As part of the greater Indian Ocean Region (IOR), the Bay of Bengal (BoB) has historically been regarded as India’s sphere of influence. However, until recently it was treated as backwaters, and it was only after external actors started showing interest in the region that India realized the importance of protecting this geo-strategic area situated right above one of the world’s busiest Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs).
By Mohammad Humayun Kabir and Amamah Ahmad
As part of the
greater Indian Ocean Region (IOR), the Bay of Bengal (BoB) has historically been
regarded as India’s sphere of influence. However, until recently it was treated
as backwaters, and it was only after external actors started showing interest
in the region that India realized the importance of protecting this
geo-strategic area situated right above one of the world’s busiest Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs).
In terms of
its foreign policy and strategy, India has adopted a ‘Look East’ approach. The
nation is also showing interest in building what it calls the “Bay of Bengal
community”, where it envisages greater security cooperation amongst the
littoral nations. As a result, India may focus on strengthening security ties
with countries like Bangladesh and Myanmar. In other frameworks, such as the
BCIM, the three countries and China are collectively cooperating.
However, this
time, India may opt for cooperation that does not include China as a reaction
to China’s assertiveness in the BoB region. The significance of the BoB to
India’s economy is immense. In 2013, 95% of India’s foreign trade by volume and
75% by value were conducted by sea; and more than 75% of its oil was imported
by sea (Hughes 2014). With India’s economic growth, the importance of its Navy
also grew. As part of its maritime strategy, India states explicitly that it
will strive to ensure the safety of the Ocean’s SLOCs as being critical for
economic growth, for itself and for the global community.
It is also
cognizant of the fact that smaller nations in its neighbourhood, as well as
nations that depend on the waters of the BoB for their trade and energy
supplies, have come to expect that the Indian Navy will ensure stability and tranquility in the waters around its shores (HCSS 2010).
Between 1980
and 2009, the Indian Navy progressed from being a “brown-water” to almost a
“blue-water” force. The country’s economic rise fueled its defence budget and
strengthened its position in the IOR. The Navy is also involved in other
activities such as providing critical training and equipment to numerous Indian
Ocean countries, and its MILAN exercise now includes sixteen Asian and African
navies and coast guards (Samaranayake 2014).
Furthermore,
Prime Minister Modi asserted that he had accorded the highest priority to the
modernization of defence forces, as strong security was necessary for an
atmosphere of peace, amity and harmony in the country. Consequently, India’s
new maritime doctrine includes new policies such as Counter-Terrorism and
Anti-Piracy missions. Since the country cannot match China’s force-for-force,
it needs to seek bilateral alliances, maritime domain awareness, and network-centric
operations. In that regard, enhancing the security of small island states is an
integral part of that strategy (Vines 2012).
An additional
reason behind strengthening its naval power is India’s “Hormuz dilemma”; it
refers to its dependence on imports through the Strait, close to the shores of
Pakistan, where the Chinese are helping the Pakistanis develop deep-water
ports. India’s objectives are hence to gain “strategic autonomy”. This policy
is aligned with the Indian goal of achieving superpower status and it is in
this context that we see India opposing the presence of extra-regional powers
in the BoB and the IOR in general (Stratrisk 2014).
Delhi’s naval
modernization may also be the outcome of a perceived maritime threat posed by
China’s naval growth. In reaction, India is simultaneously developing
relationships with states in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific, causing
some in China to question its motives. There is fear in Delhi that Beijing may
be outrunning them and strengthening its strategic position in the Bay. China’s
investment in infrastructure and financial aid to the littoral countries could
pose a serious threat to India which, up until now, remained the most important
partner for many of these nations. Now, Delhi is re-focusing on the Bay of
Bengal Initiative through a Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
(BIMSTEC), with emphasis on improving transport connectivity across the
southern Asian littoral. It is also sponsoring the construction of new road and
river connections between its land-locked northeast states and the BoB through
new port facilities at Sittwe in Myanmar, to be completed by 2015.
Additionally,
Indian officials have welcomed the US re-balancing to Asia but made it clear that
its “Look East Policy” is separate from the US re-balancing and driven by Indian
and not US interests, thus the interests are not synonymous. Nonetheless, a
number of counter-terrorism and anti-piracy efforts have been conducted in
coordination with American forces. US interest in countering the threat of
terrorism in South Asia has pushed India and the United States towards more
substantive military cooperation.
India’s
economic and political links across the BoB are growing, accompanied by an
expansion of India’s regional security role. The nation has long aspired to be
recognized as the predominant power in the BoB and to assume a greater
strategic role in Southeast Asia. These ambitions are consistent with the
perspectives of many ASEAN states which generally perceive India as a positive
factor in the regional balance of power, in contrast with China (Brewster
2014).
The China
Factor:
Historical
mistrust between China and India has encouraged mutual suspicion regarding each
other’s intentions. India and China both view the BoB as a crucial frontier in
their competition over energy resources, shipping lanes, and cultural
influence. The competition stemming from the two countries expanding their
regional sphere of influence in each other’s backyards may result in skirmishes
over energy, SLOCs or maritime issues.
Up until now,
the strongest manifestation of Sino-Indian rivalry in the BoB was in Myanmar
where they both connect through Myanmar to their economically weaker regions,
namely India’s Northeast and China’s Yunnan province. However, since 2011
Myanmar opened its economy to the Western world after the US and Europe lifted
sanctions (BBC 2014), creating more partnership options as the reforms
attracted a wave of foreign investors. This in turn reduced Sino-Indian
competition by making space for new actors and creating more balance in the previously
polarized scenario.
Another major
aspect of the rivalry lies in the so-called String of Pearls Strategy that
China allegedly pursues. However, although there is competition, there is
little evidence that the Chinese are planning an encirclement of India with
their naval facilities stretching from southern China across the Indian Ocean.
Their strategy appears benign, seeking agreements, allowing access to
facilities for resupply, etc. The Chinese are here not for bases but for
access. Bases would involve huge amounts of investment and would have political
implications. It is not just the Chinese Navy that seeks access, the Indian
Navy pursues access facilities too but follows a different strategy from that
of the Chinese. While the Chinese provide aid in infrastructure building, the
Indians create small pockets of bilateral naval exercises (Agnihotri 2014).
In an attempt
to reduce suspicion, China has recently invited India to join the country’s
efforts of building a wide network of new silk roads on land and sea with the
aim of increasing global connectivity (Time of India 2014). Another challenge
for China may be India’s military reaction making Chinese sea lines more vulnerable;
Beijing is already worried about the Malacca dilemma, and now the Andaman and
Nicobar (A&N) Command will put India’s naval and air power in a position to
control access to the Strait of Malacca (McDevitt 2013). Whether it is the US
or India, whoever controls the Strait, will have a stronghold on Beijing’s
energy access, which constitutes a serious concern for China.
About The Authors:
Mohammad Humayun Kabir is Senior Research Director at the Bangladesh
Enterprise Institute in Dhaka, Bangladesh, and head of its Foreign Policy and
Security Studies Division. He studied International Law in Kiev State
University, Ukraine, and International Relations at Oxford University, UK.
Amamah Ahmad is a Research Associate at the Bangladesh Enterprise
Institute in Dhaka, Bangladesh. She graduated with a Bachelor of Arts in Social
Science and a Master of Arts in Political Science from the University of
Lausanne in Switzerland. She has research interests in Geopolitics,
International Security and Transboundary issues.
Publication
Details
Citation
Information: Croatian International Relations Review. Volume 21, Issue 72,
Pages 199–238, ISSN (Online) 1848-5782, DOI: 10.1515/cirr-2015-0007, March 2015.
© 2015. This
work is licensed under the Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0)
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