Rather a Referendum than a Vote On August 17, Sri Lanka’s 15 million strong electorate went to the national polls for the second...
Rather
a Referendum than a Vote
On August 17, Sri Lanka’s
15 million strong electorate went to the national polls for the second time this
year. Among analysts, there is no doubt that this was not only a ‘popular
vote’, which decided over the new composition of the country’s
225-seat-parliament, it was also a referendum regarding the basic nature of Sri
Lanka’s political culture. Furthermore it was a choice of destiny over the
future course of national reconciliation, the need for political revamping to
fix political-administrative aberrations, and the pledge of the minorities in a civil war-torn country. More
concretely, it was a decision whether the authoritarian strongman and former
president, Mahinda Rajapaksa representing the vision of a ‘strong state’ based
on an extreme, ethnic exclusive brand of nationalism, should be allowed to return to power or not. In sharp
contrast, there was the alternative option to continue the notion of democratic
political reforms and inclusive, consensual-based politics in order to improve
good governance in multi-ethnic and multi-religious Sri Lanka- despite the fact
that it started slow and tenacious – personified in President Maithripala
Sirisena and incumbent Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. The latter
phenomenon marks a process that started just some months ago. Despite all
speculations about potential electoral scenarios, the people’s vote was clear
and defined an important critical juncture in the country’s history: Rajapaksa
should resign and give up his political ambitions to return to
power, as well as face the legal consequences for abusing power during his time
in office (19 November 2005 to 9 January 2015) as well as for establishing an
autocratic, nepotistic and clientelistic regime (controlled by his family and
friends) which was accused for severe human rights violations, suppressing freedoms, and
war-crimes. As such, the vote was also an expression that dynastic rule,
political feuding and violence has no space anymore in Sri Lanka’s political
landscape. [1]
Ethnic Outbidding and
Rajapaksa’s Authoritarian Path
One must state that Rajapaksa is
one of the most controversial and divisive figures in contemporary Sri Lanka.
Some segments of the Sinhalese majority see in him a national hero, who ended
the three decade old civil war and embodies the country’s protector of the
Sinhalese Buddhist heritage. For other people he is a despotic autocrat who was
running the country in a brutal and corrupt way, especially onthe expense of religious and ethnic minority.
Subsequently, for many years Sri Lanka was perceived as a classic example of a country in
which democracy facilitated majority rule and the marginalization of minorities
based on a vision of ethnic exclusiveness and authoritarianism. This was reducing rather than enhancing democratic stabilization and
consolidation. Sri Lanka was never able or lacked the willingness to construct
a democratic multi-ethnic society (approx. Sinhalese-/Buddhist 74
percent, Tamil-/Hindu 12 percent, and Muslims 10 percent) and fostered
exclusion of its ethnic minorities since its independence in 1948.
With reference to Donald Horowitz[2], in the case of Sri Lanka, democracy was
interpreted as a pure majoritarian rule without sufficient minority protection.
As such, the political decision making processes turned out to be a problem
rather than a solution due to the fact that it perpetuated domination of one
group over the other. In this context political observers traditionally point
out that the dialectic between majority rule and ethnic outbidding is the major
aberration in Sri Lanka’s political-institutional development, which produces
‘undemocratic results’.[3]
This phenomenon can be described
as an ‘auction-like process’ in which certain politicians as a mean to attain
and sustain power try to outbid one another by instrumentalizing the fears and
ambitions of their majority community. In doing so, Sri Lanka’s minorities,
especially the Hindu Tamils and Muslims, were systematically marginalized around political mobilization and
ensuring of political interests during the time of elections. Furthermore, it
led to an extraordinary institutional decay and portrayed how institutional structures
can influence actors’ behavior.
It also shows how democratic
institutions can create in a certain societal context (e.g. where ethnicity is
a politically salient cleavage and utilized for outbidding) a political
dynamic, which is able to unleash an armed conflict. In attempting to assess
the recent as well as future trends, one has to be aware that although the war
in Sri Lanka might be over militarily speaking, the deepest roots of the
conflict—marginalization of minorities, i.e. how the political class (majority)
and political system deal with them or protect their rights, as well as to
ensure a distribution of national resources, remains intact.
Having this is mind, many
observers state that ‘post-conflict Sri Lanka did not make much progress in
addressing any of the major socio-political challenges. The main reason
therefore was the Presidency of Mahindra Rajapaksa. Furthermore, on-going human
rights violations, a persistent presence of armed forces in the war-torn north,
lack of accountability for war crimes and the absence of a noteworthy
power-sharing model with former combatants have spurred criticism. Not only the
Tamils, but also the Muslims suffered from the Rajapaksa’s hard-line approach
on rapprochement towards the country’s minorities. Growing sectarian violence
facilitated by Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists enjoying the goodwill of
Rajapaksa’s administration further bolstered the alienation of Muslims, Hindus and Christians.
In sum, Rajapaksa symbolizes Sri
Lanka’s traditional power-politics based on majority rule on the expenses on
minorities leading to the truncation of the democratic process[4] and
wasting the chance for national reconciliation. Additionally, his partly
promising economic policy, which led to remarkable economic growth, focused on
establishing Chinese funded ‘mega projects’ has failed to benefit the poor. Consequently, he not lost
support among the minorities but also within his core constituency, the rural
conservative Sinhala-majority who suffered from inflation and high living
costs. The estrangement with the West and the failure to implement a
constructive policy in the country’s foreign policy triangle with India and
China further bolstered the nation-wide frustration about
Rajapaksa’s ‘family regime.’
An Unprecedented
Electoral Scenario
The 2015 parliamentary elections
were a complicated and unprecedented situation in Sri Lankan politics. By
having said this, one has to look at the preceding elections for Sri Lankan’s
parliament in 2010 which was decided by a landslide victory of the than
incumbent SLFP heading the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA), headed by
then President Rajapaksa. In November 2014, Rajakapsa was calling for new,
early presidential elections. By a ‘surprise move’, the then health minister
Sirisena and general secretary of SLFP defected from Rayakapsa and stood up as
an rival candidate from the same party but supported by the oppositional United
National Party (UNP). In the so called ‘January 8 revolution’, he kicked
Rayapaksa out of office and brought the country once again on the democratic track. However, the situation got
intricate since Sirisena not only toppled Rajapaksa as president but also
replaced him formally as leader of the SLFP, at the same time continued to be
political allied with the rival UNP. Subsequently Sirisena appointed a SLFP
(minority of his loyalists) government with the blessings of the UNP
opposition.
The whole electoral scenario got
even more politically wired since Sirisena was not able to stop
the nomination of his party-internal arch rival Rajapaksa, as a candidate and
de facto prime ministerial face of the SLFP led alliance, the United People’s
Freedom Alliance (UPFA). Sirisena –despite being officially leader of SLFP
& UPFA- was subsequently supporting the UNP which was heading a broader
coalition called the United National Front for Good Governance (UNFGG) led by
current PM Wickremesinghe. The third major political force was the Tamil
National Alliance (TNA) struggling with other, more radical Tamil parties. In
the fray in Sinhala-dominated areas of Sri Lanka’s south was the Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) a remarkable actor. Otherwise, in the eastern province,
Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, took part in the electoral gambit.
In sum, regarding electoral
authorities and international observers the keenly fought parliamentary
elections were orderly, fair, and incident free (also a novelty in Sri Lanka)
besides some complaints – most of them were minor in nature).[5] By assessing the elections results
(Rajapaksa/UPFA: 95 seats versus Sirisena & Wickremesinghe/ UNFGG: 106
seats & Tamil National Alliance: 16 seats) one can state that months after
losing his presidency; Rajapaksa’s political leverage and social base shrunk
considerably.[6] In
consequence, the 2015 parliamentary elections were blocking a key step for
Rajakapsa’s return to power. Instead of capturing one of the two most
significant positions in Sri Lanka’s governmental system, he was got ones again
defeated once again.
Final Thoughts – Outlook
In order to form a government, a
political party or a coalition must have at least 113 seats for the necessary
overall majority. Therefore the old and new PM Wickremesinghe needs support from smaller parties. Most likely, the
Tamil National Alliance (TNA), which swept the ethnic Tamil-majority northern
and eastern provinces, will fill this gap. PM
Wickemesinghe can also rely on SLFP parliamentarians who are loyal to President
Sirisena. Being in favour of the reform policy of the ‘duo for democratic change’
President Siresena & PM Wickresinghe more SLFP parliamentarians might be willing to cross the aisle and join the UNFGG
government benches. Therefore, the country got spared from an unrestricted
political struggle between incumbent President Sirisena and a potential new PM
Rajapaksa. Such a political conflict would not only paralyse all efforts to
bring the country forward but also possesses the risk of initiating a process
in which the country could slide back into widespread violence and armed
upheaval. In this context, it is important to be aware that during the last
months, besides having of ‘normative control’ over the major parties (in
government and opposition), Sirisena could not gain much political capital out
of this advantage. Basically he was able to carry out a slow, but some kind of
political reform. Most remarkable the 19th amendment which limited the powers
of the president to the advantage of the prime minister and gave more autonomy
to the constitutional institutions.[7] But
Sirisena alsowasted much time and energy struggling to achieve
effective control, to stabilize his position, and to keep Rajapaksa at bay.
By having said this, it will be
far too early to state that Rajapaksa really gave up his aim
to regain power and/or back out from the country’s political arena. One should
rather expect that he uses his remaining influence to mobilize oppositional
forces to undermine a constructive working environment in the country’s
legislative body and to prepare another political comeback. This will gain
significance in case the new government will falter on the promised, full-scale reforms,
especially towards reconciliation, demilitarization, war crimes justice,
federal elements within the political system, and political integration of
minorities among others. In this context, one must expect that Sinhalese-Buddhist
hard-line forces like the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU)[8] will sharply oppose any power-sharing arrangement between
the government with the Hindu Tamils and Muslims, living in the country’s North
and East. Nevertheless, having only six seats in the parliament JHU determines
only a much limited support base for Rajapaksa.
Finally, the ‘political duo’
Sirisena and Wickemesinghe were able to widen their lead and make decisive
gains to improve the stability and realm of their government after several
months of minority rule. This is significant, since the government is in urgent
need for a stronger mandate to be able to carry out much desired (and promised)
reforms, namely to create a government possessing a two-thirds majority
required to pass proposed major constitutional reforms. Until now, the
Siresana-Wickemesinghe cooperation produced already positive outcomes, like the
19th constitutional amendment and the removal of power from the president to
the prime minister. However, much more has to be done, especially regarding the
inclusion of minorities and national reconciliation.
The latest election results
provided Sirisena and Wickemesinghe significantly more space to continue with
their reform policy. Last but not least, Sri Lanka’s people demanded and the
country’s electorate created a new political environment feature by new
landmarks: Communalism and blatant political rhetoric on the expense of the
country’s minorities is not enough to win elections anymore. The time has come
that politicians have to deliver good governance instead of covering misrule
and autocratic political behaviour under the shadows of ethnic outbidding.
Taken the particular war-ridden history and the multi-cultural and ethnic and
religious plurality of Sri Lanka into account, national unity, consensus-based politics,
and reconciliation are the new and only way forward.
This article was first published at E-International Relations on August 29, 2015
About the Author:
Siegfried O.
Wolf is Director of Research at SADF; he was educated at the Institute of
Political Science (IPW) and South Asia Institute (SAI), both Heidelberg
University. Additionally he is senior researcher in International Relations and
Comparative Politics at SAI as well as a former research fellow at IPW and
Centre de Sciences Humaines (New Delhi, India). Before starting his academic
career, Dr. Siegfried O. Wolf worked for various consultancies specialising in
political communication, e.g. promoting the interaction and cooperation between
academic, political and economic spheres. He is the co-author of ‘A Political
and Economic Dictionary of South Asia’ (Routledge: London, 2006), and Deputy
Editor of the ‘Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics’
(HPSACP). Furthermore, he has worked as a consultant for the Federal Ministry
for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Germany.
Notes
[1] “Rajapaksa’s
comeback fails as Sri Lankan voters back reforms”
[2] Horowitz,
Donald. Ethnic Groups in
Conflict. California: University of California Press, 1985.
[3] Neil
DeVotta, eds., Politics of Conflict and Peace in Sri Lanka.New Delhi: Manak;
Wilson, A. Jeyaratnam (1988); The Break-Up of Sri Lanka. London: C. Hurst &
Co; DeVotta, Neil. (2004); Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional
Decay, and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka. Stanford: Stanford University Press;
Kulandaswamy, M.S. Sri Lankan Crisis: Anatomy of Ethnicity, Peace, and
Security. Delhi: Authors press, 2000.
[4] During
his time in office, Rajapaksa is accused of using his popularity to take
control of Parliament, the courts, the armed forces and all government institutions
as well as being responsible for widespread human rights violations and of
suppressing of fundamental freedoms and rights
[5] Around
75,000 police forces have been deployed to ensure nothing interfered with the
poll which was observed by around 13,000 poll monitors. Nevertheless, four
people died and some hundreds of election-law violations recorded.
[6] In this
context one can state that Rajapaksa’s political power was based on his control
of the government and its machinery as well as its patronage opportunities.
Being not able anymore to misuse the full resources of the state bureaucracy
and security apparatus for his own sake, Rajakasa’s latestelectoral campaign were conducted on a much lower scale.
[7] More
concrete, it limits the president to two terms, restricts his ability to
dissolve parliament early and call snap elections, ends the absolute immunity from court challenge to a president’s
actions, and gives the prime minister significant control over cabinet
appointments.
