By Rear Admiral Dr. S. Kulshrestha (Retd.), INDIAN NAVY Senior Fellow - New Westminster College , Canada The oceans are compl...
By Rear Admiral Dr. S. Kulshrestha (Retd.), INDIAN NAVY
The oceans are complex mediums whose nature provides ample opportunity for an enemy to avoid detection—weather, sea states, and coastal land masses all present considerable challenges to modern sensors. Peacetime economic use of the seas complicates this problem enormously. The oceans are the world’s foremost (and most unregulated) highway, home to a vast and wide variety of international neutral shipping that possess no apparent threat. Determining the enemy in such a crowded and complex environment is difficult during conventional war, during an asymmetric conflict such as the global war on terror (GWOT), it is a formidable task.
It is the asymmetric
nature of terrorism that forms the core of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). In
conventional naval war the enemy is relatively well defined and almost
universally a combatant. Pursuit of GWOT, where literally any vessel could be a
potential enemy or weapon carrier, or when any maritime event can have an
impact on the security of India, demands a much higher level of awareness than that
normally required in a conventional naval conflict. This is recognized by the
formal definition of MDA as articulated by the US government vide their
document National Security Presidential Directive 41, 2004:-
Maritime Domain Awareness
is "the effective understanding of anything associated with the global maritime
environment that could impact the security, safety, economy or environment of U.S.
This is accomplished through the integration of intelligence, surveillance,
observation, and navigation systems into one common operating picture (COP)
that is accessible throughout the U.S. Government".
Schematic Explanation of MDA - Maritime Domain Awareness by POLE STAR |
Unlike
traditional naval operations, it is apparent that the goal of MDA is far more
than simply looking for potential maritime enemies poised to attack India. The
implications of “Anything associated” with the maritime environment that can
impact the security, safety, economy or environment go far beyond a classic
maritime threat. As per the US
interpretation, these include smuggling of people or dangerous cargoes, piracy, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), identification and
protection of critical maritime infrastructure, oil spills, weather, and
environmental concerns among other events.
Maritime events that could
potentially impact India are not the only wide-ranging element of MDA it is
also essential that threats be identified as early and far from the coast as
possible. The global nature of MDA activities occurring overseas and in foreign
ports is very much a part of MDA. For example, if cargo is loaded in Aden and
its ultimate destination is India (via several other international ports), the
loading, transport, security, and all matters associated with that container
would be part of MDA. MDA must therefore be exercised over all oceans
worldwide, and potentially cover all maritime interests that ultimately impact
India. Putting in place an effective MDA is a herculean task viewing the range
of potential security challenges and enormous geographic area represented by
the maritime domain. In India, a plethora of agencies possessing a wide range of
operational and intelligence capabilities would require information fusion
under the over-arching MDA.
Although many factors are
considered in MDA, its core process is ultimately the monitoring of vessels and
the vessels’ cargo, crews, and passengers to rapidly generate geo-locating
information on vessels of interest. This is an analytical process that includes
tracking, database searches for unknown linkages, and anomaly detection.
Fundamental to this is the detection, monitoring, tracking of vessels. This
tracking process is comprised of five elements designed to focus on a narrow
area of tactical dimension where threats can be identified and isolated namely; maritime
surveillance, detection, tracking, classification & identification, and
targeting. Targeting involves interpreting detection and identification
information fused with intelligence to sort vessel intentions and determine
risk.
MDA’s core is applying the
vessel tracking process to a layered defense model centred on the coastline of
India, the ultimate goal of which is to detect potential threats early and as
far away from the Indian coastline as possible. As there is no single high-value unit to protect MDA “layers” are expanded to include an entire coastline
with the overall goal of coordinated surveillance. Not all areas in these
“layers” are considered equally, but rather additional attention is given to
areas that are potential targets for the terrorist/enemy.
The US has the 2000 nm
limit of the Maritime Detection and Identification Zone-MDIZ it is based on the
legislated 96-hour notification requirement for foreign vessels entering U.S.
ports. A vessel traveling 20 kts will arrive at its destination in roughly 96
hours. MDIZ’s aim is to gather more timely information on the vessel as it
approaches closer to the U.S. coast. When entering the MDIZ, positions every
four hours are the norm while in territorial waters the goal is to obtain
positional data every 3 minutes. There are many systems that could provide a
high degree of surveillance and tracking data, but the actual fusion of
this data remains a problem area. In order to derive a comprehensive MDA
picture, information needs to be fused, correlated, and analysed and for it to
be relevant to national security it must be designed to operate cohesively at
tactical, regional and strategic levels.
Structure of the Indian MDA
The
26 Nov 2008 attack on Mumbai has been analyzed and security gaps addressed to
formulate the MDA. The fundamental principle for the MDA has been the
application of data fusing to get actionable intelligence inputs to measure,
compare and identify and engage and prevent sea-borne criminal activities. The
number of different agencies at the central and state levels involved is 13, and
therefore effective coordination is an issue. Some of the initiatives include:-
-
Launch of GSAT7 satellite in geosynchronous orbit by lSRO, with Rukmani
terminals (ex Israel) placed on Major warships for instantaneous data transfer to
meet the requirements of the Navy. ISRO is also likely to put in place by 2013
the Indian Regional Navigation Seven Satellite System (IRNSS) which would provide
data within 1000 miles of India.
- Setting
up of The National Command Control Communication and Intelligence Network (NC3IN).
-
The setting up of a radar chain (X band AIS receiver VHF and Electro-Optics) of
46 sensor stations being linked with the AIS inputs (Covering the entire Indian
coast), LRIT (Long Range Identification & Tracking) and VTMS (Vessel Traffic Management Systems). Coastal plots are
maintained by the ICG Regional HQs to support the Joint Operations Centres
(JOCs) set up next to naval maritime operations rooms (MORS) in all naval
commands and at New Delhi.
Kerala Police - Fiber Reinforced Interceptor Boats
- Setting
up of Multi-Agency Centres (MAC) for intelligence inputs and reports.
- Registration
of fishing vessels by states, and provision of battery-operated Distress Action
Terminals (DATs) for vessels below 300 tons. DG Shipping would provide smaller
fishing boats with AIS transponders which have enforced ISPS code for Port
security with port security plans. Providing Biometric /recognition identity
cards for fishermen which can be identified on a machine onboard surveillance
platforms.
-
Setting up of a Marine Police force with 73 Coastal police stations across 9
states and provided with 5 and 10-ton craft that can patrol inshore waters.
- A continuous synopsis of the record of shipping with the World Customs
Organisation has been enforced and MARSEC (Maritime Security) levels are exercised and
coastal villagers are educated on the need to be vigilant by the IN and ICG.
- The
Indian Navy has instituted Marine Commandos Rapid Reaction Forces and a Sagar
Prahari Bal (SPB) of 100 seamen who are being equipped with 80 fast interceptor
craft (FICs) for protection of naval bases, VAs and VPs. UAVs and Aerostats are
also planned for induction.
-
Coordinated coastal and offshore asset patrolling has been strengthened by the
IN and the ICG.
- All steps for MDA are networked with the Indian
Navy’s fleet of ships, submarines, and MR aircraft.
The Government of India
has put in place a formidable plan for MDA, and the individual systems are
being set up prior to final integration and fusing of data. It is expected that
the MDA would be fully functional by 2015.
Publication Details:
Kulshrestha,
Sanatan. "FEATURED | Maritime Domain Awareness - Indian Context by Rear
Admiral Dr. S. Kulshrestha (Retd.), INDIAN NAVY " IndraStra Global 01, no.
06 (2015): JUNE-14.http://www.indrastra.com/2015/06/FEATURED-Maritime-Domain-Awareness-Indian-Context-by-Rear-Admiral-Dr-S-Kulshrestha-retd-INDIAN-NAVY.html.
|ISSN 2381-3652| https://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.2064888