Following the realist tradition, the bargaining perspective sees conflict as originating from disagreement over the allocation of scarce resources. This point of departure brings us to the fact that international politics is often concerned with scarce resources, of which territorial dispute is but one manifestation.
By Andy Yee
Following
the realist tradition, the bargaining perspective sees conflict as originating
from disagreement over the allocation of scarce resources. This point of
departure brings us to the fact that international politics is often concerned
with scarce resources, of which territorial dispute is but one manifestation.
Realism, or
power politics, has traditionally dominated thinking about territorial
disputes. For realists, nation-states, existing as units within an
international system of anarchy, live in a world of self-help. Material power
and military strength are the decisive forces which shape relations among
states (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001).
For
pessimistic realists, a major focus for the international security of East Asia
is the rapid industrialization of China, and the associated competition for
energy resources in order to power its manufacturing industries (Kenny 2004).
Since the start of economic reforms in 1978, Chinese GDP has consistently grown
at an average rate of 7 to 8 per cent annually. China became a net importer of
oil in 1994, and passed Japan as the second-largest importer of oil in the
world in 2003. This year, it also passed Japan to become the second-largest
economy in the world (The New York Times 2010b). It follows that, as a rising
power, there is a great need for China to compete for external sources of raw
materials. A fast-growing economy makes it easier for China to modernize its
military, which in turn enables China to project power and secure external
resources.
Image Attribute: East China Sea Maritime Claims / Source: Chinese Defence Ministry, EIA, Yonhap
While the idea
of Lebensraum or survival space has long been discredited, Graver (1992:
1018-1019) showed that such a notion has strongly influenced Chinese policy in
the South China Sea since the late 1970s. While the area’s importance as a
transit lane between the Indian and Pacific Oceans was continually emphasised
in Chinese commentary during the 1980s and 1990s, this was overshadowed by
discussions on the exploitation of natural resources in the region. Control
over the South China Sea was seen as a way for China to seek living space for
its population and achieve a position of great power through the exploitation
of oil, gas, fisheries and other resources. Leifer (1995) pointed to the link
between economic reform and security policy in the South China Sea – on the one
hand, successes in economic reform enabled China to strengthen its armed
forces, on the other hand, securing the South China Sea and its natural
resources would in turn contribute to continuing economic development.
Buszynski (2003: 346-347) also reiterated how the Chinese naval authorities
used material reasons as a justification for naval expansion. Liu Huaqing,
appointed Naval Commander in 1982, highlighted the South China Sea as one of
China’s lost territories and used it to justify larger budgets and a strategic
mission for the navy. In 1992, Vice Admiral Zhang Lianzhing predicted that the
struggle for ocean resources would intensify in the future and that China would
strengthen its navy to protect its territorial waters.
Likewise,
realism also points to increasing conflicts in the East China Sea. The two
neighboring states, China and Japan, are the world’s second- and third-biggest
economies and oil consumers, respectively. Disputes between the two countries concern
both the sovereignty of the Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands and the maritime
delimitation of each country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The Diaoyu/
Senkaku Islands have strategic value to both countries due to their particular
location. Should either country secure control of the islands, it would acquire
a prolonged and enlarged frontier, putting the other side at a disadvantaged
position militarily. In fact, some Japanese military experts have highlighted
the desirability of establishing a radar system, a missile base or a submarine
base on the biggest Diaoyu/ Uotsuri Island. Further-more, control over the
islands would enable either China or Japan to claim the surrounding 40,000 km2
as part of their EEZ area, and with it the rights to exploit the natural
resources therein (Pan 2007: 71-72).
Another issue
is the delimitation of the EEZs as measured from each country’s coast. This has
implications over who could exploit the oil and gas deposits in the central
area of the East China Sea, which could potentially go a long way to satisfying
the energy needs of both countries. The dispute between the two countries stems
from their well documented alternative interpretations of the 1982 UN Law of
the Sea Convention (LOS) in accordance with two cardinal principles for
maritime delimitation (Hsiung 2005).
The first
principle, employed by China, is to follow the natural prolongation of the
continental shelf. Article 76 (1) of the LOS essentially defines the
continental shelf as the seabed extending up to a distance of 200 nautical
miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured, or to the outer edge of the continental margin, with the outer limit
not exceeding 350 nautical miles from the baseline.
China’s
continental shelf claim extends up to the axis of the Okinawa Trough, which
measures approximately 350 nautical miles from the Chinese coast (Hsiung 2005:
516). The second principle, used by Japan, references the respective EEZs of
the coastal states. Article 57 of the LOS defines an EEZ as not extending
beyond 200 nautical miles from the baseline. Furthermore, Article 74 (1)
specifies that the delimitation of EEZs between states should be agreed on an
equitable basis, taking into account all facts and norms within the context of
general international law. The body of waters between China and Japan is fewer
than 400 nautical miles in total. Without having mutual agreement, Japan
unilaterally drew a “median line” by connecting the middle points between the
two shores (Hsiung 2005: 517).
As for the
East China Sea, progress is at a more primitive stage. Never in the course of
history have China and Japan both emerged as major geopolitical players at the
same time. This power balance is one characterised by uncertainty and mistrust.
Recent events suggest that China and Japan have not yet succeeded in building
trust, and it is apparent that they cannot even agree on whether there is a
territorial dispute. Along with the political, economic and military tensions,
China and Japan would do well to confront the underlying “strain of minds”.
The heightened
existence of suspicion and the “clash of nationalisms” do represent genuine
constraints within which governments may have to operate. This implies that any
resolution would have to start with confidence-building measures and,
ultimately, the thorough facing of history.
As of now, the
US backing of Japan appeared ambiguous. The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands incident had highlighted the still-virulent, historically rooted animosity between China and
Japan. The important lesson for the US, as the key mediating and moderating
power in the region, is that the strategic backing of its allies in the region
could have very different consequences: diplomatic and military escalation in
the East China Sea, and negotiations in the South China Sea. In these ways, the
simplistic attribution of the twin conflicts to being inevitable consequences
of China’s rise would be to misjudge the nuanced state of international
affairs, as well as its complex and different dynamics.
About The
Author:
Andy Yee is a
public policy professional with expertise in finance and technology. He is
currently a Public Policy Director for Visa in Greater China, handling policy
issues related to digital payments, economic growth and financial inclusion.
Prior to Visa, he served for four years as a Public Policy Analyst for Google
in Asia Pacific. This entailed internet policy issues including technology
innovation, free expression, privacy and intellectual property. Earlier in his
career, he has held permanent and visiting roles in public institutions and
investment banks, including the Hong Kong Government, the European Union
Delegation to China, UBS and Crédit Agricole.
Publication Details:
This article is an extract from a journal publication mentioned below, republished under the Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0 License provided by the Original Publisher.
Yee, Andy
(2011), Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: A Comparative Analysis of
the South China Sea and the East China Sea, in: Journal of Current Chinese
Affairs, 40, 2, 165-193. ISSN: 1868-4874 (online), ISSN: 1868-1026 (print).Download The Paper - LINK
