Following the 2002 Bali bombings, Indonesia confronted a seemingly unmanageable terrorist problem. Over the next decade, however, the country became widely viewed as a counter-terrorism success story as the threat from al-Qaeda-linked or -inspired jihadist groups declined dramatically. Unfortunately, the transnational pull of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, and the emergence of the Islamic State, risk undermining Indonesia’s counter-terrorism successes.
By: Andrew
Zammit and Muhammad
Iqbal
Following the 2002 Bali bombings, Indonesia confronted a seemingly unmanageable terrorist problem. Over the next decade, however, the country became widely viewed as a counter-terrorism success story as the threat from al-Qaeda-linked or -inspired jihadist groups declined dramatically. Unfortunately, the transnational pull of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, and the emergence of the Islamic State, risk undermining Indonesia’s counter-terrorism successes.
Image Attribute: Detachment 88, Counter Terrorism Unit performing drill, / Source: Wikimedia Commons
Background
In the early
2000s, a range of jihadist groups operated across the Indonesian archipelago.
These were not initially considered a major security concern by the government,
as Indonesia prioritized rebuilding its economy after the Asian Financial
Crisis and consolidating its democracy after overcoming a 32-year-long
dictatorship. Additionally, most of these groups confined their violence to the
islands of Maluku and Sulawesi, where communal conflicts had broken out between
Muslims and Christians.
One such
group, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), had a close relationship with al-Qaeda, dating
back to the 1980s foreign fighter mobilization against the Soviets in
Afghanistan. JI’s co-founders Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir were
hesitant to follow Osama bin Laden’s 1998 call for attacks on Western military
and civilian targets, but one faction of JI chose to join al-Qaeda’s global
war. This faction was led by Riduan Isamuddin, a.k.a. Hambali, who had a close
operational relationship with 9/11 architect Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Hambali’s
JI faction bombed churches across Indonesia, unsuccessfully attempted to attack
the U.S. Embassy in Singapore and in October 2002, bombed tourist venues in
Bali, killing 202 people. [1]
In response,
Indonesia launched a police-led counter-terrorism campaign, assisted by
Australia, the United States and other countries, arresting hundreds of
suspected militants. Hambali himself was arrested in Thailand, suspected of
planning an attack against the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit
in Bangkok (The Age, August 15, 2003). One of the Bali bombers,
Noordin Mohammad Top, stepped in to Hambali’s role and continued attacking
Western-associated targets in Indonesia. His faction bombed the Jakarta Marriot
Hotel in September 2003, the Australian Embassy in September 2004 and Bali
tourist venues again in October 2005 (Kompas, August 9, 2003).
Each bombing
led to further arrests by Detachment 88, a new counter-terrorism unit within
the Indonesian National Police. In response to the crackdown, JI’s leadership
distanced itself from Noordin’s breakaway faction and eschewed mass-casualty
attacks on foreign targets. Instead, they sought a secure base in Poso, a
Sulawesi town recovering from recent communal conflict. JI’s Poso network
focused on killing Christians and government officials, and in 2005, shocked
the nation by beheading three Christian schoolgirls (Jakarta Post, April 26, 2013). In 2007, Detachment
88 killed and arrested many members of the network, prompting JI to cease
violence and focus on gradually rebuilding itself.
JI was further
weakened in 2008, when their former leader Abu Bakar Bashir created a new
organization, Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), taking many JI members with him.
[2] Noordin’s network, also weakened by counter-terrorism efforts, failed to
launch another major attack until July 2009, when it bombed Jakarta’s Marriot
and Ritz-Carlton hotels. Detachment 88 killed Noordin in raids after the
attack, and his network did not recover (Jakarta Post, August 8, 2009).
Following
these setbacks, Indonesian jihadism took a different direction. Leading
figures, including clerics and fighters, rejected both the Noordin network’s
strategy of prioritizing foreign targets and JI’s approach of favoring outreach
over action. Instead they established a training camp in Aceh province, which
had experienced decades of separatist conflict. The camp involved every major
Indonesian jihadist group except for JI, and received funding from Abu Bakar
Bashir’s JAT. Their plan was to hold territory and gradually build up an
insurgency, which they saw as the approach taken in the southern Philippines,
southern Thailand and Chechnya. [3]
They
miscalculated. The aspiring insurgents lacked popular support, and locals soon
tipped off the police. In early 2010, Detachment 88 launched raids, killing
eight of the militants and arresting 48 others in the following months. [4]
Aman Abdurrahman, the camp’s leading spiritual authority, was jailed. Bashir was
later jailed for providing funding (Kompas, June 19, 2011).
Indonesian
jihadism, thereafter, only continued at a low level. Fragmented networks of
jihadists turned to small-scale attacks, robbing stores and killing police
officers. Attempted attacks on foreign targets became rare, except for a
possible plot against tourists in Bali in 2012 and a failed attempt to bomb the
Myanmar Embassy in 2013 (Jakarta Globe, March 22, 2012; Jakarta Post, January 22, 2014). Counter-terrorism
efforts had suppressed the most violent networks, but pools of supporters
remained and waited for opportunities, which were soon provided by the conflict
in Syria.
Indonesian
Jihadists in Syria and Iraq
From 2012,
Indonesia’s radical Islamist organizations watched the Syrian war closely. Abu
Bakar Bashir described the conflict as a “university for jihad education,” and
Indonesians joined a range of groups, including the Islamic State (then the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria—ISIS) and al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra.
[5] Their first “martyr” was announced in November 2013, by a Syrian Islamist
militia, the Suqour al-Izz Brigade. They claimed Riza Fardi, an Indonesian who
had been studying in Yemen and then joined the Syrian uprising, had died
fighting in eastern Ghouta (Inside
Indonesia, August 3).
By 2014, the
Islamic State had become the most popular group for Indonesian jihadists, who
began to appear in its propaganda (Tempo, January 5). The al-Hayat Center, an Islamic
State media outlet, released an eight-minute Bahasa Indonesian-language video
on July 23, 2014, called “Join the Ranks” (Tempo, January 4). The video featured a man later
identified as Bahrum Syah, who was a follower of Amman Abdurrahman and left
Indonesia in March 2014, at the age of 29 (Kompas, August 6, 2014; Kompas, August 8, 2014). Bahrum Syah called upon
“the brothers in Indonesia, [to] have patience, be upright upontauhid (monotheism)
and put all your effort into using your physical and financial strength to
emigrate to the Islamic State, for hijrah (migration) today is
obligatory. It is an obligation decreed by Allah the Exalted.” [6]
In September
2014, Indonesian and Malaysian Islamic State fighters announced the existence
of a Bahasa-speaking unit called “Katibah Nusantara Lid Daulah Islamiyah,”
meaning the Malay Archipelago unit of the Islamic State. [7] The unit has at
least 22 members with combat experience, reportedly brought together because
their lack of English and Arabic proficiency created a need for their own unit
(Kompas, May 26, 2014).
There are
competing estimates of how many Indonesians are involved with jihadist groups
in Syria and Iraq. One of the most widely-used estimates is that up to 500 have
joined the conflict, including fighters, but also their wives and families (The Strategist, July 17). Around 40 have reportedly been
killed (The Australian, July 1). Given Indonesia’s Muslim
population is an estimated 209 million, 500 people does not represent a
dramatically large level of involvement in Syria and Iraq. [8] Despite this,
the conflict’s potential to reinvigorate Indonesian jihadism has led to a
proactive response by the government.
Developments
at Home
Indonesian
authorities are greatly concerned about the foreign fighter mobilization and
have arrested several suspects. One suspect was Afif Abdul Majid, who had been
the head of JAT’s Central Java branch, had helped fund the failed Aceh camp and
was placed on the U.S. Treasury Department’s sanctions list for his terrorist
involvement (U.S. Department of Treasury, September 18, 2013). He was
arrested in August 2014, after returning from Syria. In December 2014, police
arrested a group of six people suspected of planning to join the Islamic State,
and then arrested a seventh person, thought to have facilitated their attempted
travel (Kompas, December 27, 2014). In March 2015, three
suspected Syria returnees were arrested (Jakarta Post, March 27). That same month, Turkish
police arrested 16 Indonesians suspected of trying to join the Islamic State (Kompas, March 19). Indonesian police then arrested
four men for allegedly arranging travel documents (for these 16 suspected
Islamic State supporters and 21 others) (Malay Mail, March 23). 12 of the suspects deported
from Turkey were subsequently entered into a de-radicalization program (Kompas, March 26).
However,
securing convictions has been difficult. Prosecutors could not convict Afif
Abdul Majid for his activities in Syria, even though he admitted training with
the Islamic State and pledging allegiance to them (Jakarta Post, July 10). The government banned the
militant organization in August 2014, but it is not currently clear what the
ban means in practice (Tempo, January 5).
Indonesia’s
jihadist groups have increasingly taken inspiration from the Islamic State.
Aman Abdurrahman, currently imprisoned for his role in the Aceh camp, pledged
allegiance in an online oath to Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Jakarta Post, June 14, 2014). However, support to
the Islamic State has not been uncontested. Abu Bakar Bashir pledged allegiance
to the organization from prison, but the decision split JAT (Kompas, July 14, 2014). Bashir’s own sons and top
aides refused to support the Islamic State and were expelled, going on to form
a new group, Jemaah Ansharusy Syariah (JAS – Group of Supporters of Shari’a).
Meanwhile JI, which has been quietly redeveloping its military capacity, has
sided with Jabhat al-Nusra against the Islamic State (Tempo, January 5).
The Islamic
State has also gained support from Santoso, the most infamous Indonesian
terrorist currently at large. Santoso is a former JI member who became head of
JAT’s Central Sulawesi affiliate in 2010 (IPAC[Jakarta], April 15). By late 2012, he formed a
coalition of local jihadist groups in Poso, called Mujahidin Indonesia Timur
(MIT), that repeatedly ambushed and killed police officers. His network
maintains ties to jihadists elsewhere in Indonesia, as well as in Malaysia and
the Philippines (Janes
Terrorism & Insurgency Centre (JITC), February 7, 2013). Escaping multiple
raids and manhunts, Santoso has since become Indonesia’s most wanted jihadist.
Santoso has
released videos taunting police, described himself as “the Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
of Indonesia,” and was one of the first Indonesian jihadists to pledge allegiance
to IS (IPAC [Jakarta], April 15). His group has not been
officially recognized by the Islamic State, but it has received support from
jihadists abroad. For instance, on September 2014, police arrested four Uyghurs
who had entered Indonesia with fake passports and tried to join Santoso’s
militia (Jakarta Post, July 13). They were suspected of
having been part of a group that attacked a train station in Kunming in
southwestern China (Jakarta Post, February 10).
Another
concern has been of Islamic State-connected or -inspired bombings within
Indonesia. On February 23, 2015, a small chlorine bomb exploded in a mall on
the outskirts of Jakarta, but no one was harmed (Kompas, February 26). Police blamed the attack on
Syria returnees, although no suspects have been named (Jakarta Globe, July 11). In July, another mall
bombing occurred, which the police linked to the Islamic State’s call for
attacks during Ramadan (Kompas, July 11). On August 12, 2015, Indonesian
police arrested three men who were allegedly planning an attack to coincide
with Independence Day celebrations (Kompas, August 14). The planned attack apparently
intended to target police as well as several places of worship in Central Java
(Kompas, August 14). Police confiscated 21 improvised
explosives and Islamic State-related items from the suspects’ homes (Kompas, August 13). The three men reportedly
received funding from an Indonesian currently in Syria (Kompas, August 14). As most jihadist attacks in
Indonesia since 2010 had been small-scale shootings, these recent plots suggest
a potential return to mass-casualty bombings.
Future
Prospects
The outlook
for Indonesian counter-terrorism is not bleak. The estimated numbers involved
in the Syria-Iraq mobilization are relatively small, and many Middle Eastern,
North African and Western countries have produced more foreign fighters, both
in absolute terms and relative to the size of their Muslim populations. The
communal conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi, in which jihadist groups thrived,
ended over a decade ago and show no signs of restarting. Moreover, Indonesia
has developed formidable counter-terrorist capabilities over the past decade.
However, while
Indonesia’s jihadist networks are not large or widespread, they have proven
persistent. Detachment 88 and other counter-terrorism bodies have had tactical
successes, but the government has been less successful in its non-coercive
effort to undermine support for jihadism. At first, Indonesia’s Countering
Violent Extremism (CVE) approach involved ad-hoc initiatives by police, prison
authorities and NGOs. However, in 2010, the military was put in charge of CVE,
but has so far not proven adept at it (IPAC [Jakarta], June 30, 2014).
Detachment
88’s often-questionable shootings of suspects have also created new grievances
for jihadists to use as a rallying cry, potentially undermining CVE attempts (ABC, February 8, 2013). A further issue is increased competition
between the military and police. The military plays little substantial role in
counter-terrorism, but has recently used the police’s failure to catch Santoso
to push for greater involvement; the military also has a receptive ear in the
new government of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) (IPAC [Jakarta], May 25). These factors complicate
Indonesia’s counter-terrorism efforts.
The resilience
of Indonesia’s jihadist networks meanwhile provides opportunities for the
Islamic State. The threat Indonesia faced in the early 2000s resulted in part
from local extremist groups becoming involved in the 1980s foreign fighter
mobilization to Afghanistan. The current mobilization to Syria and Iraq, if not
handled well, could result in a similar escalation of the terrorist threat.
About The Authors:
About The Authors:
Andrew
Zammit is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Melbourne and formerly a
researcher at Monash University’s Global Terrorism Research Centre
Muhammad
Iqbal is a Ph.D. candidate at Monash University, researching violent extremism.
End Notes
1. Solahudin,
NII Sampai JI: Salafy Jihadisme di Indonesia (Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu, 2011).
2. “Indonesia:
The Dark Side of Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT),” International Crisis Group,
July 6, 2010,http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/B107-indonesia-the-dark-side-of-jamaah-ansharut-tauhid-jat.aspx.
3. “Indonesia:
Jihadi Surprise in Aceh,” International Crisis Group, April 20, 2010,http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/189-indonesia-jihadi-surprise-in-aceh.aspx.
4. Ibid.
5. “Indonesian
Jihadists and Syria: Training Ground,” RSIS, October 14, 2013,http://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/2081-indonesian-jihadists-and-syria/.
6. “al-Hayat
Media Center presents a new video message from The Islamic State: ‘Join the
Ranks,’” Jihadology, July 22, 2014, http://jihadology.net/2014/07/22/al-%E1%B8%A5ayat-media-center-presents-a-new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-join-the-ranks/.
7. “Katibah
Nusantara: Islamic State’s Malay Archipelago Combat Unit,” RSIS, May 26, 2014,http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/CO15126.pdf.
8. “The Future
of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050,” Pew Research
Centre, April 2, 2015, http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/muslims/.
Terrorism Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 18, September 4, 2015 - [PDF] by The Jamestown Foundation.
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