Throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century, the world witnessed the rise of the Islamic movement Hamas in Palestinian politics. Embedded within the movement’s Charter is the urgent necessity to engage in armed jihad against Israeli occupation.
By William Sewell Fernández
Throughout the first decade of
the twenty-first century, the world witnessed the rise of the Islamic movement
Hamas in Palestinian politics. Embedded within the movement’s Charter is the
urgent necessity to engage in armed jihad against Israeli occupation. To
understand Hamas’ concept of armed struggle, it is essential to understand the
Quranic concepts of jihad and qital. As an Islamist movement, Hamas favors
basing their political postures in accordance with particular theological
foundations. The concepts of jihad and qital, along with that of fitna, are
inseparable and essential to understanding Hamas’ theological foundation for
armed struggle against Israeli occupation. This article is divided in three
sections.
Image Attribute: A Member of Palestinian Islamic Jihad at “The Gathering”
Source: Jerusalem Post
The first section defines and describes the Quranic concepts of
jihad, qital, and fitna.
The second section provides a description of
circumstances endured by Palestinians under Israeli occupation. The purpose of
this section is to familiarize the reader with the political, social, and
economic conditions that the occupation has imposed on the Palestinian
population in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.
The third
section analyzes Hamas as an organization engaged in jihad. Here, I will
interpret Hamas’ notion of jihad as described in its Charter and demonstrated
through its actions. This section is divided into two parts:
- the first analyzes Hamas’ conception and practice of jihad of the sword, as noted in its armed struggle against Israel;
- the second part concludes the section by examining Hamas’ conception and engagement in jihad of the hand, made evident by its active participation in Islamic welfare programs.
Upon discussing all of these
concepts and events, the reader is invited to reflect once more on jihad and
the legitimacy of Hamas’ invocation of it, be it in a strictly theological or
practical sense. Notwithstanding, this essay is strictly expository and should
in no way be understood as a call for the use of force.
Jihad, Qital, and Fitna
Jihad is not always related to
bloodshed, violence, and conflict. Jihad’s, or jahada’s (verbal form), lexical
meaning is to strive, to exert great effort, struggle, in Allah’s[1] cause.
There are four types of jihad:
(1) Jihad of the heart, which consists of
purifying the self against desires and overcoming the devil’s influence;
(2) Jihad of the hand, which consists of performing good deeds;
(3) Jihad of the
tongue, which consists of performing persuasive missionary activity; and
finally,
(4) Jihad of the sword, which consists of the just use of violence.
This essay focuses on the two latter forms.
Jihad is considered the duty of
every Muslim and is explicitly ordered in numerous verses of the Quran;[2]
among these, verse 5:35 states: “O you who believe! Do your duty to Allah and
fear Him. And seek means of approach to Him, and strive hard in His Cause (as
much as you can), so that you may be successful.”[3] Numerous verses express
Allah’s preference for those who practice jihad. For example, verse 2:218 reads
as follows: “those who . . . strive in the cause of God have deserved God’s
mercy,”[4] clearly implying that Allah will have mercy upon those that practice
jihad.[5]
As previously mentioned, jihad of
the sword, despite receiving the most publicity, constitutes only one of the
four types of jihad. To understand this kind of jihad one must understand
qital, or qatala (verbal form), as these are inevitably linked. Qital can be
defined as an attempt to kill or fight. Islam’s general idea of taking life is
very harsh; it claims that killing one person is equal to killing all of
humanity.[6] Despite this general restrictive approach, Islamic postulates
present justifiable reasons for the taking of life. These justifiable reasons
are fitna -worse than killing.[7] Fitna is defined as persecution, oppression,
and murder.[8] The Quran accepts fighting in self-defense but, nonetheless,
discourages aggression: “[F]ight in the way of Allah against those who fight
against you but be not aggressive.”[9] Overall, fighting to prevent or defend
against fitna is justified since oppression, slaughter, and murder are
considered worse than the particular act of killing. Thus, jihad of the sword
is exercised through qital to prevent or defend against fitna. Moreover, this
constitutes the only justifiable reason for taking the life of another human
being. Hence, under this interpretation, if the conditions faced by the
Palestinian population are considered fitna, they could be understood to
justify Hamas’ engagement in jihad of the sword.
The Palestinian Condition
A. Background[10]
Since 1948, Palestinians have
borne the brunt of the Zionist desire for a Jewish nation-state. Palestinians
have faced constant displacement: “750,000 Palestinians [were] driven from
their land and homes during the 1948 war, as well as 400,000-500,000 additional
Palestinians made refugees by the 1967 war.”[11] Once able to roam and settle
freely throughout the land that currently constitutes the Israeli state, most
Palestinians were forced to abandon their homes and move into the West Bank and
Gaza Strip territories. These territories are collectively known as the
Palestinian Occupied Territories (POT).
The Palestinian issue is a
familiar and much discussed subject, but some general facts are worth noting.
Palestinians have not exercised their right to self-determination; they do not
have a recognized state of their own and exercise no true sovereignty.[12]
Palestinians are subject to many limitations regarding legal rights, freedom of
movement, and economic matters, among others. For example, Palestinian customs
duties are managed by Israel, this being a major source of revenue for many
governments. Since the culmination of the Oslo Agreements and the establishment
of the Palestinian Authority (PA), the POT have witnessed periods of intermittent
Israeli offensives and military occupation. Hamas was victorious in the
parliamentary elections of January 2006, and in February 2007 established a
short-lived national unity government in coalition with the traditional
powerhouse in Palestinian politics, Fatah.[13] After failing to consolidate
their differences, especially regarding the recognition of Israel, Hamas and
Fatah engaged in violent clashes that resulted in Hamas gaining exclusive
control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, and the establishment of a Fatah-led
government in the West Bank. In late 2010, direct peace talks between the
Israelis and Palestinians collapsed. In
early 2011, Fatah and Hamas agreed to reunify the Gaza Strip and West Bank, but
the factions struggled to implement details on governance and security. In
November 2012, the UN General Assembly upgraded the Palestinian status at the
UN to that of an observer state.[14] Moreover, Palestine has acceded to various
international agreements, most notably, the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court in January 2015.[15] The latest U.S.-mediated peace plan, dubbed
the John Kerry Peace Plan, failed in 2014, placing Israeli-Palestinian peace
talks in a standstill. Notwithstanding, 135 states recognized the State of
Palestine, Sweden being the latest to recognize it on October 30, 2014.[16] In
2014, Hamas and Fatah agreed to form a “national reconciliation” government but
the deal has yet to be fully implemented; the status quo remains with Hamas in
firm control of the Gaza Strip and the PA governing the West Bank.[17]
B. East Jerusalem
First of all, the particular
significance of East Jerusalem for Palestinians must be noted – East Jerusalem
has been designated as the capital of the future Palestinian state. However, at
the moment, this is a far-flung aspiration. Palestinian communities in East
Jerusalem face what Israeli political activist, author, and founder of the
Alternative Information Center, Michel Warschawski, has described as an
“administered ethnic cleansing.”[18] Palestinians in East Jerusalem are faced
with the encroachment of Israeli settlements in both the urban and suburban
regions of East Jerusalem. For example, Palestinians constantly face
court-ordered forced evictions and demolitions in urban areas, such as the Palestinian
neighborhoods of Al Buslan and Sheik Jarrah. This is part of an Israeli
strategy to dismantle highly populated Palestinian parts of urban East
Jerusalem in order to establish their own settlements. Israeli settlers also
continue expansion into the suburban areas of East Jerusalem by building
separated communities within the PA-administered West Bank, such as the
ultra-Orthodox settlement of Ramat Shlomo. These communities are later annexed
into Israeli-controlled East Jerusalem.[19] According to Warschawski, this is
all part of Israel’s attempt to make Jerusalem an exclusively Jewish city, to
the detriment of Palestinian communities.[20] As a result of this policy,
Palestinian Jerusalemites face continuing displacement and restricted freedom
of movement. These policies are enforced to maintain Israeli and Palestinian
communities ethnically and physically separated. On top of this, the Israeli
Barrier Wall already cuts off many Palestinian communities, such as the Shu’fat
refugee camp, from access to basic services such as health and education.[21]
C. West Bank
Not surprisingly, the West Bank
and East Jerusalem face many of the same problems regarding Israeli settlement
expansion. For example, the 2010 approval by the Israeli government to build
112 apartments in the settlement of Beitar Illit stirred discontent among the
Palestinian and international communities.[22] United Nations Under-Secretary
General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator John Holmes
noted the severity of the Israeli demolition policy during his visit to Al
Jahalin Bedouin community in Area C of the West Bank, where a school built with
the assistance of the UN and NGOs was marked for demolition in order to make
space for Israeli settlements, impeding the Palestinian children’s access to
education.[23] Another controversial policy enacted by Israel is an order
issued by the Israeli Defense Forces that imposes criminal punishment on
Palestinian residents of the West Bank for not possessing Israeli-issued
permits. Anyone older than 16 years of age not possessing such document is
considered an infiltrator and subject to deportation or incarceration for up to
7 years. This policy affects more than 70,000 Palestinians. The individuals
affected by this policy range from expatriates to Palestinian internationals,
and even to Palestinians with Gaza-issued ID cards.[24]
D. Gaza Strip
The Palestinians who endure the
worst conditions, by far, are those who reside in the Gaza Strip. It would not
be an exaggeration to describe the Gaza Strip as a prison housing a million and
half people. About 1.1 million of these are refugees, and 500,000 live in
refugee camps. Since 2006, the Gaza Strip has endured international sanctions,
and, since 2007, Israeli-enforced border crossing closures have been in effect,
drastically limiting food and consumer product imports. As a result of this
policy and the Israeli control of the Gaza Strip’s coastline, most Gazans meet
their needs in the black market with products smuggled via underground tunnels
from Egypt. This blockade has had drastic economic and social consequences. At
certain points in time, approximately 95% of industrial operations in the Gaza
Strip have been halted, contributing to the 45% unemployment rate.[25] Gazans
also frequently experience twelve-hour power shortages. Approximately 90% of
Gazans have been reported to live below the poverty line,[26] and about 57% are
classified as “Food Insecure” by the World Food Programme.[27] Apart from
facing these inhumane conditions on a daily basis, Gazans have also been the
sector of the Palestinian population most drastically affected by IDF military
operations; the most recent notable ones being Operation Cast Lead in 2008,
which resulted in the death of 1,417 Palestinians; Operation Pillar of Defense
in 2012; and,Operation Protective Edge in the summer of 2014, which resulted in
an estimated 2,300 deaths.[28] The International Criminal Court has opened an
inquiry into these last events.[29]
Hamas’ Conception and Pursuit of
Jihad
Hamas’ conception of jihad is
embedded in its 1988 Charter. According to Knudsen, Hamas, through its
conception of jihad, has “Islamisized” an ethnic and territorial conflict.[30]
Unlike other Islamist organizations, such as Islamic Jihad and Al Qaeda, Hamas
delimits armed jihad to the struggle against Israeli occupation. Article 11 of
the Hamas Charter provides the theological foundation for Hamas’ struggle: “the
land of Palestine is an Islamic waqf (trust) endowed for Muslim generations
until the Judgment Day. It, or any part of it, should not be squandered: it, or
any part of it, should not be given up.”[31] Hamas regards the struggle against
the Israeli occupation as the duty of every Muslim due to this conception of
Palestine as an Islamic waqf. Article 15 of the Hamas Covenant states: “The day
that enemies usurp part of Moslem land, Jihad becomes the individual duty of
every Moslem.”[32] However, Hamas logically recognizes all of the forms of
jihad mentioned in the first section of this essay. This is noted in Article
30, which reads:
Jihad is not confined to the
carrying of arms and the confrontation of the enemy. The effective word, the
good article, the useful book, support and solidarity -together with the
presence of sincere purpose for the hoisting of Allah’s banner higher and
higher- all these are elements of the Jihad for Allah’s sake.[33]
Article 30 makes evident Hamas’
recognition of the importance of jihad of the heart (sincere purpose for the
hoisting Allah’s banner) and jihad of the tongue (effective word, good
article); but it is through the jihad of the sword and jihad of the hand that
Hamas truly distinguishes itself and cements its legitimacy amongst the
Palestinian population.
Hamas emerged during the First
Palestinian Intifada and, ever since, has engaged in jihad of the sword against
Israeli occupation. Jihad of the sword is implicitly described in Article 13 of
the Hamas Charter as the only viable option for the Palestinians in the face of
Israeli occupation; Article 13 reads: “There is no solution for the Palestinian
question except through Jihad. Initiatives, proposals and international
conferences are all a waste of time and vain endeavors. The Palestinian people
know better than to consent to having their future, rights and fate toyed with.”[34]
Hamas’ preference for this specific form of jihad was made clear in their
communiqué of December 7, 1993, through which they stated that “jihad is the
only way to liberate Palestine, and that force is the only language of
understanding with the enemy,”[35] in clear reference to jihad of the sword.
The branch of Hamas dedicated to
engaging in jihad of the sword is its military wing, the Ezzedeen Al-Qassam
Brigades (EQB). The EQB’s function as “a network of specialized cells operating
all over the Gaza Strip and West Bank. The cells work independently of each
other under the instructions of the Brigades’ leadership.”[36] These cells
engage in military operations “against fortified military targets and against
occupation forces attacking Palestinian neighborhoods.”[37] The EQB’s official
site states that they utilize “sheer determination, dedication, and ingenuity,”
as well as a strong faith in Allah, and belief in the Palestinian cause, in
their armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.[38] Hamas has earned its
legitimacy among the Palestinian people partly due to the willingness of its
members to sacrifice for the cause and its institutional perseverance in face
of the conditions – fitna – imposed by Israeli occupation.[39]
The other factor that has earned
Hamas notable legitimacy among the Palestinian population is its engagement in
jihad of the hand, made evident through Hamas’ Islamic welfare organizations.
Islamic welfare organizations are extremely important in the POT, where
approximately one-sixth of the population benefits from Islamic charities.[40]
Hamas has allocated up to 95% of its resources to its social services and
employs an extensive system:
The Islamic welfare organizations
are of two kinds: those concerned with the collection and distribution of alms
(zakat committees), and those concerned with service delivery (education,
medical, relief, etc.)… Charity aid and zakat donations are preferentially
distributed to widows, female-headed households or families of slain martyrs,
as well as to orphaned children. In-depth studies bear out the efficiency and
professionalism in the service delivery of Islamic charities.[41]
Hamas’ insistence on jihad of the
hand can also be found in its Charter. Articles 20 and 21 of the Hamas Charter
state that “it is necessary that social mutual responsibility should prevail
among the people . . . . Mutual social responsibility means extending
assistance, financial or moral, to all those who are in need and joining in the
execution of some of the work.”[42] This dedication to providing welfare
programs should not be surprising, considering that Hamas evolved out of the
Islamic Center, which itself engaged in providing many of these same
services.[43]
Conclusion
Jihad is commonly misunderstood,
and even more so when analyzed in the context of such a complex geopolitical,
ethnic and religious conflict as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with its
years of history and countless intricacies. This essay serves to dispel some of
the myths surrounding the concept of jihad and clarify many of the
misconceptions. Moreover, it is a brief attempt at presenting the concept of
jihad within the context of Israeli occupation and Hamas’ resistance to it. As
alluded to above, this essay aims at provoking the reader to reflect on the
interconnection between jihad, Palestinian liberation, and Hamas. Furthermore,
I sincerely hope that it serves as catalyst for the reader to conduct his or
her own personal investigation on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – a conflict
that has unquestionably dragged on for too long, caused too much suffering on
all sides, and continues to be a significant source of regional and
international discord.
About The Author:
William Sewell Fernández, Juris Doctor
candidate at the School of Law of the University of Puerto Rico in May 2015. He
has a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations at Florida International
University, Certificate in Education in Latin America and the Caribbean and
second concentration in Geography . Currently he serves as Associate Director
of the Law Review at the University of Puerto Rico.
Publication Details:
This work is
licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0
Unported License by the Original Publisher - Pangea UPR
References:
[2] This essay will not address
issues related to the distinct Quranic translations and differences between
them.
[3] Al-Mã’edah 5:35; cf.
Interpretations of the Meanings of the Noble Qu’ran 5:35 (Muhammad M. Khan and
Muhammad T. Al-Hilali trans., 1999) (hereinafter, “Khan and Al-Hilali”).
[4] Al-Baqarah 2:218; cf. Khan
and Al-Hilali, supra note 3, 2:218.
[5] See also Al-Tawba 9:20; cf.
Khan and Al-Hilali, supra note 3, 9:20.
[6] See Al-Mã’edah 5:32; cf. Khan
and Al-Hilali, supra note 3, 5:32.
[7] Al-Baqarah 2.191; cf. The
Quran: English Meaning and Notes (Saheeh International eds. 2011) available
athttp://www.quranabc.com/quran/#/The%20Qur’an/38.
[8] Al-Baqarah 2:217; cf. Quran:
The Final Testament (Rashad Khalifa ed. trans. 2001).
[9] Al-Baqarah 2:190; cf. Maulana
M. Ali, The Holy Quran with English Translation and Commentary 2:190 (2002).
[10] This section provides a
brief description of the current political and socio-economic conditions that
Palestinians endure as result of the Israeli occupation. This section is
intended for readers to make their own judgments regarding whether these
current conditions can be considered as fitna, and therefore justify Hamas’ jihad
of the sword. To facilitate the depiction of these conditions, the latter part
separately deals with the conditions Palestinians face in East Jerusalem, the
West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.
[11] Center Staff, The
Palestinian Refugee Crisis, The Jerusalem Fund (July 14,
1999),http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/www.thejerusalemfund.org/carryover/pubs/19990714ib.html.
[12] See Legal Consequences of
the Construction of A Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136.
[13] See Paul Scham & Osama
Abu-Irshaid, Hamas: Ideological Rigidity and Political Flexibility, United
States Institute of Peace (June 1, 2009),
http://www.usip.org/publications/hamas-ideological-rigidity-and-political-flexibility.
[14] See The World Factbook –
Gaza Strip, Central Intelligence Agency (Jun. 20, 2014),
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/we.html (last
visited Feb. 24, 2015); see also Steven Erlanger, Hamas Seizes Broad Control in
Gaza Strip, The New York Times (June 14, 2007), available
athttp://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/14/world/middleeast/14mideast.html?_r=0.
[15] Press Release, International Criminal Court,
The State of Palestine accedes to the Rome Statute, (Jan. 7, 2015).
[16] Diplomatic Relations,
Permanent Observer Mission of the State of Palestine to the United Nations,
http://palestineun.org/about-palestine/diplomatic-relations/ (last visited Apr.
22, 2015).
[17] Palestinian premier heads to
Gaza on reconciliation mission, Associated Press (March 15, 2015),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-3011195/Palestinian-premier-heads-Gaza-reconciliation-mission.html
(last visited on April 26, 2015).
[18] Michel Warschawski, On the
Border, Pt. 5, The Real News (April 10, 2010),
http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=4987.
[19] See Rory McCarthy, Israel
plans more East Jerusalem homes as talks collapse, The Guardian (March 11,
2010),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/mar/11/israel-homes-east-jerusalem-talks.
[20] See U.N. Officials Call for
‘Radical’ Policy Shift in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Un News Centre (March
4, 2010), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=33974#.VQeI_lpH2L8.
[21] See Legal Consequences of
the Construction of A Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra note
12.
[22] See Rory McCarthy, Israel
Approves More Construction in West Bank Settlement, The Guardian (March 8,
2010),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/mar/08/israel-construction-settlement-west-bank.
[23] See supra note 20.
[24] The Identity Card Carrying
and Displaying Act of 1982 is still current. See Ali Abunimah, Infrographic:
How the Israeli ID Card System Enforces Apartheid, Electronic Intifada (May 15,
2014),http://electronicintifada.net/blogs/ali-abunimah/infographic-how-israeli-id-card-system-enforces-apartheid
(last visited on March 15, 2015).
[25] See UN Report: At 45 %, Gaza
Unemployment is the Worst in the World, HAREETZ (July 30, 2008),
http://rete-eco.it/2011/fr/home/35-documenti/riflessioni/2300-un-report-at-45-gaza-unemployment-is-highest-in-the-world.html.
[26] See 90 % of Gazans Live
Below the Poverty Line, 95 % of Water Undrinkable, Middle East Monitor
(September, 17, 2014),
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/14198-90-of-gazans-live-below-poverty-line-95-of-water-undrinkable.
[27] See Palestine External
Situation Report, World Food Programme (December
2014),http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ep/wfp270840.pdf.
[28] See Sean Nevins, Israel
threatens Intl’ Criminal Court with Retribution if War Crime Investigations
Continue, Mint Press News (February 9, 2015),
http://www.mintpressnews.com/israel-threatens-intl-criminal-court-with-retribution-if-war-crime-investigations-continue/201967/;
Two years after Operation Cast Lead: Gaza Remains Sealed-Off from outside
World, Impunity for War Crimes Prevails, Palestinian Centre for Human Rights
(December 27, 2010), http://www.pchrgaza.org/portal/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7196:two-years-after-operation-cast-lead-gaza-remains-sealed-off-from-outside-world-impunity-for-war-crimes-prevails-&catid=74:war-reports&Itemid=217.
[29] See Allison Deger, I.C.C.
Opens War Crimes Inquiry into Israel Over Gaza War as Palestinians Prepare
Another U.N. Resolution, Mondoweiss (January 16,
2015),http://mondoweiss.net/2015/01/palestinians-another-resolution.
[30] See Are Knudsen, Crescent
And Sword: The Hamas Enigma (2004).
[31] The Covenant of the Islamic
Resistance Movement (Hamas Covenant 1988), The Avalon Project – Yale Law School
(1988), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp (last visited Feb.
24, 2015) (hereinafter, “Hamas Covenant 1988”).
[32] Id. at Art. 15.
[33] Id. at Art. 30.
[34] Id. at Art. 13.
[35] See Scham & Abu-Irshaid,
supra note 13.
[36]Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades –
About Us, Al Qassam Brigades,http://www.qassam.ps/aboutus.html (last visited
Feb. 24, 2015).
[37] Id.
[38] Id.
[39] “[M]ore than eight hundred
members have been martyred since the outbreak of Al-Aqsa Intifada in September
2000.” Id.
[40] Knudsen, supra note 29.
[41] Knudsen, supra note 29, at
12.
[42] Hamas Covenant 1988, supra
note 31, Arts. 20-21.
[43] Knudsen, supra note 30.
