The relationship between Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency and the Taliban took roots during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979. Many nations, particularly the United States and Saudi Arabia, had given billions of dollars to Afghanistan’s mujahedeen, which would later develop into the Taliban, to fight the Soviets.
By Shaul M. Gabbay
Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, USA
Image Source: Former Taliban fighters return arms / Source: Wikimedia Commons
The
relationship between Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency and the
Taliban took roots during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979. Many nations,
particularly the United States and Saudi Arabia, had given billions of dollars
to Afghanistan’s mujahedeen, which would later develop into the Taliban, to
fight the Soviets. It was Pakistan’s ISI that facilitated the allocation of
these hefty funds, although discriminately among the tribes in Afghanistan [1]
.
By the time
the Taliban was emerging in 1994, ISI was supporting Hezb-e-Islami, which had
been led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. In his book, Taliban, Ahmed Rashid describes
an interview he had in 1999 with an advisor of Mullah Omar, a warlord in
Afghanistan, illustrating the ISI’s financial support of Hekmatyar:
“Hikmetyar had
5 percent of the popular support but 90 percent of the military aid from the
ISI. We were never recognized but, with the arrival of the Taliban, the support
of the people of Afghanistan fell into our lap” [2]
.
However, when
Hekmatyar suffered losses in 1994, ISI looked elsewhere for a group to support,
all the while, keeping Pakistan’s interests in mind. When the Taliban reached
the Afghan-Pakistan border, the group seized Hekmatyar’s bastion: here was the
ISI’s new team. The ISI allowed the Taliban to take its depot of weapons and
ammunition to continue the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan [1]
.
As the Taliban
conquered cities in Afghanistan in 1995 and 1996, albeit suffering defeats
along the way, Afghanistan’s President at the time, Burhanuddin Rabbani, gained
regional support against the Taliban. Neighboring countries did not want to
live with a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan next door. In reaction to the regional
support of Rabbani, Pakistan bolstered its support of the Taliban. Pakistan’s
Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto “even tried to convince the U.S., which had an
interest in curbing Iran, to support the Taliban”, but with no success [1]
. Meanwhile, Pakistan continued to send Pakistani men with weapons to fight
alongside Taliban rebels. Additionally:
“Pakistan provided
diplomatic support, organized training for Taliban fighters, some of whom it
had itself recruited, planned and commanded offensives, delivered ammunition
and fuel and on several occasions apparently got directly involved in combat
support. Undoubtedly, the Pakistani army and intelligence agencies, with the
ISI at the forefront, made a vital contribution to the Taliban becoming a
highly effective military force. The covert support of the Taliban by the ISI
came from the corps headquarters in Peshawar. To give an example: a contact
person deemed trustworthy by the U.S. consulate in Peshawar in October 1996
reported the border crossing from Pakistan into Afghanistan of an ISI convoy,
consisting of 30 - 35 ISI trucks and 15 - 20 fuel trucks, at Torkham. The ISI
itself in late 1996 estimated the total Pakistani aid to the Taliban to be as
high as 20 million rupees. A number that may well be set too low. Two years
later, a Pakistani source of the U.S. State Department put the support of the
Pakistani government for the Taliban at about a million dollars every few
months” [1] .
Even following
Pakistan’s change in President in 1999, when Pervez Musharraf led a coup
d’état, the Taliban still thrived with the backing of the Pakistani government
and the ISI. But after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 in the
United States, and a U.S. occupation of Afghanistan to drive out the Taliban,
the Pakistani government suddenly switched sides and appeared to be a U.S.
ally. On the surface, Pakistan’s ISI pledged to fight the Taliban alongside the
U.S. troops, but in reality, the agency continued to send weapons and fuel to
the Taliban in Afghanistan. In this conflict, the U.S. was confronting not just
Mullah Omar’s Taliban, but also Hek- matyar’s Hezb-e-Islami and the Haqqani
network. The U.S. accomplished ousting the groups for a short time;
subsequently, Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani received sanctuary in Pakistan
and were able to restore their groups.
The
resignation of President Musharraf in August 2008 added to the uncertainty that
Pakistani citizens face with regard to judicial fairness, and guarantees of
personal and societal protection by the military or civilian police authorities.
The assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in December of 2007
still contributes to the unrest and suspicions of the Pakistani people. It is
widely suspected that Baitullah Mehsud, killed by a U.S. drone strike in 2009 [3]
, a religious extremist orchestrated her murder. Suspicions of collusion in her
murder by ISI security forces, and government cover-ups are nevertheless
ongoing at the time of this writing. The same forces are also thought to have
planted the bombs, which killed over 130 people when Mrs. Bhutto returned to
Pakistan in October 2007. Recently in August 2013, Pervez Musharraf was
indicted on charges of murder, conspiracy to murder, and the facilitation of
murder in relation to the death of Benazir Bhutto [4]
.
Despite or
perhaps due to Pakistan’s alignment with the West in the war on terror, Western
nations have little or no impact on social behavior in Pakistan. Pakistani
society and Muslim societies in general, have been swept by anti-Western
sentiments after the September 2001 attacks in the U.S. Examples of this
atmosphere in Pakistan include the beheading of American Journalist Daniel
Pearl, the numerous assassination attempts against former President Musharraf
(because of his perceived ties with the U.S.), and the strict implementation by
the government of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws. Anger towards the West has been
further fueled by developments along Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan.
Beginning in
June 2008, 11 Pakistanis were killed by U.S. airstrikes as they were caught in
a firefight between Coalition Forces and Taliban fighters. In response, the Pakistani
government publically condemned the U.S. military, and according to the New
York Times, “Local tribesmen with rocket launchers and Kalashnikov rifles
gathered Wednesday near the checkpoint that was reportedly attacked by the
airstrikes to show their outrage after the attack” [5]
.
Amid these
examples of extreme violence occurring throughout Pakistan, tensions continue
to mount as the U.S. has been embarking on raids inside Pakistan. Since August
2008, there have been over 100 American strikes in Pakistan, most notably on
November 1, 2008 when missiles fired by a remotely piloted American aircraft
hit two villages near the Afghan border, killing 27 people. According to the
Associated Press, “[t]he attacks have angered many Pakistanis and put strains
on a seven-year alliance between the United States and Pakistan, where rising
violence is exacerbating economic problems and threatening the country’s
stability” [6] . U.S. attacks, largely carried out by drone aircraft,
continued into 2009 and 2010.
Furthermore,
the killing of Osama bin Laden within Pakistani territory has only strained the
already weak alliance between the United States and Pakistan. In May 2011, the
Pakistani Parliament passed a formal resolution describing the U.S. operation
in Abbottabad (which killed bin Laden) as violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty,
and called for a review of Pakistan’s relationship with the United States [7]
. A few months later, on November 26, 2011, a U.S. led NATO attack resulted in
the deaths of 24 Pakistanis along the Afghan border [8]
.
Reports over
the past few years claiming that the Pakistani government is making progress
against Taliban strongholds can be very misleading. By no means should they be
taken to mean that the threat posed by the Taliban has significantly subsided.
While military forces have moved into volatile regions (particularly the Swat
Valley) and have allowed the return of a small number of refugees, the
government cannot actually guarantee stability in the region, as demonstrated
by the fact that the Taliban has invaded and occupied the Swat Valley twice
since 2007.
Moreover, it
is clear the Pakistani police and military continue to lack effective control
over the Taliban despite claims they have achieved victory in parts of the
country. According to the U.S. State Department’s Human Rights Report published
in 2014, “Police often failed to protect members of religious minorities,
including Christians, Ahmadiyya Muslims, and Shia Muslims, from attacks” [9]
. Recent years have only shown that the Taliban has continued to strengthen its
forces in spite of claims to the contrary by its opponents. Particularly
concerning the Swat Valley, the past few years have proven to be nothing more
than a “seesaw” of power between the Pakistani government and Taliban forces
resulting in instability and a crumbling infrastructure in the Valley. It is a
scenario in which the Taliban thrives.
Over the past
several years alone, socio-political conditions in Pakistan have deteriorated
to the point that it is a nation in crisis. The government is in turmoil, which
has opened wider the doors for other Islamist extremists and terrorists to
violently impose their will on Pakistani society. In Pakistan today, religious
minorities and apostates are officially discriminated against and persecuted by
the government by way of its laws that restrict religious freedom and generally
so by Pakistan’s majority Sunni Muslim society. The religious tenets of
fundamentalist Islam give support to the powerful socio-political positions of
imams in Pakistan and to Pakistan’s various tribes to make and impose their
decisions according to their strict interpretations of Islamic law. They are
overtly and covertly supported by elements in the military and the ISI, who
support the harsh punishment of accused apostates, blasphemers, Muslim
“deviants” and individuals perceived to be spies for Western powers, especially
the United States.
The United
States government has declared Pakistan an ally in the fight against terrorism
in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but many U.S. officials have openly stated that
Pakistan’s ISI has a relationship with the Taliban. Although the U.S. is
fighting an idea, terror, rather than a sole entity, officials contend that
discounting the ISI and Taliban relationship hinders progress. This is
especially true as the U.S. downplays the role of the ISI in the growth of the
Taliban, providing billions of dollars in aid and military support to Pakistan
over the years. Nonetheless, Pakistan is not the only player in its double-game.
The U.S. also states one thing, and acts out another. The U.S. deems Pakistan
an ally, but has killed innocent civilians with drones in Pakistan. If Pakistan
were sending drones to kill militants and the aftermath included destroyed U.S.
property and U.S. civilian casualties, Pakistan would never be considered an
ally of the U.S. Pakistan would be an enemy. When Robin Lustig, a journalist
for the BBC Network, spoke with General Asad Durrani, a former Director General
of the ISI, Durrani echoed this actuality:
“Pakistan
should be supporting the anti-US opposition in Afghanistan, he said. If the US
insists on launching drone strikes against targets in Pakistan, sometimes
killing innocent Pakistani civilians, then the US and Pakistan are in a state
of what he called ‘low-intensity conflict’” [10]
.
And veteran
intelligence analyst Bruce Riedel maintains that if the U.S. were to stop the
drone program:
“Al-Qaeda will
regenerate rapidly in Pakistan. Its allies like the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba
will help it to rebuild. The ISI will either turn a blind eye or, worse, a
helping hand” [11] .
For the
Pakistani public eye, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has criticized the drone
program and railed against U.S. drone strikes as an affront to Pakistani
sovereignty while advocating for talks with the TTP. Yet, the International
Crisis Group notes, “Ample evidence exists of tacit Pakistani consent and
active cooperation with the drone program”. Pakistan’s leadership seeks greater
say over targeting, the ICG says, “often to punish enemies, but sometimes,
allegedly, to protect militants with whom the security services have
cooperative relations—in- cluding elements of the Haqqani Network and Taliban”
[11]
.
Both the U.S.
and Pakistan appear to be playing one another at a time when there is no room
for games. The Taliban continues to orchestrate and execute attacks in
Afghanistan and Pakistan and U.S. forces are placed in danger whilst Pakistan
is supporting the enemy. The Haqqani network, a semiautonomous group allied with
the Afghan Taliban and acting as mediator for the Pakistani Taliban, “presents
the greatest threat to security forces”, General Joseph Dunford, the commander
of the U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, stated on March 14, 2014 [12]
. The U.S. declared the Haqqani network a Foreign Terrorist Organization only
one and a half years ago. And one year prior to that designation, in September
2011, the former US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, warned of the
Haqqani network, assuredly insisting that the Haqqanis act as a “veritable arm”
of the Pakistani military intelligence agency, the ISI” [10]
. Pakistan is likely supporting the Haqqani network to create leverage against
India and Afghanistan.
Admiral Mike
Mullen is not alone in his view of the ISI. Officials in the British government
have also made assertions that the ISI has ties with the Taliban. Specifically,
British officials have blamed the ISI for bombings in their country:
In fall 2006,
a leaked report by a British Defense Ministry think tank charged, “Indirectly
Pakistan (through the ISI) has been supporting terrorism and extremism whether
in London on 7/7 [the July 2005 attacks on London’s transit system], or in
Afghanistan, or Iraq” [13]
.
Moreover, a
BBC article reported that a London School of Economics paper revealed that
Taliban field commanders suggested that ISI intelligence agents even attend
Taliban supreme council meetings—and that support for the militants was
“official ISI policy” [14]
.
While such a
claim cannot be confirmed as it is stated by Taliban field commanders, it is
not of benefit to the Taliban to falsely state that ISI agents have been
attending Taliban meetings. If for no other reason, the Taliban may be
revealing the ISI’s commitment to the Taliban to demonstrate that the militants
are receiving support from a government agency, legitimizing their purpose. In
addition to the British Defense Ministry think tank, current British Prime
Minister, David Cameron, has also publicized his concern of ISI’s ties with the
Taliban, “He accused the country of ‘looking both ways’ when it came to
fighting terrorism and suggested that elements in Pakistan were guilty of
promoting the “export of terror” [14]
.
Like some U.S.
and British officials, the Afghan government is not in the dark when it comes
to the reality of ISI and Taliban cooperation. Afghanistan and Pakistan have
had a relationship since Pakistan acquired independence in 1947. Two
governments have shared intelligence information and have attempted to confront
the Taliban together. However, Afghan officials are acknowledging that their
neighboring brother has been conspiring behind closed doors. According to
Bajoria and Kaplan, of the Council on Foreign Relations:
In June 2008,
Afghan officials accused Pakistan’s intelligence service of plotting a failed
assassination attempt on President Hamid Karzai; shortly thereafter, they
implied the ISI’s involvement in a July 2008 attack on the Indian embassy. Indian
officials also blamed the ISI for the bombing of the Indian embassy. Pakistani
officials have denied such a connection [13]
.
The Pakistani
government always incessantly denies any connection to the Taliban. Not
surprisingly so, it is in Pakistani’s interest to keep up the charade. If
Pakistan were to admit to maintaining ties with the Taliban, the U.S. would
cease to provide billions of dollars in aid to Pakistan. Pakistan’s game is in
plain sight, especially in Afghanistan. Omer Aziz, of The Diplomat, highlights
the game that Pakistan has been playing for years:
For four
decades, Pakistan’s spy-generals have played Afghanistan like a powerful chip
in a consequential game of poker. They know the important local militants, have
open channels to their favorite groups, and regularly play various groups
against the Western coalition. The twin justifications for the aggressive
intervention in Afghan affairs are India and American withdrawal. Since
Pakistan’s humiliating dissection at Indian and nascent Bangladeshi hands in
1971, Islamabad’s doctrine vis-à-vis Afghanistan has been known as strategic
depth. For the ISI, Afghanistan is to be a safety net should the delusional prediction
that India will invade a weaker Pakistan actually come true [15]
.
Pakistan fears
India, sometimes making decisions in a state of paranoia, and has been willing
to maintain relations with the Taliban to ensure the country has leverage in
the future. Maintaining ties with militants that are anti-U.S. and also against
the Afghan government may prove disastrous for Pakistan. In a state of turmoil,
Pakistan is fighting militants in its own cities. If the Pakistani government
allows the ISI to continue waging a false fight against the Taliban, the
country may lose support from the rest of the world. Keeping the Taliban as a
friend will ultimately create many enemies for Pakistan, placing an already
volatile nation on the edge of a cliff.
Publication Details:
Social
Networking
Vol.03 No.05(2014), Article ID:51104,9 pages
10.4236/sn.2014.35027
Vol.03 No.05(2014), Article ID:51104,9 pages
10.4236/sn.2014.35027
Networks,
Social Capital, and Social Liability: The Case of Pakistani ISI, the Taliban
and the War against Terrorism
Shaul M.
Gabbay
Josef Korbel
School of International Studies, University of Denver, Denver, CO, USA
Email: shaul.gabbay@du.edu
Copyright ©
2014 by author and Scientific Research Publishing Inc.
This work is
licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY).
Endnotes:
(1.) The
Pakistani Godfather: The Inter-Services Intelligence and the Afghan Taliban
1994-2010. Small Wars Journal.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-pakistani-godfather-the-inter-services-intelligence-and-the-afghan-taliban-1994-2010
(2) Rashid, A.
(2000) Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia. I.B.,
London.
(3)
Pakistanis Are Indicted in Benazir Bhutto’s Killing.
NYTimes.com.http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/06/world/asia/7-pakistanis-are-indicted-in-benazir-bhuttos-killing.html
(4)
Musharraf Accused of Benazir Bhutto Murder Case. Pakistan
Today.http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2013/08/20/news/national/musharraf-accused-of-benazir-bhutto-murder-case/
(5)
Pakistan Angry as Strike by U.S. Kills 11 Soldiers.
NYTimes.com.http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/12/world/asia/12pstan.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slon
(6) Missile
Attacks, Apparently by U.S., Kill 27 in Pakistan, Including Qaeda Operative.
NYTimes.com.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/01/world/asia/01drone.html?_r=1&scp=39&sq=Pakistan&st=nyt&oref=slogin
(7) BBC
News—Pakistan Profile-Timeline.http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/country_profiles/1156716.stm
(8) BBC
News—Pakistan Orders Nato and US Review after Deadly Border
Strike.http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-15905777
(9) Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013.http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper
(10)
BBC—World Tonight: US and Pakistan: Allies or
Enemies?http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/legacy/worldtonight/2011/09/us_and_pakistan_allies_or_enem.html
(11) Council on
Foreign Relations Backgrounder.
www.cfr.org/pakistan/pakistans-new-generation-terrorists/p15422
(12) Haqqani
Network a Threat to Afghan Election: US Commander. Pakistan. Dunya News.
http://dunyanews.tv/index.php/en/Pakistan/215253-Haqqani-network-a-threat-to-Afghan-election-US-co
(13) Kaplan , E.
(2011) Council on Foreign Relations.
www.cfr.org/pakistan/isi-terrorism-behind-accusations/p11644
(14.) BBC
News—Pakistan’s Shadowy Secret Service, the
ISI.http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-13272009
(15) Aziz, O.
(2014) The ISI’s Great Game in Afghanistan | The
Diplomat.http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/the-isis-great-game-in-afghanistan/
