By AB Katrina Laygo, Thomas W. Gillespie, Noel Rayo and Erin Garcia 1. Introduction Drone bombing, as a US defense strateg...
By AB Katrina Laygo, Thomas W. Gillespie, Noel Rayo and Erin Garcia
1.
Introduction
Drone bombing,
as a US defense strategy in Pakistan, began under the George W. Bush administration
as part of the “US War on Terrorism” and aimed to defeat Taliban and al-Qaeda
militants who have sought refuge in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) of North West Pakistan [1]. The strikes, which have continued under the
Obama administration, are carried out by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and
are primarily operated remotely from Creech Air Force Base in Nevada. Since
2001, Taliban and al-Qaeda activity has increased significantly in the region,
triggering US security concerns [2]. The FATA has become a safe haven for the
Taliban, prompting US security officials to reassess their Middle East policy.
The Taliban, if left unchecked, could disrupt the progress that the US has made
in neighboring Afghanistan. Currently, it is difficult to collect field data
from the FATA and most of what is known about the distribution and densities of
drone bombings is from second hand sources [1,3] on the locations of bombings,
extent of damage, and impacts in the region that would be of use for the political
science community in assessing the current impacts of drone bombings.
There has been
an increasing interest in near real-time satellite imagery that can be used to
assess contemporary political geography questions [4,5]. One of the current
advantages of using remote sensing in political geography is that it can
collect imagery of the Earth in regions where it is very difficult to collect
field data [6]. For instance, it is now possible to study genocide in Darfur by
quantifying the number of destroyed structures in villages in southern Sudan
with high-resolution commercial imagery [7]. Currently, there are a number of
commercial satellites that can provide sub-meter resolution imagery (QuickBird,
IKONOS, OrbView, GeoEye) from space. This has allowed researchers to address
questions that previously were impractical to study from space or on the
ground.
This research
examines the utility of satellite imagery to identify the location and extent
of damage from drone bombings in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
First, we identify the regions with the highest incidence and density of drone
bombing activity. Second, we systematically search the area to see if there is
any evidence of bombing damage and determine the exact locations of US military
air strikes. Finally, we assess the potential for satellite imagery to monitor
the region in order to increase transparency and security in the region.
2. Methods
2.1. Study
Area
The Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan are home to attacks carried out by
the US military in an attempt to eradicate al-Qaeda and Taliban militants.
There are seven tribal areas known as agencies in the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas: Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and
South Waziristan and six smaller zones called Frontier Regions. The region
contains rugged mountains, barren hills, and deep valleys with most human
habitation in open valleys in extensive floodplains where soil is fertile and
tributaries provide irrigation water [8]. There are 3.3 million people in the
FATA, most of which are ethnic Pashtuns that live under their own century-old
rules and regulations [9]. The domestic affairs of tribes are regulated through
“Pakhtunwali” or code of conduct designed on the principles of equity and
retaliation [8]. The FATA is one of the poorest, most isolated, and dangerous
regions of Pakistan.
2.2. GIS and
Remote Sensing Methods
Data on the
location of potential drone bombing was collected from the Center for American
Progress, which provides estimated location and casualty data for the FATA [3].
The locations of potential drone bombing from 2004 to December 31, 2009 were
entered into ArcMap 9.2. The region with the highest number and density of
drone bombings was identified, and a QuickBird 2 image was purchased from
GeoEye over the region. QuickBird 2 provides 0.41 m resolution data in the
panchromatic and 1.65 meter data in the multi-spectral. A clear image was
purchased from November 9, 2009 (ID:101001000A95C201). Areas that did not contain
structures (i.e. natural areas) were cut to reduce the cost of the imagery and
to focus on structures in the region. The image cost was $1200 for a 10.6 km2
area and allowed a sufficient view of individual structures inFigure 1. The
image was sent in a GeoTIFF format and was uploaded into ENVI 4.8 software.
A systematic
search was undertaken in 1 km2 grids to identify structures that showed
potential damage from drone bombings. Searches began in the upper left hand
corner of each grid and continued east until reaching the easternmost section
of the grid or where the image was subset. A 100 m by 100 m window was used to
examine the structures for potential drone damage. Potential sites were marked
as regions of interest in vector files, then examined by all authors to assess
if there were bombed sites. Once potential bombed sites were identified, we
examined publicly available Google Earth imagery to identify if there was
high-resolution imagery before and after November 2009.
Figure 1. An
example of structures in the FATA region from QuickBird 2 imagery.
3. Results
There were 16
drone bombings in Miram Shah in North Waziristan before January 1, 2010, shown
inFigure 2. There were an estimated 212 people killed in Miram Shah, which was
the highest number in all cities in the FATA. A systematic search was
undertaken of the acquired QuickBird 2 image in 1 km2 grids that contained
potential drone bombing sites in Figure 3. We identified two structures as
potential sites where a drone bombing might have occurred in Figure 4. Figure
4(a) is an irregular structure with wall damage in the center of the structure.
However, it is difficult to determine if this is damage from a drone bombing or
decay of a structure that has been abandoned. If it is a drone bombing, it
could be over 6 months old. Figure 4(b) does appear to be a recently bombed
site. There is an unusual plume of sediment away from the structure in the
North and burned area damage in black. The blast radius is less than 15 m and
the outer walls are still intact. There was no high-resolution image available
from Google Earth from before or after November 2009 for the two potential
bombed sites.
4. Discussion
The Center for
American Progress provides data on the location of drone bombings, target
values, and number of casualties. According to the center, information on these
strikes was compiled from analysis of “existing open-
Figure 2.
Hypothesized location of drone bombings and casualties (blue) before December
31, 2009.
Figure 3.
QuickBird 2 imagery with 1 km grid lines of Miram Shah, North Waziristan.
Fig 4 (a)
Fig 4 (b)
Figure 4.
Potential drone bombing sites from November 2009 QuickBird 2 image.
source
reporting”. Sources include the New York Times, Washington Post, BBC, Reuters,
Associated Press, Agence France-Press, Dawn, the Daily Times, GEO TV, and
secondary source reporting from the Long War Journal and the Jamestown
Foundation, among others [3]. Most of the drone bombings were in large cities
such as Miram Shah and Ladha that are easy to find on maps and Google Earth.
However, we were not able to find the names of smaller towns or rural areas in
current GIS databases or Google Earth. Most of these areas were small villages,
and news sources were unable to provide an adequate description of the
locations. Currently, there are a number of groups besides the Center for American
Progress that also provide interactive maps on the locations of drone bombings
and militant attacks [10,11]. Standard population centers and village names are
still needed for the region in order to adequately assess the accuracy and
extent of drone bombings in FATA from all these sources. However, we were able
to narrow the location of most of the drone bombings to the capital city of
Miram Shah in the FATA.
We feel
confident that we were able to identify the location of one drone bombing in
Figure 4(b). If the center of the compound is the target, it would appear that
the drone bombing is accurate. This also suggests that the blast radius of such
attacks is relatively small or less than 20 m. Indeed, the walls still appear
to remain intact. This appears similar to blast radii reported for hellfire
missiles which are used by both the Predator and Reaper drones [12]. The
resolution of QuickBird 2 is currently not high enough to see or quantify
casualties.
Our results
suggest that drone bombings can be monitored in large towns in the FATA such as
Miram Shah. In theory, the high-resolution imagery of Miram Shah is available
weekly, especially in the summer when high pressure and low humidity permit the
acquisition of high quality imagery. A weekly analysis of a city over one year
in FATA would cost approximately $64,000 from GeoEye [13]. This assumes a clear
image is available for each week. Although it does appear possible to monitor
large towns, it may be prohibitively expensive to monitor the entire FATA
region. Indeed, many of the drone bombings have been reported to target
vehicles on roads in isolated areas.
We were able
to capture an image of a Predator drone flying over the landscape just
southwest of Miram Shah in Figure 5. The slight blue discoloration north of the
drone is most likely the result of an active lidar (light detection and
ranging) sensor that is scanning the landscape and interfering with the visible
portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. Although such an image clearly plays
into the “spectacle of secret places”, we believe that this is the first
satellite image of a drone in the FATA [6]. This suggests that there is a high
density of drones in the region because this snapshot was captured during the
daytime in a relatively small area.
The public and
political science community has access to high-resolution imagery that can be
used to assess the impacts or success of a military campaign. However, remote
sensing data can be used to monitor important
Figure 5. An
MQ-1B Predator drone flying over the landscape on November 9, 2009.
quality of
life variables within the FATA and cross border regions in Afghanistan. In
theory, US policy in southern Afghanistan and the FATA can be assessed using
remote sensing imagery over a number of spatial scales. Ethnic groups in the
FATA are extremely independent, operate at a tribal level, and do not always
accept government aid or intervention [8]. According to The United States
Agency for International Development, there is no US humanitarian aid access to
the FATA [14]. Thus, the success of the US controlled areas can be compared to
the FATA areas using remote sensing. The development of infrastructure such as
roads and buildings is easy to quantify with high-resolution imagery [15].
High-resolution imagery can also be used to compare changes in agricultural
areas, crop type, and crop health along with assessing the transportation
activity in a region by examining cars and buses [16]. Moderate-resolution
imagery such as free Landsat and MODIS imagery can be used to assess
large-scale patterns of agricultural productivity, hydrology, and land cover
change [16,17]. Finally, nightlight imagery can be used to estimate increases
and decreases in energy within the region [5].
5. Conclusion
It is possible
for the public to monitor drone bombings in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas of Pakistan. However, monitoring and comparing quality of life indicators
in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and southern Afghanistan using a
diversity of satellites may have a more profound impact on the general public
and policymakers. Results suggest that there should also be some concern with
the use of drones in further “technologizing” warfare. The results also shed
light on the issue of Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty and US intervention.
The continued use and development of drone technology may open the door to
counterattacks on the US from whoever acquires access to the technology.
6.
Acknowledgements
We thank Dave
Northup, Christopher Santiago, Alandre Martin, and Thalia Edelman for help with
research. We thank John May, John Agnew, and Stephanie Pincetl for comments and
suggestions on this manuscript. The California Center for Population Research,
UCLA provided funding through the Spatial Demography Program.
About The Authors:
- AB Katrina Laygo - Department of Geography, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), Los Angeles, USA
- Thomas W. Gillespie - Department of Geography, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), Los Angeles, USA
- Noel Rayo - Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), Los Angeles, USA
- Erin Garcia - Department of Geography, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), Los Angeles, USA
REFERENCES
- M. E. O’Connell, “Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan,” Notre Dame Legal Studies Research Paper, Vol. 43, No. 9, 2009, pp. 2-26.
- B. R. Posen, “The Struggle against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics,” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2001, pp. 39-55.doi:10.1162/016228801753399709
- The Center for American Progress, “US Airstrikes in Pakistan on the Rise,” 2009. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/pakistan_map.html
- R. A. Beck, “Remote Sensing and GIS as Counterterrorism Tools in the Afghanistan War: A Case Study of the Zhawar Kili Region,” The Professional Geographer, Vol. 55, No. 2, 2002, pp. 188-190. doi:10.1111/0033-0124.5502005
- J. Agnew, T. W. Gillespie, J. Gonzalez and B. Min, “Baghdad Nights: Evaluating the US Military “Surge” Using Nighttime Light Signatures,” Environment and Planning, Vol. 40, No. 10, 2008, pp. 2285-2295.
- C. Perkins and M. Dodge, “Satellite Imagery and the Spectacle of Secret Spaces,” Geoforum, Vol. 40, No. 4, 2009, pp. 546-560. doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2009.04.01
- L. Parks, “Digging into Google Earth: An Analysis of ‘Crisis in Darfur’,” Geoforum, Vol. 40, No. 4, 2009, pp. 535-545. doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2009.04.004
- A. H. Siddiqi, “Society and Economy of the Tribal Belt in Pakistan,” Geoforum, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1987, pp. 65-79. doi:10.1016/0016-7185(87)90021-2
- Government of Pakistan, “Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) Federally Administered Tribal Areas,” Planning and Development Department, FATA Secretariat, Peshawar, 2009.
- British Broadcasting Corporation, “Mapping US Drone and Islamic Militant Attacks in Pakistan,” 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-10648909
- New America Foundation, “The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of US Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2011,” 2011. http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones
- R. A. Efroymsona, W. Hargrovea, D. S. Jones, L. L. Pater, and G. W. Suter, “The Apache Longbow-Hellfire Missile test at Yuma Proving Ground: Ecological Risk Aassessment for Missile Firing,” Human and Ecological Risk Assessment, Vol. 14, No. 5, 2008, pp. 898-918.doi:10.1080/1080703080238750
- GeoEye, Accessed 10 January 2010. http://www.geoeye.com
- USAID, “USG Humanitarian Assistance to Conflict-Affected Populations in Pakistan in FY 2008 and to date in FY 2009,” 2009, Accessed 2 January 2010. http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/HHOO-7VGTM6?OpenDocument
- J. Park, R. Tateishi, K.Wikantika and J. Park, “The Potential of High Resolution Remotely Sensed Data for Urban Infrastructure Monitoring,” Geoscience and Remote Sensing Symposium, Vol. 2, 1999, pp. 1137-1139. doi:10.1109/IGARSS.1999.774557
- J. R. Jensen, “Remote Sensing of the Environment: A Earth Resource Perspective,” Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River, 2007, 592 p.
- K. M. de Beurs and G. M. Henebry, “Land Surface Phenology, Climatic Variation, and Institutional Change: Analyzing Agricultural Land Cover Change in Kazakhstan,” Remote Sensing of Environment, Vol. 89, No. 4, 2004, pp. 497-509.doi:10.1016/j.rse.2003.11.006
Publication Details
Vol.4
No.2(2012), Article ID:18766,6 pages DOI:10.4236/jgis.2012.42018
This article and GEOINT images was first published at JGIS Journal under Creative Commons License
Image Attribute: MQ -9 Reaper / Source: Wikimedia Commons [Link]
Image Attribute: MQ -9 Reaper / Source: Wikimedia Commons [Link]
.jpg)
