The implementation of the deal over Iran’s nuclear program, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), on July 14, 2015 will in the light of Iran’s relations with the world powers provide a new geopolitical potential for Iranian foreign policy that can be used at the service of Iran’s economic development, as well as regional stability.
By Kayhan
Barzegar
(via Iran Review)
Iran’s Foreign Policy after the Nuclear Deal
The
implementation of the deal over Iran’s nuclear program, known as the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), on July 14, 2015 will in the light of
Iran’s relations with the world powers provide a new geopolitical potential for
Iranian foreign policy that can be used at the service of Iran’s economic
development, as well as regional stability.
There are two
perspectives in Iran in regard to Iran’s foreign policy conduct in the post-JCPOA
era: The first perspective focuses on a developmental approach stressing on the
economic benefits of the JCPOA. The second perspective focuses more on a
political-security approach stressing on the geopolitical benefits of the
nuclear deal.
The development
approach is based on the logic that the nuclear deal with six world powers,
reached due to the country’s economic urgency, resulted from the international
sanctions. Withdrawing from the current economic constraints requires
attracting foreign investment and especially from the Western countries,
increased energy exports and generally integrating Iran’s economy with that of
the world. From this perspective, fostering the country’s economic development
and progress is dependent on increased interaction and cooperation with world
economic powers and international institutions such as WTO, the World Bank,
etc.
The
geopolitical approach is more based on the necessity of institutionalizing
Iran’s role and status in the regional political-security equations. From this
perspective, Iran’s defense and security strategy, and especially in fields
that have a direct connection with the national security threat domain in the
region (like that of other countries such as the U.S., Russia, Turkey and
Saudi Arabia), is the priority of foreign policy conduct. To this end,
the nuclear deal has created a new potential in the region’s geopolitical
equations and Iran should take advantage of this situation and solve its
strategic discrepancies with Western countries especially with the United
States.
In reality,
both the above-mentioned approaches are related to the sole traditional concept
in Iranian foreign policy conduct, which is that the country’s best interest is
to act in favor of increased stability in the region. In this respect, the
expectation of the Rouhani government, as mentioned several times by the
President, Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, Secretary of the Supreme National
Security Council Ali Shamkhani and the President’s Chief of Staff Mohammad
Nahavandian, is that the JCPOA should bring about both economic and
geopolitical benefits for Iran. In other words, Iran’s foreign policy conduct
is trying to somehow balance between international economic interactions and
regional geopolitical equations.
Now, the main
challenge is the regional opposition, and especially from Saudi Arabia and to
some degree from Turkey, which is more or less focusing on the negative
geopolitical aspects of the JCPOA on regional equations. Their main concern is
that the improved Iran-West relations will increase Iran’s regional role,
thereby unbalancing the regional equations at their expense, and especially in
regard to the Syrian crisis.
These two
countries are also concerned about the expanded Iran-Russia relations resulting
more from the Russians’ new understanding that the JCPOA has given a new
potential to Iran’s foreign policy which ultimately favors Russian interests.
With the international sanctions lifted, Russia can restore its traditional
weapons trade and economic exchanges with Iran. Russia also believes that
Iran’s economic progress can bring about more stability in the region, keeping
the status quo, which is in a way Russia’s priority in its relations with Iran.
For this
reason, the Saudis, who have had to officially accept the JCPOA, with an
obvious change of strategy are trying to limit the positive effects of the
nuclear deal on Iran’s regional status, mostly through increasing political
pressures on the U.S. Congress to adopt new sanctions or block further economic
incentives to Iran. Indeed, in a recent report, the Christian Science Monitor
reveals that the Saudis allocated 11 million dollars for lobbying against Iran.
In this respect, President Erdogan’s government in Turkey is also cautious of
the geopolitical consequences of the JCOPA as equivalent to Iran’s increased
regional role and especially initiating possible cooperation with Western
countries in introducing a new peace plan for Syria that might not favor
Turkey. He talks of a prospective coalition with Saudi Arabia in handling the
regional issues.
The underlying
reality on the other hand is that increased geopolitical tensions in the region
will not benefit Iran in the post-JCPOA era. Attracting foreign investment and
fostering economic improvement require establishing stability in the region and
this in turn needs removing tensions in regional relations, and
especially with Saudi Arabia in the Syrian and Iraqi crises which involve
solving the ISIS issue. At the same time, the real value of Iran to
Western countries is its strong state, which is able to simultaneously preserve
its stability while playing an appropriate regional role for solving the
current regional issues.
In this
respect, one can argue that the growing regional problems put the Western
countries on the path of reaching the nuclear deal with Iran. Lack of
interaction with Iran in past years created some strategic constraints for the
West to find workable solutions for regional problems and properly battling
terrorist organizations such as ISIS and Al Qaeda and their affiliates who are
now endangering Western security by perpetrating attacks in France and the
United States. This development has convinced the West, as Federica Mogherini
puts it, that Iran’s role in the broader regional map cannot be ignored. This
view is also accepted by President Obama and Secretary John Kerry.
In such
circumstances, the legitimacy of the Saudis’ opposition to the JCPOA is faced
with a serious challenge by the West. While the Saudis have adopted an
aggressive regional policy, combined with the sabotaging of the Syrian peace
process in obvious contrast with present field equations and realities,
opposition against the Saudis’ regional polices, and especially the continued
bombing of Yemen, is taking root in the West, i.e. among the Germans and other
Europeans. At present, world powers are against any further warmongering
policies in the region, as they perceive them to be in favor of spreading
terrorist activities and regional insecurity and instability.
The
geopolitics of the JCPOA has even changed the equation of Iran’s relations with
Russia, China, India, Japan and other economic powers in favor of Iran. In a
situation of improved relations with the West, these countries have sharply
sought to develop comprehensive political-economic relations to enhance their
traditional relations with Iran. Lifting the international sanctions has also
removed the main obstacle for conducting trade with Iran. Moreover, with the
solving of the strategic discrepancy of the nuclear issue, Iran’s subsequent
participation in efforts to solve regional issues has increased Iran’s
geopolitical value for such states.
In sum, the
JCPOA has been implemented in the light of the new understanding of Western
countries, which accepts Iran’s regional role in preserving peace and security
in the region and especially battling terrorism. Iran’s foreign policy should
benefit from the new geopolitical potential created in the post-JCPOA era and
balanced relations with world powers for removing the regional tensions. This
will allow Iran to press ahead with the developmental approach and economic
advancement.
About The Author:
Kayhan
Barzegar is the director of the Institute for Middle East Strategic Studies in
Tehran and a former research fellow at Harvard University. He also chairs the
Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Islamic Azad
University in Tehran.
An earlier
version of this article was first published in Turkish and in Analist on
March 1, 2016
This article was originally published at IranReview.org.
All rights reserved by the original publisher. Reprinted with permission.
Source:
The Institute for Middle East Strategic Studies
.jpg)
