It is easy to understand why politicians and scholars would initially focus on civil–military relations from a single perspective, as exclusively democratic control of armed forces, if we recall the classic dilemma captured in the phrase: “Who guards the guardians?” Any armed force strong enough to defend a country is also strong enough to take over a government; that is, to stage a coup.
By Various Sources
It is easy to understand why politicians and
scholars would initially focus on civil–military relations from a single
perspective, as exclusively democratic control of armed forces, if we recall
the classic dilemma captured in the phrase: “Who guards the guardians?” Any
armed force strong enough to defend a country is also strong enough to take
over a government; that is, to stage a coup. This is the assumption behind most
analyses of civil–military relations, which not only leads into military
governments, but also out of them. The issue is all the more important in those
states, which includes Brazil, where the military served as the government
between the years of 1964 and 1985.
Image Attribute: SISFRON enabled Brazilian Soldier
However, control alone is not sufficient to
begin to describe and analyze contemporary civil–military relations. For this
reason, the authors have formulated a framework that includes not only control,
but also effectiveness and efficiency. This framework has been put forth in
five refereed publications, in which it has been applied to the United States
and four South American countries, utilized by Chilean scholars in the analysis
of civil– military relations in Chile (Flisfisch and Robledo 2012), and even
figures in President-elect Michelle Bachelet’s Programa de Gobierno, 2014–2018,
Chile de todos (Bachelet 2013: 151).
Flashback:
Flashback:
The years that
followed the 21-year period of military control over Brazil were marked by
severe political and economic difficulties. In the political realm, former
President Fernando Collor’s impeachment and corruption-related scandals
distressed the emergent Brazilian democracy, while economic difficulties were
mainly related to the necessity to curb inflation, to establish the basis for
long-term stability and growth, and to reduce Brazil's extreme socioeconomic
inequalities. At the same time, the Brazilian foreign policy adopted a more
globalist-oriented view of world politics, which drifted away the realist
military influence over the country’s international affairs. According to Cervo
and Bueno (2002:469), “by separating the two strategic fields [the doctrine of
security that guided foreign policy during the military regime and the defense
policy], (…) [Brazil] distanced itself from realism and embarked in utopia.” In
other words, the country's foreign policy underplayed force as a means of
action in international relations in favor of persuasion and soft power. It is
therefore not astonishing to notice that substantial military reforms have been
postponed for almost a decade after liberalization. (Vizentini, 2005).
The first
National Policy of Defense (NPD) or Estratégia Nacional de Defesa (END) was published in 1996 during former President
Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s term. The NPD made public the country's security
priorities for the first time in history, and thus represented a major
milestone for the formulation of a national defense agenda. It was built around
two central pillars: active diplomacy (peaceful resolution of conflicts) and
conventional deterrence. The document was designed in order to guarantee the
country’s sovereignty and the safety of national wealth; to guarantee respect
for the rule of law and democratic institutions; to maintain the national
unity; to protect citizen rights and the Brazilian interests abroad; to provide
the country with a more significant role in international affairs; and to
contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. (Brazil,
1996; Oliveira, 2005; Costa, 2006).
The NPD also
determined the establishment of an autonomous Ministry of Defense (MD) run by
civilian administration to subordinate all three branches of the armed forces
(the Air Force, the Navy, and the Army), which happened three years after the document
was released, in 1999. The creation of the MD meant an important step towards
the consolidation of democracy in the country, as it allowed increased civilian
control over the military, a tendency that has been widespread all over Latin
America since the late 1980s.8 Once implemented, the Ministry allowed the
development of a more cohesive discourse for the drafting of the second NPD,
and represented a breakthrough in terms of institutionalization in the field of
defense in Brazil. (Fuccille, 2006; Pagliari, 2009).
The second NPD released during the first term of President
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in 2005, expanded the concept of security used so far
to incorporate an even broader approach whereby political, economic,
environmental and social factors might also be seen as threats to the state.
Moreover, the document emphasized the threats posed by non-state actors to both
national and international security. Following the former policies
stipulations, the new NPD also characterized South America as a peaceful
continent, despite recognizing the existence of some zones of instability and the
occurrence of transnational organized crime in the region. The need to sustain
national sovereignty and the defense of the state were reaffirmed as important
means of curbing such issues. The commitment to regional integration was also
reiterated, as well as the protection of borders and sensitive areas as the
“Green Amazon” (land and river areas within the Amazon Basin) and the “Blue
Amazon” (coastal areas where major hydro-carbon and other resources are
located). (Brazil, 2005)
The MOD was
established fourteen years after Brazil’s democratic transition, with the
passage of Complementary Law 97 on 9 June 1999. Between its creation in 1999
and the appointment of Nelson Jobim as minister of defense on 25 July 2007, the
MOD was under very weak and erratic leadership, and did not develop as an
institution. Since the ouster of Nelson Jobim by President Dilma Rousseff on 4
August 2011, the MOD has been headed by Ambassador Celso Amorim, who was
foreign minister during both of the Lula da Silva administrations (2002–2010).
Ambassador Amorim is a highly regarded bureaucrat with no back ground in
defense or national security. Even under Minister Jobim, however, a civilian
cadre of advisors was never established. There is no career track within the
MOD, or the required concurso to fill positions, which results in civilians
having minimal roles in the MOD. A constant theme in Brazilian Colonel Skora
Rosty’s Strategy Research Paper is the lack of prepared civilians to deal with
security and defense in Brazil (Skora Rosty 2011: 8, 13, 21). Consequently,
while Minister Amorim may be excellent as an individual, cabinet member, and
strategic thinker, he is almost alone as a civilian in the Ministry of Defense.
However, the
lack of civilian expertise is less of an issue for democratic civilian control
than for effectiveness, as we will see below, as there is a national security
council-like institution, the Gabinete de Segurança Institucional (GSI)
Secretariat for Institutional Security. This is an institutional mechanism
whereby the democratically elected president exercises control over the
security sector, including the armed forces (see Bruneau, Matei, and Sakoda
2009). There is also a series of other oversight institutions whereby the
democratically elected executive and legislative bodies can enforce
accountability, including the defense or security sector. Probably the most
important of these is the Ministério Público (MP) or Federal Public Ministry.
The Current Scenario:
The Current Scenario:
Image Attribute: Rollout of
Multimission Transport Aircraft KC-390 EMBRAER KC-390, October 2014. Photo - FAB
In line with Strachan’s quote regarding the
iterative process between the civilian decision-makers and the armed forces,
and based on comparative studies, we believe that there is a need for an
institutional basis for bringing the civilians and the leaders of the armed
forces together. While the MOD, as discussed above, formally links the
executive (the civilian president in the case of Brazil) to the armed forces,
we find that increasing numbers of countries have found it necessary to create,
or recreate, joint staffs to bring the civilian-led MOD into structured contact
with the armed forces. Portugal, for example, created a joint staff in 2009
(Bruneau and Matei 2013: 277–282).
In 2010, Brazil established a joint operational military structure as part of a more general reform of national security and defense institutions. The Lei Complementar 136 of 25 August 2010 specified the roles of the MOD and created the Estado-Maior Conjunto das Forças Armadas (EMCFA, The Armed Forces Joint Command). The minister of defense at the time, Nelson Jobim, proposed a set of four laws, passed by the Congress, that provided for an overall updating of roles, missions, and structures. A pending question now is whether the joint structure will work since Minister Jobim has departed and the officers at the top levels of the three services are four-star, and their positions mirrors to some degree the continuing structure of the services. From our most recent information, development of the EMCFA is definitely a work in progress.
As Table 2 shows, Brazil commits a relatively
low percentage of its GDP to defense: 1.29 percent. And, as Table 3 shows,
percentage of personnel costs in this budget (73 percent) is very high compared
to other countries. The comparison group is the BRIC and the permanent members
of the United Nations Security Council, to which the country aspires. As stated
in Jane’s assessment in 2013:
Personnel welfare spending consumes a large
share of the Brazilian defense budget: fully 73.2% in 2013, when counting
wages, salaries, pensions and social security payments. This rate is unlikely
to change significantly over the coming five years. Brazil has historically
provided generous benefits to both its serving personnel and their families.
Brazil’s high
level of personnel costs in the defense budget leaves policymakers with little
room to maneuver in terms of non-personnel costs, including procurement. Plans
for the Brazilian Navy to purchase new ships, an item highlighted in the 2008
END, were put on hold in 2011. The much-heralded nuclear submarine project was
first discussed as early as 1989 (Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly 1989).
As Jane’s states, defense was one of the hardest-hit ministries in the 2011 USD
30 billion budget cut, which affected procurement significantly.
In 2011,
procurement was to receive about 11.7 percent of the defense budget, down from
the 13.2 percent in 2010. About 30 percent of the procurement funds were frozen
due to the budget cut. There is wide awareness in the Brazilian Navy that it
lacks the assets to be able to implement the missions defined in the END,
including the so-called Blue Amazon (José Augusto Abreu de Moura 2013: 56). The
continuing budget limits on procurements is not lost on the Federation of
Industries of São Paulo (Federação das Indústrias do Estado do São Paulo,
FIESP) which publishes a Panorama Defesa Comercial and laments the lack of
opportunity for Brazilian industries to do more in defense due to a shortage of
funds (FIESP 2014).
Download The Deloitte Global Defense Outlook 2015
When seen in a
context of peace, defense industry tends to be lacking. Its main challenge is
to acquire capabilities and commercial competitiveness, without letting go of
the demands of its only customer, the government. Therefore, budget becomes
once again a key-word. Current sharing of Ministry of Defense resources goes as
follows: more than 70% is for paycheck – wages of active and reserve military,
as well as pensions. Around 20% is to pay the bills and keep things going.
There’s not much left for investment, technological development and acquiring
new assets.
When we look at the main focus of the Brazilian Navy in the recent years is to protect country’s maritime resources. The area known as “Blue Amazon” holds a large piece of our GDP and the source of income of thousands of Brazilians. Within the approximately 1.54 square mile region there are oil reserves estimated around 15 billion barrels. By 2020, these reserves will be worth about 7 trillion dollars according to official data.
Image Attribute: Submarine Developing Program PROSUB, the most ambitious Project of Brazilian Navy. Photo - DefesaNet
Last year, the Union Finance Court (TCU)
analyzed the Navy’s submarine development program (PROSUB). The project aims to
build conventional submarines at a R$10,5 billion cost, plus a nuclear unit
(another R$8,9 billion) as well as a naval base and a shipyard to build and
maintain said submarines (R$ 7,8 billion). The deadline to deliver all these
assets is 2025.
The TCU acknowledges the fact that Brazil
doesn’t have industrial know-how to take on these programs. Without considering
these circumstances, there’s no way for the nation to acquire the advanced
technology it needs from foreign partners.
The Brazilian
Army went through a transformation as well. In order to adapt its capabilities
to the age of knowledge, it also chose its top seven strategic projects:
borders surveillance (SISFRON), strategic ground structures protection
(PROTEGER), developing a new line of armoured vehicles (GUARANI), anti-aircraft
defense systems, currently outdated, the Astros 2020 project for deterrence,
cyber defense and also recovering operational capabilities (RECOP).
Image Attribute: Sistema Integrado de Monitoramento de
Fronteiras (SISFRON),
Brazilian Integrated Border Surveillance Program
The SISFRON program
is expected to be completed by 2025, at an overall cost of 12 billion RL Many
criminal activities happen at Brazilian borders, such as drugs and arms
traffic. According to 2010 data, the amount of taxpayer's money spent to
contain violence all over the country was around R$180 billion, of which R$40
billion were investing on fighting drug traffic. If the government doesn't
treat crime prevention (border surveillance included) as a priority, it’s bound
to spend a lot more to mend the damage caused by crime and violence.
Image Attribute: SAAB Gripen 39, / Source: Wikimedia Commons
In August
2015, the crucial decision was made by the Brazilian Air Force (FAB) regarding the purchase of latest fighter jets and military equipment from the Swedish
company SAAB Gripen NG, which is eventually based upon various combination of
factors and unit price is one of the primary one after multiple back and forth.
Conclusion:
In conclusion, the argument is that Brazil is
a fully-consolidated democracy, with a high level of democratic civilian
control over the armed forces which has been systematically developed since 1984 . That control is exercised by a wide variety of
institutions, the most important of which are not specifically designed for
this purpose, but are part of a vast array of institutions that exercise
oversight and accountability over public bureaucracies. Civilian control of the
military and other security institutions such as Agência Brasileira de
Inteligência (ABIN) are part of the ample set of institutions, whereby
democratically elected civilians control all sectors of the State in Brazil.
But according to Cosme Degenar Drumond, Special Correspondent Defensa.net - "Proper defense is not cheap. And we’re still missing an essential part of the process: technological independence. Without it, the circle won’t close. The problem is our economic prognostics are not good at the moment. Some companies are drawing back from defense. The Defense and Security Industry Brazilian Association (ABIMDE) considers it hard to analyze or predict anything right now."
But according to Cosme Degenar Drumond, Special Correspondent Defensa.net - "Proper defense is not cheap. And we’re still missing an essential part of the process: technological independence. Without it, the circle won’t close. The problem is our economic prognostics are not good at the moment. Some companies are drawing back from defense. The Defense and Security Industry Brazilian Association (ABIMDE) considers it hard to analyze or predict anything right now."
When government resources finally reach the
industry chain, they are late. Sometimes the money passes year by year as
“payments left”. Equipments must be renewed on schedule. Budget management must
consider things such as stability, constancy and foresee ability, as stated in Brazil’s
National Defense White Book.
Recognizing such fact requires in-house
insight and attention to identify these institutions and their roles.
Separately, and given the absence of a credible civilian presence in the MOD,
the role of the Ministério Público in exercising oversight over the defense
sector in terms of activities like budgeting and procurement are crucial to
exert control. The lack of civilian expertise is important in the dimension of
effectiveness as there are few civilians in the bureaucracy who know enough to
be able to formulate strategies and interact credibly with the EMCFA.
It is ironic that while there is a dearth of
competent civilians in the MOD due to the absence of a career path and the
required concurso, a cadre of civilians interested in defense topics is
emerging in academia and other sectors. In the bureaucratic realm, there is a
substantial lag in the specialization of civilians in defense, especially
compared with the level of specialization seen in other arenas such as
economics, finance, trade, and social welfare. Also, the relatively few
resources that are invested in the defense sector are primarily directed to
military personnel themselves. The military are both under democratic control
and relatively well cared for in terms of salaries and benefits.
SOURCES:
NOTE: Current Exchange Rate R$ 1 = $0.26 , Dec 1, 2015
