On February 6, a meeting of the ‘Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) on Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Process’ took place in Islamabad. The QCG is a partnership between Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, and the United States (US) that seeks to promote a conducive environment for the commencement of Afghan-led, Afghan-owned peace talks aimed at reducing violence and establishing lasting peace in Afghanistan and in the region as a whole.
By Dr. Siegfried O. Wolf
The background –
Talking About Talks & the remaining inconvenient questions
On February 6, a meeting of the ‘Quadrilateral
Coordination Group (QCG) on Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Process’ took place
in Islamabad. The QCG is a partnership between Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, and the United
States (US) that seeks to promote a conducive environment for the commencement
of Afghan-led, Afghan-owned peace talks aimed at reducing violence and
establishing lasting peace in Afghanistan and in the region as a whole. This
latest meeting was third in the row of the QCG group this year. The first meeting
was held on January
11, 2016, in Islamabad, followed by
a second one in Kabul on January 18.[1]
During these two meetings, the representatives of the four countries reiterated
the commitment of their countries towards the realization of objectives
expressed in their statement from the quadrilateral meeting held on the
sidelines of the ‘Heart of Asia Conference’ in Islamabad on December 9, 2015.
As such, the QCG meetings are a continuation of the so called ‘Heart of Asia-Istanbul
Process (HOA-IP)’[2]
which started in Turkey in 2011 and aimed at promoting regional security and
cooperation for security and stability in Afghanistan (Istanbul Declaration). Inspired by the ‘spirit of Istanbul’, the group of
the QCG countries are stressing that the process of initiating negotiation with
the Taliban should lead to a political settlement and an end to
violence, or at least a significant reduction
of violence, in Afghanistan.
However, it is important to note, that besides the
much discussed and criticised opening of the Taliban office in Doha, the efforts to facilitate direct peace talks between
the Afghan government and Afghan Taliban did not produce any fruitful outcome. Even more important, is that they failed for the
same reasons that existed till today. This therefore, raises some old as well
as new questions: first, in general terms, what is different this time and
might make the QCG initiative successful? And more specifically, how far can
these four countries influence anything in Afghanistan?
The
Actors-Change Conundrum – Why now?
Basically one can state that in order to change
anything in the decades-long war-torn Afghanistan, one need actors who possess-
the political will to improve the situation (even if it means that one must
depart from its own partisan interests), the necessary financial and military
resources, sufficient leverage among the Taliban and other militant groups,
acceptance of and credibility among the Afghan people, and most importantly,
Afghans who still believe in a peaceful future. Having these factors in mind
and to prerecord, one can’t help anticipating but also the QCG meetings result
in ‘talks about talks’. It is argued here, that the conditions responsible
for the ongoing difficulties with arranging any peace negotiations between the
Afghan government and the Afghan Taliban have not only remained the same, rather
have also turned worse. In this regard, there are several indicators that need
to be outlined and it necessitates some light on the political will and their
capacities to bring out change in the actors involved.
Pakistan &
China: Lack of credibility and policy of ambiguity
As long as Pakistan continues its support and
sponsorship for certain radicalized
Islamist organizations, which are either directly or indirectly, promoting
militant, terrorist activities against the Afghan state and society as well as
civilians and troops of the international community, there will be no peace and
stability. In this context, Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership should
reassess their relationship with Jihadist organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and its front (or better cover) organization
Jamaat ud-Dawah (JUD), the al-Akhtar Trust (a front
organization for terror group Jaish-e-Mohammed) and al-Rashid Trust (a Pakistani
Deobandi terrorist group active in India & Afghanistan)[3].
There is no doubt about the fact that there will be no peace without the
collaboration of Pakistan. However, Islamabad remains as an actor which lacks credibility
when it comes to terms with peace and stability in Afghanistan. Furthermore,
even if Pakistan continues support for Jihadist organization, its relationship
with the Taliban was always and is still complex as well as complicated. In
other words, it is not clear how much influence Pakistan has over the Taliban.
In this context, the sudden appearance and active role
of China at the negotiating table was rather a matter of time rather than a real
surprise. Nevertheless, acting for last one and a half decade as an ‘economic free rider’ with minimal involvement in the Afghan internal
political developments, one must wonder about the motives of Beijing’s new
diplomatic engagement. Taking the ongoing major development projects into
account, especially Beijing’s ‘one road, one belt (OROB)’, it seems that there is a new quality of China’s
interest in Afghanistan, which goes beyond the rational of exploitation of
natural resources. The OROB initiative aims at in linking China with Asia and Europe as well as to
improve connectivity with the Middle East and Africa via numerous gigantic
infrastructure projects, like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The
initial rational of this whole development program was to boost Chinas’ slackening economy, especially in its western, landlocked province
Xinjiang. The project should help to bridge the imbalance in development
between the prosperous eastern and underdeveloped western part of China. Against this backdrop it is apparent that China’s
leadership is keen on peace in Afghanistan in order to ensure stability in
Central Asia which is a sine qua non condition for its grand vision of regional
development and cooperation. Furthermore, besides this economic reasoning there
is also a concrete political interest behind fostering peace negotiation.
China’s western province is not only troubled by economic underdevelopment but
also hit by a religious motivated separatist movement of local Muslim Uyghurs. Radicalized elements
among the Uyghur militants maintain close links with the Taliban and other terrorist
groups in neighboring Afghanistan and Pakistan. Over the years both countries have served as a
platform for activities to destabilize China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous
Region. The fact that international terror groups like Islamic State (IS) and
al-Qaeda is calling for ‘Global Jihad’ against China for being anti-Muslim
reflects the tremendous security challenge for Beijing’s decision-makers.
Having said so, it becomes less difficult to understand
China’s point of view with respect to its actions regarding the current Afghan
peace talks in order to contain violence. However, China’s diplomacy speaks its
own language which might rather complicate the efforts for reconciliation. It
seems that China’s strategy regarding Afghanistan is torn between the perceived
necessity to please its ‘all-weather-friend’ Pakistan and its own interests to ensure stability
in Afghanistan. For example, it is astonishing that Beijing still continues to
block UN sanctions (based on Resolution 1267) against Pakistan based on terrorists and Jihadist
organizations (for example LeT/JUD, al-Akhtar Trust, al-Rashid Trust). It is
important to note that these militant elements don’t just have the operational
base in Pakistan but also in Afghanistan. Therefore, China’s (as well as
Pakistan’s) position during the negation process might face critics of
ambiguity, especially through the lens of the Afghan government.
The US and
Afghan government do not operate from a position of strength
The US as the initial prime negotiator has nothing really to offer to the
Taliban to make them stop their ongoing
violent attacks and bring them to the negotiation table. The fact that US is perceived
to have lost the battle in Afghanistan in last 15 years, has reduced their
significance and thus, has given more room to Pakistan and Chinese delegations
to manoeuvre. The Afghan government, which is evidently the weakest actor in
the whole process, mostly had a ‘rubber-stamp-function,’ that is, to provide
official Afghan legitimacy for potential upcoming negotiations and arrangements
on the country’s future trajectory. In contrast, Taliban enjoyed a tremendous rise of power and gained control over the territory. Today, most of
the rural areas are under the rule of the Taliban or other militant groups.
Even in the north, which was a traditional stronghold of anti-Taliban forces,
have come under Taliban’s control. The battle of Kunduz, one of the larger urban areas of the country and the
temporary taking over of the city by the Taliban can be seen as examples which
reflect the failure of the Afghan army from keeping the militant oppositional
forces at bay. In this context, it is important to note that in the last
decade, Taliban has grown stronger not only militarily but also economically . Given Taliban’s awareness of its own strength
compounded with the weakness of the Afghan government, the loss of political
will among the international community to be military involved in Afghanistan,
and the reduction of the US engagement in the region- makes the Taliban a
difficult negotiation partner, if they join the talks at all.
Taliban and
Peace: An unequal equation?
In order to assess a potential role of the Taliban in
the next round of the peace negotiation process, it is interesting to have a
look at the internal dynamics of the Taliban movement since last year. For the
2015 negotiation attempt, which was pushed by Pakistan (Murree process) and supported by China, broke down in July 2015
after it became known to the Taliban leader Mullah Omar. After Omar’s death, Mullah Akhtar Mansoor was
appointed to be the new leader of the Taliban. Being generally portrayed as a
pragmatic and protagonist of negotiations for a political settlement to end the
ongoing armed insurgency of the Taliban and affiliated groups to topple the
western-backed government in Kabul, created a new hope for a peace process. But
quite from the start as new leader, Mansoor had to face an identity crises of the Afghan Taliban over the dilemma of continue fighting
or entering peace negotiating. Subsequently, he had to deal with severe
factionalism within the movement, and much critic, especially, from the
ideological hardliners and many of the battle-field commanders who rather
prefer to fight than to talk. In this process, the advent of IS in Afghanistan
was an additional challenge.
However, after months of infightings, today it seems that
the most crucial transitions in leadership and organisational structures as
well as power shifts within the Taliban movement made substantial progress, and
that Afghanistan's Taliban are closing ranks around their new
leader. This phenomenon might help
to serve the goal of bringing Taliban factions into the negotiation process. But
even if the Taliban joins the next round of talks, they will have their own
agenda in the negotiation process, which will not necessarily match the
prospects for Afghanistan as envisaged by the government in Kabul and by the
Afghan people.
Final thoughts –
How sustainable would be political solution?
Even if the Taliban is following the calls and the ongoing
‘peace talks’ lead to a political settlement, it will still remain as an
expression of hopeless ‘expedient optimism’. There are several reasons to say
so as:
First, two of the main facilitators -Pakistan and
China- should know that the Taliban never stick to their promises. For example,
until today, the Pakistan Taliban have broken each agreement with the country’s
military. Likewise, despite giving Beijing guarantees that Afghan territory
(during the Taliban regime from 1996-2001) will not be used for anti-Chinese
activities, Taliban turned a blind eye towards their Uighur affiliates by carrying out
terrorists activities in order to destabilize China’s western
Xinjiang province. The fact on
the ground proves that, until now neither China’s nor Pakistan’s influence have
helped to reduce the level of violence in the country. Furthermore, neither the
Afghan government nor the US will address the Taliban condition for peace, that
is, the total withdrawal of foreign troops. This will remain as a permanent
trigger for armed conflicts. Furthermore, one should always keep in mind that Mullah Akhtar Mansoor has also a history of being a hardliner and a
ruthless, stone-hard ‘political strategist’. When he is convinced that a more
radical stand would serve to manifest his position within the movement’s inner-
and outer relations, it can be expected of him to switch again to a more
hard-line stand. Latter one could result in an end of any peace negotiation.
Second, even if the most significant sections within
the Taliban movement (meaning those providing and controlling most of the
fighters) are willing to negotiate a political solution to end the war, there
is the severe threat that fighters attracted by the Islamic State (IS) -which
is persistently expanding its influence in Afghanistan- will continue their fights to undermine any sustainable peace in the country. In this context, one should not
forget that most of the middle and lower ranks of the Taliban are just
mercenaries and/or part-time fighters. They are fighting for money rather than for any religious creed, and are
increasingly attracted by the success and large financial resources of IS. Any
ceasefire in Afghanistan or changing towards another battle field of global
jihad (like Syria) is not in their interests.
Third, and most important crux of the matter is (even
if Afghan government and Taliban would meet the demands and conditions) that Taliban interpret the ‘talks’ as a broadening of the armed struggle rather than a
‘peace negotiation’. The talks are seen as an extension of their militant
activities into the
political arena. In other words, through the current round of peace talks
Taliban will get an additional opportunity to undermine Afghanistan’s democracy from within and to push their Islamic fundamentalist
agenda in the political-administrative structure. The tremendous rise of highly
radicalized Islamist clerics in state and society in the last few years have prepared
the ground for the Taliban to regain political leverage.[4]
Furthermore, looking at the development of previous talk initiatives as well as subsequent agreements and their
‘implementation’ it is legitimate to question the credibility of Taliban commitments especially, regarding the hold
of a future ceasefire agreement.
Last but not the least, since the IS and other
terrorist groups are not interested in a political solution, any potential results
of a sustainable peace process by Afghan government and Taliban remains an
illusion. Thereby, fighting will remain rather as a norm than an exception.
About The Author:
Dr. Siegfried O.
Wolf, is Senior Researcher (member) at the
South Asia Institute (SAI), Heidelberg University, and Director of Research at
SADF (Coordinator : Democracy Research Program). He was educated at the SAI and
Institute of Political Science (IPW) in Heidelberg. Additionally he is a
visiting fellow at the National University of Science and Technology (NUST,
Islamabad), affiliated researcher at the Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU,
Durham University), and a former research fellow at IPW and Centre de Sciences
Humaines (New Delhi, India).
He is the co-author of 'A Political
and Economic Dictionary of South Asia' (Routledge; London 2006), co-editor of
'Politics in South Asia. Culture, Rationality and Conceptual Flow' (Springer:
Heidelberg, 2015), 'The Merits of Regionalisation. The Case of South Asia'
(Springer: Heidelberg, 2014) and 'State and Foreign Policy in South Asia'
(Sanskriti: 2010), and Deputy Editor of the 'Heidelberg Papers in South Asian
and Comparative Politics' (HPSACP). Furthermore, he has worked as a consultant
for the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ),
Germany, and is member of the external group of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Task
Force, Federal Foreign Office, Germany.
Cite This Article:
Wolf, Siegfried
O."FEATURED | The Latest Attempt for a Roadmap for Peace in Afghanistan- A Lost Cause? " IndraStra Global 02,
no. 02 (2016): 0029.
http://www.indrastra.com/2016/02/FEATURED-Latest-Attempt-for-Roadmap-for-Afghan-Peace-002-02-2016-0029.html
| ISSN 2381-3652
EndNotes:
[1] At both meetings, the
delegations were led by Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister Hekmat Khalil Karzai,
Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry, the US Ambassador to
Afghanistan Michael McKinley and China’s Special Envoy for Afghanistan
Ambassador Deng Xijun.
[2] The first ‘Heart of
Asia’-Conference
[3] Regarding UN
reports, Al Akhtar Trust maintains regional offices in the Pakistani
cites of Bahawalpur, Bawalnagar, Gilgit, Islamabad, Mirpur Khas, and
Tando-Jan-Mahammad, as well as in Spin Boldak in Afghanistan. Al Rashid Trust
is primarily focusing on Afghanistan and conducts activities in Herat
Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar, and Mazar Sharif.
[4] Dr. Massouda Jalal, former Minister of Women's Affairs (2004-2006) and only
woman candidate in the 2004 Afghan presidential election in an interview
with the author, 25.4.2015.
