The magnitude of the victory by the Venezuelan opposition in the December 6, 2015, congressional elections surprised many in the country, and in the region, who had expected that the government of Nicolas Maduro would use its control over much of the media, most of the economy, the electoral authority and the repressive apparatus of the state to reduce the opposition margin of victory, if not engage in large scale electoral fraud to change the results entirely.
By Dr. R. Evan Ellis[1]
The magnitude of the victory by the Venezuelan opposition in the December 6, 2015, congressional elections surprised many in the country, and in the region, who had expected that the government of Nicolas Maduro would use its control over much of the media, most of the economy, the electoral authority and the repressive apparatus of the state to reduce the opposition margin of victory, if not engage in large scale electoral fraud to change the results entirely. The enormous opposition victory gave the “Unified Democratic Table” (MUD) coalition 112 of the 167 seats in Venezuela’s national assembly, and with it, a 2/3 “super majority” which, at least according to the constitution, could allow it to pass legislation over President Maduro’s veto, remove judges, and force the removal of ministers.
The victory unleashed a wave of euphoria in the region by opponents of Maduro and his populist socialist government, and more broadly, those frustrated with the abysmal and deteriorating conditions in the country, including widespread shortages of food, medicines, and basic goods, rampant crime, government corruption, and narco-trafficking, to name a few. In the context of Latin America more broadly, the opposition victory has been interpreted in the context of the November 22 election of conservative Mauricio Macri to the presidency of Argentina, the announcement by Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa that he will not run for a fourth term, the economic crisis in Brazil with the looming impeachment of its president Dilma Rousseff, and the rapprochement between Cuba and the United States, as a trend away from leftist populism across the region.
The victory unleashed a wave of euphoria in the region by opponents of Maduro and his populist socialist government, and more broadly, those frustrated with the abysmal and deteriorating conditions in the country, including widespread shortages of food, medicines, and basic goods, rampant crime, government corruption, and narco-trafficking, to name a few. In the context of Latin America more broadly, the opposition victory has been interpreted in the context of the November 22 election of conservative Mauricio Macri to the presidency of Argentina, the announcement by Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa that he will not run for a fourth term, the economic crisis in Brazil with the looming impeachment of its president Dilma Rousseff, and the rapprochement between Cuba and the United States, as a trend away from leftist populism across the region.
Venezuelan Election
2015: Results by Electoral circuits, Blue denotes
circuits won by the MUD
and Red denotes those won by the PSUV.
While Venezuela
and the region are indeed in the midst of a process of significant
transformation, before arriving at the end of the country’s destructive 17-year
experiment with populist socialism, it may be on the brink of a chaotic and
dangerous phase of political and economic warfare with grave implications for
both the country and its neighbors.
Anatomy of the
Coming Crisis:
The potential for
catastrophe in Venezuela within the coming months arises from a potentially
destructive interaction between three dynamics:
(1) The deepening economic and
humanitarian crisis,
(2) The posture of Maduro and his inner circle to confront
the solid electoral mandate given to the MUD in the December 6 election, rather
than accepting it and working with the opposition to govern the country, and
(3) The structure of the current confrontation, pushing both sides toward a stalemate with escalating
tension, augmenting rather than resolving Venezuela’s deepening crises.
Sources of
Chavista Leverage against the Opposition:
Maduro and his supporters (hereafter the “Chavistas,” since they are
generally united more by Maduro’s predecessor Hugo Chavez, than Maduro himself) possesses a number of
powerful weapons to counter the MUD “supermajority” in the just elected
national assembly to be seated on January 5, 2016. They have already shown their disposition to
use them to work against, rather than with, that elected majority, even if the
legality and constitutionality of those tools are dubious.
First, the
Chavistas continue to dominate Venezuela’s judicial institutions, allowing them
to impede attempts by the newly elected national assembly to pass laws that go
against the strategic or material interests of the Chavista government. Indeed, Maduro has already obligated 13
Supreme Court justices to retire early, and in a special session on December
23, the outgoing national assembly, dominated by the Chavista “United Socialist
Party of Venezuela” (PSUV) appointed their replacements, denying the incoming, MUD-dominated assembly
with the opportunity to install judges acceptable to them, when the normal
terms of the sitting judges expire.
Ensuring that
the Venezuelan Supreme Court and its critical 7 person constitutional chamber
will continue to be filled by judges beholden to the Chavistas, will allow them
to use the court to rule unconstitutional, or otherwise invalidate laws passed
by the new National Assembly.
While the
appointment of the new judges by the Chavista-dominated outgoing National
Assembly may be of questionable legality, both the courts who would decide the
issue, and the military and law enforcement organizations which would enforce
the decisions, are also in the hands of the Chavistas. Indeed, it has been relatively common during
the past 17 years of Chavista government for the opposition to complain of the
unconstitutionality of a government initiative, only to find such complaints
disregarded by the Venezuela’s Supreme Court.
While the
incoming national assembly, with their two-thirds super majority, could
potentially dismiss the newly appointed judges, again, those dismissed would
almost certainly contest their removal, and the courts to which it would fall
to resolve the dispute, as well as the law enforcement institutions who would
be called upon to remove them, are dominated by Chavistas.
Second, even
without the help of the newly “packed” Venezuelan Supreme Court, President
Maduro has the power to block legislation from the incoming National Assembly
by vetoing it, as he has already promised to do with respect to a law granting
amnesty for political prisoners that the incoming MUD legislators have
prioritized to pass upon assuming power on January 5th[6]. While the 112 seats won by the MUD in the
new congress theoretically allows them to override such a presidential veto,
the incoming MUD assembly members are an ideologically diverse group, with a
range of approaches for confronting or working with the government. Although the granting of amnesty for
political prisoners is the first priority of the MUD and will probably find
them unified, they are less likely to vote as a block on other issues in the
months to come.
Moreover, it is
likely that the government will work to reduce the opposition’s effective
ranks, through a combination of intimidation, and cooperation, as they did with
the 64 National Assembly seats won by the MUD in September 2010.
Beyond his veto,
President Maduro has considerable powers through the 29 ministries under the
“Executive Power,” as well as Chavista dominance of other organs of the state
including the “Citizen” power (the Public Defender’s office, the Attorney
General’s Office, and the Public Ministry), among others.
Such dominance
allows the Chavistas to exercise day-to-day control over the country even
without the concurrence of the National Assembly. It is possible that the outgoing
Chavista-dominated assembly could confer on Maduro “rule-by decree” authority, as
it did in September 2013[7], and as the
outgoing Chavista National Assembly did in November 2010, to prevent the
authority of then President Hugo Chavez from being impacted by the incoming
National Assembly in which the opposition had won a greater voice.[8]
Indeed, even
without such special powers, the arbiter of whether Maduro is within the limits
of the constitution in exercising his existing legislative authority[9] is the
courts, which are in the hands of the Chavistas.
In addition to
the powers of the government organizations still in Chavista control, while the
Venezuelan National Assembly, in principle, will have control over federal
spending, the executive has created funds, such as Fonden, which are relatively
independent of legislative authority, and
allow Maduro to continue select activities even without the assembly
authorizing funds for the government, although the amount of money actually in
such funds is unclear.
At the same
time, such “power of the purse,” while an important tool, will also be, in
practice, very difficult for the National Assembly to exercise, since
de-funding government programs would, in principle, allow the Chavistas to
blame the opposition not only for the economic hardship caused by such acts,
but for the suffering occasioned by the conditions of the broken Venezuelan
economy in general.
Finally, the
Chavistas have demonstrated an intent to create a National Communal Assembly
that parallels the Venezuelan National Assembly[10]. This body would be a congress of the
“Communal councils,” created by then president Hugo Chavez and the
PSUV-dominated legislature in June 2010 [11],
after the attempt to establish the councils through a popular referendum
in 2007 failed. Anticipating the
potential utility of the communes as a tool of Chavismo at the grassroots
level, President Maduro increased the 2015 budget for the communal councils by
62% over its 2014 level.[12]
The creation of
a national communal assembly, while lacking constitutional authority to make
laws, allows the Chavistas to create the illusion among its followers of support
from “a legislature” for its program.
Indeed, outgoing head of the national assembly Diosdado Cabello
symbolically invited the communal council to sit in the National Assembly
building until the incoming Congress takes office on January 5th[13]. The presence of the communal assembly,
publicly debating national policy issues in the physical space of the
Venezuelan legislature with the blessing of the executive branch, and the need
for the incoming legitimately elected national assembly to displace or disband
it when it assumes power on January 5, ironically creates the opportunity for
Maduro to mobilize followers around accusations that the opposition is going
against the “will of the people” by doing so.
The outcome of
the present struggle between the incoming National Assembly on one side, and
Chavistas, who control the courts, ministries and organization of government,
cannot be readily predicted through an analysis of the powers of each body
under the constitution, since during the past 17 years, the Chavistas have
arguably repeatedly shown a willingness to stretch the government’s
constitutional authority beyond its limits, or (some might say), simply ignore
constitutional limits to their powers[14].
In the upcoming struggle, the Venezuelan constitution is not a framework
which establishes the rules of the game and the powers of each side, but
rather, a weak tool for legitimization in a political discourse in which
multiple actors, including the Venezuelan military, police, and other
institutional actors, decide where to place their loyalties.
While, as argued
in the preceding paragraphs, the Chavistas will have considerable authority to
ignore or override the newly elected National Assembly, one of the most likely
scenarios will be a dangerous paralysis of government in the context of an
escalating national economic and political crisis. In the coming months, it is probable that the
opposition-dominated National Assembly will pass important laws that challenge
the power of the Chavistas, which President Maduro will subsequently veto, some
of which may be overridden by the Assembly, then challenged by the Chavistas in
the courts, including the constitutional chamber of the supreme court, which is
likely to declare them unconstitutional.
Similarly, the Maduro government is likely to continue to launch new
initiatives and execute existing programs in perceived contradiction to the
constitution or new laws passed by the assembly, leading it to challenge the
government in court, to use its power of the purse to defund the government, or
both.
In the extreme
case, such conflict and defunding could precipitate the collapse of the final
vestiges of the Venezuelan government and productive sector. If oil production and export by the national
oil company PdVSA were affected, such a crisis could simultaneously force
Venezuela to default on its debts and lose the last remnants of its ability to
import basic goods for the Venezuelan people[15],
a particularly grave occurrence given that Venezuela's own industrial
and agricultural capacity have been decimated over 17 years of Bolivarian rule.
In addition to
the increase in the already enormous suffering of the Venezuelan people, the
bitter discourse regarding who was to blame would likely mobilize Venezuelans
on all side and produce civil unrest going far beyond that seen in 2014[16], if not occasioning an outright collapse of
public order. Indeed, Venezuelan
security experts consulted for this work anticipate that the armed forces might
intervene if the conflict between powers extend for several months.
Even if the
situation does not evolve into civil unrest, the confrontational posture
adopted by Maduro will increase the likelihood that the opposition supports the
collection of signatures to hold a referendum to recall President Maduro, when
its constitutionally defined window to do so presents itself in mid-2016. The Chavista-dominated Supreme Court or the
National Electoral Council (CNE) will
likely rule to block any such effort, and the fight to take the recall referendum
forward is one of the focal points around which violent struggle could emerge.
Key Factors in
Determining the Outcome:
There are a
number of important factors that will impact whether or how the scenarios of
political conflict, economic collapse and violence could play out:
The choice of
who is elected as head of the National Assembly when the new body convenes on
January 5 could be critical. Some of the
candidates mentioned to date include Henry Ramos Allup and Julio Borges. Borges’ party, Primer Justicia, arguably
represents the new generation of politics within the Venezuelan
opposition. Neither candidate, however,
fully represents the MUD, which features a diverse array of groups, agendas,
and political orientations. Ramos’
party, Acción Democrática, is one of Venezuela’s two establishment parties of
the pre-Chavez era, would arguably present an attractive target for Chavista
efforts to characterize the National Assembly as dominated by the interests of
Venezuela’s pre-Chavez political establishment and business elites, although
some consulted for this analysis, who know Ramos, suggest that his experience
could be useful in managing the dangerous political showdown likely to
come. Yet others consulted for this
analysis suggest that the bargaining approach embodied by Ramos could turn out
very badly.
Beyond the
choice of who will preside over the incoming National Assembly, it is also not
clear to what degree the Chavistas will succeed in dividing or coopting members
of the MUD coalition. Indeed, if the
opposition is able to overcome the previously analyzed impediments to governing
and rally the Venezuelan people around concrete results, it could actually
attract some defectors from the PSUV. A
number of PSUV delegates are said to be upset by the widespread corruption and
poor governance in Venezuela, while others would presumably be attracted by the
power and access to resources potentially available by being part of the
majority in the assembly.
Another key
question is who the Venezuelan public will blame if conditions in the country
continue to deteriorate in the context of political conflict between the
Chavistas and the MUD. If the people
believe that the newly elected members of the National Assembly are making
conditions in the country worse, rather than better, they could turn against
them. Yet if, on balance, they perceive
that an intransigent President Maduro is thwarting their will to change,
expressed in the December 6 election, the wrath of the people may turn on the
Chavistas in general.
Beyond the
perception of the people regarding “who is to blame,” the posture of the
Venezuelan military will be more important than ever in the outcome of the
conflict. During the election, Minister
of Defense Vladimir Padrino Lopez reportedly made it clear to President Maduro
that the military would not condone large scale electoral fraud, nor take to
the streets to repress Venezuelans, if the perception of government vote fraud
produced civic unrest[17]. Indeed, the
military is believed to have taken a similar position in December 2007 when
Hugo Chavez lost a key national referendum, forcing him to accept the results.
In the coming
months, the military may be called upon to again make such a decision if a
major constitutional dispute forces it to choose between following the orders
of Maduro, or the laws passed by the Congress.
The continuing
stream of criminal indictments by U.S. and other courts against Venezuelan
officials, including the indictment of the head of Venezuela’s National Guard,
Nestor Reverol[18], and charges against the
nephews of Venezuelan First Lady Cecilia Flores[19], is also likely to play an important, albeit
indirect, role in the outcome of the Venezuelan crisis. As the military, and other agents of the
Venezuelan government face decisions regarding following the orders of Maduro
or the laws passed by the National Assembly, they may also be influenced by
such indictments. While the Maduro
government almost certainly will not extradite those indicted by the U.S., such
cases will sew uncertainty among those who are involved in narco-trafficking
within the military and Venezuelan government, regarding whether they can risk
traveling abroad in light of possible sealed indictments against them. Moreover, as an increasing number of persons
are captured and chose to cooperate with international authorities, and as an
increasing number of officials have their assets outside Venezuela frozen due
to accusations of wrongdoing, those who remain will increasingly fear losing
their ill-gotten gains, or going to jail when the government eventually
changes, if they do not act while they can to “cut a deal.” In addition, those indicted, if not removed
from office will further undermine the credibility of the government, fuel more
fractures within the ruling party and nomenclature and increase tensions within
the Armed Forces.
In short, the
unfolding of such criminal cases, in combination with mounting evidence that
the Chavista regime is on its last legs, may change the calculus of the
military. Instead of conspiring to help
the President Maduro and his allies hold on to power, they may seek ways to
cooperate with the opposition and international law enforcement to escape
future criminal charges, as well as to protect the integrity of the Venezuelan
military as an institution.
How the broader
international community reacts to the unfolding drama will also impact the
outcome. With the loss of power of the
Peronists in Argentina’s November 22, 2015 elections, the unfolding political
crisis in Brazil, and Cuba’s rapprochement with the United States, Venezuela no
longer has dependable allies to shield it from international scrutiny and
pressure the way it once did. Indeed,
with Venezuela’s diminished ability to provide subsidized petroleum to
PetroCaribe, even its leverage over nations in the Caribbean in the past year
has arguably weakened.
The People’s
Republic of China (PRC) may also play a key role in the transition. The PRC has already loaned Venezuela more
than $56 billion since 2005[20], and has
funds that could help the Venezuelan government overcome the present
crisis. Yet it also has demonstrated
caution in providing new funds to Venezuela when political leadership in the
country is uncertain, as occurred during the 2012-2013 transition from Hugo Chavez
to Nicolas Maduro[21].
Western
companies and institutions such as the International Monetary Fund may
similarly play a role in re-negotiating loans and providing new capital and
investment for Venezuela, but it is doubtful that they will do so with Venezuela
in the midst of a political crisis, while the efforts by the Chavistas to
circumvent the outcome of the December elections casting doubts on the
government’s commitment to rule of law in general, let alone honor its
financial commitments.
The Path Forward:
In the December 6th election, the Venezuelan
people expressed a strong desire to turn away from the policies of Chavismo and
more pointedly the Maduro government as the path to growth, development and
greater fairness and justice. There is
arguably, however, no consensus within the opposition nor the government about
the path forward, yet there are reasons to be concerned regarding how the new
political dynamic set into motion by the December 6th election will turn out.
The United
States has a strong interest in helping Venezuela to avoid that Venezuela’s
political struggle degenerates into economic collapse, disorder and violence
harming not only Venezuelans, but potentially generating adverse impacts on the
nation’s neighbors in South America and the Caribbean basin.
At the very
least, the United States can help Venezuela’s neighbors to prepare for the
possible consequences of such a disaster.
At best, it can work through multilateral institutions, bilateral
diplomacy, and conditional economic assistance, to ensure that the bold choice
of the Venezuelan people on December 6 succeeds in re-establishing a framework
of democracy, rule of law, and healthy independent governing institutions in
the country.
One of the most
powerful tools that the United States has for bringing about change in
Venezuela, ironically, is its continued pursuit of those in Venezuela’s
leadership who have engaged in narco-trafficking and other illegal behavior,
making them subject to prosecution in the U.S. under the provisions of
international law. As the incoming
Venezuelan Congress struggles to fight corruption and restore democratic
accountability to its institutions, U.S. authorities should reach out to it, to
pass new laws in Venezuela, or strengthen existing ones, that strengthen its
hand in doing so. These potentially
include laws in areas such as extradition, law enforcement cooperation, and the
sharing of financial data. Presuming a
positive outcome of the struggle, the U.S. should also be prepared to provide
assistance, through appropriate State and Justice Department channels, to help
the government to strengthen the capacity of judicial institutions, re-take
control of Venezuela’s prison system, and to purge corruption in the police
through a combination of confidence tests and changes to the nation’s “basic
law” as necessary.
The United
States should also engage in a dialogue with the Venezuelan military, to
include indirect interactions through the militaries of other nations which
engage regularly with the Venezuelans, regarding the importance, as the
situation deteriorates, of not engaging in activities that will bring about
bloodshed, undermine the prestige of the military as key defender of the
constitutional order, and lead to actions for which individual members may be
held criminally liable in the future[22].
The United
States can also assist by coordinating with Venezuela’s neighbors Guyana,
Colombia, and Brazil, to augment their security in the event that the destabilization
of the country gives rise to rash action by its leadership such as military
action against the Essequibo region of Guyana, or la Guajira region of
Colombia, bordering Venezuela. The
United States should also be prepared to support Venezuela’s neighbors if such
a collapse occasions a cross-border flood of refugees, or a significant spike
in narco-trafficking and criminal activity along Venezuela’s borders.
Beyond such
preparations, the United States should also work through the Organization of
American States (OAS) to hold Venezuela accountable for adhering to the
democratic framework of its own constitution, including the invocation the OAS
Democratic Charter if necessary, suspending Venezuela from the organization and
sanctioning it, if it fails to do so[23].
At the same
time, the United States should also be prepared to commit resources through the
same Inter-American system to support Venezuela’s resolution of institutional
disputes and weathering of the economic crisis, possibly including emergency
loans through the Inter-American Development Bank once the resolution of
political disputes in the country, and the demonstration of political will by
the Venezuelan executive, permit such aid.
Indeed, the
present crisis represents an opportunity for the United States to help restore
the OAS to its rightful place as the lead multilateral institution for the
countries of the Americas to collectively address their security and other
challenges. OAS Secretary General Luis
Almagro has already demonstrated the potential for the OAS to play such a role,
through the leadership that he has already shown in publicly fighting for
adherence to democratic processes in Venezuela[24].
Nonetheless,
assistance through the OAS or other organizations whether by the OAS will also
require a commitment of the executive to work with the opposition to govern and
resolve Venezuela’s crisis together, a commitment to adhere to the nation’s own
constitution, and the release of the estimated 80 political prisoners in the
country[25], such as Leopoldo Lopez, former
Caracas mayor Antonio Ledezma, and former mayor of San Cristobal Daniel
Ceballos[26].
As one element
of Venezuela’s economic stabilization, the United States can also play a role
in supporting Venezuela’s efforts to salvage its national petroleum company,
PdVSA, and restructure its oil sector.
Restoring PdVSA to a reasonable level of functionality will be necessary
to produce the revenues that the country needs in the short term to import the
basic needs of its people.
To date, the Maduro
regime has shown no intention to work with the newly elected National Assembly
on this issue. Thus helping Venezuela to
rescue its economy, and its society, may have to wait until the Maduro
administration is either driven from office, or forced to compromise.
The U.S. should
also coordinate with other key players such as the PRC regarding assistance to
Venezuela. The U.S. can make making it
clear to the PRC that it will not object to it providing loans to, and
investment in, Venezuela to help the country weather the crisis and rebuild its
economy, but that such engagement must take place under conditions of
transparency, and respect for the nation’s laws and constitution. The U.S. should emphasize that it will not
tolerate Chinese banks providing funds to the Venezuelan Executive through
extra-constitutional channels, or otherwise interfering in the internal affairs
of the country by helping the Chavistas prevail in their institutional struggle
against the opposition.
For China, such
coordination with the U.S. over assistance to Venezuela arguably presents its
government and country with a “win win” situation, insofar as that it would
help the PRC to secure its at-risk investments and pursue its economic
interests in a more economically functional country, in an atmosphere of
predictability, while at the same time, helping it to establish a more
constructive relationship with the United States in the region.
Conclusion:
Through the opposition victory in the December
6 Venezuelan elections, it is possible to foresee an eventual end to 17 years
of populist socialism which has destroyed the Venezuelan economy and governing
institutions and polarized its people.
Yet in approaching that end, Venezuela is arguably passing through one
of the most dangerous periods in its contemporary history. The actions taken by all parties in
Venezuela, by the United States, and by the rest of the international
community, will have an enduring effect far beyond Venezuela’s borders.
About The Author:
Dr. R. Evan Ellis is
an analyst of Latin American economic, political, and security issues, with a
research focus on Latin America’s relationships with China and other external
actors, including India, Russia, and Iran. He is an associate professor of
Latin American studies at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
(SSI), and he has previously served as a professor with the William J. Perry
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies in Washington, D.C. Dr. Ellis has
authored over 120 works, including China in Latin America: The Whats and
Wherefores (Lynne Rienner, 2009), The Strategic Dimension of Chinese Engagement
with Latin America (Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, 2013), and
articles in national security, finance, and technical journals. He has
presented his work in a broad range of business and government forums in 25
countries on 4 continents.
He has
discussed his work regarding China and other external actors in Latin America
on a number of radio and television programs, including CNN International, CNN
En Español, Voice of America, and Radio Marti, and has testified on Chinese
activities in Latin America before the U.S. Congress. He is also cited
regularly in the print media in both the United States and Latin America,
including in the Washington Times, Bloomberg, America Economia, DEF, and
InfoBAE. Dr. Ellis holds a Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in
comparative politics from Purdue University.
Cite This Article:
Ellis, R. Evan. "Venezuela: Into the Abyss?" IndraStra 1, no. 12 (2015): 0582. http://www.indrastra.com/2015/12/FEATURED-Venezuela-Into-Abyss-0582.html. ISSN 2381-3652
Ellis, R. Evan. "Venezuela: Into the Abyss?" IndraStra 1, no. 12 (2015): 0582. http://www.indrastra.com/2015/12/FEATURED-Venezuela-Into-Abyss-0582.html. ISSN 2381-3652
End-Note:
[1] The author is professor of Latin American Studies with
the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. The views expressed here are strictly his
own.
[2] William Neumann, “Venezuelan Opposition Claims a Rare
Victory: A Legislative Majority,” New York Times, December 6, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/07/world/americas/venezuela-elections.html?_r=0.
[3] See, for example, Andres Oppenheimer, “Andres
Oppenheimer: Obama's big opportunity in Latin America,” Miami Herald, December 12, 2015, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/broward/article49303765.html.
[4] Diego Ore, “Venezuela's outgoing Congress names 13
Supreme Court justices,” Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-idUSKBN0U626820151223.
[5] Kejal Vyas, “In Venezuela, Lame-Duck Parliament Plans
to Pack Supreme Court,” The Wall Street
Journal, December 15, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/in-venezuela-lame-duck-parliament-plans-to-pack-supreme-court-1450233104.
[6] Andrew Cawthorne, “Triumphant Venezuela opposition
looks to boost economy, free prisoners,” Reuters,
December 7, 2015,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-election-idUSKBN0TP03Y20151208.
[7] Emilia Diaz-Struck and John Forero, “Venezuelan
president Maduro given power to rule by decree,” Washington Post, November 19, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/venezuelan-president-maduro-given-power-to-rule-by-decree/2013/11/19/af304c3c-516b-11e3-9ee6-2580086d8254_story.html.
[8] Philip Sherwell, “Chavez given power to rule by decree
for 18 months,” Daily Telegraph,
December 18, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/venezuela/8211537/Chavez-given-power-to-rule-by-decree-for-18-months.html.
[9] See, for example, “Central Bank of Venezuela to
transfer USD 3.7 billion to Fonden,” El
Universal, January 14, 2014, http://www.eluniversal.com/economia/140114/central-bank-of-venezuela-to-transfer-usd-37-billion-to-fonden.
[10] “¿Qué es el Parlamento Comunal que instaló el chavismo luego de perder la
mayorÃa legislativa?,” El Nacional, December 16, 2015, http://www.el-nacional.com/bbc_mundo/Parlamento-Comunal-instalo-chavismo-legislativa_0_757724376.html.
[11] Jaime Lopez, “Venezuela aprueba la primera ley sobre comunas y busca
legalizar el trueque,” El Mundo, June
23, 2010, http://www.elmundo.es/america/2010/06/23/venezuela/1277310400.html.
[12] Nick Miroff, “On Venezuela’s communes, idyllic future
is just over the rainbow,” Washington
Post, November 25, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/on-venezuelas-communes-idyllic-future-is-just-over-the-rainbow/2014/11/25/838f3bf4-6602-11e4-ab86-46000e1d0035_story.html.
[13] “Cabello instala un Parlamento Comunal dentro de la Asamblea Nacional,” Diario de las Americas, December 15,
2015, http://www.diariolasamericas.com/4848_venezuela/3516371_cabello-instala-un-parlamento-comunal-dentro-de-la-asamblea-nacional.html.
[14] See, for example, William Partlett, “Hugo Chavez’s
Constitutional Legacy,” Brookings,
March 14, 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/03/14-chavez-constutional-legacy.
[15] Juan Francisco Alonso, “Jueza condena a Leopoldo López a casi 14 años de
cárcel por hechos del 12F,” El Universal,
September 10, 2015, http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/150910/jueza-condena-a-leopoldo-lopez-a-casi-14-anos-de-carcel-por-hechos-del.
[16] See Carlos Garcia Rawlins, “Venezuela’s Military Saved
Democracy (For Its Own Reasons),” Reuters,
December 17, 2015, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/12/17/how-venezuela-s-military-saved-democracy-for-its-own-reasons.html.
[17] Julia Harte and Nate Raymond, “U.S. to charge
Venezuela's National Guard chief with drug trafficking,” Reuters, December 15, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-usa-idUSKBN0TY2RV20151216.
[18] Nicholas Casey and William Newman, “Venezuela May Have
Indirectly Aided U.S. Inquiry of Official,” New
York Times, December 16, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/17/world/americas/venezuela-may-have-indirectly-aided-us-inquiry-of-official.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fus&action=click&contentCollection=us®ion=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=9&pgtype=sectionfront&_r=0
[19] “China-Latin America Finance Database,” Interamerican
Dialogue, accessed December 20, 2015, http://thedialogue.org/map_list
[20] See, for example, R. Evan Ellis, “Chinese Engagement
with the ALBA Countries: A Relationship of Mutual Convenience?” in Decline of the U.S. Hegemony?: A Challenge
of ALBA and a New Latin American Integration of the Twenty-First Century. Bruce M. Bagley and Magdalena Defort,
eds. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015,
pp. 345-368.
[21] A similar recommendation was made in March 2015 by
Ambassador Patrick Duddy, “Political Crisis in Venezuela,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 2015, http://www.cfr.org/venezuela/political-crisis-venezuela/p36356.
[22] See, for example, “US ready to invoke Inter-American
Charter in Venezuela if necessary,” El
Universal, March 12, 2014, http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/140312/us-ready-to-invoke-inter-american-charter-in-venezuela-if-necessary.
[23] “OAS chief slams Venezuela over election observation,”
Reuters, November 10, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-election-idUSKCN0SZ33U20151110.
[24] “Winning Big, Venezuela's Opposition Now Plans Push
For Prisoner Release,” National Public
Radio, December 12, 2015, http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/12/12/459054144/winning-big-venezuelas-opposition-now-plans-push-for-prisoner-release.
[25] John Otis, “FJohn Otis,
“Freeing Political Prisoners Leads Agenda for Victors of Venezuela’s Election,”
The Wall Street Journal, December 7, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/freeing-political-prisoners-leads-agenda-for-victors-of-venezuelas-election-1449535579
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