By Major (retd.) A. H. Amin 1965 was a watershed in Indo-Pak history! The war instead of being dispassionately analysed became a g...
By Major (retd.) A. H. Amin
1965 was a watershed in Indo-Pak history! The war instead of being
dispassionately analysed became a ground to attack and condemn political
opponents! Complete books were written out of sheer motivation based on pure
and unadulterated venom! To date the trend continues at the cost of serious
research and history writing! Most of these books were written by beneficiaries
of the usurper Ayub or Bhutto haters! Men with a naive knowledge of military
history made worse by a desire to settle personal scores! Jaundiced history of
the worst kind!
This article is an overall analysis of the 1965 war based on military
facts rather than any motivation to settle political scores based on matters of
ego rather than any serious objective considerations! It is hoped that after 36
years readers would be more interested in hard facts rather than pure and
unadulterated polemics by men who did
not know the division of battle “more than a spinster”!
Timing of 1965 War
This has been the subject of many
controversies and myths! In 1965 India was recovering from the effects
of the China War. Indian Army was engaged in a process of massive expansion
with units and divisions half trained half novice! Something like the Austrian
Army of 1809! Outwardly expanding and
larger but lacking the military virtue and military spirit identified by Carl
Von Clausewitz as the key elements in an military machines effectiveness! There
was no overwhelming Indian numerical superiority unlike 1971 and many parts of
the
Indo-Pak border like the vast bulk of Shakargarh bulge were unmanned on
the Indian side! Qualitatively Pakistan had a tangible superiority by virtue of
possession of relatively superior tanks and artillery! The Centurion tank which
was the backbone of Indian army was concentrated in the Indian Armoured
division while the vast bulk of Indian infantry divisions were equipped with
the obsolete Shermans! Even in quality of command there were serious drawbacks!
The Indian 1 Corps had been just raised and the GOC of the Indian 1st Armoured
Division was about to retire! Indian Mountain Divisions brought into the plains
lacked sufficient antitank resources and were not in the ideal fighting
condition. Some 38 plus Indian Infantry Battalions were absorbed by the
blotting paper of Indian Army i.e a tract known as Kashmir! All these
battalions were deployed north of Chenab River.
Indian Army was in the process of expansion and the Indian Army had no
strategic reserves in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor against the Pakistani 1st
Armoured Division.
Setting aside the ethical dilemma whether war is the best instrument of
policy to settle political disputes militarily 1965 was the ideal time for
Pakistan to settle its political problems with India. This point was realized
by some mid- ranking senior officers in the Pakistan Army which included the
Pakistani DMO Gul Hassan, Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik and by some
civilians like Foreign Minister Z.A Bhutto and Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmad.
On the other hand Musa the Pakistani C-in-C was opposed to war! This was
not because Musa was a pacifist but because Musa lacked military competence and
was enjoying his second four-year-term as C-in-C of the Pakistan Army! Ayub the
military ruler was initially against any military adventure but revised his
ideas after Pakistani military successes in Rann of Katch.
In Clausewitzian terms 1965 was the ideal time for Pakistan to start a
war. The following quotation illustrates the rationale; ‘Let us suppose a small
state is involved in a contest with a very superior power, and foresees that
with each year its position will become worse: should it not; if war is
inevitable, make use of the time when its situation is furthest from worst?
Then it must attack, not because the attack in itself ensures any advantages
but it will rather increase the disparity of forces — but because this state is
under the necessity of either bringing the matter completely to an issue before
the worst time arrives or of gaining at least in the meantime some advantages
which it may hereafter turn to account’.1
Comparative Level of Planning-Strategic
At the strategic level the Pakistani plan was superior. Its initial
thrust launched with an infantry division-tank brigade size force against
Akhnur was enough to cause a crisis of strategic level in the Indian Army. The
situation with Akhnur in Pakistani hands would have been disastrous for India.
All the Indian plans to launch the 1 Corps against the MRL would have been
thrown to winds and Indians would have spent the entire war redressing the
imbalance caused due to loss of Akhnur! On the other hand the Pakistani thrust
in Khem Karan would have bottled up three Indian Infantry divisions in the
Beas-Ravi corridor and three Indian divisions would have been forced to
surrender. 1965 could have then been a Pakistani strategic success rather than
a tactical draw as it turned out to be.
On the other hand the Pakistani 6 Armoured Division was well poised to
deal with any Indian armoured thrust launched in the Ravi-Chenab corridor.
Pakistani failure lay in poor execution and understanding at the
strategic level rather than planning
It was in implementation rather than planning that the Pakistani GHQ and
Ayub failed miserably at the strategic level. The reason was simple. Both Ayub
and Musa lacked strategic insight! They lacked the resolution and strategic
coup d oeil to conduct decisive warfare. Both were extremely defensive in their
approach and saw war as reacting to enemy countermoves rather than making the
enemy react to their moves. Thus Musa as late as 1983 naively claimed in his
book “My Version” that the aim of Grand Slam was not to capture Akhnur but to
merely threaten it. In other words Musa saw a move which had the potential to
cause a severe strategic imbalance in the Indian High Command as a tactical
move to relieve pressure on Muzaffarabad! Allah be praised!
(details of grand slam lower down
in this article)
Even a foreigner saw the immense importance of capturing Akhnur. Thus
the remarks of Marshall Chen Yi the Foreign Minister of China who was visiting
Pakistan at the time of Grand Slam. Chen Yi thus “made a sharp cutting movement
at the little finger; ‘knock them out at Akhnoor’.That will help the freedom
fighters and also guarantee the security of East and West Pakistan. With the
little finger gone, the whole hand becomes useless”!2 So thought a veteran of a
many decade long civil war! This was Greek for a man who was elevated to the
rank of Army Chief because of political considerations! This was Greek for a
man accused of tactical timidity in Burma!
Inability to develop a doctrine of decisive warfare
The principal reason of failure of both the armies was “failure or
inability to develop a doctrine of decisive warfare”. This was a colonial
legacy. The Indian Army of pre-1947 was an internal security machine designed
for defence while the main forces of the empires allies came into action on
other decisive fronts. The concentration on both sides was to have tactical
concepts while no doctrine integrating tactics with operational strategy and
national strategy existed to give coherence to the whole business of warfare.
Lack of Resolution in the Ayub-Musa duo to energetically conduct the war
1965 was a failure in resolution at the highest level. Both the
president and his handpicked chief lacked the resolution to provide strategic
direction to a well oiled machine which had the potential to inflict a severe
strategic defeat on the enemy.
Failure of Pakistani GHQ to effectively supervise execution of plans or
to create alternative organization or command arrangements to supervise the
conduct of war
The job of an army HQ is not just to formulate plans but to effectively
supervise the execution of plans. Ayub in words of a British contemporary was
devoid of “operational experience” “organizational understanding” and “lacked
tactical flair”.3 Thus Ayub and Musa saw
no need to have intermediate corps headquarters to over insure the success of
the army’s main attack involving a force of an infantry division and an
armoured division. This was a case of extreme naivette rather than a minor
error of judgement. Probably the supreme commander was too busy with Five Year
Plans and big business and had lost sight of the business of soldiering! His
handpicked proxy chief wanted a peaceful tenure in which he would not be forced
to exercise any strategic judgement!
The 12 Divisional organizational failure, one of the main reasons of
Grand Slam’s failure, was another glaring case of lack of organizational
insight on part of Ayub and Musa. While the Indians had bifurcated their forces
in Kashmir based on north and south of Pir Panjal range right from 1948 and
early 1950s Pakistan’s military supremos naively thought that one divisional
headquarter was sufficient to manage a front of 400 miles in a mountainous
territory spanning the Himalayas, Karakorams and the Pir Panjal!
Indian and Pakistani Armour Failures Compared
At the strategic level both India and Pakistan got an opportunity to
knock out the other side. Pakistan got it twice, first at Akhnur and then at
Khem Karan. India got it once at Gadgor on 8th September. Both the sides
failed. On the Pakistani side the failure had more to do with lack of strategic
insight at Akhnur, ordering a change of horses in the middle of a crucial
operation. Then at Khem Karan the Pakistani failure was at divisional level i.e
failure to pump in all five armoured regiments on the 8th or 9th September thus
achieving a decisive breakthrough.The situation was made worse by absence of
Corps Headquarter. The Indian failure at Gadgor had more to do with failure at
brigade and divisional level in actual execution despite the fact that the
Indians had the mains “available” as well as “physically available” to achieve a breakthrough. The failure was
Brigadier K.K Singh Commander Indian 1st Armoured Division who saw a threat to
his flanks which in reality was a tank squadron of 62 Cavalry which had lost
its way and blundered into the Indian artillery echelons opposite Rangre. The
Indians had the means to achieve a breakthrough but failed primarily because
lack of coup d oeil and resolution at brigade level. This was a command and
execution failure. In Khem Karan on the other hand Pakistan had the resources
but failed to bring them into the battle area because of poor staff work and
planning at divisional level. Thus on the decisive 8th September Pakistan did
not have the means to achieve a breakthrough and this had more to do with poor
initial planning and staff work at div and brigade level rather than at the
command or execution level. Thus the Pakistani failure was a staff and planning
failure in which all from brigade till GHQ were included while the Indian
failure was a command failure in which the prime culprits were the armoured
brigade and divisional commander.
On the Pakistani side the success at Gadgor had more to do with
outstanding leadership at squadron and unit level rather than any operational
brilliance at brigade or divisional level. In the Indian success at Khem Karan,
however, an important role was played by Indian higher headquarters at
divisional corps and army command level.
Triumph of Defence and Failure of Offence as a Form of War
1965 was a failure of offence and triumph of defence. Except in Grand
Slam where initial overwhelming superiority enabled Pakistan to achieve a
breakthrough, on both sides defence triumphed as a way of war. Both the armies
were more used to defence because of British colonial military experience and
comparative relative lack of difference in weaponry also ensured that defence
triumphed over attack. Thus the attackers failed at Gadgor, Chawinda, Assal,
Uttar and Valtoha regardless of religion of the defender! Both the armies
lacked the dynamism to conduct attack a far more complicated form of war and
totally outside the pre-1947 experience of fighting divisional and brigade
level defensive battles till overwhelming superiority enabled the Britisher to
resume the offensive as at Alalamein and
that too with non-Indian formations like the purely British armoured divisions
or in Burma where the British-Indians had overwhelming superiority against the
Japanese in tanks and air.
Ignored aspects of the war
There are certain points which are conveniently forgotten or not
understood at all. Although the paratroopers failed in Pathankot area their
dropping delayed the move forward of 14 Indian Infantry Division to support
Indian 1st Armoured Division operations opposite Chawinda. The latter fact was acknowledged by a man no less
eminent than the Indian GOC Western Command Harbaksh Singh.4
Conclusion
While Indian GOC Western Command Harbaksh Singh admitted that the
Pakistani attack opposite Khem Karan could have been decisive we in Pakistan
have twisted 1965 war into a case of
blaming the civilians for intriguing against the army and leading it into an
aimless military adventure. Even today India’s top military thinker Ravi Rikhye
admits that Khem Karan had the potential to be India’s Fourth Battle of Panipat.
Pakistan failed because its military leaders lacked the strategic
insight which was necessary to transform its tangible qualitative superiority
in equipment and manpower at the tactical level into a victory! 1965 was an
undoubted strategic failure on part of Pakistani higher command. Pakistan paid
the price six years later. Success would have meant unity. Defeat led to civil
war and secession. The fault lay in lack of strategic insight at the military
level.
About The Author:
About The Author:
Major (retd.) A. H. Amin - Tank Corps: 13 Years service in Pakistan Army (PAVO 11 Cavalry,29
Cavalry,58 Cavalry,15 Lancers,5 Independent Tank Squadron,14 Lancers,15 SP) and
31 years research . Ex Editor Globe , Ex Assistant Editor Defence Journal , Ex
Editor Journal of Afghanistan Studies. Publications: More than 200 articles in
News, Nation , PRAVDA,Pakistan Army Journal , Citadel Magazine of Command and
Staff College,Journal of Afghanistan Studies,Indian Strategic Review,Dawn
,Friday Times,Outlook Afghanistan ,Afghanistan Times,Frontier
Post,Globe,Defence Journal,Media Monitors Network,Pakistan Army till 1965 held
at US Army War College Library,US Army Command and Staff College Library,Indo
Pak Wars a Strategic and Operational Analysis,Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59
Reinterpreted, The Essential Clausewitz,Man’s Role in History:
Education/Credentials : Masters (History). Past/Present Clients: Various Think
Tanks , Afghanistan Research Associates,Centre for Study of Non State Militant
Actors in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
End Notes
Pages-397 and 398-On War-Edited by Anatol Rapport-Reprinted National
Book Foundation-1976.
Page-93-Memoirs of a Bystander-A Life in Diplomacy-Iqbal Akhund-Oxford
University Press-Karachi-1997.
Pages 428 & 429-Pakistan-Memories of Earlier Years-Lieut Gen Sir
James Wilson-Army Quarterly and Defence Journal-Volume-120-No Four-October
1990.
Pages-61,129,135 and 136-War Despatches-Harbaksh Singh-Lancer-1991.
Ravi Rikhye’s article on Assal Uttar-ORBAT-19 August 2001.
This article was first published at DefenseJournal on September 2001 and All rights are held by the original publisher.
