Hedging in Tatters: Gulf Monarchies Face Dire Choices in US-Iran War

By Rula Gabr

Cover Image Attribute: A column of black smoke billows from a warehouse in Sharjah’s industrial district in the United Arab Emirates after reported Iranian strikes in nearby Dubai on Sunday, March 1, 2026. / Source: AP.

 Fires illuminated the night sky near luxury hotels along Dubai’s iconic skyline on March 1, 2026, as debris from intercepted Iranian projectiles rained down on the Jebel Ali port, forcing the suspension of operations at one of the world’s busiest container terminals. Panic gripped passengers at Kuwait International Airport after nearby impacts, while smoke billowed from energy facilities at Qatar’s Ras Laffan complex, prompting an immediate shutdown of liquefied natural gas production that accounts for roughly 20 percent of global supply. Saudi Arabia’s massive Ras Tanura refinery, a cornerstone of global oil exports, was temporarily knocked out of commission by drone strikes the following day, and an oil tanker came under attack 50 miles off Oman’s coast near Muscat, with successive drones hitting the Duqm port complex and damaging a fuel tank. Across the six Gulf Cooperation Council states—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman—civilian infrastructure, airports, high-rises and residential neighborhoods bore the brunt of a barrage that included, in the UAE alone, 174 ballistic missiles of which 161 were intercepted, 689 drones with 645 downed, and eight cruise missiles all destroyed, resulting in three fatalities and 68 minor injuries in that country, with dozens more wounded elsewhere.
President Donald Trump, speaking in a CNN interview broadcast on March 2, described the Iranian attacks on Gulf territory as “probably the biggest surprise” of the conflict so far, adding that the Gulf countries “were going to be very little involved and now they insist on being involved.” The remark captured a widening gulf between Washington’s expectations and the reality confronting its long-standing partners, who had invested years in a carefully calibrated hedging strategy that balanced deep security partnerships with the United States against economic interdependence and diplomatic outreach to Iran. That approach, rooted in the 2019 informal UAE-Iran understanding and accelerated by the China-brokered 2023 Saudi-Iran rapprochement, now lies in tatters as the monarchies find themselves on the front lines of a war they had worked assiduously to prevent.
In the weeks leading up to the US-Israeli campaign that began on February 28 with strikes on Iranian military and government targets, including the reported killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and senior commanders, Gulf leaders had repeatedly signaled restraint. Oman’s foreign minister publicly declared peace “within reach” after Tehran offered concessions on uranium enrichment that went beyond the 2015 nuclear deal. Qatar’s emir lobbied Washington against using Al Udeid Air Base, the region’s largest US installation, for operations against Iran, while several capitals explicitly refused to permit US or Israeli use of their airspace or territory. “We had been very clear and had been in communication with them that we would not let the U.S. or Israel use our airspace,” one Arab diplomat recalled. Public statements remained measured, but private diplomacy emphasized the risks of blowback to economies reliant on open sea lanes, stable energy flows and an image of security that underpins diversification away from hydrocarbons.
Iran’s retaliation, framed under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter as a “legal and legitimate right” to respond to aggression, quickly extended beyond US military sites. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi highlighted Tehran’s prior compromises on its nuclear program, including zero stockpiling of highly enriched uranium, while Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, stated, “We do not intend to attack you. But when the bases of your country are used against us and the United States operates in the region with its own forces, we target them.” In practice, the salvo—believed to number hundreds of missiles and drones across the GCC in the first 48 hours—hit civilian and economic targets with precision calculated to impose reputation costs and compel Gulf rulers to press Washington for de-escalation. Debris shattered glass and concrete in landmark buildings and high-rises from Dubai and Manama to Doha and Riyadh’s eastern province; airports in Dubai and Kuwait experienced direct disruption; Amazon data centers in the UAE and Bahrain were affected; and energy infrastructure at the heart of global supply chains came under fire.
Analysts described the targeting of airports, ports and hotels as a deliberate shift by a cornered regime. Monica Marks, professor of Middle East politics at New York University Abu Dhabi, observed that a regime fighting for survival would “choose fratricide before suicide,” taking its Gulf neighbours hostage rather than accepting defeat, likening strikes on cities like Dubai, Doha and Manama to the unimaginable bombing of American cities such as Charlotte, Seattle or Miami. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen noted that Iran sought to expand the conflict, “thereby significantly raising costs to the US and its partners in the Gulf,” with the explicit hope that economic pressure would force Gulf leaders to lobby for an endgame. Rob Geist Pinfold of King’s College London added that Tehran was “picking the Gulf countries because it sees them as a soft target. They’re easier to hit than Israel. These countries have less of an appetite for a fight, because at the end of the day, this is not their war.”
Gulf responses blended condemnation, defensive measures and diplomatic caution. An emergency video meeting of GCC foreign ministers on March 1 affirmed that the “option to respond to Iranian attacks” remained available to protect regional security and stability. A joint statement issued the next day by the GCC states together with Jordan, Iraq and others declared that “targeting civilians and countries not engaged in hostilities is reckless and destabilising.” Qatar’s foreign ministry spokesman Majed al-Ansari declared at a press briefing, “All the red lines have already been crossed. … The attacks on our sovereignty are constant. There are attacks on infrastructure. There are attacks on our residential areas. … Attacks like these will not go unanswered and cannot go unanswered.” Anwar Gargash, senior diplomatic adviser to the UAE president, posted on X: “Your war is not with your neighbours. Return to your surroundings, and deal with your neighbours with reason and responsibility before the circle of isolation and escalation widens.”
Qatar took immediate steps, shutting down LNG production at Ras Laffan and scrambling F-15QA fighters. The UAE withdrew its ambassador from Tehran, noting that Iran had launched more attacks on its territory than on Israel, while officials toured Dubai malls to project normalcy. Saudi Arabia voiced solidarity with the UAE. Oman, despite strikes on Duqm, continued quiet mediation efforts. Kuwait and Bahrain, home to key US assets, echoed calls for restraint. Beneath the surface, divergences persisted: the UAE and Saudi Arabia signaled greater readiness for defensive posture, while Qatar and Oman stressed off-ramps. Yet former Qatari prime minister Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber al-Thani captured a shared frustration, writing that Iran had “lost through this action the Gulf sympathy that was pushing with every possible effort towards de-escalation” and “sowed doubts that will be hard to erase” in future relations. He urged the GCC to act as “a single, unified hand in confronting any aggression” while warning against being “picked off one by one.”
The economic toll mounted swiftly and carried global ramifications. Interception costs in the UAE alone approached $2 billion, with each drone engagement far more expensive than the projectile itself. Airspaces closed over multiple states, stranding tens of thousands of passengers—the largest travel disruption since the COVID-19 pandemic—and halting cargo flows. Seaborne traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, which carries about one-third of the world’s seaborne oil, faced de facto interruptions amid soaring insurance premiums and Iranian threats to set vessels “ablaze.” Qatar’s LNG halt and Saudi refinery outage raised immediate supply concerns, while analysts warned of potential oil prices reaching $200 a barrel, with ripple effects on electricity costs in Asia and fuel prices in China. For the Gulf itself, where non-oil sectors now constitute more than 75 percent of UAE GDP and form the backbone of Saudi Vision 2030 and Qatari diversification plans, the damage struck at the core narrative of stability. Marks highlighted the nightmare scenario of strikes on power grids or water desalination plants: without air conditioning and desalinated water, “the scorching hot and bone-dry Gulf countries are essentially uninhabitable. Without energy infrastructure, they’re unprofitable.” Coates Ulrichsen described the events as “undoing years of work to de-risk the region and placing in jeopardy the unique selling point and business models that have underpinned the Gulf states’ global rise.”
US policy compounded the pressure. A Saudi official told reporters that “the United States abandoned the Gulf states and redirected its air defence to protect Israel. They left all the Gulf states that host American military bases at the mercy of Iranian strikes.” Trump administration officials urged partners to abandon neutrality, including potential tanker escorts, while signaling an open-ended campaign. The presence of US forces, long viewed as a security umbrella, now exposed hosts to retaliation without commensurate protection, raising fundamental questions about the cost-benefit of the arrangements. Yasmine Farouk of the International Crisis Group noted the anger: “The Gulf countries now are at a point where there’s a lot of anger at Iran. Many of them have invested a lot in the detente with Iran and in mediating and trying to find solutions only to find that Iran still sees them as a platform for its bigger war with the US and with Israel.”
Kuwaiti political scientist Bader Al Saif had argued months earlier that “only collective action among the GCC states is likely to get them out of this dilemma. It is easier for Iran to cajole, and the United States to dismiss, individual Gulf states, so Gulf leaders should capitalize on this crisis by pushing their countries closer together.” Geist Pinfold suggested that rather than opening airspace for US or Israeli operations—which would risk legitimacy given public sentiment—Gulf states were more likely to act through joint mechanisms such as the Peninsula Shield Force or a unified military command, thereby demonstrating agency and protecting their standing. Faisal Al-Mudahka, editor-in-chief of Gulf Times, framed the broader sentiment: “This is Israel and the US’s war, and it has nothing to do with us. We are just stuck in this geopolitical location. The Gulf is all about prosperity, development, security and dialogue. We are not war seekers.”
As of March 4, emergency coordination continued amid ongoing threats. The strikes have accelerated a reassessment of security guarantees, with advanced air defenses proving effective in interception yet unable to prevent debris damage or psychological impact. Long-term, analysts foresee erosion of US credibility as security guarantor, potential recalibration of base-hosting arrangements, and stronger internal GCC integration. Whether through pooled missile-defense resources, coordinated diplomacy via Oman and Qatar, or unified statements reserving self-defense rights, the monarchies confront narrowing options. Hamad bin Jassim warned that after the current battle, “new forces will emerge in the region, and Israel will hold sway over our region,” urging collective resilience against external dictates.
The conflict underscores the fragility of the Gulf’s prosperity model, built on openness, connectivity and an aura of stability that has attracted global investment, aviation hubs and tourism. Disruptions to these pillars carry consequences far beyond the region, from supply-chain strains in Europe to energy volatility in Asia. For the GCC states themselves, the events test the durability of diversification strategies at a moment when images of smoke over Dubai and Doha compete with visions of AI hubs and global financial centers. Without greater collective coordination, the monarchies risk remaining collateral in a confrontation not of their choosing, where Iranian desperation meets US determination. The coming days will reveal whether shared vulnerability can forge the unified response that individual hedging could not sustain, or whether external pressures will further expose the limits of balancing between great-power rivalry and regional survival.

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