By Djan Sauerborn Pakistani-Indian relations in the past have hardly been amicable. However, the post 9/11 landscape offered ...
By Djan Sauerborn
Pakistani-Indian relations
in the past have hardly been amicable. However, the post 9/11 landscape offered
both nations an opportunity to renew their political and diplomatic ties with
more positive overtones. However, this did not occur.
In the Pakistani-Indian
context, the tragedies of 9/11, the fluid nature in global politics and the
regional security environment acted as catalysts in further deteriorating the
relationship between these two countries. India’s influence in Afghanistan has
suffered under Pakistan’s successful attempts at positioning itself as the core
mediator between the Taliban and the West, while at the same time
instrumentalizing radical elements to maintain its strategic advantage.
India
In the early stages of the
post 9/11 era, India’s main focus regarding Afghanistan was solely centered on
the threat of an influential and heavily involved Pakistan on India. This was
of particular concern to India due to the US support of Pakistan (Price 2013:3).
Nonetheless, in the immediate aftermath of Operation Enduring Freedom, India
had a favorable position in Afghanistan. This stemmed from the fact it had
close ties to key elites of the victorious Northern Alliance. However,
influence decreased over time as the United States favored Pakistan as its main
node for the War on Terror (Chaudhuri 2010: 206). As such, India’s influence in
Afghanistan has deteriorated under Pakistan’s strategy of positioning itself as
the core mediator between the Taliban and the West. It can be argued that this
strategy is being implemented while Pakistan simultaneously utilizes radical
elements to maintain to strategic advantage.
Integrating Afghanistan
into South Asian regional dynamics became a strategic imperative for India. At
the 14th Summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
in 2007 in New Delhi, Afghanistan was granted full membership (Sharma 2011:
112). As such, the economic realm of India’s Afghanistan approach has
been increasing ever since. Although intra-regional trade in South Asia is
extremely low, the admittance to SAARC was aimed at paving the way for economic
reconstruction initiated by Indian support. The generated economic benefits
would lead to political capital, reestablishing India’s historically positive
linkages with Afghanistan and demonstrating to the world community that India,
although a developing country itself, was able to live up to its great power
aspirations (Pattanaik 2012:572). The economic realm of India’s Afghanistan
strategy is not however detached from the Pakistan and Taliban factor as Yadav
and Barwa highlight:
By drawing Afghanistan away
from its economic and geo-political dependence on Pakistan, India hopes to
weaken the resources base of the Taliban or at least provide alternative
sources of income and resources for the Karzai regime. (Yadav/Barwa 2011: 116)
Increasing economic growth,
providing humanitarian assistance, improving capacity building measures are all
part of India’s soft power strategy of “reviving the traditional role of
Afghanistan as a land bridge, connecting South Asia with Central Asia and West
Asia.” (Roy 2011: 70) This notion was reiterated by Shri S.K. Lambah, the
special envoy of India’s prime minister at the Afghanistan conference in Moscow
in 2009:
Historically, Afghanistan
has prospered when it has served as the trade and transportation hub between
Central and South Asia. If we were to implement the projects and
activities on the anvil, which allow greater commercial and economic
exchanges by removing barriers to investment, trade and transit, this
would transform not just Afghanistan but other regional countries as well.
Afghanistan is not only
relevant from a security perspective, but also as an essential gateway to
hydrocarbon rich Central Asia. This region, if made accessible could improve
the resource portfolio of an energy thirsty economy, while reducing the
dependency of supplies from the Middle East. Moreover, it would allow India to
chime in to the concert of other nations, such as Russia and China, seeking to
exert influence in Central Asia and exploit energy hotspots. (Sharma 2011:111)
Overall, India’s
Afghanistan focus is aimed at curbing terrorism, containing and decreasing
Pakistan’s influence, pursuing an aid, development and economic integration
policy with the goal of being recognized as a major power globally and general
good will locally, within the Afghan population. In addition, it is also keen
on exploiting energy sources in Afghanistan and developing it into a hub for
accessing Central Asian resources.
The Pakistan Factor
India and Pakistan have had
‘a relationship of unremitting hostility’ as Ganguly writes, which reached its
low-point four times, in 1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999 where both former nations of
British India went to war (Ganguly 2013:1). The issues of state construction,
Jammu and Kashmir, cross-border terrorism, alliances with extra-regional powers
and water disputes continue to have cast a cloud over potential reapproachment
and have fostered deeply entrenched patterns of ‘enmity’ (Ganguly 2013:6).
Moreover, Pakistan has been the main obstacle of Indian hegemony, through
nuclearization, but also due to Islamabad’s ability to force alliances or deep
cooperation with other powers such as China or the United States. As a result,
India’s ambition to gain global status continues to be “curbed by the ongoing
conflict with Pakistan” (Tadjbakhsh 2011:49). The competition over influence in
Afghanistan also exemplifies the hostile nature of this troubled relationship.
(see Chatterjee 2013)
As India’s footprint
started growing in Afghanistan, so too was Pakistan’s will to curb Indian
engagement in its backyard. The Iraq war in 2003 diverted the attention of the
United States and Pakistan utilized the reemergence of the Taliban as a welcome
entry point to reestablish itself as the prime partner for Washington in the
War on Terror, as well as, foster its ties with radical non-state proxy
elements (Pant 2013:48). For example, India lost its standing in the Afghan
peace negotiations whereas Pakistan “positioned itself as a vital player in any
Afghan reconciliation process” (Hanauer/Chalk 2012:29). The disjuncture between
India’s position and that of other nations became evident at a 60 nation London
conference on Afghanistan in 2010, where New Delhi was alone on its
‘zero-tolerance’ stance towards the Taliban (Pant 2013:50). Pant attributes the
dwindling perception amongst international stakeholders that India should play
a more pro-active in Afghanistan to successful Pakistan lobbying:
So when London decided that
the time had come to woo the ‘moderate’ section of the Taliban back to
share power in Kabul, it was a signal to India that Pakistan seemed to
have convinced the West that it could play the role of mediator in
negotiations with the Taliban-thereby underlining its centrality in the
unfolding strategic dynamic in the region. (Pant 2013:50)
Pakistan has also stifled
the efficiency of Indian trade and transport to Afghanistan. Due to the fact
that both nations are in competition for the same consumer goods in the
Afghanistan and because Islamabad wants to prevent an integration of Indian and
Afghan markets, Pakistan has not allowed India to transit its territory (Ved
2008:77). Although Pakistan did not veto the admittance of Afghanistan to
SAARC, it is not interested in a regional integration of Kabul into Central and
South Asia. While one could make the argument that Indo-Pak levels have
improved, at least in the realm of trade, since Pakistan granted India a ‘most
favored nation’ status in 2011, it has not altered the rationale of Islamabad’s
stance towards Afghanistan. While Afghan goods can enter India, Indian products
cannot reach Kabul through Pakistan (Hanauer/Chalk 2012:31). As a response
India has built rail and road links from Afghanistan to Iranian border cities,
where goods are transported to ports at Bandar Abbas and Chahbahar and then
shipped to Indian harbors (Torjesen/Stankovic 2010:26). Although Pakistan has
been heavily subsidized by the United States it still fears alliances that
undermine its position in Afghanistan as Rashid and Rubin argue:
The Pakistani security
establishment believes that it faces both a US-Indian-Afghan alliance and
a separate Iranian-Russian alliance, each aimed at undermining Pakistani
influence in Afghanistan and even dismembering the Pakistani state. Some
(but not all) see armed militants within Pakistan as a threat-but
largely consider it one that is ultimately controllable. (Rashid and Rubin
2008: 36-37)
With regards to India,
Pakistan has accused its neighbor of using its four consulate in Afghanistan,
especially the ones in Kandahar and Jelalabad, close to Pakistani territory as
Indian intelligence gathering facilities aimed at destabilizing Afghanistan.
(Ved 2008:75)
Conclusion
India’s influence in
Afghanistan has suffered under Pakistan’s successful attempts at positioning
itself as the core mediator between the Taliban and the West, while at the same
time instrumentalizing radical elements to maintain its strategic depth
vis-a-vis New Delhi. Pakistan has intentionally redirected activities of
Kashmiri extremists to Afghanistan, especially the Lakshar-e-Taiba, which has
worked closely with the ISI to is recruiting militants from mosques and
madreassas in Peshawar (Hanauer/Chalk 2012: 29). Islamabad’s optimal scenario
would include a pro-Pakistani state, which would function as a rear base, in
which it could train Islamist militants such as Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM),
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Lakshar-e-Taiba and the Haqqani network. This would
keep extremist forces outside of Pakistan, creating a safe haven in
Afghanistan, which in turn would allow Islamabad to refute accusations of
state-sponsored terrorism (Hanauer/Chalk 2012:29). It does not seem that this
strategic modus vivendi will soon be altered, for “as India continues its rise,
Pakistan’s reliance upon Islamic militancy, the only tool it has to change
India’s trajectory, will increase, not decrease” (Fair 2011:6). With NATO
troops leaving Afghanistan, an increased presence of Chinese involvement and
the entrenched patterns of enmity between India and Pakistan, to use a term of
Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, it will be interesting to observe how India pursues
its stakes in the Hindu Kush.
References
Chatterjee, Shibashis.
2013. “International Relations Theory and South Asia.” In International
Relations Theory and South Asia, E. Sridharan, 2. Ed., 53–70. New
Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Chaudhuri, Rudra. 2012.
“Dealing with the Endgame: India and the Af-Pak Puzzle.” In Grand
Strategy for India 2020 and Beyond, V. Krishnappa and Princy Marin
George, 204–18. New Delhi: Pentagon Security International.
Fair, Christine. 2011.
“2014 and Beyond: U.S. Policy Towards Afghanistan and Pakis- tan, Part I”. Report
for House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Middle
East and South Asia. Washington, D.C.
Ganguly, Sumit. 2013. Conflict
Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Pant, Harsh V. 2013.
“India’s Changing Afghanistan Policy: Regional and Global Implications.” In India
in Africa and Afghanistan, Cameron
Buzatto (ed.). New York: Nova Science Publishers.
Pattanaik, Smruti S. 2012.
“India’s Afghan Policy: Beyond Bilateralism.” Strategic Analysis 36 (4): 569–83.
Price, Gareth. 2013.
“India’s Policy towards Afghanistan.” Chatham House (ASIA ASP), Nr. 4 (August): 1–10.
Roy, Meena Singh. 2010.
“Afghanistan and Regional Strategy: The India Factor.” In China
and India in Central Asia: A New “Great Game?”,Marlene Laruelle,
Jean-Francois Huchet, Sébastien Peyrousse, und Bayram Balci (eds.), 61–80. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Rubin, Barnett R., and
Ahmed Rashid. 2008. “From Great Game to Grand Bargain.” Foreign Affairs,
December, 33–41.
Sharma, Raghav. 2010.
“China’s Afghanistan Policy Slow Recalibration.” China
Report 46 (3):
201–15.
Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou.
2011. “South Asia and Afghanistan: The Robust India- Pakistan Rivalry.”Afghanistan in a Neighbourhood
Perspective. Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).
Torjensen, Stina, and
Tatjana Stankovic. 2010. “Regional Change: How will the rise of India and China
shape Afghanistan’s stabilization process?” Norwegian Institute of
International Affairs.
Ved, Mahendra. 2008.
“India’s Afghanistan Policy.” In India’s Foreign Policy: Continuity
and Change, 70–81. World Focus Series 2. New Delhi: Academic
Excellence.
Yadav, Vikash, und Conrad
Barwa. 2011. “Relational Control: India’s Grand Strategy in Afghanistan and
Pakistan.” India Review 10 (2): 93–125.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Djan
Sauerborn has a Master of Arts (M.A.) in Political Science and
Anthropology. He is currently the Democracy Programme Manager at the South Asia
Democratic Forum, a think tank based in Brussels, Belgium. He is also a
co-editor at the International Security Observer.
