North Korean nuclear motivations are divided into three categories: shields, swords and badge.
By Hiroshi Nakatani
It is generally
believed that there are three or five common motivations that drive nuclear
proliferation.[4] Notwithstanding the fact that “security” is considered as
a main nuclear motivation, it shall not be examined; instead, this essay shall
focus on the “domestic politics” motivation since North Korea has a peculiar
political system. Without mention, domestic policy-making is a highly
sophisticated process while an important policy like a nuclear program is the
final product of institutional and specific fractions disputes.[5] As Colin Gray notes, after all every single policy is
ultimately determined within states.[6] Specifically, North Korean nuclear motivations are
divided into three categories: shields, swords and badges.[7] More importantly, the causes of nuclear
proliferation differ from nation to nation.[8] That means that some motivations are important for some
states but they are less important for other states.
Image Attribute: Kim Jong Un is developing his own legacy / Source: KCTV Screengrab
North Korea is
known as a totalitarian nation with extremely strong leadership – even stronger
than that of Stalin and Mao.[9] Moreover, the military is the most influential
organization in North Korea and it even controls the domestic economy.[10] Although it not easy to say, due to the lack of reliable
information, it seems that military activities and their relation with the
economy are very deep and strong.[11] It is said that Kim Jong Il gained power particularly
from the military.[12] However, it is wrong to suppose that this formidable
regime was not restrained by domestic political and bureaucratic actors.[13] For instance, the centralized regime is still required
to control the military interests; otherwise it is difficult for the regime to
stabilize the nation. For example, when Kim Jong Il was inaugurated as the head
of the North, he first controlled the military.[14] Furthermore, its political course echoes the
institutional interests.[15] Therefore, although it seems that the leadership can
control everything, its decisions are still strongly influenced by other actors
mostly from the military interests.
With regards to
the political motivations of the North Korean nuclear program, it is said that
the North seeks to pursue nuclear weapons in order to maintain its
“military-first” politics (Songun) otherwise it cannot stabilize the
country.[16] Benjamin Habib maintains that “nuclear weapons
development also serves the narrow bureaucratic interest of institutions within
the North.”[17] Nuclear weapons are vital to the regime survival as they
can demonstrate its strong posture in the state.[18] Additionally the nuclear capability enhances its
symbolic figure in the politics.[19] North Korea’s own survival (internationally and
domestically) is particularly important to the regime given its unique
political system, Juche (founded by Kim Il Sung for the
protection of the national sovereignty), or self-reliance. In fact this Juche system
was successful until the 1960’s partly because of the industry infrastructure
Japan left behind during its annexation of Korea (1910-1945).[20] Yet, this system has virtually collapsed due to the
economic crisis and the great famine of the 1990s which created the need for
international help.[21] However, the Kim regime fears that international help
would undermine the regime due to an inflow of new culture from overseas.[22] North Korea understands that it needs to open the society
in order for economic recovery to come about. Nevertheless, it will probably
not do so, and thus nuclear weapons appear to be an absolute means to control
the nation. In this respect, nuclear weapons have become the badge of the
military regime to justify its existence.[23]
It is important
to note that Kim Jong Il’s greatest concern was his power.[24] As long as Kim was in power, he tended to pursue nuclear
weapons that were used as a means to secure the status quo. According to John
Park and Dong Lee, nuclear weapons enabled Kim Jong Il to sustain the regime
since they brought him power and norm.[25] Kim’s Songun or “military-first” system
strengthened its regime position,[26] and became his norm.[27] Although both Songun and Juche (self-reliance)
systems are not successful, they, in fact, enable the regime to justify the
nuclear weapons program.[28] For instance, the nuclear weapons program in Songun politics
can allow the regime to spread an ideology, show a strong symbol, and meet
bureaucratic interests such as the access to more resources.[29] Benjamine Habib clarifies further these three points:
“Firstly,
it provides the ideological pretext to divert the nation’s resources to the
military. Secondly, the nuclear programme is the defining symbol of North
Korea’s unique anti-American nationalism. Thirdly, nuclear weapons development
also serves the narrow bureaucratic interests of institutions within the DPRK
state.”[30]
Furthermore, Kim
Jong Il domestically could claim that the North Korean people were protected by
its nuclear arsenals, which was merely in his interest.[31] Ultimately, nuclear weapons can legitimize and stabilize
the regime, and the bureaucratic actors.[32] In this light, it becomes obvious that the nuclear
weapons program under the names of North Korea’s political system, Juche and Songun,
does not only serve as a security guarantee but also as a means to stabilize
the nation domestically. Despite the great technological barriers such as the
mineralization of warheads for mounting the missiles, North Korea’s nuclear
weapons program is more feasible than generally perceived.[33] Most importantly, however, as long as the
“military-first” regime gains profits from the program, it is unlikely that
North Korea will relinquish its nuclear weapons. Moreover, the regime highly
relies on the weapons program to ensure its own survival. Then, it is safe to
say, even after the change of the leader, that the North Korean nuclear weapons
are here to stay. Most likely, the current leader, Kim Jong Un, is following his
grandfather’s and father’s logic and manner, so as to establish and secure his
own power. Nevertheless, we also need to examine international factors that
greatly affect the nuclear decision; otherwise, this paradigm does not account
for its security posture and diplomacy, or known as nuclear
brinkmanship.
About The Author:
Hiroshi Nakatani is from
Tokyo, Japan. He studied Political Science in Japan and obtained an MA degree
in International Relations from the University of Birmingham, UK. His research interests lie, among
other things, in nuclear proliferation in the 21stcentury; the
history of the Japanese nuclear weapons program; nuclear deterrence in the
second nuclear age; and the nature of war and the Clausewitzian ideas of war.
Publication Details:
This article was originally published under the title "The Impact of Domestic Politics on North
Korea’s Nuclear Decisions" at The GW Post with a Creative Commons License. Follow the link for more details.
References:
[1] This essay is partly based on the MA dissertation of the
author: Why are nations still attempting to obtain nuclear weapons?,
University of Birmingham, 2011.
[2] Justin McCurry, “North Korea holds funeral for Kim
Jong-il.” The Gurdian, 28 December 2011. Accessed 29 December 2011.
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/28/kim-jong-il-funeral-north-korea>
[3] Shigemitsu Toshiaki, “Kitachousen no Shinzitsu (The facts
of North Korea)” Tokyo: Nihon Bungei Sya, 2012.
[4] Scott Sagan’s three nuclear paradigms are most prominent:
Security, Domestic Politics and Prestige. See Sagan, D, Sagan, “Why Do States
Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb.” International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter., 1996-1997, pp.54-86; Joseph Cirincione
raises another two causes: Technology and Economy. The following is a completed
list:
Proliferation
Drivers
Security
States acquire
nuclear weapons to protect their own sovereignty.
Prestige
States acquire
nuclear weapons to fulfil perception of national destiny or to be viewed as a
“great power” in international affairs.
Domestic
Politics
States acquire
nuclear weapons when a set of well-placed bureaucratic actors convince
political leaders of the need for them.
Technology
States acquire
nuclear weapons because they have the technological ability to do so.
Economics
Economics
generally do not drive a state to pursue nuclear weapons, though advocates of
nuclear weapons do argue that a nuclear defence is cheaper than a conventional
defence.
See Joseph
Cirncione. Bomb Scare: The History & Future Of Nuclear Weapons.2007,
P. 49
[5] Ibid. 63-64.
[6] Colin, S. Gray. The Second Nuclear Age. London:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.1999.
[7] Victor, Cha. “Badges, Shields or Swords?: North Korea’s
WMD Threat.” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 117, No. 2,
Summer, 2002, pp. 209-230.
[8] Andy, Butfoy. “Nuclear Strategy.” In Snyder, C. A. (ed.) Contemporary
Security and Strategy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2008, pp. 136-152
[9] David, Reese. The Prospects for North Korea’s
Survival.Oxford: Oxford University Press.1998.
[10] Benjamin, Habib. “North Korea’s nuclear weapons
programme and the maintenance to the Songun System.” The Pacific Review,
Vol. 24, No. 1, 2011, pp. 43-63. Etel, Solingen. Nuclear Logics:
Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.2007, pp.118-140.
[11] Benjamin, Habib. “North Korea’s nuclear weapons
programme and the maintenance to the Songun System.” The Pacific Review,
Vol. 24, No. 1, 2011, pp. 43-63.
[12] David, Reese. The Prospects for North Korea’s
Survival. Etel, Solingen. Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East
Asia and the Middle East.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Benjamin, Habib. “North Korea’s nuclear weapons
programme and the maintenance to the Songun System.” David, Reese. The
Prospects for North Korea’s Survival.
[15] Benjamin, Habib. “North Korea’s nuclear weapons
programme and the maintenance to the Songun System.”
[16] Watanabe, T. Shin datsua ron (New
de-Asianization). Tokyo: Bungei Shusyu.2008. Emphasis added.
[17] Benjamin, Habib. “North Korea’s nuclear weapons
programme and the maintenance to the Songun System.” pp.56
[18] Etel, Solingen. Nuclear Logics: Contrasting
Paths in East Asia and the Middle East.
[19] Jonathan, D. Pollack, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons
Program to 2015: Three Scenarios.”
[20] Etel, Solingen. Nuclear Logics: Contrasting
Paths in East Asia and the Middle East.
[21] Benjamin, Habib. “North Korea’s nuclear weapons
programme and the maintenance to the Songun System.”
[22] David, Reese. The Prospects for North Korea’s
Survival. Willian, J, Perry. “Proliferation on the Peninsula: Five North
Korean Nuclear Crises.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, Vol. 607, Sep., 2006, pp. 78-86.
[23] Benjamin, Habib. “North Korea’s nuclear weapons
programme and the maintenance to the Songun System.”
[24] David, Reese. The Prospects for North Korea’s
Survival. Willian, J, Perry
[25] John, S, Park. and Dong, Sun, Lee. “North Korea:
Existential Deterrence and Diplomatic Leverage.” In Muthiah, Alagappa. The
Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia. California:
Stanford University Press. 2008. pp. 269-295
[26] Benjamin, Habib. “North Korea’s nuclear weapons
programme and the maintenance to the Songun System.”
[27] Ibid; Etel, Solingen. Nuclear Logics:
Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.2007, pp.118-140.
[28] John, S, Park. and Dong, Sun, Lee. “North Korea:
Existential Deterrence and Diplomatic Leverage.”
[29] Benjamin, Habib. “North Korea’s nuclear weapons
programme and the maintenance to the Songun System.”
[30] Ibid.49
[31] Jasper, Becker. Rogue Regime: Kim Jong IL and
the looming threat of North Korea. New York: Oxford University
Press.2005.
[32] Benjamin, Habib. “North Korea’s nuclear weapons
programme and the maintenance to the Songun System.”
[33] Justin McCurry, “North Korea holds funeral for Kim
Jong-il.”
