By Robert Potter
In signaling its intent in the South and East
China Seas, China faces a challenge of how to calibrate its response. Sending
the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) into direct confrontation with rivals
would be interpreted
as bellicose.
The use of civilian ships would not send a strong enough
signal of sovereignty. Sitting between these two is the Chinese Coast Guard
which when deployed to a space reinforces sovereign claims while also appearing
less belligerent than the use of PLAN ships. The development and use of this
force has been fundamental to China’s success in keeping tensions at a minimum
while asserting claims to territory.
In March of 2013, China passed legislation that
transformed four maritime law enforcement agencies into a Coast Guard. This new
organization has been expanded
substantially since then. At this point there are more than 100
ships serving in the Chinese Coast Guard, making it the largest
coast guard in the world and this number shows little sign of slowing down.
These ships are the perfect weapon for China to use as a tool of coercive
diplomacy in its maritime disputes.
A typical mission for the Coast Guard involves the
protection of what China’s sees as its maritime rights and claims. This
involves interdicting
fishing ships from other states, protecting its
own fishing ships, disrupting
surveys and even
blockading the operations of other states looking to defend their own
claims. The main aim of these deployments seems to be to normalize China’s
presence in disputed territory while also making it more difficult for other
states to operate.
The SOA is perfectly equipped to complete these
missions. The use of PLAN assets would look very much like an invasion.
Carriers might be referred to as ‘acres of sovereign and mobile territory’ but
the use of such ships will be interpreted as traditional gunboat diplomacy whereby
a larger power imposes its will on a smaller state. The use of Coast Guard
ships implies sovereignty and defense. It is clearly China’s desire for these
forces to appear as a traditional coast guard, to the point where they have
painted their cutters in the same red, white and blue style as their U.S.
equivalents. This represents is a direct attempt to leverage a specific image.
The missions carried out by China’s Coast Guard might
not seem congruent to that of the United States but the use of these ships is
Beijing’s method of saying that it wants these ships to be perceived within
that context. These efforts are designed to manage tensions while still
leveraging China’s capability to impose costs on rivals. The navy that sinks a
Chinese Coast Guard ship will most likely be perceived differently to the one
that sinks a PLAN vessel. This provides a direct disincentive to escalate
tensions in reply to the deployment of these vessels while also softening the
image of China’s efforts to push their claims.
The trend in these missions is escalating, both in
terms of scope and number of operations. In the early 2000s it
was rare for Chinese coastal forces to be deployed into blue water
environments. Presently, Chinas ships are constantly deployed and their numbers
are increasing. China has also supported these efforts by building
bases to support their forward deployment. As a result, China will probably
continue to work within this strategy.
These forces represent the perfect platform for Beijing
to use in order to push its co-called ‘salami’
strategy. The deployment of a coast guard ship is not, on
its own, a grave enough threat to be cause for war. Over time these efforts
repeated add up to substantial
strategic change. Complimenting these efforts is the slow pace but
increasing pace of China in pushing out its actual level of control in the
South and East China Seas.
Taken together the Coast Guard units represent the
core of China’s efforts to assert its claims in disputed territory. The use of
naval or civilian ships within these spaces would not facilitate the outcome
that Beijing is looking for. As a result, China has built a force that can be deployed
in pursuit of a specific goal. It has shown a desire to represent its
capability in line with existing norms relating to coastal forces in order to
emphasize its claims without the appearance of outright naval coercion. As a
result, the Coast Guard forces have become China’s most successful weapon in
its maritime disputes.
About The
Author:
Robert Potter is currently a PhD Candidate at the
University of Queensland. Prior to this he was Research Assistant Volunteer at
the John F Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Prior to this he
was a Visiting Scholar at Columbia University – Saltzman Institute of War and
Peace Studies, School of International and Public Affairs. Thomson Reuters Researcher ID: L-5421-2015 / Twitter
Handle: @rpotter_9
Cite This Article:
Potter, Robert "China’s Best Weapon in Maritime Disputes, its Coast Guard" IndraStra Global 002, 02, (2016) 0020, http://www.indrastra.com/2016/02/FEATURED-Chinas-Best-Weapon-in-Maritime-Disputes-Coast-Guard-002-02-2016-0020.html,
ISSN 2381-3652 | https://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.2074321
