ safety and security and fully cooperate with and facilitate
the Mission in all respects.
In all circumstances, the Government must allow
immediate and full humanitarian access to humanitarian organizations to all
areas affected by the fighting. The Government and all parties must enable the
evacuation of the wounded, and all civilians who wish to leave to do so. All
parties must fully adhere to their obligations under international law,
including in relation to the protection of civilians.
Agreed
Principles and Guide-lines for a Syrian-led transition
6. Action Group
members agreed on the following ‘Principles and Guide-lines on a Syrian-led
transition’:
Any political
settlement must deliver to the people of Syria a transition that: • Offers a
perspective for the future that can be shared by all in Syria; • Establishes
clear steps according to a firm time-table towards the realization of that
perspective; • Can be implemented in a climate of safety for all, stability and
calm; • Is reached rapidly without further bloodshed and violence and is
credible.
6.I. Perspective for the Future The aspirations of the
people of Syria have been clearly expressed by the wide range of Syrians
consulted. There is an overwhelming wish for a state that: • Is genuinely
democratic and pluralistic, giving space to established and newly emerging
political actors to compete fairly and equally in elections. This also means that
the commitment to multi-party democracy must be a lasting one, going beyond an
initial round of elections. • Complies with international standards on human
rights, the independence of the judiciary, accountability of those in
government and the rule of law. It is not enough just to enunciate such a
commitment. There must be mechanisms available to the people to ensure that
these commitments are kept by those in authority. • Offers equal opportunities
and chances for all. There is no room for sectarianism or discrimination on
ethnic, religious, linguistic or any other grounds. Numerically smaller
communities must be assured that their rights will be respected.
6.2. Clear Steps in the Transition The conflict in Syria
will only end when all sides are assured that there is a peaceful way towards a
common future for all in Syria. It is therefore essential that any settlement
provides for clear and irreversible steps in the transition according to a
fixed time frame. The key steps in any transition include: • The establishment
of a transitional governing body which can establish a neutral environment in
which the transition can take place. That means that the transitional governing
body would exercise full executive powers. It could include members of the present
government and the opposition and other groups and shall be formed on the basis
of mutual consent. • It is for the
Syrian people to determine the future of the country. All groups and segments
of society in Syria must be enabled to participate in a National Dialogue
process. That process must not only be inclusive, it must also be
meaningful—that is to say, its key outcomes must be implemented. • On this
basis, there can be a review of the constitutional order and the legal system.
The result of constitutional drafting would be subject to popular approval. •
Once the new constitutional order is established, it is necessary to prepare
for and conduct free and fair multi-party elections for the new institutions
and offices that have been established. • Women must be fully represented in
all aspects of the transition.
6.3. Safety,
stability and calm Any transition involves change. However, it is essential to
ensure that the transition can be implemented in a way that assures the safety
of all in an atmosphere of stability and calm. This requires: • Consolidation
of full calm and stability. All parties must cooperate with the transitional
governing body in ensuring the permanent cessation of violence. This includes
completion of withdrawals and addressing the issue of the disarming,
demobilization and reintegration of armed groups. • Effective steps to ensure
that vulnerable groups are protected and immediate action is taken to address
humanitarian issues in areas of need. It is also necessary to ensure that the
release of the detained is completed rapidly. • Continuity of governmental
institutions and qualified staff. The public services must be preserved or
restored. This includes the military forces and security services. However, all
governmental institutions, including the intelligence services, have to perform
according to human rights and professional standards and operate under a top
leadership that inspires public confidence, under the control of the
transitional governing body. • Commitment to Accountability and National
Reconciliation. Accountability for acts committed during the present conflict
must be addressed. There also needs to be a comprehensive package for
transitional justice, including compensation or rehabilitation for victims of the
present conflict, steps towards national reconciliation and forgiveness.
6.4. Rapid steps
to come to a Credible Political Agreement It is for the people of Syria to come
to a political agreement, but time is running out. It is clear that: • The sovereignty,
independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria must be respected. • The
conflict must be resolved through peaceful dialogue and negotiation alone.
Conditions conducive to a political settlement must now be put in place. •
There must be an end to bloodshed. All parties must re-commit themselves
credibly to the six-point plan. This must include a cessation of armed violence
in all its forms and immediate, credible and visible actions to implement items
2-6 of the six-point plan. • All parties must now engage genuinely with the
Joint Special Envoy. The parties must be prepared to put forward effective
interlocutors to work expeditiously towards a Syrian-led settlement that meets
the legitimate aspirations of the people. The process must be fully inclusive
to ensure that the views of all segments of Syrian society are heard in shaping
the political settlement for the transition. The organized international
community, including the members of the Action Group stands ready to offer
significant support for the implementation of an agreement reached by the
parties. This may include
6.5. an international assistance presence under a United
Nations Mandate if requested. Significant funds will be available to support
reconstruction and rehabilitation.
Agreed actions
Group members will take to implement the above in support of the Joint Special
Envoy’s efforts to facilitate a Syrian-led political process
7. Action Group
members will engage as appropriate, and apply joint and sustained pressure on,
the parties in Syria to take the steps and measures outlined in paragraph
5.
8. Action Group members are opposed to any further
militarization of the conflict.
9. Action Group members underscore to the Government of
Syria the importance of the appointment of an effective empowered interlocutor,
when requested by the Joint Special Envoy to do so, to work on the basis of the
six-point plan and this communiqué.
10. Action Group members urge the opposition to increase
cohesion and be in a position to ensure effective representative interlocutors
to work on the basis of the six- point plan and this communiqué.
11. Action Group members will give full support to the
Joint Special Envoy and his team as they immediately engage the Government and
opposition, and consult widely with Syrian society, as well as other
international actors, to further develop the way forward.
12. Action Group members would welcome the Joint Special
Envoy’s further convening of a meeting of the Action Group should he deem it
necessary to review the concrete progress taken on all points agreed in this
communiqué, and to determine what further and additional steps and actions are
needed from the Action Group to address the crisis. The Joint Special Envoy
will also keep the United Nations and the League of Arab States informed.
________________________________
3.6 Analysis of the Communique.
The Geneva Communique in 2012 (in it's final part) set
out with urgent need for the working group to seek out peaceful solutions, but
this made specific reference to the 6 point peace plan, and was documented at
the 66th session of the security council on 6th July 2012 when agenda 34 was
discussed by the General Assembly.
The focus is
primarily to identify steps and measures by the parties to secure the full
implementation of the six-point plan and Security Council resolutions 2042
(2012) and 2043 (2012), including an immediate cessation of violence in all its
forms"
Analysis of the final communiqué, however, would
suggest that facilitating regional stability is equally as important as active
dialogue between the envoy and the warring
factions. In an effort to set the
stage the working groups are
intended to provide Syrians with a platform to address in-depth themes that are
certainly not new, but have lacked to date sustained intra-Syrian discussion. In
addition to this, facilitators have been appointed by the
Secretary-General for the thematic working groups to oversee 4 key themes in
protecting regional stability within the Syrian Republic; Jan Egeland for safety and protection;
Nicolas Michel for political and legal issues; Volker Perthes for military,
security and counter-terrorism; and Birgitta Holst Alani for continuity of
public services, reconstruction and development. This does of course add value to clause 6.3
enhancing the long term plan of stable conditions for the people of Syria:
without which, it may take much longer to provoke transitional change to democratic
structural governance. [4]
These facilitators form parallel
progressions and the envoy has a framework
to coordinate any draught agenda in conjunction with all concerned.
With stability and calm being a main theme for
providing the correct environment for political transition, it is difficult see
a way forward with continued fighting in the towns and cities. The fighting has
indeed hampered the process to create such an environment. Niether side appear to have shown any
commitment to ceasefire for this purpose.
In this case, the communique has without doubt been subject to problems
of implementation. Attempts to invoke
localised and regional ceasefire agreements must there continue for the benefit
of the facilitators and the working groups.
3.6.1
Implementation
Arguably, implementation is, hitherto, one of the greatest obstacles facing any peace
process during times of conflict. Diplomatic dialogue which transpires into agreement and policy often finds a stumbling block in it’s attempts to alter the opinions of those fighting on the
ground. In Syria, the rebel groups have
shown to have differences across their organisations, making the task even more
difficult.
Stefan de Mistura, pointed out how complex he felt the
situation was when addressing Chatham
House in London in March 2015. In his address he claimed " in his
professional life of 43 years, having worked in one way or another on 21
conflicts, he has not come across a conflict that is more complex than that of
Syria."
Issues of implementation were raised after the chemical
weapon attacks of 2013, prompting calls for a further convening, as soon as
possible of an international conference on Syria to implement the Geneva Communique.
In May 2013, US Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov agreed to try to bring
both sides to the table to end the bloodshed. Senator Kerry said the
alternative was that Syria "heads closer to an abyss, if not over the
abyss and into chaos". Initial
attempts to convene a further conference failed. Their initiative, however, gained
greater impetus after a chemical weapons attack on the outskirts of Damascus on
21 August 2013. On 27 September, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted
resolution 2118, which demanded the destruction or removal of Syria's chemical
stockpile by mid-2014. The United Nations also called for "all Syrian
parties to engage seriously and constructively" and be committed to the
"achievement of stability and reconciliation".
In a statement issued by way of a press release from
the United Nations on 16th
September 2013 – The United Nations concluded that the vast majority of Syrians are killed in
unlawful attacks using conventional weapons such as guns and mortars, with
children making up a large proportion of the casualties, the United Nations appointed
human rights probe today reported, calling for a halt to weapons being supplied
to Government and the rebels. To a large
extent this is deemed a breach to implementation of the Communique. The
statement continued to the view of the chairman of the International
Commission of Inquiry on Syria. He noted ( as he introduced the report to the
Human Rights Council.)
“Arms transfers
should not occur where there is a real risk that they will be used in the
commission of crimes against humanity, violations of international humanitarian
law, or war crimes. In Syria, this is a tragic reality” [5]
He also noted that failure to bring about a settlement
to the conflict has led it to deepen in its intransigence and also to widen
“expanding to new actors and to unimaginable crimes”.
3.6.2
Concerns
The primary concern for resolution in Syria is the
continued existence of violence. Stopping the fighting is fundamental to both
the 6 point plan and the Final Communique. In addition to this there are two
other areas of concern which have accentuated the complexities and hindered the
process flow in a positive direction.
The two main concerns facing the Final Geneva
Communique derive in the context of geopolitical change since it was announced
in 2012. Implications from the both chemical weapons attacks and the uprising
of the Islamic State have altered the dynamics of the process. The political
transition process had already been acknowledged as a long term solution: it has now become
even longer and will require even greater efforts to create an environment for
the political will to be a justified means of resolution.
3.6.3 Implications
resulting from Chemical Weapons
The communiqué was documented in 2012 before the
international outrage of the chemical weapon attacks in 2013. This, it could be
suggested further demonised Bashar Al Assad in the eyes of the international
community, and calls for international intervention ran high. International intervention is of course a
contradiction the Geneva communiqué as the agreement was to be settled
internally without outside interference.
When considering the Communique’s principle for political transition as
inclusive to all intra-Sryian bodies, including the government, feelings among
all aspired back to the original claims made by the Arab Spring of brutality
and dictatorship. Consequently, further calls emerged for the removal of Basher
Al Assad as leader of the Syrian Republic.
The situation of illegal tactics in warfare, and
indeed the use of banned Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), has since given
rise to increased distrust both in Syria and the international community in a
wider context. This it could be argued poses a threat to the stability of the
Middle East and Near East regions. However, the removal of the Al Assad regime
is not an option under the terms of the agreement without a democratic
political process.
3.6.4 Implications
resulting from Rise of the Islamic State (Daesh)
The communiqué did not expect nor cater for the
emergence of the so called Islamic
State (Daesh) in Syria. The rapid
development of Daesh as force has profound implications to any notion of
creating a stable and calm environment. On the contrary, it has created a
culture of fear for the Syrian civilians, which transpired into an exodus of
millions to the neighbouring States and beyond as refugees. The remaining civilians now face the fear of
attack from the Bashar Al Assad regime and acts of violent extremism from
Daesh, who now occupy huge areas within the Syrian Arab Republic.
The presence of the Islamic State. does of
course invoke severe effects on the implementation of the Geneva
communiqué and raise a number of pivotal issues;
1.The political will of the people has, in fact, been
diluted due to the mass migration of the Syrian population. This weakens the
credibility of any political reform intended to challenge the government
regime. The effects of continued
fighting has reduced civilian populations by millions: in some towns the exodus
has left them almost desolate with very few people remaining.
2.The destruction of many Syrian towns and cities
occupied by Daesh are no longer habitable to the residents,.creating stability
for through the working groups and facilitators in not always possible, as
Pro-government and Russian Federation forces have a remitt to attack Islamic State
under international Counter -terrorism laws. The reconstruction and
rehabilitation process of regions, as pointed out in (clause 6.5) will now take
considerable time and be a daunting task.
3.The insurgence
and force of Daesh within the geopolitical boundary, has allowed “ outside
influence” to take place to remove them. This also includes support for the
Assad regime from president Putin, who today, have military weapons and
equipment in Syria. The international
community is committed, along with the United Nations, to respond to threats of
international terror, and this it would appear is over-riding to the terms of
the Geneva Communique: allowing different nations to take appropriate action in
Syria. This has without doubt changed
the dynamics of the Civil war between the Government regime and the opposing
rebel forces.
4.Clause 7 of the Communique is now more challenging
and with the presence of Daesh not withstanding.
This is due to the occupation of Daesh in land areas and claiming a
pseudo State as Caphilate. – Clause 7 States;
“Action Group members will engage as
appropriate, and apply joint and sustained pressure on, the parties in Syria to
take the steps and measures outlined in paragraph 5.”
This is contradictory whilst the Islamic State remain
in place, them having been determined as a terrorist movement, conducting
extremist violent acts. To this end they would be excluded from negotiations: even
though the communiqué calls for an all inclusive intra-Syrian discussion. The intentions
of the Islamic State, along with their affiliates go beyond declaring a
Caphilate State within the Syrian border. Extrapolation of the Jihad from Syria
to other nations, therefore, poses a threat to the geopolitical stability in a
much wider sphere.
It is of course inevitable that all sides should want
to defeat Daesh, as they form part of the Jihadist movement, adding further
misery to the lives of civilian people. They pose a threat to the leadership
and governance of the Syrian administration and an equal threat to the freedoms
of the rebel opposition who attempt hold ground. However, the veracity of the fighting is, to
say the least, catastrophic to the infrastructure, and detrimental to the peace
process.
This, it could be argued, has led to the situation
whereby those opposing President Bashar Al Assad and President Putin of the Russian Federation have pledged support
for thier military action against the Islamic State in Syria. These attacks, directed at strategic targets,
aim to eliminate, Daesh cells, infrastructure, and supply routes. The down side is the damage being caused to
the notion of protecting the infrastructure through the Geneva working groups and
facilitators. This adds another layer of
complexity toward implementing all aspects of the communiqué.
4. Conclusions
The 6 point peace plan and the Geneva communiqué have
developed a solid platform for a peaceful resolution but has been subject to
changes in the Syrian geopolitical landscape. This it could be argued has led
to contradictions between the desire to invoke change and actual implementation
of any change. When coupled with persistent
violations of it’s terms the notion of a peaceful resolution has been
considerably prolonged. This does not mean the process has been lost, it simply
means the dynamics within Syria have
changed since their introduction in 2012.
The objectives of the plan are; to end the violence,
create stability and calm, create a safe environment, and allow the political
will of the people within Syria to prompt a transition of change for democratic political governance. Implementing
such a plan has so far proved to be incredibly complex, made more so by the
emergence of the Islamic State.
Indeed, Islamic State have caused a severe problem and
hampered progress. The removal of Islamic State will not result in resolution
to the Syrian crisis. It will, however, mean the process can continue on course:
albeit with extra challenges, and increased levels of need to the existing
challenges facing facilitators.
The conflict has raised any number of concerns, in
terms of violations to international laws and treaties. It is clear that all
sides have a desire to remove the so called Islamic State from the equation.
However, it is also clear that when this happens both sides engaged in the
civil war will face the same unresolved issues.
Subsequently, the greater challenge for the communiqué is
installing confidence back to the Syrian people giving them the knowledge that
their country is a safe environment for them to rebuild their lives. Only then
can thoughts begin of creating an environment of stability and calm. This, according to the Geneva communiqué is
the platform that will lead to the Syrian people having a freedom of thought,
which in turn develops a political will for structural change in
government.
The tragedy is the inability of all those engaged in
the fighting to recognise the destruction of their own country through acts
of extreme violence. Millions have fled in fear of their lives, and millions
have fled in search of the stability and calm which the communiqué intends to
help restore.
When praying for a peaceful solution to the problem,
one can only conclude that the answer is in the desire of the Syrian people to
enter into a new era of tolerance and enter into a new social contract with
themselves and the government., Transition invoked through political will involves changing the thought process of those concerned. Firstly to acknowledge
that change is required, and secondly, to have the strength to want to
implement change. This process will take many years to develop, and will
require a generation of repair and reconciliation.
The Final Communiqué offers a platform for long term
solutions which are inclusive to intra-Syrian differences and no-discriminatory.
Despite it’s problems, it still remains the
existing principle platform for developing peace in the Syrian Arab
Republic.
About The Author:
Phillip Paul Dennis (C-1610-2016) is an inspector, combining academic and office skills with
practical work based skills which enabled him to attain First Article Inspector
status.
Formally educated at Portsmouth University, reading geography and
geographical science, he graduated with honour, and successfully completed
an independent research dissertation in geopolitics by conducting a
geographical enquiry into the social contract theory and the development of
nation-states. In 2010 he achieved a UK-TEFL Cert at Cambridge UK, and
was previously awarded distinction by the London City and Guilds Institute for
computer aided engineering in 1992.
In 2013 he was part of the university alumni networking group, attending
events & functions, and has represented geography & geographical
science as a delegate for a reception evening at the House of Lords, in
Westminster, London.
Cite This Article:
Dennis, P.P. "THE PAPER | Analysis of The Geneva Communiqué & 6 Point Peace Plan for Syria" IndraStra Global 02,
no. 02 (2016): 0026.
http://www.indrastra.com/2016/01/PAPER-Geneva-Communique-and-6-point-Peace-Plan-for-Syrian-Crisis-002-02-2016-0026.html
| ISSN 2381-3652 | https://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.2076289
| ISSN 2381-3652 | https://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.2076289
Suggested Readings:
Umar F. Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria
(Berkeley, Calif.: Mizan Press, 1983)
Hanna Batatu, "Syria's Muslim Brethren," MERIP
Reports no. 110 (December 1982)
Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "The Islamic Movement in
Syria," in Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, ed. Islamic Resurgence in the Arab
World (New York: Praeger, 1982)
Line Khatib, Islamic Revivalism in Syria
(London: Routledge, 2011)
Fred H. Lawson, ed. Demystifying Syria (London:
Saqi Books, 2009)
Fred H. Lawson, "Explaining Shifts in Syria's
Islamist Opposition," in Holger Albrecht, ed. Contentious Politics in
the Middle East (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2010)
Hans Guenter Lobmeyer, "Islamic Ideology and
Secular Discourse: The Islamists of Syria," Orient 32(September
1991)
Thomas Mayer, "The Islamic Opposition in Syria,
1961-1982," Orient 24(December 1983)
Thomas Pierret, "The Role of the Mosque in the
Syrian Revolution," Near East Quarterly no. 7 (February 2012)
Thomas Pierret and Selvik Kjetil, "Limits of
'Authoriarian Upgrading' in Syria: Welfare Privatization, Islamic Charities and
the Rise of the Zayd Movement," International Journal of Middle East
Studies 41(November 2009)
Thomas Pierret, Baas et Islam en Syrie (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 2011)
Johannes Reissner, Ideologie und Politik der
Muslimbrueder Syriens (Freiburg: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1980)
Joshua Teitelbaum, "The Muslim Brotherhood and
the 'Struggle for Syria', 1947-1958," Middle Eastern Studies 40(May
2004)
Joshua Teitelbaum, "The Muslim Brotherhood in
Syria, 1945-1958: Founding, Social Origins, Ideology," Middle East
Journal 65(Spring 2011)
Itzchak Weismann, "Sai'd Hawwa: The Making of a
Radical Muslim Thinker in Modern Syria," Middle Eastern Studies
29(October 1993)
Itzchak Weismann, "The Politics of Popular
Religion: Sufis, Salafis and Muslim Brothers in Twentieth-Century Hama," International
Journal of Middle East Studies 37(February 2005)
Itzchak Weismann, "Democratic Fundamentalism? The
Practice and Discourse of the Muslim Brothers Movement in Syria," Muslim
World 100(January 2010)
Eyal Zisser, "Syria, the Ba'th Regime and the
Islamic Movement: Stepping on a New Path?" Muslim World 95(January
2005)
Useful
links
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-statement-to-geneva-conference-on-syria
http://blog.unwatch.org/index.php/2012/07/01/full-text-action-group-for-syria-final-communique/
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/friends-of-syria-core-group-final-communique
http://sputniknews.com/voiceofrussia/2013_05_08/The-Geneva-Communiqu-is-a-way-to-end-the-
Syrian-crisis-John-Kerry/
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/friends-of-syria-core-group-final-communique
http://damascus.usembassy.gov/statedept011314en1.html
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf
https://damascus.usembassy.gov/g2con.html
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2014/01/20140131292128.html
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2014/01/20140121291282.html
http://www.voltairenet.org/article188819.html
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusRel.asp?infocusID=146&Body=Syria&Body1
ENDNOTES:
[1] This makes reference to
the UN document Session 22; points page 2 to 11 (condemnation of violations)
and particular attention point 9.
[2]Ref; General Assembly, UN Human rights council, Report of the
international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic: This report
was based on findings between the dates15 Januarys to 15th May 2013.
The summary states “A diplomatic surge is the only path to a political
settlement.” However it also states; “War crimes have become a daily reality
within the county.” (page 1 & 2 summary.
[3] Human Rights independent commission: Ref;Human rights
Council, 23rd session agenda item 4, report page 21 Section D, paragraphs 136 to 140.
