Tehran's Calculated Endurance: Iran's Strategy of Imposed Costs in the Persian Gulf Conflict

Iran’s war strategy focuses on attrition, proxies and Hormuz pressure to raise costs for the U.S.–Israel coalition and force a negotiated outcome.

Cover Image Attribute: First responders gather at the strike site after an Iranian missile barrage in Ramat Gan, Israel, during the U.S.–Israel conflict, March 3, 2026 / Source: AFP

As United States and Israeli strikes continue to target Iranian military installations, nuclear-linked facilities and export infrastructure in a conflict now entering its fifth week as of March 28, 2026, Tehran has demonstrated a deliberate approach that prioritizes regime continuity over outright battlefield victory. The fighting, which erupted on February 28 following intensified exchanges involving ballistic missiles and drone swarms, has drawn in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members through retaliatory attacks on energy sites in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. Oil prices have swung wildly, holding near $105 to $107 per barrel amid partial disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and a reported phantom blockade that has slowed commercial traffic, underscoring the economic stakes that now ripple through global markets. What has emerged is not a conventional war of decisive engagements but a contest of attrition in which Iran seeks to raise the price of continued pressure to levels that force adversaries to reconsider their objectives.
At the core of Iranian decision-making lies a survival-first doctrine shaped by decades of sanctions, isolation and intermittent confrontation. The regime's leadership structure has already been tested by the assassination of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on February 28, yet operations have continued without apparent fracture. Mojtaba Khamenei was announced as the new supreme leader on March 9 following deliberations by the Assembly of Experts, with an interim council including senior figures ensuring continuity during the transition. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) maintains operational redundancy through decentralized provincial networks, Basij militias and layered command posts. This architecture, designed explicitly to withstand decapitation strikes, allows the IRGC to function as the primary warfighting and internal security apparatus even as clerical authority adapts. Internal stability remains intact for now, bolstered by sweeping communications blackouts, shoot-to-kill orders against perceived collaborators and a heavy security presence in major cities that has prevented any resurgence of earlier protests. Public morale, though strained by blackouts and economic hardship, has not translated into open revolt, partly because the regime frames the conflict as an existential defense against foreign aggression.
Iran's warfighting doctrine rests on asymmetric tactics that exploit the limitations of superior conventional forces. Rather than seeking head-to-head battles, Tehran relies on proxy networks, missile and drone barrages, and maritime harassment to disperse enemy resources across multiple theaters. Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthi forces in Yemen and Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) serve as forward extensions, capable of independent action that complicates any attempt at rapid containment. These groups cannot be dismantled by airstrikes alone; their durability stems from local roots, ideological cohesion and Iranian resupply lines that have proven resilient. The same logic applies to Iran's own forces, which operate under a "mosaic defense" model of decentralized command that disperses decision-making to regional commanders, reducing the impact of leadership losses. Missile and drone strikes, averaging dozens per day in recent phases, target air bases, energy infrastructure and shipping lanes, while maritime strategy centers on mining, fast-boat swarms and coastal missile batteries that threaten commercial traffic without requiring a blue-water navy. The approach favors a long war over a short one, absorbing initial shocks and converting time into a weapon that erodes adversary political will.
This mindset explains why Iranian forces have struck targets across multiple countries, including GCC states that are not Tehran's primary ideological foes. By activating proxies and launching direct missile salvos against Saudi and Emirati facilities, Iran signals that any coalition supporting U.S. or Israeli operations will share the pain. The goal is not conquest but deterrence through cost imposition and coercive pressure: the aim is to raise the cost of participation to the point where Gulf capitals press Washington for de-escalation. In game-theoretic terms, Tehran plays an escalation ladder in which each rung is calibrated to stay below the threshold of full-scale invasion while demonstrating resolve. Psychological operations amplify the message, with state media emphasizing civilian casualties from coalition strikes and framing the conflict as a defense of regional sovereignty. Economic warfare forms another pillar, as threats to close or contest the Strait of Hormuz—through which roughly one-fifth of global oil passes—have already triggered insurance spikes, shipping delays and price volatility. Even partial interdiction, modeled in probabilistic assessments using short-run demand elasticity of approximately negative 0.15, can drive Brent crude upward by substantial margins, imposing trillions in annualized global costs.
Recent coalition operations have introduced a new dimension with what analysts describe as a multi-island gambit, involving phased efforts to seize or degrade control of key Iranian islands such as Kharg, Qeshm, Abu Musa, Larak, Greater Tunb and Kish without committing to mainland invasion. This approach seeks to dismantle Iran's anti-access/area-denial capabilities around the Strait through suppression of coastal defenses, amphibious or heliborne insertions and sustained air support from Israeli and GCC assets. Strikes have already neutralized significant IRGC Navy elements, including the reported death of naval commander Rear Adm. Alireza Tangsiri, and damaged port facilities, bunkers and communications on islands like Greater Tunb. Yet Tehran has responded with swarm tactics, additional mining and selective fees on vessels attempting transit, maintaining leverage while avoiding actions that would invite irreversible escalation. The strategy against Israel continues to blend direct retaliation with proxy pressure. Ballistic missile volleys aimed at Israeli sites have been met with counterstrikes on Tehran-area infrastructure, yet the exchanges remain limited in scale. Hezbollah's rocket arsenal ties down Israeli ground forces along the northern border, creating a secondary front that prevents full concentration on Iranian territory. The objective is not military defeat of a far superior adversary but sustained harassment that drains resources and tests domestic support in Israel.
Similarly, operations against U.S. forces focus on bases in the Gulf and Iraq, using drones and missiles to inflict casualties and force defensive reallocations. Dozens of American service members have been reported killed or wounded since fighting intensified, according to U.S. Central Command updates, yet Iran avoids actions that would invite an all-out ground invasion. Instead, the IRGC coordinates with Iraqi militias to threaten supply lines and logistics hubs, maintaining pressure without triggering irreversible escalation. The Strait of Hormuz remains the conflict's economic centerpiece. Iranian officials have warned repeatedly that continued pressure will keep the waterway contested, with fast boats, mines and coastal defenses ready to interdict tankers. Kharg Island, the export terminal handling 90 percent of Iran's crude, has been degraded by U.S. strikes yet left partially intact as leverage in any future bargaining. Probabilistic models, incorporating Monte Carlo simulations across thousands of iterations and Bayesian adjustments for allied multipliers, assign modest probabilities to rapid success scenarios while highlighting tail risks that could push oil prices into the $130-to-$225 range or higher, with non-oil commodity shocks—fertilizer, helium, sulphur and aluminum—amplifying global economic multipliers through networked effects.
Tehran's escalation strategy is one of controlled risk rather than reckless adventurism. It employs deterrence by denial—making conquest prohibitively expensive—while using compellence to extract concessions. Proxies provide plausible deniability layers, allowing Tehran to respond indirectly when direct confrontation would be suicidal. This calibrated approach aligns with a broader war-of-attrition doctrine in which time favors the side willing to absorb punishment longer. As assessments have noted, the regime's resilience stems from its ability to outlast expectations of quick collapse. Another analysis observed that airstrikes alone cannot destroy the underlying power structure, which draws strength from ideological cohesion and internal security organs. Tehran is not pursuing decisive military victory; its aim is political endurance that reshapes the regional order by demonstrating that external regime-change efforts carry unacceptable costs.
Negotiation remains a secondary track, activated only when economic pain reaches critical thresholds. Iran has signaled through intermediaries that any diplomatic off-ramp must include security guarantees against future strikes, compensation for infrastructure damage and an end to certain sanctions, while refusing limits on its missile program. War termination conditions center on survival with dignity: an acknowledgment that the regime remains in place, proxies intact and regional influence preserved. Tehran demands a settlement that validates its deterrence posture rather than one that concedes core capabilities. In this calculus, the biggest fear is not battlefield loss but internal fragmentation triggered by prolonged economic collapse or a miscalculated escalation that invites overwhelming coalition ground operations. The biggest advantage, by contrast, lies in the proxy network's durability and the regime's proven capacity to turn adversity into cohesion, as seen in the seamless transition following leadership losses.
The strategic environment is shifting into a new phase, as U.S. Airborne and Marine expeditionary units are getting positioned for potential operations near contested islands and Iranian missile fire continues at a steady pace; the strategic picture remains one of mutual restraint laced with high tail risks. President Donald Trump has extended a deadline to April 6 for Iran to fully reopen the Strait and described the campaign in terms of complete objectives while pausing certain energy-site strikes. Yet Iranian responses, including continued drone launches toward Gulf targets and proxy actions in Lebanon, underscore Tehran's commitment to prolongation. An IRGC commander was reported as stating that Iran will determine when the war ends, while a senior adviser emphasized that diplomacy would follow only after economic pressure mounted sufficiently. Another figure warned Gulf states directly of consequences for any deeper involvement. These messages, combined with the regime's post-decapitation continuity, point to an endgame in which Iran does not seek to "win" in traditional terms. Iran is not trying to win the war militarily; it is trying to make the war too costly to win against Iran. In doing so, Tehran bets that sustained attrition, economic disruption through contested islands and proxy resilience will eventually produce a negotiated pause that preserves the Islamic Republic's core interests and reshapes the balance of power in the Gulf for years to come. Whether that calculation holds depends on the endurance of all parties as oil markets, domestic politics and escalation ladders continue to intersect in unpredictable ways.

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