OPINION | The Fourth Nail : The Unity of Pakistan & Islamic Radicalization

"If you only have a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a nail." - Abraham Maslow

"If you only have a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a nail." - Abraham Maslow

First Nail - Soviets in the 1980s, Second Nail - India in 1990s - Present, Third Nail - the United States as 9/11 - Present, Fourth Nail - The Pakistan itself and the story continues with the "hammer" of Islamic radicalization 

In 1954, both India and Pakistan were in the nascent stages of democracy, taking baby steps towards fulfilling their roles as sovereign nations for their respective citizens. Then came the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly by Governor-General Malik Ghulam Muhammad on October 24, 1954, which ultimately shaped the future of Pakistan and created a domino effect that continues to influence events in the South Asian subcontinent. This event fanned the flames of anti-India sentiments, already sown during the 1947 Partition and the First Kashmir War, within the Pakistani psyche as a core element of the nation’s survival. Let us acknowledge and accept this fundamental truth: Pakistan has existed as a reactionary country, rooted in an inherent sense of insecurity since its inception on August 14, 1947, particularly due to its animosity towards India, whose fabric is predominantly made up of Hindus. "This is where the rightists’ conservative narrative comes from," as quoted by Mohammad Jibran Nasir, a Pakistani peace advocate who has initiated a crusade to persuade his countrymen to reclaim the nation from the clutches of religious radicals.

In the post-1965 War scenario, the Tashkent Declaration deepened the fissures in Pakistan-India relations, shaping each nation's perceptions of the other. At the same time, strategic thinkers and conspiracy theorists in both nations began voicing dissident views against their leaders, both in the political and military realms. While the Simla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration were surgical post-mortems of the 1971 Bangladesh Crisis and the Kashmir issue (in the 1990s), they only resulted in diplomatic engagements for "quick-resolve" without making significant strides to enhance the confidence levels between Pakistan and India, necessary for future engagements. In this context, it is well-known that an anti-Indian doctrine has been the dominant factor keeping Pakistan united since 1971, learning from the vestiges of the 1971 War and the creation of Bangladesh out of Pakistan.

Next came India's entry into the nuclear weapons club, deploying a composite deterrence doctrine against China's nuclear policy, which automatically became the default firewall protection between India and Pakistan, preventing a declared conflict in the future. However, it simultaneously triggered Pakistan's nuclear weaponization program, which took significant undeclared leaps in the 1980s through Abdul Qadeer Khan's clandestine network for nuclear technology acquisition by any means necessary. Unlike India, Pakistan has no proclaimed convention and has embraced ambiguity as integral to its nuclearization strategy. The presence of small but potent "Tactical Nuclear Weapons" in their inventory suggests that a basic standard of conventional warfare could be applied to alter outcomes. This sets into motion a military element that provides the impetus for the use of nuclear warheads and the reactionary development of a first-strike capability, while the adversary attempts to produce a counter-force potential. Ambiguity has been used as a counterbalance for conventional inferiority, with the belief that escalation control is possible. This is clearly a false notion, given the nature of the weapon system and its deployment in various theaters of conflict. Moreover, the clandestine technology acquisitions, combined with uncertainty of objectives and the mounting impact of radical Islamists through a strategic lens, have increased the dangers of utilizing such weapons with dubious stability.

With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the ten-year war brought a huge influx of refugees into Pakistan, armed with the most powerful weapon of mankind—the ideology of vengeance in the name of "Jihad." First, the Soviet-Afghan War ended with the withdrawal of the 40th Army under the command of Lt. General Boris Gromov across the Afghan-Uzbek Bridge, laying the roots of a Jihadist ideology. In this sequence of events, Pakistan, as a nation, was caught in a quandary regarding the rehabilitation of these battle-hardened fighters, attuned to the Islamic ideologies of Jihad. Secondly, there was virtually no control over these elements since the Americans had backed out of taking responsibility for the crop sown by the seeds provided by various Arab countries. To save Pakistan's northern belt from the fallout of a splinter army of Islamic fighters, the doors to Kashmir were opened as part of the nation's survival plan, resulting in the Kashmir insurgency of the early '90s on an unprecedented scale—an outcome the Pakistani establishment itself did not fully anticipate. However, by the end of the 20th century, with the adventurism of the Kargil War, Pakistan eventually realized that Kashmir is not Afghanistan, and with the start of the “War on Terror” at the beginning of the century, they also realized that Afghanistan is not Kashmir either. Gradually, these indoctrinated fighters spearheaded the concept of "Jihadist Solutions" for Kashmir's youth, eventually creating the concept of Proxy War, which incorporated the hidden shades of neighborly enmity as seen during the Khalistan insurgency phase.

The radical philosophy in Pakistan originates from the educational doctrine adopted by the establishment during the Afghan War, particularly the policy dictated by military dictator Zia-ul-Haq to churn out the required number of ideologically brainwashed Afghan militias for counter-offensive operations across the Durand Line. However, in return, these elements began influencing those at the grassroots level who had no jobs, no education, and no economic security within the nation. Free madrassa education, free living quarters, and two daily meals meant to radicalize Afghans funded by Saudi Arabia and other Arab states were equally appealing to poverty-stricken Pakistanis. This process became a form of "Reverse Osmosis," and this was the moment when the ideology of Islamic Jihad spread like wildfire, turning freethinkers into a minority within their own country in the coming years. General Zia-ul-Haq also realized that "Anti-India" sentiments coupled with the "Islamic Covalent Bond" were the only ways to prevent another "Bangladesh" from happening. Within a decade, a radical philosophy became an undeclared national philosophy, serving as the first line of defense against any potential Indian attack in the near future, whether full-blown or surgical.

In conclusion, Pakistan faces two possible outcomes: either it will disintegrate as a nation by not harboring anti-India sentiments based on Islamic fundamentalism, or it will become involved in an offensive based on various vectors of its national interest, ultimately leading to its own complete annihilation. In either scenario, the country will cease to exist. However, there is a middle path that Pakistan is religiously following, as any other nation would as part of survival tactics: keeping the issue alive and unresolved, forever."

About the Author:

Rahul Guhathakurta is Curator of IndraStra Global and can be reached at his Linkedin profile.