By Joel Lawton and Phillip Serpico (Edited by: Barry Wardlaw, SWJ) Introduction The Net Assessment Working Group, comp...
By Joel Lawton and
Phillip Serpico
(Edited by: Barry Wardlaw, SWJ)
Introduction
The Net
Assessment Working Group, comprised of Army science and technology (S&T)
experts, formed to compare planned S&T acquisitions and investments with
emerging technologies. The purpose was to assist the Army in defining potential
areas where future forces may be presented with “overmatch” technologies from
adversaries that may impact future forces. In March 2015, Net Assessment
Working Group participants identified the following: 1) Army mobility and protection assets are at
risk from the proliferation and advances of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM);
2) Army aviation assets are facing an increasing threat from area denial (AD)
strategies as well as a growing range of weapons; 3) Individual Soldiers are at
risk from a general reliance on position, navigation, and timing (PNT)
technologies and cognitive overload; 4) U.S. precision ammunition is at risk
from jamming technologies that threaten the delivery of precision fires; 5)
Army intelligence and electronic warfare (EW) systems are at risk from cover, camouflage,
concealment, denial, and deception (C3D2) technologies and an inability to
identify some advanced adversary EW systems: and 6) Combat Service Support is susceptible to the
large resource requirements required to deploy and sustain Army forces where
resources may be limited.
Overview
In the
near-term, mid-term (2020-2030), and far-term (2030-2040) adversarial
technological advances are expected to be wide-ranging and challenging for the
U.S. Army to defend against.[i] In order
to ensure the U.S. Army maintains its technological and competitive edge, it is
important to categorize the potential for adversary advantage by capability
portfolio management and equipment areas identified by the Long-Range
Investment Requirements Analysis (LIRA) process. The LIRA is a "30 year
long-range planning process" which includes the major investment areas
(portfolios) of: Mission Command; Maneuver; Ammunition; Fires, Air, and Missile
Defense; Protection/Chemical Biological Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNE);
Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (EW); Combat Service Support; Aviation;
Soldier, and Mobility.[ii] Thus, the LIRA is a 30-year plan that depicts the
“big picture,” linking “all capability gaps to S&T activity to fielding
material, and every fielding operations, support and eventual disposal and/or
replacement.”[iii]
This paper
examines threat insights as they pertain to each of the LIRA's investment
categories. Each of the LIRA's categories are related potential threats derived
from multiple intelligence community assessments and S&T subject matter
experts (SME) during a Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Army
Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) S&T sponsored Net Assessment
Working Group held in March 2015. The purpose of the Net Assessment Working
Group was to use members of the Army S&T community to collaborate with
ARCIC capability developers to address overmatch concerns. Discussions were
limited to topics where potential adversaries may have a technological
advantage over future U.S. investments. The insights in this paper are intended
to assist the LIRA process and inform the S&T community's research and
development efforts.
The Net
Assessment Working Group assisted in the substantiation of several concerns
impacting some technological investment categories within the LIRA. Some of the
insights derived include possible vulnerabilities to space, cyberspace
operations (CO), intelligence surveillance reconnaissance (ISR), and U.S.
networked Mission Command Systems (MCS). There is a potential for risk in the
assessed timeframes as a result of the increased lethality and velocity of
kinetic weapons such as anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), rocket-propelled
grenades (RPG), man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), and improvised explosive
devices (IED) affecting the protection, maneuver, fires, and aviation functions
of the Army. Emerging electro-magnetic weapons, such as directed-energy weapons
(DEW), radio frequency (RF), electromagnetic rail guns, and advanced electronic
attack/jamming will undoubtedly force the Army and Joint community to adapt to
these technological and threat-based trends.
This paper
discusses generally the future operational environment and how threats may
impact future acquisitions. Further, this paper is organized to give the reader
a broad sense how the Army will be presented with diverse technologies in the
future. Finally, it associates specific
threats to LIRA portfolios and concludes with recommendations that may help the
Army mitigate a technological gap in the future.
Threats to
Portfolios
The possible
threats identified and reviewed by the Net Assessment Working Group were
matched against planned U.S. Army technological investments in the mid- and
far-terms, as defined above. Major adversarial technological threats that
present a challenge to investments in the LIRA are generally developed by
near-peer competitors. Conversely, it is unlikely that the U.S. will come into
direct confrontation with near-peers, but nations supplied or sold these
technologies may pose a threat to the U.S. or its interests. This proliferation
makes it possible that the U.S. will confront advanced technologies that can
have an advantage over planned programs in the LIRA.
Adversaries will
continue to target U.S. vulnerabilities and try to negate technological areas
where the U.S. has the advantage. In the mid- and farterms, access to
progressively more advanced technology will give adversaries increased
advantage in: range, inventory, and precision of rockets and missiles; space
capabilities; counter-precision capabilities, and an increase in the lethality
within small units.[iv] These future threats require comprehensive solutions to
mitigate due to pervasive characteristics of the operational environment (OE),
which include: increased velocity and momentum of human interaction and events;
potential for overmatch; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; spread
of advanced cyberspace and counter-space capabilities; ease of technology
transfer to state and non-state actors; transparency and ubiquitous media, and
demographics and operations among populations, in cities, and in complex
terrain.[v] [vi] Ergo, the characteristics of future adversaries will be
complex, dynamic, innovative, and determined to match or supplant historical
U.S. technological advantages.
The
proliferation and distribution of new and emerging technologies makes it
important that the Army develop a comprehensive concept and capability
development program through collaboration with the public and private S&T
communities. The ambiguity about technological advances of potential near-peer
adversaries and the proliferation of those technologies to non-state groups
presents a challenging future OE, and along with ominous DoD budget cuts, makes
prioritized S&T investments critical. Former Secretary of Defense, Chuck
Hagel, stated in his 2014 Defense Innovation Initiative Memorandum that the
U.S. must accelerate innovation through “identify[ing], develop[ing], and
field[ing] breakthrough technologies and systems that sustain and advance the
capability of U.S. military power” in order to assure “America’s continued
strategic dominance.”[vii] Conclusively,
the Net Assessment insights help the Army think about the evolution of the OE
and the effects of all aspects of technology on the future of armed conflict.
Net Assessment
Insights
The
proliferation of technology in the near-, mid-, and far-terms puts planned Army
investments at risk. Programmed technologies in the LIRA address some concerns
through near-term (i.e., until 2020). Near-peer adversaries are currently
investing heavily in capabilities, technologies, and concepts in order to
mitigate perceived U.S. advantages on the battlefield. Their investments will
likely create a technological gap throughout the mid- and far-terms,
confronting the Army with commensurate or superior technologies. Joint and Army
investments throughout the far-term will have to address the concerns of the
future through developing advanced technologies and concepts in order to minimize
adversarial advances in weapon and technology effects.
Mobility and
Protection. The LIRA’s Mobility and Protection portfolios are at risk
throughout the far-term from several threats exhibited currently. The most
stressing threat to the portfolio is the proliferation of and advances in
ATGMs. Trends indicate advances in ATGM effects have accelerated
partner-nations’ investments in protection systems. The use of protection
systems by partners have had great success in recent conflicts, increasing the survivability
of many armor platforms. Such advancements include Israel’s development and
deployment of the Trophy Active Protection Systems (APS) used during the 2014
Israel-Gaza Conflict. However, LIRA investments do little to advance or invest
in APS.
Another
stressing threat is system survivability and protection against IED blasts.
IEDs are easily made and adapted by both state and non-state adversaries.
Presently, the Army has invested in IED protections (e.g., heavy armor packages
for vehicles, electronic counter-measures, and body armor for dismounted
troops), but due to pervasiveness and adaptability of the IED threat,
protection and mobility will continue to be at risk throughout the far-term.
The LIRA does not sufficiently invest in capabilities to defend against the
impacts of IED technologies without impacting mobility (i.e., size, weight, and
power considerations).
An additional
threat to the portfolios is the use of chemical and biological weapons by state
and non-state actors. The LIRA does not invest in areas of CBRNE, presenting a
threat to future land forces. As the recent cases of the use of chemical
weapons in Syria has shown the DoD, state and non-state actors will exploit the
low cost of CBRNE weapons as an effective alternative to expensive advanced
weapon systems. Near-peer adversaries are making advances in fourth-generation
chemical and biological agents that will likely be weaponized by unpredictable
non-state actors. Current protection equipment is currently not adequate for
use against all types of CBRNE attacks. This makes the Protection portfolio
vulnerable to new or modified CBRNE technology (e.g., inoculations, protective
gear, decontamination; etc.) and risks Mobility through degraded maneuver in a
CBRNE environment.
Aviation. The
Aviation portfolio is facing an increasing threat from area denial (AD)
strategies as well as growing range of weapons. Such as the proliferation of
MANPADS, programmable fusing munitions, long-range air defense systems, and
air-to-air missiles, which increases the threat to aircrafts and their
associated mission sets. Within the LIRA and tech base (i.e., technologies available,
but not programmed) there are programs looking at increasing the capability of
airframes to defend against advances in these weapons. However, the Net
Assessment Working Group was aware of few technologies that could counter the
threat posed by MANPADS due to a general lack of research and development
directed towards counter technologies.
Participants
also noted counter-tactics such as avoidance that will do little to thwart this
threat and will likely diminish effectiveness by adding to, for example, loiter
and response times. Concepts and technology together must begin to address the
increasing AD threat and allow the Army to maintain its advantage in the air
domain.
Soldier.
Technology threats and cognitive overload pose risk to the Soldier portfolio.
Initially, the targeting of U.S, position, navigation, and timing (PNT) systems
will be the most stressing threat. Soldiers will likely face degraded or denied
PNT throughout the far-term when faced with adversarial employment of jamming
and spoofing technologies. Current PNT systems rely on 1970’s technology
enabled by the Global Position System (GPS); which has limited defenses. In the
future, PNT must be available in environments where GPS is unavailable. The Net
Assessment Working Group believed LIRA investments are adequate to ensure the
effects from jamming or spoofing will be limited and the Army can operate in a
GPS denied or degraded OE. However, provisions and requirements must be made
within the acquisition and S&T communities to ensure access to PNT in any
environment.
Cognitive
overload is another risk that Soldiers may be presented with when challenged
with managing numerous Mission Command Systems, operating in complex
environments, and analyzing all variables of the OE. The LIRA does have some
programs to optimize cognitive performance via emphasizing “Agile and Adaptive
Leaders.”[viii] Agile and Adaptive Leaders is a “position of intellectual
advantage over a situation or adversary that fosters proactive agility over
reactive adaptation, facilitating the ability to anticipate change before it
occurs.”[ix] This will allow for Soldiers, leaders, and decision-makers to make
timely judgments and maneuver through complex areas of operation. Training in
the mid- and far-terms must assimilate new techniques to foster competencies in
cognitive dominance to deal with the complexities and countless variables where
Soldiers will have to make decisions.
Ammunition. The
Ammunition portfolio is another category where jamming technologies pose risk to
the delivery and range of munitions. Specifically, precision-guided munitions
(PGM) are enabled by PNT technologies and may be vulnerable to GPS denial
systems. Denial of GPS through jamming or spoofing could reduce or degrade the
Army’s ability to deliver precision fires. Alternative PNT technologies (i.e.,
other than GPS) need to be integrated into PGM development programs to ensure
the delivery and accuracy of munitions in the future. The LIRA and tech base
does little to address the development of alternatives to traditional PNT
technologies within PGMs. The development of future munitions similarly should
address their survivability in AD environments.
Intelligence and
EW. The Intelligence and EW portfolio is at risk from cover, camouflage,
concealment, denial, and deception (C3D2) technologies as well as an inability
to identify some advanced adversary EW systems. Near-peer adversaries currently
have advanced C3 that is designed to conceal the locations of air defense
systems or advanced decoys used to deceive oppositional forces. C3D2
technologies are comparatively inexpensive to produce and provide protection to
both ground and air defense systems. The LIRA or tech base does little to
invest in systems to help the Army distinguish between actual or decoy systems.
A second area of
concern is that the DoD has invested much into the interoperability of Command,
Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems, but greater compatibility of systems will be
needed throughout the far-term. The Net Assessment Working Group believed that
EW and intelligence systems are not integrated well. This impacts how
information and data is disseminated throughout the intelligence community (IC)
as well as between military IC components. Future Intelligence and EW
investments will have to address the interoperability through a
systems-of-systems (SoS) approach and procedurally systematize the integration
of EW with intelligence functions.
Combat Service
Support. The Combat Service Support portfolio is susceptible to the large
resource requirements required to deploy and sustain Army forces where
in-theater resources may be limited. Power and energy resources (e.g., fuel,
electric power generation; etc.) are the most contentious resource constraints.
Increasing power and energy consumption of the future force may limit response
times and sustainment of land and air systems. The Army has invested in lighter
and more efficient systems (e.g., solar power, fuel efficient vehicles; etc.),
nonetheless improvements are needed to facilitate a smaller, lighter, and
versatile supply chain. Throughout the far-term, it is expected that DoD
budgets will be constrained, thus requiring an efficacious approach to power
and energy consumption.
Conclusion and
Recommendations
The Army will
undoubtedly be challenged with a diverse and challenging future OE. This will
require “the U.S. Army to innovate to ensure that forces are prepared to
accomplish future missions.”[x] The Net Assessment Working Group is part of
many efforts throughout the Army intended to help to “anticipate the demands of
future armed conflict.”[xi] Specifically, this event and other concurrent
efforts will help the Army maintain a technological edge and maintain its position
of “overmatch” over adversaries through prioritizing investments, determining
capability gaps, and organizing a greater community of interest.
Recommendation
1. The LIRA’s portfolios will remain contested throughout the far-term. The
S&T community, through research and development efforts, can present a
range of viable and sustainable solutions to counter threats to U.S. systems
and capabilities. One potential approach may be to seek partner nation
technologies as well as work with the trusted international communities to
foster new and innovative solutions.
Solutions must also be broad and agile enough to adapt to changes in the
OE and emerging technologies.
Recommendation
2. The Army should initiate a phased approach to research and development,
acquisition, and Joint Force collaboration. In the interim, the Army S&T
community should continue to explore, develop, and expand existing technologies
by adding to the tech base. During this period, Mobility and Protection
portfolio technologies should receive priority; followed by Soldier and
Aviation portfolios. Also, programs funded through LIRA investments that
provide little value to sustaining or advancing Joint Force capabilities should
be reallocated to areas of high risk within the portfolios. Following
realignment and prioritization of efforts, the Army should take strides to work
with the Joint Force and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics [OSD (AT&L)] to develop a Joint Net
Assessment. The purpose of a Joint Net Assessment would be to examine
technologies across the services and to prioritize capability gaps requiring
improvement or expansion.
Recommendation
3. Use of TRADOC G-2’s Mad Scientist line of effort and ARCIC’s Technology
Industry Exchange (TIE) to better integrate private sector, academic, and the
S&T community of interest with LIRA planning initiatives. Mad Scientist,
enables continuous dialogue to help the “Army think about the evolution of the
OE and the effects of all aspects of technology on the far future of Armed
Conflict.”[xii] Mad Scientist and TIE can be used as a venue to help prioritize
investment/acquisition activities by linking them to specific technologies,
capabilities, and concepts.
The opinions
expressed in this paper are those of the authors, and may not represent those
of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, U.S. Army, or TRADOC.
About The Authors:
About The Authors:
Joel Lawton ,is a
former member of the U.S. Army’s Human Terrain System (HTS). His work with HTS
included working in the U.S. and two tours to Afghanistan, where he conducted
socio-cultural research management, collection, and support; as well as
open-source intelligence analysis and qualitative data collection and analysis.
Joel served in the USMC, deploying to southern Helmand Province in 2009 in
support of combat operations. Further, Joel is an advocate of qualitative
analysis and its use in military intelligence collection efforts. He currently
works as an intelligence analyst for the Army, Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC). Email: j
Major Phillip Serpico is an Army Field Artillery Officer with experience in targeting and planning joint fires. His most recent deployment was to Regional Command South (RC-S) Afghanistan in 2010, where he served as the Assist Division Fire Support Coordinator. His other published works include a 2011 Center for Army Lesson Learned (CALL) article titled Joint Fires in Regional Command, South. MAJ Serpico also served as a military transition team advisor in Iraq in 2006-2007. He is currently serving as a military analyst for the Science and Technology (S&T) Division within the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC).
End Notes
[i] ARCIC
S&T. “Balancing S&T Efforts and Innovation for the Deep Future.”
October 2014. Overall document classification is: SECRET//NOFORN. Extracted content is: UNCLASSIFIED
[ii] Department
of the Army. Army Equipment in Support of Presidents Budget 2015. May 2014.
Overall document classification is: UNCLASSIFIED
[iii]
Matrisciano, Vince. “Thirty-Year Plans: What They Are and Why We Need Them.”
Defense AT&L: January-February 2014.
http://dau.dodlive.mil/files/2014/11/Matrisciano.pdf. Overall document classification
is: UNCLASSIFIED
[iv] TRADOC G-2.
“The Potential for Adversary Advantage in the Operational Environment.” Overall
document classification is: SECRET//NOFORN. Extracted content is: UNCLASSIFIED.
[v] Department
of the Army 2014. The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World
2020-2040. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1. 31 October, 1-12. Overall document
classification is: UNCLASSIFIED
[vi] TRADOC G-2.
“The Potential/or Adversary Advantage in the Operational Environment.” Overall
document classification is: SECRET//NOFORN. Extracted content is: UNCLASSIFIED.
[vii] Hagel,
Chuck, U.S. Secretary of Defense 2014. “The Defense Innovation Initiative.”
Memo OSD013411-14. 15 November. Overall document classification is:
UNCLASSIFIED
[viii] Gen Mark
A. Milley redfined the term “Cognitive Dominance” with Agile and Adaptive
Leaders in 2015. See “STAND-TO” article “Cognitive Dominance Education Program”
for more information. http://www.army.mil/standto/archive_2015-09-08/
[ix] Nabi,
Farzana PhD. “Culture of Learning, Innovation & Human Dimension.” TRADOC
Human Dimension Task Force. 20 December 2014, 10. Overall document
classification is: UNCLASSIFIED
[x] Department of the Army 2014. The U.S. Army
Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World 2020-2040. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1.
31 October, 8. Overall document classification is: UNCLASSIFIED
[xi] Ibid.
[xii] Hutchinson, Kira PhD. “Mad Scientist
Conference: Human Dimension 2025 and Beyond.” TRADOC G-2. Information Paper, 19
August 2015. Overall document classification is: UNCLASSIFIED
This paper was originally published at Small Wars Journals on October 10, 2015 and licensed under the Creative Commons 3.0 by the Original Publisher itself.
Image Attribute: US XM1219 Armed Robotic Vehicle / Source: Wikimedia Commons [Link]
Image Attribute: US XM1219 Armed Robotic Vehicle / Source: Wikimedia Commons [Link]
AIDN: 001-10-2015-0352
