By Duane Neal In February 2015, two of the most senior leaders in the U.S. armed services, the Chief of Staff of the Army and t...
By Duane Neal
In February
2015, two of the most senior leaders in the U.S. armed services, the Chief of
Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations, delivered an “8-star memo”
to the Secretary of Defense which recommended the Department sponsor a
ballistic missile defense (BMD) strategy assessment, due to the growing
challenges associated with ballistic missile threats versus the number of
available U.S. BMD systems. The next month, Representative Jim Cooper of the
House Armed Service Committee called for a way to address the Service Chiefs’
concerns. Without an interagency approach, this question could be answered in
the wrong way. The solution does not lie solely within the military’s
management or employment of forces, but rather in the political philosophy underpinning
the deployment of U.S. missile defense assets.
As one of a
handful of nations with this capability, missile defense carries indisputable
benefits to U.S. foreign policy. However in providing BMD to allies and
partners, the U.S. must insist recipient nations take subsequent actions which
help maintain the flexibility of U.S. BMD forces. Without such commitments,
security cooperation using U.S. BMD assets risks placing overwhelming demands
on a limited resource.
The interest in
BMD stems from the growth of actors seeking ballistic and cruise missiles
through smuggling or outright sales. As recently seen in Turkey and SaudiArabia, countries are finding themselves vulnerable to a new threat, even
though it may come from some of the oldest versions of the Scud missile.
Sufficiently armed, a rudimentary missile may still devastate large population
centers, cripple infrastructure or severely impact the economy.
Missile defense
improves security against these dangers while creating positive effects on foreign
relations. U.S.-Israel co-development of the Arrow and David’s Sling BMD
systems, plus bipartisan Congressional support for funding and manufacturing of
the Iron Dome counter-rocket system, have been much-needed demonstrations of a
positive U.S.-Israeli relationship. Japan’s recent broader reinterpretation of
collective defense and successful co-development of the SM-3 Block IIA missile
is a reflection of improving interoperability and effectiveness in the
Asia-Pacific region, and the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)
solidified the U.S. as a key guarantor of NATO European security against
ballistic missiles launched from Southwest Asia. While missile defense appears
to have a deleterious effect on U.S.-Russia diplomacy, BMD’s effect on strategic
parity could be considered exaggerated. The relationship instead appears
mutualistic – the antagonism over BMD benefits Putin’s economic strategy, and
BMD is credited as a robust capability and valuable security cooperation
measure.
Possessing a BMD
capability resonates with countries which have a high risk of limited ballistic
missile attack – one where the number of threat missiles actually used does not
greatly exceed the resources available to defeat them. The quandary of
assurance through “missile defense diplomacy” is that it is limited by force
availability. Meeting new commitments means BMD forces must be augmented,
transferred, or made more efficient.
Augmenting consists of buying additional BMD systems such as Patriot and
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) – difficult to do in the current
budget environment. Augmenting also means leveraging capabilities from partner
nations, or adding “left of launch” options – i.e., employing non-BMD assets to
neutralize threat missiles prior to launching, which avoids using BMD
interceptors. The transfer of BMD assets from another region may be acceptable
during a crisis, but prolonged reassignment risks detracting credibility in
meeting original commitments. Finding system efficiencies include developing
ways for interceptors to defend larger areas (e.g., SM-3 Block IIA), improving
the speed at which BMD systems move between locations (e.g., rapid deployment),
lower response time to threats (e.g. Aegis Launch on Remote), reducing the cost
to engage threat missiles through evolutionary technology (e.g. directed
energy, rail gun), and increasing the number of threats defeated per
interceptor (e.g. Multiple-object Kill Vehicle). However, all of these measures
are internal to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), and will still reach
capacity eventually.
Terminating U.S.
BMD regional deployments using time or condition-based caveats alone may not be
practical with prolonged conflicts – consider Patriot battalions have been
supporting a 62-year old war with North Korea since 1994. The international
community could also interpret preset termination as an “expiration date”, or
at least a “half-life” to the endurance of U.S. commitment. The U.S. should
instead ensure greater flexibility of BMD assets by seeking commitments such
as:
Build a Program
A country which
asserts missile defense as vital to its national defense might agree to develop
an indigenous BMD program. Regardless of its form, the program must (1)
eventually phase out reliance on U.S. BMD forces, and (2) maintain an
equivalent level of effectiveness. A complete missile defense program consists
of interceptors, sensors, a battle management system, and a research and
development organization. Japan and Israel possess programs, but lack
established timelines for reductions in BMD deployments. Israel created a developmental organization
similar to the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, and has even matured to a point
where it markets systems to India and South Korea, yielding an economic as well
as security benefit.
An indigenous
program would remain effective if it incorporated components which are
compatible with deploying U.S. BMD systems. This construct is essentially what
President Obama achieves with NATO through the EPAA, and seeks to build among
the Gulf Cooperation Council states. The U.S. Administration streamlined the
Arms Export Control Act review process for foreign military and direct
commercial sales to further achieve system interoperability, but without a
legal or policy obligation to use compatible systems, an indigenous program
contributes virtually nothing toward effective coalition operations. In 2012,
Turkey invoked Article 4 of the NATO charter to request BMD assistance against
errant or intentional Syrian missile strikes, leading to the U.S., Netherlands,
and Germany providing Patriot batteries. Later, Turkey took steps to modernize
its missile defense capability using the Chinese FD-2000 system which neither
complements NATO systems nor alleviates the use of foreign Patriots.
Improve
Deterrence
Countries
requesting U.S. BMD assets may accept their gradual reduction if the nation has
a greater ability to impose consequences on their adversaries. This approach,
unlike purely defensive weaponry, carries risk of exacerbating a volatile
situation. In such cases, a commitment to build capabilities which complement
flexible response options by the U.S. and partner nations may be a better
answer. Countries might take steps to improve their ability to facilitate
allied response by reinforcing internal support systems such as terrestrial or aerospace
communications, building materiel repair facilities, or fortifying locations to
improve supporting logistic movements.
Agreeing to
alternate between offensive and defensive forces may also reduce the need for a
persistent BMD presence. In March 2014, the U.S. provided Poland offensive
strike capability with ten F-16s during the Ukrainian crisis in order to
demonstrate a commitment to regional security. Patriot forces deployed to
Poland later as part of a military exercise, but did not remain there. Poland
is investing more than $9 billion to modernize their air defense forces, opting
to use systems which maintain NATO interoperability. This type of mutually
supportive development improves the chances for successful military operations
during actual conflict.
Build Resiliency
In addition to
offensive and defensive programs, countries may reduce the necessity for a
geographic area to require a persistent missile defense presence. The request
for BMD may stem from a need to protect vital infrastructure or resources in
that location – for example, an area might have a large amount of banking or
government infrastructure, a confluence of oil and gas fields, or hold the
majority of defense or civil infrastructure. The U.S. may coordinate BMD
deployment timelines with U.S. government construction projects or energy
security measures designed to reduce that location as an “Achilles Heel.”
Building bunkers, or placing new airfields, server farms, pipelines or other
infrastructure which are not within range of threat missiles, could provide
better resiliency against attack. If the area being defended is no longer a
central point of failure, then the urgency for seeking continuous BMD coverage
may be lower. Infrastructure projects may take longer to execute but allows for
an eventual reduction of deployed U.S. BMD assets, helping them remain flexible
in a crisis.
Improving the
country’s internal resilience to missile attack has the dual benefit of
requiring the adversary to reevaluate their missile capabilities. Adversary
strike forces may now need to cover a larger area, or may require greater
accuracy and penetrability due to advanced construction methods. The adversary
may also require better proficiency with coordinated attack, or lead to
additional opportunities to expose hostile intentions or exploit weaknesses.
Engaging non-DoD
agencies has to be part of the long term strategy for missile defense. With
austere budgets and looming sequestration, the Defense Department faces an
arduous task investing in evolutionary improvements. Consequently the U.S. will
continue to contend with capacity limitations in using missile defense forces
as an instrument of diplomacy. While the U.S. remains steadfast in taking a
lead role for security cooperation, the strategy requires assurances toward
building internal security if collective defense is to be sustainable.
This article has been first published at E-International Relations Website on Sep, 10, 2015. and has been re-published under Creative Commons License provided by the Original Publisher.
About The Author:
Duane Neal is a Lieutenant
Commander in the U.S. Navy who has served onboard warships as an Aegis combat
systems officer, and specializes in missile defense. He has worked for U.S. Strategic Command, the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and has published in Missile Defense Review. LCDR Neal holds a M.S. in Military Studies
from the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and a B.S. in Naval
Architecture from the U.S. Naval Academy. He tweets at @IAMDSystems
