Rising tensions in Iran's relations with Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of the execution of top Shia cleric, Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, by the Saudi government, have raised a question about possible impact of this issue on Iran's relations with Turkey.
By Hossein Mofidi
Ahmadi
Rising tensions
in Iran's relations with Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of the execution of top Shia cleric, Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, by the Saudi government, have raised a
question about possible impact of this issue on Iran's relations with Turkey.
Of course, this question is part of a more important one: can Turkey and Saudi
Arabia be considered as strategic allies within regional coalitions following
the Arab Spring? It seems that important geopolitical and geo-economic
considerations along with Iran's more prominent regional role following the
nuclear deal will serve as important factors to preserve an acceptable level of
political and economic relations between Iran and Turkey. By the way, due to
identity-based, as well as political and security reasons, it seems very
unlikely that Saudi Arabia and Turkey would be able to form a strategic
alliance in order to manage post-Arab Spring developments.
There is no
doubt that following the so-called Arab Spring developments, different
interpretations of these developments by Iran and Turkey and, as a result,
formation of divergent coalitions and rivalries, which are aimed at infiltration
and building regional institutions by these two important regional actors, have
caused a certain level of tension and suspicion to overshadow relations between
Tehran and Ankara. This tension and suspicion will apparently continue as long
as the current atmosphere of uncertainty exists in the region. The point,
however, is that there are many geopolitical and geo-economic factors that have
guaranteed and will continue to guarantee maintenance of an acceptable level of
political and economic relations between Iran and Turkey. In fact, relations
between Iran and Turkey must be considered as a successful example in which
ideological and identity-based differences have not been able to have a
remarkable impact on political and economic relations between two countries.
Among these geopolitical and geo-economic factors and reasons one can point out
vast economic exchanges between the two countries, especially in the field of
energy (a factor whose role will probably become more prominent in view of recent
tensions in relations between Russia and Turkey), the two countries’ general
strategy for maintaining regional nation-states, and their common concerns
about activities of secessionist Kurds.
Another
important point with regard to this issue is the dynamism related to Iran's
agreement with the P5+1 group of countries over Tehran’s nuclear program.
Turkey has not ignored the possibility of Iran turning into the most important,
or at least one of the most important, strategic partners of the West in medium
and long terms. Such a development, which from the viewpoint of Turkish
officials will be accompanied with more prominence of a more pragmatic model of
governance in Iran, will most probably boost the Islamic Republic's role in the
management of regional crises.
Of course,
possible developments in Iran's relations with Turkey must be also considered
within a wider context, which is strategic or tactical nature of interactions
between Turkey and Saudi Arabia. There is no doubt that following the so-called
Arab Spring developments, the crises in Syria and Yemen, and recent incidents,
which led to the severance of political ties between Tehran and Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia is now trying to bolster regional coalitions pivoted around Riyadh.
However, there are serious doubts about a strategic coalition taking shape
between Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Such doubts, of course, are based on
identity-related, political and security factors.
The
identity-related aspect of this issue stems from the problem that the Wahhabi
reading of Islam is by no means in line with the dominant reading of Islam in
Turkey and is not also backed by Islamist groups in that country. Meanwhile,
Saudi Arabia’s evident animosity toward the Muslim Brotherhood and its
religious discourse against this group are among major reasons that intensify
innate suspicions on the part of Turkish Islamist groups toward Saudi Arabia.
An evidence to the point in this regard is that in a rare instance in Turkey,
Islamist analysts concurrent with secular analysts have issued warnings through
the country’s media and academic circles about a foreign policy decision by
Turkey to join the so-called anti-terror coalition led by Saudi Arabia. This
issue is important in that Islamist groups and currents in Turkey must be considered
among the most influential political, social and economic currents in the
political sphere of Turkey and also within the country’s government.
The political
aspect of the above issue is that Turkey, along with Saudi Arabia and Iran, is
one of those countries that have a claim to offering a model of governance
subsequent to the Arab Spring developments, which of course, is far from the
model of governance purported by Saudi Arabia. Turkish officials believe that
Ankara's model is a combination of freedom seeking and the quest for Islamic
identity, which will relieve citizens in regional countries from the purgatory
of having to choose between the currently dominant authoritarian models, or
Islamist groups that are theocratic both potentially and in practice. A case in
point, which shows the difference between these models of governance, was
evident in remarks made by the Turkish government spokesperson following Saudi
Arabia's recent execution of Sheikh Nimr. In fact, by saying that Ankara is
against all kinds of capital punishment, especially those handed down on
political grounds, the spokesperson of the Turkish government highlighted this
difference. From another angle, Ankara's willingness to play a mediatory role
between Iran and Saudi Arabia only gains prominence within the framework of
this model, which is eyed by the Turkish officials, not through strategic
coalition with a country, which is essentially different from Turkey in terms
of both identity and model of governance. It must be noted that Turkish
officials have recently announced that they can play a positive role through
diplomatic channels to reduce the existing tensions between Iran and Saudi
Arabia.
The security
aspect of the above issue must be sought in the big population of Alawite and Shia
Muslims that live in Turkey. This means that, possible strategic partnership in
sectarian coalitions will have negative security effects on Turkey by widening
religious and ethnic gaps within the country. By the way, revival of
sectarianism in the Middle East will have a negative impact on trade-oriented
and export-based economy of Turkey; an economy which has suffered great damage
in recent years due to proximity of this country to restive regions in the
Middle East.
It seems that
indirect and tactical alignment of Turkey with the Saudi-led anti-terror
coalition and such plans as establishment of a “strategic cooperation council”
between Turkey and Saudi Arabia are mostly aimed at taking advantage of
financial and economic capacities of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf littoral
countries in order to improve the current unfavorable economic conditions of
Turkey – which is now facing a new challenge as a result of sanctions imposed
by Moscow on Ankara – and to get Saudi Arabia closer to Turkey’s policies and
plans for the period of political transition in Syria. By the way, Turkey may
be also trying to maintain a high level of political and economic relations
with Iran, which is due to more prominence of Iran's role in the region
following the conclusion of the nuclear deal. Of course, developments that
followed the Arab Spring and the rivalry between the two countries for building
their desirable institutions in the region will continue to overshadow these
relations.
About The Author:
Hossein Mofidi Ahmadi, Ph.D. in International Relations &
Visiting Researcher at the Institute for Middle East Strategic Studies
Key Words: Iran,
Turkey, Relations, Regional Position, Saudi-Turkish Strategic Coalition, Arab
Spring, Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Factors, P5+1, Agreement, Muslim
Brotherhood, Middle East, Mofidi Ahmadi
The article was originally
published at IranReview.org.
All rights
reserved by the original publisher
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*Turkey Aims to
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