By Matthew Levitt Abstract In November 2008, Egyptian authorities broke up what they said was a Hezbollah network plotting atta...
By Matthew Levitt
Abstract
In November 2008, Egyptian authorities broke up what they said was a
Hezbollah network plotting attacks in Egypt. While some of the charges
appear to have been exaggerated, and it is clear that not all those arrested
were in fact Hezbollah operatives, a careful examination reveals that a
Hezbollah network was, in fact, operating on Egyptian soil. That it was originally
tasked with carrying out neither surveillance nor attacks makes the case all
the more intriguing, especially when compared with other cells that faced
similar reassignments. As a case study, the Hezbollah network—which
demonstrated the use of several known Hezbollah modus operandi—underscores how
Hezbollah operates around the world in general, and in the Middle East in
particular.
Introduction
In December 2013, Egypt’s public prosecutor filed new charges against
former President Mohammed Morsi and other Islamists, including divulging
military secrets to a foreign power and conspiring with Hamas and Hezbollah to
carry out terrorist attacks in Egypt.[1] The original charges also
involved Hamas and Hezbollah, in particular allegations that the two militant
groups helped thousands of prisoners escape from Egyptian jails in the chaotic
first few days of the revolt that toppled the Mubarak regime.[2] While
claims that Hamas and Hezbollah plotted attacks in Egypt are being received
skeptically—and with good reason, given Cairo’s recent crackdown on anyone seen
as sympathetic to Islamists, including puppets[3]—Hezbollah and Hamas prisoners
did escape from Egyptian jails during the revolt. Whether they sought to
free other prisoners as well remains to be established, but the history of the
Hezbollah network that operated in Egypt from 2005 to late 2008 is a matter of
fact, and a telling example of how Hezbollah networks operate in the Middle
East and elsewhere beyond Lebanon’s borders.
While Hezbollah purports to be a strictly Lebanese “resistance”
organisation, it has a significant track record of carrying out operations
outside Lebanon, in locations as far afield as Argentina and Thailand. In 1994,
it bombed a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, killing 85 people and
wounding some 150 more.[4] In Bangkok that same year, a plot to bomb the
Israeli embassy was foiled by sheer luck.[5] Closer to home, Hezbollah also
established relationships with militant Palestinian groups. Although
fundamentally a Shia outfit, cooperation with Sunni Palestinians against the
“Zionist occupiers” lent the organisation additional legitimacy, and won it
broad support across the Arab world.
Hezbollah’s mentor Iran also encouraged these Palestinian contacts.
Typically acting through its Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), in particular
the elite Qods Force wing, Iran has wielded a commanding influence over
Hezbollah since it first sent IRGC officers to help found the Shia group in the
early 1980s. As a rule, the IRGC is responsible for overseeing all of Iran’s
terrorist activity and supervising its proxies. In the early to mid-1990s, with
the Oslo peace accords signed and Palestinian autonomy slowly growing in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, opponents of peace funded, supported, and executed
terrorist attacks to undermine the prospects for peace. Iran was especially
active in promoting terrorism targeting Israel at this time. According to the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “in February 1999, it was reported that
Palestinian police had discovered documents that attest to the transfer of $35
million to Hamas from Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS),
money reportedly meant to finance terrorist activities against Israeli
targets.”[6] Iran’s primary proxy group, however, has always been Hezbollah. It
should therefore not be surprising that Hezbollah increased its support for
Palestinian groups in the 1990s, invested in its own terrorist infrastructure
in the West Bank, and went to great lengths to infiltrate operatives into
Israel to collect intelligence and execute terror attacks. Hezbollah
established a dedicated unit to pursue these goals – Unit 1800.
Beginning in 1995, a select group of operational leaders within
Hezbollah’s military wing, the Islamic Jihad Organisation (IJO), developed
plans to penetrate Israel’s defenses. Unit 1800 successfully infiltrated at
least five Hezbollah operatives into Israel between 1996 and 2001, though none
were able to carry out attacks. For its part, Iran sought to intensify and
coordinate the terrorist operations of the various Palestinian groups it
supported through Hezbollah. According to US officials, shortly after Palestinian
violence erupted in September 2000, Iran assigned Imad Mughniyeh, Hezbollah’s
terrorist mastermind, to bolster the operational capacity of Palestinian
militant groups, specifically Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).
Mughniyeh also tasked his European networks with providing clandestine support
for operatives who would use Europe as a launch pad for infiltrating operatives
into Israel.[7]
Other aspirations of Unit 1800 include kidnapping Israelis and
recruiting Israeli Arabs, both of which have seen some degree of success. In
2000, one of Mughniyeh’s key Unit 1800 deputies pulled off the abduction of a
retired Israel Defense Forces colonel. It proved to be an intelligence bonanza
for Hezbollah, and ultimately enabled them to secure the release of more than
400 prisoners from Israeli jails. There are also several known examples of
Israeli Arabs working for Hezbollah, some of whom were arrested by Israeli
security forces, but recruitment efforts continue to this day.[8] Finally, as
part of its support to Palestinian groups, Hezbollah has found the minimally
governed territory of Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula to be quite useful for smuggling
operations across its border with the Gaza Strip, as well as for preparations
for various plots.
Hezbollah’s “Egypt File”
Sometime in 2005, a Hezbollah operative named Muhammad Yousef Mansour
traveled to Egypt on a Lebanese passport bearing the fictitious, Sunni sounding
name, Sami Hani Shihab. In fact, Shihab was the name of a Sunni family
from Beirut whose son, Sami, tragically died as an infant.[9] Mansour was
in charge of Hezbollah’s “Egypt file,” part of a larger Hezbollah file
involving the “Ring Countries” surrounding Israel such as Egypt, Jordan, and
Syria.[10] Their shared borders with Israel made them obvious territories from
which to conduct and support operations. In Egypt, Mansour worked closely with
another senior Hezbollah operative, Mohammed Qabalan, to build a Hezbollah
support network in Egypt. Qabalan, a senior operative within
Unit 1800, focused on these ring countries and had considerable knowledge of
Egypt—where he had visited in the past—and the Sinai Peninsula.[11] The
men’s mission appears to have broadened over time, but it started out as an
operation focused on smuggling weapons and funds through Egypt to Hamas and
other Palestinian groups in Gaza. This “Egypt Branch” was also to help
oversee the training of Palestinian militants and the facilitating of terrorist
attacks targeting Israel.[12]
Then, following the February 2008 assassination of Imad Mughniyeh,
Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah personally vowed retribution
against the Israelis, whom he accused of carrying out the killing.[13] In
Egypt, some members of the Hezbollah network–by then comprising several dozen
operatives, a few Lebanese Hezbollah operatives and many more local criminal
facilitators and smugglers–began plotting a variety of terrorist attacks.
Some were clearly still targeting Israelis, though by carrying out the attacks
at Egyptian tourist resorts, the attacks would have had severe economic
consequences and have likely killed or injured Egyptians unfortunate enough to
be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Others, however, appear to have
targeted Egyptian targets more broadly, including conducting surveillance of
critical infrastructure such as the Suez Canal.[14]
The cell was broken up in November 2008, when Mansour and two
Palestinians traveling on Palestinian passports issued in Lebanon were
arrested, but the public was only informed in April 2009 – possibly as part of
an Egyptian effort to expose Hezbollah’s dark side in the run-up to the June
2009 Lebanese elections.[15] Of the 49 operatives Egyptian authorities
identified, 26 were arrested, including Muhammad Mansour (aka Sami Shihab) and
another Lebanese, five Palestinians, one Sudanese, and 18 Egyptians.[16]
The others either fled the country, like Mohammed Qabalan, or escaped to the
Sinai where authorities believed they went into hiding among the Bedouin
smugglers deep in the peninsula’s mountains.[17]
A Sunni Dangle Operation
Much like a Hezbollah network recruited in Southeast Asia in the 1990s,
the recruits to the network in Egypt were Sunni, not Shia. In Southeast
Asia, however, the recruits were aware they were being recruited to work with
Hezbollah.[18] In this case, the majority of the cell members appear to
have believed they were being recruited into a militant Sunni group, not a
Hezbollah cell, in what amounted to a simple variation of the classic “dangle”
operation – they were recruited by one group by being led to believe they would
be working for another. Using the Sunni-sounding name Sami Shihab,
Mansour presented himself as a Palestinian living in Syria. An Egyptian
member of the network, Nasser Jibril, told investigators he met Mansour through
a Palestinian member of the group. Using the name Shihab, Mansour
introduced himself to Jibril as a fellow Palestinian and invited Jibril, a
member of the Muslim Brotherhood, to break with the Brotherhood and join a new
group dedicated to helping Palestinian militants. Jibril joined the group
and was tasked with procuring 25 weapons for the network. Only after
Jibril’s recruitment did Mansour reportedly confide that he was a Hezbollah
operative. For most, the illusion of belonging to a militant Sunni group
was maintained throughout.[19]
While the Hezbollah network had been collecting intelligence on
Hezbollah’s behalf for several years, Egyptian authorities were reportedly
unaware until several different foreign intelligence services, including Mossad
and the CIA, brought the network to their attention.[20] It remains
unclear if the Egyptians were completely unaware of the network’s existence, or
if they were only unaware that the group was plotting attacks in Egypt as well
as supporting Palestinian groups in Gaza, primarily Hamas. Egyptian
authorities were especially concerned that several Muslim Brotherhood members
had been recruited into the network. Commenting on the Muslim Brotherhood
connection, then-President Mubarak made a comment several months after the
cell’s exposure, suggesting that Egyptian authorities may have known the
network had been supplying arms and money to Hamas. “They have contacts
with Hamas. They have contacts with Hezbollah,” Mubarak said of the
Brotherhood. “These are well known and they have contacts with many
organisations. As long as they do not commit any terrorist crimes, I
don’t care.”[21] By implication, had Egyptian authorities known that this
or some other network was working with Hamas or Hezbollah but not planning
attacks in Egypt, members of the network may have been left alone by local
authorities.
He Said, She Said
Some questioned the strength of the Egyptian accusations, especially
since Egyptian authorities originally asserted that the network had been
supporting Palestinian militants, only later adding charges about surveillance
and possible plans for attacks in Egypt.[22] The official charges –
conspiracy to commit murder, weapons possession, and spying for a foreign
organisation with the intent of conducting terrorist attacks – appear to have
been intentionally broad. The appearance in the Arab media of some more
outlandish charges, including one unsubstantiated and apparently erroneous
claim that some of the arrested cell members confessed a desire to target not
only Israeli but also American interests in Egypt, further eroded confidence in
the credibility of the Egyptian accusations.[23]
But the fact that the network engaged in smuggling and other logistical
activities in support of Palestinian militants was never really in question,
considering that Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah confirmed the charges
himself days after they were aired. In a televised address, Nasrallah
acknowledged that Mansour (Shihab) was a Hezbollah member who was in Egypt for
“a logistical job to help the Palestinians get (military) equipment.” But
charges that the Hezbollah network sought to destabilize Egypt or carry out
attacks on Egyptian soil, he insisted, were “lies and fabrications aimed at
setting the people of Egypt against Hezbollah.”[24] Nasrallah’s deputy,
Naim Qassem, was more adamant, insisting that “the investigation proved that
Shihab was ordered by his commanders not to deal with the Egyptian issue, but
only to transport weapons to the Gaza Strip.” That effort was done in
secret, Qassem claimed, so as not to publicly embarrass the Egyptian regime.[25]
A month after the arrests, however, credible reports began to emerge,
lending weight to Egyptian officials’ charges. Terje Roed-Larsen, the
UN’s Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories, reported to a meeting of
the UN Security Council that “over the last few weeks, there has been a growing
concern that Hizbollah has engaged in clandestine and illegal militant
activities beyond Lebanese territory.” He said UN Secretary General Ban
Ki-moon had been informed by the Egyptian government about the discovery that a
Hezbollah operative led a cell in Cairo until his recent arrest.[26] In a
sign that the UN took this information to heart, and that it was especially
concerned that Hezbollah was acting abroad not in the best interests of
Lebanon, but of Iran, Roed-Larsen stressed to the Security Council that
Hezbollah “should cease any militant activities outside of Lebanon and complete
its transformation into solely a Lebanese party.”[27]
Mubarak reportedly demanded that Hezbollah sign a statement that the
party regretted having “used Egyptian soil for illegal purposes that could put
it in danger.”[28] That did not happen. Instead, in October, Hezbollah
deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem echoed Hezbollah’s earlier acknowledgement
of the party’s weapons smuggling operations in Egypt. “We do not wish to
enter the bazaar of tense positions with the Egyptian regime because our battle
is with Israel and not with them,” he stated. “We do not think we
committed a mistake by smuggling arms across the Egyptian territories,” he
added. “This is an honorable act and not a sinful one.”[29]
Hezbollah’s Activities in Mideast “Ring Countries”
In fact, the Egyptian Hezbollah network, Mansour told his Egyptian
interrogators, was conceived as part of a wider plan aimed at establishing
Hezbollah networks not only in Egypt but in Syria and Jordan as well – the
so-called “ring countries” – under Mohammad Qabalan’s command. To ensure
the success of the Egyptian component of the plan, which was arguably the most
important given the geographic reality of Gaza’s border with the Egyptian
Sinai, Hezbollah selected Qabalan as overall commander since he had visited
Egypt several times and spent time in Sinai himself.[30] He too traveled
on a fake identity, in his case an Egyptian passport bearing the name Hassan
al-Ghul.[31] Mansour arrived on the scene in 2005 and, reporting through
Qabalan and the Unit 1800 branch, operated under the guidance of several
high-ranking Hezbollah operatives and the senior IRGC commander in Lebanon.[32]
Over the course of several years, the network facilitated the transfer
of weapons from Sudan to Gaza, breaking up various responsibilities among the
four distinct, compartmentalized cells that comprised the overall
network.[33] Mansour set up shop in the northern Sinai town of el-Arish,
where he could provide close supervision to the smuggling operation.
Additional apartments were procured as safe houses in the northern Sinai,
including in the border town of Rafah abutting the Gaza border.[34] At
one point, Qabalan personally went to Sudan “to attend to logistical matters”
related to the smuggling of weapons and even a small number of foreign fighters
into Gaza.[35] In other cases, Palestinian fighters were smuggled out of
Gaza for onward travel to Sudan, Lebanon, or Syria to receive terrorist
training or instructions.[36] Some cell members were responsible for
procuring weapons and explosives, others for constructing suicide belts, and
still others for raising funds. To facilitate their smuggling operation,
Mansour and others purchased apartments near the Egyptian-Palestinian
border.[37]
But the smuggling operation did not stop at the border with Gaza.
Mansour reportedly told his interrogators that they “smuggled Palestinian
fighters from Egypt deep into Israel, as well as into Gaza, as well as
explosives.”[38] In the course of his trial, Mansour told Egyptian
prosecutors that Qabalan trained would-be suicide bombers from Gaza in the use
of explosive belts and helped infiltrate them into Israeli in September 2008,
but Israeli police arrested the two before they could carry out their
operation.[39]
Typical of Unit 1800 operations, the network sought to recruit Israeli
Arabs to carry out or facilitate attacks in Israel. They also thought
Israeli Arabs would be well-suited to help smuggle explosives and detonators
into Israel. Under interrogation, some of the detained Hezbollah cell
members reportedly confessed that the explosives and weapons authorities found
on some of the accused were ready “for that purpose.”[40] The Hezbollah network
was reportedly assisted by an individual who worked for the group’s satellite
television channel,al-Manar. A Hebrew language speaker, the al-Manar employee
was tasked with “contacting elements inside Israel through the Internet in
order to collect information on Israeli tourists visiting Egypt.”[41] Following
the exposure of Hezbollah’s Egypt cell, Mahmoud Sabri, an Egyptian lawyer,
filed a motion to compel Nilesat—an Egyptian Satellite Company—to cease
broadcasting al-Manar, based on the fact that the station
disseminated false information and violated Egyptian legal ethics. A
Cairo court rejected the motion, however, claiming that Sabri did not present
enough evidence in support of his case and that al-Manar posed
no threat to Egyptian national security.[42]
Operating in Egypt
The Hezbollah network’s interest in Israeli tourists appears to have
solidified following the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh. At that time,
in early 2008, Mohammed Qabalan instructed Mansour and others to carry out
surveillance and prepare for an attack on Israeli tourists in Egypt in
retaliation for Mughniyeh’s death. The cell reportedly planned to carry
out three simultaneous, large-scale attacks targeting Red Sea resorts popular
among Israeli tourists, including Taba, Nuweiba, and Dahab. Cell members
collected intelligence on Israeli tourists at Orgada, as well. Allegedly,
the cell had already purchased a small van to be used as a car bomb – not
unlike similar Hezbollah operations in Thailand and Argentina – and had
prepared several suicide belts for the attacks. Ultimately, however,
senior Hezbollah officials – by one account Hassan Nasrallah himself – ordered
the attacks not be carried out.[43]
Those attacks were likely cancelled for fear that costs of carrying out
attacks in Egypt, the most populous Sunni country in the region and a leader of
the Arab world, would outweigh the benefits. Better to simply use Egypt
as a staging ground for attacks in Israel—for many a far less objectionable
action. But the cell also conducted surveillance of the Suez Canal, which
would have raised the stakes exponentially for a clash with Cairo. By
some accounts, the canal was a target itself, as were ships passing through
it. In a sign that the surveillance was more than a passing interest,
members of the Hezbollah network reportedly rented property along the canal to
facilitate the surveillance operation. The Egyptian prosecutor cited
“certain information” received from Egyptian intelligence that the Hezbollah
network spied on the canal and the traffic traveling through it.[44] But
the fact that Hezbollah seems to have been worried about the possible
repercussions of carrying out an attack on Israeli targets in Egypt suggests
that surveillance of the Suez Canal was probably collected as pre-operational
intelligence, to have as off-the-shelf contingency planning in the event
Hezbollah or Iran ever felt the need to carry out an attack in Egypt.[45]
Indeed, Hezbollah modus operandi stresses such collection of pre-operational
intelligence.[46]
Whatever the explanation, the Egyptian government was clearly shaken by
the revelations and took them extremely seriously. Media reports
subsequently cited government cables recording a conversation between Egypt’s
then-chief of intelligence, Omar Suleiman, and Admiral Mike Mullen,
then-chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which Suleiman indicated that
Cairo took the Hezbollah plot so seriously that it prepared its own capability
to “interfere” in Iran’s domestic affairs in retaliation, if necessary.
“Egypt sent a clear message to Iran that if they interfere in Egypt, Egypt will
interfere in Iran,” according to one cable quoted in the press. To that
end, Suleiman stated, Egypt had trained agents for just such a mission.[47]
If true, it would not be the first time allegations arose that Hezbollah
and Iran were targeting Egyptian interests at home. In February 1987,
Egyptian press reported that Iranian intelligence met with Egyptian militants
in Iran to discuss forming a Hezbollah-like organisation in Egypt. The
MOIS office in Cairo was reportedly tasked with monitoring canal traffic and
plotted to assassinate key Egyptian officials. Egypt subsequently
expelled two Iranian diplomats and shut down the Iran special interests section
for a period of time in May 1987. The following year, Egyptian
intelligence announced it had foiled an Iranian-hatched plot to trigger a
Khomeini-style Islamic revolution in Egypt through a series of sabotage
attacks, bombings, assassinations, and the dissemination of subversive
literature. According to Egyptian police, the cell was tied to Iran’s
MOIS, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Iraqi Dawa Party.[48]
Nor would this be the last Iranian plot targeting Egypt. Even
before verdicts were handed down in the case of the Hezbollah cell, Arab and
Israeli media reported that a parallel, two-year investigation uncovered
another cell, led by an Iranian intelligence officer who entered the country in
the summer of 2006 under a forged Iraqi passport. The press reported the
arrests in May 2009, but the Iranian intelligence officer, Muhammad Alam a-Din,
and three other Islamic Revolutionary Guardsmen had been arrested five months
earlier after Egyptian surveillance caught them making frequent trips to the
Sinai, where they contacted Bedouin smugglers. The four hid in plain
sight within the Iraqi refugee community near Cairo, and while under
interrogation reportedly confirmed being sent by Qods Force commander Qassem
Sulaimani to build an intelligence network in Egypt.[49]
The Verdicts
In April 2010, a year after the public was told the cell had been broken
up, a judge in Cairo’s emergency state security court handed down life terms to
three defendants, all Hezbollah members being tried in absentia (including
Qabalan), and sentences of six months to 15 years to 23 more, including a
15-year sentence for Mohammed Mansour. Mansour’s lawyers said their
client admitted to recommending attacks against Israeli tourists in the Sinai,
but noted Hezbollah officials told him not to carry out these attacks. As
the judge read the verdicts, the defendants chanted “God is great” from their
crowded prisoner’s cage.[50] Rejecting their claim that they only used
Egypt as a base from which to help Palestinian militants in Gaza, the court
found the defendants guilty of plotting to blow up ships in the Suez Canal and
to attack tourist sites in Egypt. “Is targeting ships in the canal
support for the Palestinian cause?” the judge asked rhetorically in making his
ruling. “Is preparing explosives and targeting tourist resorts support
for the Palestinians?”[51]
The extent to which surveillance of the canal presented a near-term,
actionable threat remains a matter of speculation. Indeed, much of the
case focused on the defendants’ preparation of explosives on Egyptian territory
and the fact that they planned to target vacationers – likely Israelis – at
Egyptian tourist resorts. Prosecutors screened video footage of
explosives found at the premises used by the defendants, leading the judge to
decide the group intended “to strike Egypt’s economy, destroy the bonds between
its people and create chaos and instability.”[52] For his part, Hassan
Nasrallah described the verdicts as “a badge of honour for these noble brothers
of the resistance,” adding, “it is a source of pride to us for all Arab and
Islamic peoples to know that we are detained and jailed for…standing by our
brothers in Palestine and Gaza.” Challenging the court’s decision,
Nasrallah reiterated that “these men are honourable brothers, fighters of the
resistance, and not outlaws, terrorists and criminals, as the court verdict
says.”[53]
The verdicts amounted to the latest volley in an ongoing tiff between
Egypt and Hezbollah, and the Mubarak government surely worried about potential
cooperation between Hezbollah and Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. In early
2004, for example, the Brotherhood’s leader, Mohammed Mahdi Akef, hosted a
delegation of visiting Hezbollah officials and issued a statement stressing
that the Brotherhood and Hezbollah shared “identical views with regard to resisting
the Zionist enemy,” adding that “resistance” was the best route to confront
“Zionist aggression.”[54] Popular support for Hezbollah ran high during
the July 2006 war the group fought with Israel, and Cairo was further piqued by
Hezbollah’s frequent criticism of Egypt’s decision to seal the border with Gaza
once Hamas took over the Strip by force in the summer of 2007. In return,
Egypt often accused Hezbollah of being an Iranian proxy and supported its Sunni
political opponents in Lebanon.
Additionally, Hezbollah and Egypt found themselves in a war of
words. In a statement to Kuwait’s al-Rai newspaper,
Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah claimed that the verdicts “against the mujahidin
who were offering aid to the mujahidin in the Gaza Strip” were “political
adjudications” and “arbitrary decisions.”In response to his open support of
those convicted and his criticism of the Egyptian legal system, the Egyptian
media labeled Nasrallah “the monkey sheikh,” “an Iranian agent,” “a Lebanese
from [the Iranian city of] Qom, “leader of the militias in the Iranian party in
Lebanon,” and “the son of garbage.”[55]
Prison Break
Not quite ten months into his fifteen-year jail term, Mansour and the
rest of his network escaped from the Wadi al-Natroun prison amid the chaos of
the revolution that brought down President Mubarak’s decades-long authoritarian
rule in Egypt. According to the findings of a six-week investigation
carried out by reporters for Egypt’s al-Masry al-Youm, it appears
“the escapes were performed by Bedouin groups working at the behest of
Hezbollah, Hamas, and the families of individual prisoners.” The breakout
was well-coordinated, involving masked men on motorcycles shooting at guard
towers and burning rice, straw, and tires outside the prison to create
smokescreens covering the movements of the attackers. Three jeeps then pulled
up to the prison gates carrying young men with machine guns. Civilians
armed with machine guns and rifles can be seen in an 11-minute video clip of
the raid. A larger crowd of some 20 men carrying clubs and knives then
appears and surrounds the prison walls while others, including children,
watch. Some of these people were organised to free Hezbollah, Hamas, and
other prisoners, while others were drawn by the opportunity to steal the
prison’s cattle, which they did. “We saw the Bedouins with their
automatic weapons freeing the detainees of the cell block next door,” recalled
Hassan al-Manakhly, a member of the Hezbollah network who escaped. “We
knew they were Bedouins from the way they looked and from their accent.”[56]
Reverse-engineering the weapons-smuggling route they helped develop from
Sudan through Egypt and ultimately into the Gaza Strip, Hezbollah operatives
reportedly smuggled Mansour across Egypt and into Sudan immediately following
the breakout. Shortly after the breakout, Mansour was reportedly seen
talking on a cell phone telling someone exactly what was happening, step by
step, appearing absent-minded or confused by the sudden turn of events.
It is likely the person on the other end of the phone gave Mansour instructions
on where to go next, because the next time his colleagues saw him, Mansour was
in Lebanon.[57]
How he got there underscores the flexibility and utility of Hezbollah’s
standing support networks, in this case in Sudan. Working through the
good offices of “an undercover Hezbollah station in an East African country,”
Hezbollah contacted people in Syrian intelligence who arranged for the Syrian
embassy in Cairo to provide Mansour a new false passport. Traveling on
his new passport, officially claimed as a replacement for one he lost, Mansour
was reportedly escorted across Egypt, into Sudan, and to the airport in
Khartoum by Sudanese-based Hezbollah operatives.[58]
Even as he was being covertly smuggled out of the country and back to
Beirut, Hezbollah officials happily boasted Mansour was “out of jail and
safe.” Responding to a press query just days after the breakout, a
Hezbollah official said that Mansour “is now in a safe location and will soon be
back in Lebanon.”[59] Less than two weeks later, Mansour appeared unannounced
at a major Hezbollah rally in Beirut. Televised on Hezbollah’s al-Manar
satellite station, Mansour waved a Hezbollah flag to the roaring applause of
the audience as he took the stage.[60]
Conclusion
The precise details of Hezbollah’s role in the January 2011 Wadi
al-Natroun prison break, if any, remain to be determined. What is clear,
however, is that a Hezbollah network had been operating on the ground in
Egypt. Its primary focus was smuggling weapons into the Gaza Strip, but
it was also tasked with providing logistical support to other operations and,
eventually, assigned to carry out surveillance of potential targets in Egypt.
As a case study, Hezbollah’s Egyptian network underscores three important
themes critical to understanding how the group operates abroad:
First, Hezbollah networks are often called upon to provide logistical or
other support for operations that go beyond their original remit. Describing
Hezbollah's financial support activity in the Ivory Coast, one U.S. official
cautioned that even such support networks are "always a bit
operational."[61] In January 2012, Thai officials stumbled upon a similar
case involving a Hezbollah logistician who had been running an explosives
transshipment center out of Bangkok for at least a year before being arrested
on suspicion of plotting attacks targeting Israeli tourists in Thailand.[62]
Second, Hezbollah has a long-established modus operandi of carrying out
pre-operational surveillance of potential targets even when no plot is in the
offing. According to FBI testimony, while Hezbollah has never conducted a
terrorist attack on U.S. soil, “Hezbollah subjects have reportedly been tasked
with surveillance of potential targets in the United States.” The FBI found
that “such tasking to date appears to have been intended as a vetting tool to
establish the individual’s loyalty to Hezbollah and Iran.”[63] Whatever the
purpose, this Hezbollah surveillance enables the group to develop off-the-shelf
operational planning that it can dust off and use at a future date, if it so
desires.
Third, while most attention has been given to Hezbollah’s global
footprint in places like South America and Europe, the group has a long and
dangerous history of activities and operations in the Middle East, beginning as
far back as terrorist operations in Kuwait in 1983 and 1985 (a series of seven
bombings in two hours and an assassination attempt targeting the Emir of
Kuwait, respectively). Hezbollah’s terrorism persisted through the 1990s with
the 1996 bombing of the US Air Force barracks at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia,
into the 2000s with the deployment of Unit 3800—Hezbollah’s support mission in
Iraq during the 2003 Iraq war—and continues today with Hezbollah’s massive
investment in Syria.[64]
All told, fully appreciating the activities of this Hezbollah network in
Egypt is important not only as a matter of historical interest, but also as a
case study that underscores how Hezbollah operates around the world in general,
and in the Middle East in particular. Moqawama, or “resistance” to
Israel, is the core aspect of Hezbollah’s identity, and until its recent
sectarian involvement in Syria, at least, was the basis for its broad appeal
among both Shia and Sunnis. While it focused chiefly on Lebanon and the
immediate area, Hezbollah demonstrated impressive reach with operations and
networks from South America to Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, such capacity is
not fundamental to its existence. The destruction of Israel is. Accordingly,
even when it has limited international activities outside the Levant, Hezbollah
has maintained a steady stream of activities under its “ring strategy” of
undermining Israeli security—directly and by supporting Palestinian groups—from
the countries bordering Israel.
Since the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, and then
again after the 2006 war and Hezbollah’s takeover of downtown Beirut by force
of arms in 2008, the group has struggled to justify its existence as a true
“resistance” organisation battling to free occupied land and has focused
primarily on tenuous claim that the Shebaa Farms are part of Lebanon and must
still be liberated.[65] Today, Hezbollah is under far more significant fire for
taking part in the Syrian civil war on the side of the Assad regime. Without an
Israeli straw man to justify the maintenance of its arms as "legitimate
resistance," Hezbollah is left with precious little justification for its
existence as an independent militia outside the control of the Lebanese
government. Worse still, so long as Hezbollah continues to fight alongside Iran
and the Assad regime against Sunni rebels, it will increasingly be seen as a
sectarian fighting force undermining the security and political interests of
the Lebanese state. Under such circumstances, it is all but certain
Hezbollah will put renewed focus on the activities of Unit 1800—especially in
the ring countries surrounding Israel—in an effort to buttress is reputation as
a group primarily focused on “resisting” Israel.
About the Author:
Dr.
Matthew Levitt is the Fromer-Wexler Fellow, and Director of
the Stein Program on Counterterrorism & Intelligence, at The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy. He is the author of ‘Hezbollah: The Global
Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God’ (Georgetown University Press, 2013).
Previously, Levitt served as US Treasury Department Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Intelligence and Analysis, and before that as an FBI counterterrorism
intelligence analyst.
Notes
[1] “Egypt to Put Morsi on Trial for Allegedly Conspiring with Hamas,
Hezbollah,” Al Jazeera America, December 18, 2013, Ddd, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/12/18/egypt-puts-morsiontrialforinternationalconspiracy.html
.
[2] “Morsi Trail Over Egypt Jailbreak Set for Jan 28,” AFP, January 2,
2014, http://news.yahoo.com/morsi-trial-over-egypt-jailbreak-set-january-28-112127950.html .
[3] Maggie Michael, “Egypt: Puppet Ad Draws Terror Accusations,” AP,
January 1, 2014, http://www.miamiherald.com/2014/01/01/3847562/egypt-puppet-ad-draws-terror-accusations.html .
[4] Buenos Aires, Argentina Investigations Unit of the Offi ce of the
Attorney General, Office of Criminal Investigations: AMIA Case,
report by Marcelo Martinez Burgos and Alberto Nisman, October 25, 2006, 20,
378.
[5] Buenos Aires, Argentina Investigations Unit of the Office of the
Attorney General, Office of Criminal Investigations: AMIA Case,
report by Marcelo Martinez Burgos and Alberto Nisman, October 25, 2006.
[6] Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), “Terrorist Group
Profiler: Hamas,” June 2002. See also Stewart Bell, “Hamas May Have Chemical
Weapons: CSIS Report Says Terror Group May be Experimenting,” National
Post (Canada), December 10, 2003.
[7] Israeli intelligence report, “Hezbollah’s International Terrorism
and the Penetration of Hezbollah Activists into Israel,” undated, author’s
personal files, received August 5, 2003.
[8] Ali Waked, “Tennenbaum’s Kidnapper Recruiting for Hezbollah,” Ynetnews,
August 26, 2010.
[9] “Exposure of a Hezbollah Terrorist Network in Egypt,” ICT’s Jihadi
Websites Monitoring Group, International Institute for Counter Terrorism,
August 2009, p. 7.
[10] “Exposure of a Hezbollah Terrorist Network in Egypt,” ICT’s Jihadi
Websites Monitoring Group, International Institute for Counter Terrorism,
August 2009, p. 3.http://www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Internet%20Monitoring%20Group/JWMG_Hezbollah_Egypt.pdf
[11] “Exposure of a Hezbollah Terrorist Network in Egypt,” ICT’s Jihadi
Websites Monitoring Group, International Institute for Counter Terrorism,
August 2009, p. 3.http://www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Internet%20Monitoring%20Group/JWMG_Hezbollah_Egypt.pdf;
[12] Patrick Galey and Agence France Presse, “Hezbollah Man Escapes
Egypt Jail,” Daily Star, February 4, 2011. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2011/Feb-04/61021-hezbollah-man-escapes-egypt-jail.ashx;
“Egypt Exposes a Hezbollah Network on its Soil,” Intelligence and Terrorism
Information Center at the Israeli Intelligence and Heritage & Commemoration
Center, April 13, 2009. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/hezbollah_e010.htm;
Samer al-Atrush, “Hizbollah Cell Convicted of Plotting Egypt Tourist Attack,” Telegraph, April
28, 2010. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/7645956/Hizbollah-cell-convicted-of-plotting-Egypt-tourist-attack.html .
[13] “Hezbollah Chief Threatens Israel,” BBC News, February
14, 2008.
[14] “Trial of Suspected Hezbollah Cell Resumes in Egypt,” Haaretz,
October 28, 2009. http://www.haaretz.com/news/trial-of-suspected-hezbollah-cell-resumes-in-egypt-1.5229
[15] “Egypt Exposes a Hezbollah Network on its Soil, Claiming it Not
Only Smuggled Weapons in the Gaza Strip…,” Intelligence and Terrorism
Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center
(IICC), April 13, 2009.
[16] “Egypt to Try 26 People Held Over Terror Plot,” Gulf News,
August 3, 2009.
[17] Samer al-Atrush, “’Hezbollah’ Plotters Face Trial in Egypt Security
Court,” Agence France Presse, July 26, 2009.
[18] For more on Hezbollah’s Southeast Asia network see See Matthew
Levitt, “A Near Miss in Bangkok,” in Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of
Lebanon’s Party of God (Georgetown University Press, 2013), pp.
117-145 .
[19] “Exposure of a Hezbollah Terrorist Network in Egypt,” ICT’s Jihadi
Websites Monitoring Group, International Institute for Counter Terrorism,
August 2009.http://www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Internet%20Monitoring%20Group/JWMG_Hezbollah_Egypt.pdf;
Abdul Sittar Hatita, “Hezbollah Planned Three Syncronized Attacks in Egypt,” Asharq
Alawsat, April 24, 2009.
[20] Yossi Melman, Amos Harel, and Avi Issacharoff, “Mossad Tip Led to
Capture of Hezbollah Cell in Sinai,” Haaretz, April 14, 2009.
[21] “’Hezbollah Cell’ to be Tried by Egypt Security Court,” Agence
France Presse, August 21, 2009
[22] Chris Zambelis, “Hezbollah in Egypt: The Politics of Conspiracy and
Resistance,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. VII, Issue 16, June 12,
2009, p. 6. http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35110&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=412&no_cache=1 .
[23] “The Jihad Cell in Egypt Targeting American and Israeli Positions,” al
Hayat, February 1, 2009; Samer al-Atrush, “’Hezbollah’ Plotters Face Trial
in Egypt Security Court,” Agence France Presse, July 26, 2009.
[24] “Hezbollah Confirms Egypt Arrest,” BBC News, April 10,
2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7994304.stm .
[25] Roee Nahmias, “Deputy Hizbullah Chief: Cairo Looking for Victim,” YNet
News, April 5, 2009.
[26] “Armed Groups, Weapons Still Threatening Lebanon’s Stability,
Reports UN Envoy,” UN News Service, May 7, 2009.
[27] “Lebanon’s Political, Security Situation Markedly Improved, after
being Taken to ‘Brink of Civil War and Back’ One Year Ago, Security Council
Told,” 6120th Security Council Meeting (AM), Department of Public Information,
News and Media Division, New York, United Nations, May 7, 2009. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9653.doc.htm
[28] Yoav Stern, “Report: Hezbollah Cell in Egypt Planned to Recruit
Israeli Arabs,” Haaretz, April 14, 2009.
[29] “Qassem to Qatari Watan: Will Not Surrender Our Necks to
Politicized Court,” al Watan (Qatar) , October 31, 2010.
[30] “Exposure of a Hezbollah Terrorist Network in Egypt,” ICT’s Jihadi
Websites Monitoring Group, International Institute for Counter Terrorism,
August 2009.http://www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Internet%20Monitoring%20Group/JWMG_Hezbollah_Egypt.pdf;
“Exposure of a Hezbollah Network in Egypt: State of Affairs, Implications, and
Reactions in Egypt and in the Arab and Muslim World,” Intelligence and
Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage &
Commemoration Centre (IICC), April 28, 2009. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hezbollah_e011.pdf .
[31] “Exposure of a Hezbollah Network in Egypt: State of Affairs,
Implications, and Reactions in Egypt and in the Arab and Muslim World,”
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence
Heritage & Commemoration Centre (IICC), April 28, 2009.
[32] Yossi Melman, Amos Harel, and Avi Issacharoff, “Mossad Tip Led to
Capture of Hezbollah Cell in Sinai,” Haaretz, April 14, 2009.
[33] “Exposure of a Hezbollah Network in Egypt, Claiming it Not Only
Smuggled Weapons in the Gaza Strip…,” ICT’s Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group,
International Institute for Counter Terrorism, August 2009.http://www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Internet%20Monitoring%20Group/JWMG_Hezbollah_Egypt.pdf .
[34] “Egypt Exposes a Hezbollah Network on its Soil, Claiming it Not
Only Smuggled Weapons in the Gaza Strip…,” Intelligence and Terrorism
Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center
(IICC), April 13, 2009. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/hezbollah_e010.htm .
[35] “Exposure of a Hezbollah Network in Egypt: State of Affairs,
Implications, and Reactions in Egypt and in the Arab and Muslim World,”
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence
Heritage & Commemoration Centre (IICC), April 28, 2009. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hezbollah_e011.pdf .
[36] “Exposure of a Hezbollah Terrorist Network in Egypt,” ICT’s Jihadi
Websites Monitoring Group, International Institute for Counter Terrorism,
August 2009.http://www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Internet%20Monitoring%20Group/JWMG_Hezbollah_Egypt.pdf .
[37] “Exposure of a Hezbollah Terrorist Network in Egypt,” ICT’s Jihadi
Websites Monitoring Group, International Institute for Counter Terrorism,
August 2009, pp. 4-5.http://www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Internet%20Monitoring%20Group/JWMG_Hezbollah_Egypt.pdf .
[38] Ibid.
[39] Samer al-Atrush, “Hizbollah Cell Convicted of Plotting Tourist
Attack,” The Telegraph (London), April 28, 2010.
[40] Yoav Stern, “Report: Hezbollah Cell in Egypt Planned to Recruit
Israeli Arabs,” Haaretz, April 14, 2009.
[41] “Exposure of a Hezbollah Network in Egypt: State of Affairs,
Implications, and Reactions in Egypt and in the Arab and Muslim World,”
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence
Heritage & Commemoration Centre (IICC), April 28, 2009. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hezbollah_e011.pdf
[42] Amro Hassan, “EGYPT: Prosecution demands death penalty for six in
'Hezbollah cell,’” Los Angeles Times, January 27, 2010.
[43] Abdul Sittar Hatita, “Hezbollah Planned Three Synchronized Attacks
in Egypt,” Asharq Alawsat, April 24, 2009; “Exposure of a Hezbollah
Terrorist Network in Egypt,” ICT’s Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group,
International Institute for Counter Terrorism, August 2009, pp. 4-5. http://www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Internet%20Monitoring%20Group/JWMG_Hezbollah_Egypt.pdf .
[44] “Trial of Suspected Hezbollah Cell Resumes in Egypt,” Haaretz,
October 28, 2009.
[45] Yoav Stern, “Report: Hezbollah Cell in Egypt Planned to Recruit
Israeli Arabs,” Haaretz, April 18, 2009; “Exposure of a Hezbollah
Terrorist Network in Egypt,” ICT’s Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group,
International Institute for Counter Terrorism, August 2009, pp. 4-5. http://www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Internet%20Monitoring%20Group/JWMG_Hezbollah_Egypt.pdf .
[46] For examples, see Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global
Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God (Georgetown University Press,
2013).
[47] Michael R. Gordon and Andrew W. Lehren, “U.S. Strains to Stop Arms
Flow,” The New York Times, December 6, 2010 .
[48] Owen L Sirrs, A History of the Egyptian Intelligence
Service: A History of the Mukhabarat, 1910-2009 (London and New York:
Routledge, 20100, p.159-160.
[49] Roee Nahmias, “Report: Egypt Finds 266 Rockets Near Israeli
Border,” ynet.com, May 15, 2009
[50] Samer al-Atrush, “Hizbollah Cell Convicted of Plotting Tourist
Attack,” The Telegraph (London), April 28, 2010.
[51] Nadia Abou el Magd, “Hizbollah Bomb Plotters Jailed,” The
National (UAE), April 29, 2010.
[52] Ian Black, “Egypt Sentences 26 for Plotting Hezbollah Terrorist
Campaign,” The Guardian, April 28, 2010.
[53] Natacha Yazbeck, “Hezbollah Hails Egypt Verdict as ‘Badge of
Honour’,” Agence France Presse, April 29, p. 201.
[54] “Cairo: Hezbollah Delegation Visits the Brotherhood’s
Headquarters,” al Hayat, January 26, 2004, accessed through BBC
Worldwide Monitoring January 27, 2004.
[55] “Exposure of a Hezbollah Network in Egypt, Claiming it Not Only Smuggled
Weapons in the Gaza Strip…,” ICT’s Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group,
International Institute for Counter Terrorism, August 2009,http://www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Internet%20Monitoring%20Group/JWMG_Hezbollah_Egypt.pdf;
Jonathan Spyer, “Iran rivalry behind Cairo’s Hizbullah tension,” Jerusalem
Post, April 30, 2010. http://www.jpost.com/LandedPages/PrintArticle.aspx?id=174349 .
[56] Hisham Allam, “Investigative Report: Escape from Marg Prison,” al
Masry al Youm, May 3, 2011. http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/422118
[57] Hisham Allam, “Investigative Report: Escape from Marg Prison,” al
Masry al Youm, May 3, 2011. http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/422118
[58] “Hezbollah Operative Fled from Egypt through Sudan: Report,” Sudan
Tribune, February 19, 2011; “Syrian Embassy Aided Hezbollah Prisoner’s
Escape,” The Jerusalem Post, February 17, 2011.
[59] “Hezbollah Confirms its Cell Members Escaped Egyptian Jails,” Ya
Libnan, February 3, 2011.
[60] “Escaped Hezbollah Member Turns up in Beirut,” CNN, February 16,
2011; “Sami Shihab, a Hezbollah Operative who Escaped from an Egyptian Prison,
Participated in a Hezbollah Rally in Beirut…,” The Meir Ami Intelligence and
Terrorism Information Center, February 20, 2011. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/hezbollah_e018.htm .
[61] Author interview with US intelligence official, Washington, D.C., July
2003.
[62] See Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of
Lebanon’s Party of God (Georgetown University Press, 2013),
pp.364-365.
[63] “Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United
States,” Hearing before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United
States Senate, February 6, 2002 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
2002), pg. 339.
[64] Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of
Lebanon’s Party of God (Georgetown University Press, 2013).
[65] Yaniv Berman, “Shebaa Farms – nub of conflict,” Ynet News,
August 10, 2006, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3289532,00.html.
Publication Details:
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Initiative and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies / ISSN 2334-3745 (Online)
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