By Ted Galen Carpenter
CATO @ Liberty
CATO @ Liberty
For months, the United States has contemplated launching a series of naval patrols in the South China Sea. Pentagon leaders are especially determined to defy China’s position that building “reclaimed” or artificial reefs and islands also creates rights to new territorial waters surrounding those entities. On October 27, the Navy sent the guided-missile destroyer USS Lassen on a “freedom of navigation” patrol within 12-miles of a man-made island in the Spratly chain. That action triggered an immediate outburst, with China’s Foreign Ministry admonishing the United States to “immediately correct its mistake and not take any dangerous or provocative acts that threaten China’s sovereignty and security interests.”
Image Attribute: Sunset on the South China Sea off Mũi Né
village on the south-east coast of Vietnam / Source: Wikimedia Commons [Link]
Washington’s action is a dangerous escalation
of already worrisome tensions in the South China Sea. It is understandable that, as the world’s
leading maritime power, the United States is unwilling to accept Beijing’s
extremely broad territorial claims in that body of water. The full extent of China’s claims would cover
nearly 90 percent of the South China Sea.
U.S. officials stress the importance of the sea lanes that pass through
the area. They note that some $5
trillion in oceanic commerce is involved, and that unimpeded navigation is
especially crucial to the trade and overall economies of Japan, South Korea,
Australia, and other U.S. allies in East Asia.
The importance of continued free navigation in
the South China Sea is obvious, but two points are relevant. First, China has made no credible threat to
disrupt the trade routes. Indeed, given
China’s vast stake in international trade, threatening trade flows in any
region would be risky to the point of self-destructive folly. Second, one has to ask why the United States
is expected to take the lead in dealing with this issue. A Reuters article notes that “U.S. allies
such as Japan and Australia, are unlikely to follow with their own direct
challenges to China, despite their concerns over freedom of navigation along
vital trade routes.”
If China truly poses a threat to trade routes
that are so essential to countries in the immediate neighborhood, why aren’t
those countries initiating naval patrols to challenge Beijing’s claims? Why is the United States, whose homeland lies
thousands of miles away, the only challenger?
The answer is that such reticence by the East Asian countries continues
a long-standing habit of free riding on U.S. security exertions. That is never going to change unless and until
Washington conveys the message to those countries that the United States is
through bearing the expense and incurring the risks of dealing with matters
that are (or at least ought to be) far more important to them than to us.
The trajectory of U.S. policy in the South
China Sea creates a crisis atmosphere and entails the grave risk of a direct
military confrontation with China. The
potential benefits flowing from an aggressive U.S. policy are, at most, quite
modest. China’s East Asian neighbors
should not be allowed to stand on the sidelines while Washington does their
dirty work for them.
About The Author:
About The Author:
Ted Galen Carpenter is senior fellow for
defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. Dr. Carpenter served
as Cato’s director of foreign policy studies from 1986 to 1995 and as vice
president for defense and foreign policy studies from 1995 to 2011.
Carpenter is contributing editor to the
National Interest and serves on the editorial boards of Mediterranean Quarterly
and the Journal of Strategic Studies, and is the author of more than 600
articles and policy studies. His articles have appeared in the New York Times,
the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the Los Angeles Times, the
Financial Times, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the National Interest, World
Policy Journal, and many other publications. He is a frequent guest on radio
and television programs in the United States, Latin America, Europe, East Asia,
and other regions.
Carpenter received his Ph.D. in U.S.
diplomatic history from the University of Texas.
This article was first published at CATO @Liberty on October 28, 2015. All Rights
are reserved by the Original Publisher