By Col. (res.) Dr. Eran Lerman EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: There is a contradiction between the ultimate purposes of Russia and Iran in ...
By Col. (res.) Dr. Eran Lerman
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY: There is a contradiction between the ultimate purposes of Russia and
Iran in their intervention in Syria. Putin’s concern for Assad's survival could
give Israel some policy leverage, if Israel astutely navigates its way through
the situation. This means that Israel should not be tempted to support
Saudi-led efforts to unseat Assad or otherwise bring about a decisive outcome
in Syria’s civil war.
The (limited)
scope and nature of Russian military operations in Syria indicate that Moscow
has actually come to terms with the reality of a country irretrievably carved
into separate domains. President Putin has taken action to save the rump
"regime state" from collapse.
Attempts to
portray this as representing a bold and ambitious new posture, and as a trans-formative moment in regional and international affairs, tend to ignore
basic realities on the ground. Putin's decision was driven by fear, not hope.
Putin’s fear for
Assad's survival could give Israel some policy leverage, if wisely used.
This
understanding needs to be grounded in a broader observation about the nature of
the Russian choice of action. Military interventions are among the most risky –
and controversial, internally and internationally – of all strategic ventures.
With people at the Russian helm of state who remain acutely aware that the
intervention in Afghanistan played a major role in hastening the demise of the
Soviet Union, it would be fair to assume that there was little enthusiasm
within the Russian leadership for the option they ultimately settled for. That
they did so anyway does not prove that Putin has become a dominant player in
world politics. It indicates, rather, that Putin came to the conclusion that he
had no choice.
By mid 2015,
strong indications began to pile up as to fatigue and fragilities in the ranks
of the Syrian regime's armed forces, which have been in almost constant battle
for more than four years; and now faced new and dynamic onslaughts. The fall of
Palmyra in May, after heavy fighting with Islamic State forces, won significant
international attention. The takeover was followed by a typical display of IS
disdain towards all human norms and standards, and the wanton destruction of
much of its unique archeological sites. Equally if not more dangerous were the
signs of decline in Syrian military moral, and the disintegration or surrender
of entire units on both the northern and Golan fronts.
With Russian
advisors embedded in Syrian units at the operational level, and deeply involved
in the conduct of the war, Moscow was well positioned to draw conclusions. By
June 2015 it was engaged in an intense effort to deflect the danger of
collapse. Interestingly, the Russians' first choice was to try and reach an
understanding with the main driving force behind the intensified campaign to
destroy Assad's regime – namely, Saudi Arabia; and specifically, Defense
Minister Prince Muhammad bin Salman, who injected a new spirit of active
hostility to Iranian ambitions into all aspects of Saudi policy, from Yemen to
Syria.
On the
assumption that containing the so-called Baghdadi "Caliphate" is a
common interest, the Russian leadership made – and continues to make – an
intense and unprecedented effort to engage with the new Saudi leadership. Putin
has by now met twice with the Prince – in Moscow in June, and in Sochi in
October. Clearly, Putin does not view the Saudis as irrelevant. For him they
are a crucial interlocutor. This is all the more so since they hold the key to
oil prices. Increased production by the Saudis is the main reason for the
present low prices of oil ($45 a barrel), which threaten the future of the
Russian economy.
Still, the June
meeting failed to produce an effective agreement, despite talk of a "Yemen
for Syria" deal being on offer. As
the situation continued to deteriorate (and with Moscow increasingly
worried, and willing to warn the Gulf Arabs that their own survival might be at
risk) Putin turned to more drastic measures, based on military consultations
with Iran – Assad's other key ally. In retrospect, it is clear that the
presence in Moscow of Qassem Suleimani, head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards,
was essentially aimed at setting the stage for coordinated (albeit not combined)
intervention.
Particularly
against the background of the ongoing Ukrainian crisis, Russian actions also
reflect a familiar pattern of disdain and distrust regarding the US and the
West, along with an inevitable degree of grandstanding. Take, for example, the
first -ever firing of the Russian Kalibr NK long-range cruise missile, their
answer to the Tomahawk, at what were purportedly IS targets. This was meant as
a demonstration of Moscow’s swagger.
The
disinformation mills were also set in motion, describing panic and
demoralization in Baghdadi's capital, Raqqah. Russian propaganda focused upon
western "cooperation with terrorists", i.e. Syrian rebels of all
colors, as opposed to their own noble motives. Given the meager results of the
coalition campaign so far, it is not difficult for Putin to pose as more
resolute and effective than the competition.
Note, in this
context, the telling remark made yesterday by the newly-elected Prime
Minister-designate of Canada, Justin Trudeau. He said that Obama "understands"
why Trudeau has to stand by his campaign promise to pull the Canadian
contingent out of combat operations against IS.
Once the dust
has settled, however, it is bound to be increasingly clear that the location
and scope of the Russian (and Iranian) intervention are far from sufficient to
resurrect Syria as a unified state under Assad's rule. At best, the
intervention is designed, together with Hizbullah's intensive involvement, to
secure the north-south links between the remaining segments of the rump regime
state, and perhaps improve somewhat the “Line of Control” (to borrow an
Indian-Pakistani term) in Assad's favor.
This is also the
best that international mediation efforts, led by Staffan De Mistura, can
achieve. There are no grand solutions; merely a rationalization of realities on
the ground and the occasional alleviation of some suffering in contested areas.
(This was recently negotiated for the besieged, largely Shi'a communities of
Faw'ah and Kafrayyah in the north, and the population exchange arranged with
the town of Zabadani). The effective partition of Syria is by now beyond the
capacity of any power, internal or external, to undo in the foreseeable future.
Against this
background, proposals have been floated recently in Israel (and elsewhere in
the West) to counter the Russian intervention by supporting a powerful push to
unseat Assad and to bring about a decisive outcome in Syria. Such ideas are
misguided, for several reasons.
Firstly, while
Assad's regime indeed may be despicable in moral terms (– and the spectacular
horrors inflicted by IS on their captives are easily matched by the Syrian
regime gassing and fire-bombing of its own people!), nevertheless moral
judgments should also take into account the probable consequences of one's
actions. In the case of Syria (and Lebanon) these would include, in the case of
any push for a decisive outcome, mass slaughter on a scale exceeding anything
we have witnessed so far.
Secondly, in
regional terms, it may be tempting for Israel to align itself with key Sunni
players such as Saudi Arabia (somewhat less so when it comes to Erdogan's
Turkey), as well as with key powers in the West. But it is even more important
to take into account the perspectives of our (also Sunni) peace partners, and particularly
Sisi's government in Egypt, who take a much more cautious view as to the
consequences of Assad's possible collapse.
Thirdly, it is
rarely wise to opt for the impossible. Assad's removal from power is certainly
possible; but it is quite impossible to predict with any degree of validity
what will take the regime's place in the land once known as the Syrian Arab
Republic. With uncertainty already mounting across the region (and within
Israel’s borders) there is no reason to add to the chaos.
Moreover,
clear-eyed review of the situation leads to the realization that Russia and
Iran may be acting in close coordination, but their interests do not really
cohere. For Moscow, Assad is a client to be saved from the gallows. For Iran,
Syria is a key stepping-stone on the road to destabilizing Jordan; and, as
Ayatollah Khamenei has ordered, to "turning the West Bank into the next Gaza."
This would greatly enhance, not reduce, the risks for Assad – precisely what
the Russians are working to avoid. This contradiction between the ultimate
purposes of Russia and Iran can serve Israel's long-term interests, if Israel
astutely navigates its way through the situation.
About The
Author:
Col. (res.) Dr. Eran Lerman has joined the
Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies as a senior research associate. For
the past six years, he served as deputy for foreign policy and international
affairs at the National Security Council in the Israeli Prime Minister's
Office. For 20 years prior to that, he held senior posts in IDF Military
Intelligence, and also was Israel director of the American Jewish Committee.
BESA Center
Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg
Rosshandler Family
Publication Details:
Publication Details:
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 315
This article was first published at BESA Center Website, October 22, 2015 and is republished on IndraStra.com with Original Publisher's Permission. All Rights Reserved by BESA Center.
Image Attributes: Vladmir Putin and Bashar Al Assad / Source: Wikimedia Commons
AIDN: 001-10-2015-0350
Image Attributes: Vladmir Putin and Bashar Al Assad / Source: Wikimedia Commons
AIDN: 001-10-2015-0350
