By Dominic Johnson
The attacks in
Paris have elevated both the desire and the case for a full-scale war against
Islamic State (IS) in Syria. French President Francois Hollande has vowed not just
to fight IS, but to destroy it. The US and Russia are poised to significantly
up their stakes, and Prime Minister David Cameron has begun laying out the argument
to extend British air strikes into Syria as well. The war is already underway
and likely to escalate into an even greater coalition of military power than
already exists.
Image Attribute: French President Francois Hollande / Source: Wikimedia Commons
However, wars
are unpredictable. This is especially so in the case of Syria, with multiple
non-state armed groups interacting with each other, multiple foreign state
actors, and no legitimate government. Even the vast asymmetry in power between
the international coalition and IS does not make the outcome predictable:
powerful states have often lost wars against much weaker foes, from the United
States in Vietnam, to Russia in Afghanistan, to the British Empire in the
American colonies. If they have the right strategy and motivation, the
weak can win, and this is a trend that has increased over the time.
There is,
however, one thing that is predictable about war: overconfidence.
Even if the outcome of war cannot be known in advance, the historical record
shows a remarkable empirical regularity in that politicians, military leaders,
and the public on both sides tend to believe they will win, with astounding
repetitiveness. Nations around the world and over the centuries have repeatedly
underestimated their enemies, overestimated their own capabilities, and
exaggerated their ability to control what are inherently unpredictable events.
Notably, the bias becomes
stronger once we decide we must fight (which is now), and enter an
implemental rather than a deliberative mindset.
Overconfidence
might seem like a naïve pitfall that has afflicted distant generations or other
states—not us. Yet western states have been as susceptible to overconfidence as
everyone else, in numerous wars from WWI and Vietnam, to Kosovo and Iraq, and
it continues
to plague foreign policy. In 2011, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe
acknowledged that NATO had underestimated resistance from Gaddafi’s forces (and
hence the war became longer and costlier than anticipated). In 2014, the US
Director of National Intelligence himself, James Clapper, admitted they had
underestimated IS and overestimated the Iraqi Army.
This
overconfident bias might seem surprising, but it should not be. Psychologists
and neuro-scientists have long shown that human beings have a natural
tendency towards overconfidence, or “positive illusions”, a phenomenon that
affects most of us most of the time. Indeed, it is considered a vital component
of mental health. Optimism engenders resolve and persistence against the many
obstacles we face in life. The conclusion of this research is that optimism is
actually not just a quirk of western cultures, but a critical ingredient of
human nature. While it may help us in everyday life at home, it can become a major
disaster for critical judgments about war and strategy on the international
stage.
We have
already underestimated Islamic State and it is likely that we will continue to
do so. At least, that is the conclusion from cognitive psychology and the
historical record. Obama and others have impressed us with the number of
countries involved in the anti-IS coalition. This is heartening. But it also
highlights the problem: with so many powerful countries already in the
fight, why
are we losing? Evidently, we face an incredibly resilient enemy and
ideology on the ground, and one that we are only prepared to engage from the
air.
This is not an
argument against intervention. It is a prediction that intervention will take
longer and cost more than we think. With many coalition states hard pressed to
sell another war in the Middle East to a skeptical public, leaders are likely
not only to perceive but also to push a vision of rapid victory at affordable
cost.
In fact, it
will be costly, slow, and any kind of clear-cut victory is unlikely. The
ideology will live on even if the current cohort is dead, and with each brother
killed, we plant the seeds of new avengers. However tempting it is to claim a
comprehensive strategy and the prospect of victory to gain public and political
support, great expectations will only lead to greater disappointment. In 1940
Churchill sold the British people a war on blood, sweat, toil, and tears. We
should not be promising anything else.
About The Author:
Dominic
Johnson is the Alastair Buchan Professor of International Relations in the
Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford.
This article is licensed under a Creative
Commons (Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International) by the Original Publisher - OxPOL