In the course of two weeks, the relations between India and its smaller neighbor to the north have hit a new low. Twitter storms have been raised and television channels have been cut in response to an 'unofficial' blockade of fuel and supplies.
By Mikhil Rialch
In
the course of two weeks, the relations between India and its smaller neighbor
to the north have hit a new low. Twitter storms have been raised and television channels have been cut in response to an
'unofficial' blockade of fuel and supplies.
On
20 September, the Nepal Constituent Assembly's (CA) unveiling of the
Constitution - its seventh in almost seven decades - witnessed fireworks
and gaiety across the country. However, in further south of the Terai region,
the tension seemed palpable. The political context met with a state of flux,
which hailed by many as the finish line of a tortuous nine-year odyssey since
King Gyanendra's ouster in 2006. As the promulgation of the Constitution is
largely owing to the united front presented by the three major parties in Nepal
- the Nepali Congress, Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML),
and the Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist. While the text of the Constitution
was approved by nearly 85 per cent of the 601 CA members, the main opposition
came from 60-odd legislators belonging to the Terai region. Their defiance
stemmed from the concerns of the Madhesi, Tharu and Janajati communities
residing in the region- wherein the new Constitution is seen as a gateway to
their political marginalization.
Genesis of Crisis
The
bone of contention lies in the Constitutional amendment which seeks to recarve the country's 28 million
population from the erstwhile fourteen provinces to seven federal provinces.
The Madhesies, along with the Tharus and the Janajaties make up over 40 per
cent of Nepal's population and, as such, expected a proportional representation
on the basis of population. However, being divided across five of the seven
with only one province with a clear Madhesi majority, a perceived political
disenfranchisement triggered their call for concern.
The
rift between the Madhesies and the central government is, at one level, the
historical struggle of plains-folks versus hill-elite. The rift can be seen two ways: first, the Madhesi
predominance in the Terai region guarantees them the vote bank of the province,
but the new demarcation of provinces, it only guarantees half the population
(consisting mainly the hill-elite) with 100 seats, while the other half
(Madhesi, Tharus, Janajati) receive only 65 seats. And secondly, the 'proportional inclusion' clause provides several
castes of the hill communities with reservation- a move that further marginalizes
the Madhesies.
With
such intricacies attached, the Constitutional announcement caused a new
imbroglio- where, dissent turned into protest, cities faced a lock-down, and
police were put to action to quell any form of state unrest. And with Madhesi
and Tharu political parties aiming at a grand alliance to commence the second
phase of protest, the current volatility seems to grow bigger and bitter.
Indian Response: From Suggestive to Abrasive
India’s
longstanding paternalistic attitude towards Nepal's political transition from a
royalist monarchy to that of a secular, federal democracy met with a pithy response with the 20 September Constitutional
announcement. While Kathmandu grumbles over this lackluster response, Indian
officials claim that it has given them cause. The MEA's official release stated, "We are deeply
concerned over the incidents of violence resulting in death and injury in regions
of Nepal bordering India following the promulgation of Constitution
yesterday..." It went further, stating, "We had repeatedly cautioned
the political leadership of Nepal to take urgent steps to defuse the tension in
these regions. This, if done in a timely manner, could have avoided these
serious developments."
Over
the course of the last few months, Indian response to the developments in Nepal
have undergone a transition- from polite suggestions to
cautionary warnings to, finally, barely-veiled disapproval. The official reason
for Indian apprehension is the risk of "spillover" from the violence
in Terai - which lies along the porous India-Nepal border - into Indian
territory. Also cited are complaints by freight and transporters on difficulty
of movement. However, India’s disapprobation can be assessed based on two
criticalities. First, the immediate
cause of the upcoming Bihar elections. The politically fractious state of Bihar
has been the keystone to any Indian election, and this year promises to be a
keenly contested tug-of-war between the ruling NDA and the grand alliance of
the Congress, the RJD and the JD(U). Any spillover from the Terai crisis could
quite conveniently end up in the latter's court. Safeguarding poll-bound Bihar
from external infractions is, after all, a responsibility of the Centre.
Secondly,
over the course of the Constitution's progress, India has increasingly
perceived itself to be the slighted party. Revisiting 2006 when India brought
together the forces that have finally delivered the Constitution, it had a key
influence over its formation, even playing guarantor to some parties. However,
it had sought guarantees for the rights of the Madhesi people. According to
officials, none of these commitments were upheld by the Nepali government in
the new Constitution. With its proprietorship over the Constitution-building process
shrunk to a minimum, India was left seething, clearly evidenced by the Hon'ble
Home Minister Rajnath Singh's remarks in August of protecting the "Madhesis as
Indians" (The Indian embassy was forced to issue a denial following
Kathmandu's protests). The natural India-Madhesi affinity means that India is
strongly in their corner, even if it translates to being against the other 85
per cent of Nepal's lawmakers.
Skirting the 'I' Word
India's
efforts to stall the announcement and reach a more inclusive conclusion have
included actors at the highest corridors - from Foreign Secretary S.
Jaishankar's two-day visit to Sushma Swaraj's remarks and Prime Minister Modi's
telephone call imploring his counterpart, Nepali Prime Minister Sushil Koirala,
to obtain, "consensus, not numbers". But apart from putting a stay
the announcement of the Constitution till the 4 pm final deadline, Nepal did
not bat an eye. Jaishankar's visit met with a point-blank refusal by its three
top leaders - Koirala, Maoist chief Prachanda and UML's K.P. Oli. Swaraj's
requests were countermanded by an implacable Dinesh Bhattarai, Nepal's Foreign
Affairs Adviser, who baldly stated, "Flexibility has to come from both
sides" (referring to the stalemate between the government and the
Madhesies).
This
state of flux also raises concerns over India’s big brother attitude towards
its smaller neighbours- often resulting into concerns of intervention. As India
has long been accused of casting its shadow in the political affairs of Nepal.
In this regard, instances like Rajnath Singh's remarks and Jaishankar's
meetings with the Madhesi leaders- raises Nepal’s concerns over India's true
motive in furthering their cause. In his statement of 22 September, Maoist
chief Prachanda strongly affirmed that Nepal does not want
to be India's 'yes' man- signalling a rift in the relations.
The Road Ahead
Considering
the above, India doesn't have many options on the table. As India’s sublime response
to Nepal's announcement, along with Jaishankar's bordering-on-blunt remarks has
generated a major backlash, which is reflected in Nepal’s social media stand,
which strongly slogans at “back Off India”. Adding to this contention is the
crucial ‘China factor’. As unlike India's cold posture, China extended a warm
welcome to Nepal’s Constitutional
success. In congratulating Nepal China stated that "Nepal [should]
seize the opportunity to realise national unity, stability and
development" China's such open backing towards the CPN-UML supremo KP Oli
for the Prime Ministerial berth is as unprecedented as it is worrisome in South
Block circles. Its recent offer to train officers of the Nepali army, which
already buys significant quantities of arms and equipment from China raises
strategic concerns for India. In light of China's economic and military
overtures to Nepal, playing the disapproving uncle is perhaps not the best
course of strategy for India.
Some
however, such as Indian Member of Parliament D.K.Tripathi, think India shouldn't
have been too critical of Nepal's decision in the first place. The concerns of
the Madhesies can certainly be addressed in the coming months or years. As he
said: “Nepal has adopted a Constitution, and like all other constitutions in
the world, this too will mature and evolve”.
What
appears is that, India’s concerns, while somewhat masked, are justified to some
degree. While Terai accounts for one-fifth of Nepal's territory, it comprises
more than half of its population. An unstable Terai is bound to shake up
Nepal's constitutional fabric, especially now since the Constitution's
opponents stand in resolute unity. Rather than engaging in a war of words,
India should monitor the situation from a distance. Its bonhomie with the
Indian-origin Madhesies means that it could play an honest broker if the
situation gets out of hand and, more importantly, when the need to act as a
facilitator is not just a necessity, but comes via invitation from Kathmandu
itself.
About The Author:
About The Author:
Mikhil
Rialch is a Strategic Affairs Researcher at the Oval Observer Foundation, NewDelhi. He specializes in socio-political issues in South Asia. / Thomson Reuters Researcher ID:
L-7185-2015