The Middle East is today divided into four rival camps: Iran with her proxies and allies; the Salafi Jihadists, currently dominated by the so-called “Islamic State”; the Muslim Brotherhood movement in its various manifestations, including Hamas, supported by Qatar and by Erdogan's Turkey; and the “forces of stability”: all those who fear and resist the rise of the first three camps, with Israel an active and important player in this latter camp.
By Col. (res.) Dr. Eran Lerman
Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies
Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The Middle East is today
divided into four rival camps: Iran with her proxies and allies; the Salafi
Jihadists, currently dominated by the so-called “Islamic State”; the Muslim
Brotherhood movement in its various manifestations, including Hamas, supported
by Qatar and by Erdogan's Turkey; and the “forces of stability”: all those who
fear and resist the rise of the first three camps, with Israel an active and important
player in this latter camp.
The first few days of 2016 have already
provided fresh evidence of the changing dynamics of the regional balance of
power. The escalating tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran are the most
salient aspect of a larger drama now unfolding across a broad landscape – from
Yemen to Syria and from the Gulf to Libya.
The traditional tool of analysis of the
Realist school – "raison d'etat" – has largely been rendered
irrelevant by the collapse of states. Thus it is necessary to map the regional
struggles – which have brought about immense destruction, bloodshed,
deprivation, mass migration and foreign intervention – along the ideological
fault lines dividing the groups now seeking to dominate the region's future.
It is easy enough, when the Saudis execute a
Shi'a cleric and Iran erupts in sectarian anger, to simplify the current
upheaval in terms of the primordial confessional divide between Shiites and
Sunnis; the divide that has torn apart the world of Islam since the days of 'Ali
Ibn Abu Talib in the 7th century. And yet the present confrontation deserves a
more nuanced analysis; a perspective that avoids the tarring of all Muslims, or
of all Shi'a or Sunnis, with the same brush.
The rivalries being played out so violently
across the region reflect the imprint of modern ideological imperatives, albeit
interwoven with traditional themes: the revolutionary politics of 20th century
totalitarianism woven into, or rather, dressed up as, fundamental religious
positions. This distinction is useful not only in order to better understand
the emerging landscape but also to design coherent strategies to beat back and
ultimately defeat the totalitarian challenge.
Thus, it is possible to discern in the
"Middle East" as broadly defined – North Africa, the Levant, the Red
Sea basin, and the Gulf – not two confessional camps, but four ideological
camps.
[One might add a fifth, secular nationalist
socialist camps, which once dominated Arab politics; and a sixth camp:
the hopeful young liberals who played such a prominent role in launching
the political upheaval in the first place. But these are the forces of the past
and (perhaps) of the future, respectively. They are not in real contention for
power at present.
Of the forces who are in contention, three
camps or groups belong to the general category of Islamist totalitarians: Iran
with her proxies and allies; the Salafi Jihadists, currently dominated by the
so-called “Islamic State” (IS); and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) movement in its
various manifestations, including Hamas, supported by Qatar and by Erdogan's
Turkey. (Prime Minister Netanyahu has called these groups “branches of the same
poisonous tree”).
The fourth camp, loosely defined, brings
together all those who fear and resist the rise of the first three camps. We
can call these actors []the forces of stability, with Israel as an active and
important player in this camp.
What we are witnessing is a shift in the
complex balance of power among these four camps. They are essentially at war –
even if they do at times find it possible to cooperate across the ideological
divide, against what they come to see as even more dangerous enemies.
The sharp edge of the escalating
Iranian-Saudi confrontation reflects the fact that the Iranian camp on one
hand, and the forces of stability on the other, have by now come to see each
other as the predominant challenger, with IS and the MB relegated to a second
tier.
What happened? To begin with, the Ikhwani
(Muslim Brotherhood) camp went into sharp decline, diminishing their prospects
and curbing their ambitions. (Turkey had hoped that the AKP could become
the predominant political template for the rising MB tide). Sisi's grip on
power in Egypt seems firm, despite persistent economic problems, recurrent
terror attacks, and serious doubts as to the validity of the
recent parliamentary elections. The chances of an MB return to power seem slim.
Elsewhere, an-Nahdha in Tunisia has regained
the status of the largest party in parliament, when the governing coalition of
parties (Nidaa Tunis) fell apart. But at this point, they seem to have little
appetite to take power again.
Hamas, after the painful blows of 2014,
remains eager to avoid another test of wills in Gaza. The Jordanian front party
of the Ikhwan has split. The Syrian MB factions have been marginalized. Across
the Gulf, the written work of Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Mawlana Abu-A'la al-Mawdudi
and their likes is being taken off the shelves as subversive. The list could go
on and on. In short, since the summer of 2013, the fortunes of the MB has been
receding, casting doubts about the movement's usefulness as a “strong horse”
with which to ride to power.
The same cannot yet be said of IS, whose
spectacular acts of public brutality enhance their mystique and still draw to
them certain types of young people, excited by the prospect of a life of action
outside all Western (read: human) norms.
On the ground, IS has made gains in places
like Libya, and its forces still hold large swathes of Iraq and Syria. Its
momentum, however, has been checked.
The Russian intervention in Syria may not
have been quite as transformative as it is claimed to be, but it did increase
the Western drive to do more – as did the horrors in Paris. The fight against
IS is still far from being overwhelming; it needs to be far more focused and
purposive, operationally and strategically. But it is sufficient to ensure that
Baghdadi's “Caliphate” is being steadily eroded, and cannot ultimately compete
at the highest level of the struggle for power.
This seemed to leave the Iranian regime and
its wide network of proxies, allies and agents in a position to turn the years
of turmoil to its advantage. With the Russians now shouldering some of the
burden of saving the rump regime state in what is left of Syria from collapse,
the Iranian camp is free to resume the march for regional hegemony. This is
true even before international sanctions on Iran are lifted and funds begin to
flow to Tehran.
Consider these developments. An IRGC
commander has already boasted that the Guards already control four Arab
capitals – Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut and Sana'a – and two of the world's
maritime choke points, in the Straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab. To this
scary list could be added the network of subversives in the Eastern seaboard of
the Arabian peninsula – whose activities were at the core of the violent Saudi
reaction. On the Mediterranean, in addition to their grip on Lebanon through
Hizbullah, a fully-owned Iranian subsidiary, and their hold on Assad's remnant
of Syria, Iran also has a proxy in Gaza known as Palestinian Islamic Jihad
(PIJ), as well as a cooperative relationship with Hamas (although the latter
belongs to the MB camp).
The Obama Administration, which looks upon
the nuclear deal as a key strategic legacy, has been paying lip service (but
little more) to the need to counter Iranian regional ambitions. As the
international focus shifts to fighting IS, it is not surprising that the Saudis
and others in the region have the impression that Obama and other Western
leaders are willing to look at Iran as part of the solution, not the key part
of the problem. After all, Iranian-trained Shi'a militias were increasingly
significant in the battle against IS in Iraq, and Tehran has been willing to
sing from the same sheet of music as Washington when it comes to fighting
“terrorists.”
(This is, of course, a fairly surprising
assertion from the world's premier fount of state-sponsored terror, as the
authorities in Argentina, Bulgaria and India know all too well. Even more
surprising is the willingness of some in Washington to take these Iranian
protestations at face value.)
Perhaps more than any other factor, it is
this sense that the US can no longer be relied upon to stand effectively
alongside the forces of stability in the region which drives the new dynamics
in “the game of camps.”
Saudi Arabia has by now put together a broad,
Sunni-based coalition of forces committed to fighting terrorism. It is, in
effect, conducting a continuous and often brutal coalition warfare against the
Houthi uprising in Yemen (– which is seen in Riyadh as a Shi'a dagger aimed at
the two holy sites, Mecca and Medina, in the Hijaz, Saudi Arabia's Western
province and the cradle of Islam).
Enough inducements (and pressures) were
brought to bear on Bashir's regime in Sudan, ultimately translated into a
dramatic decision to defect form the Iranian camp directly over into the
Saudi-led ranks in Yemen The Sudanese have been joined several Arab states in
cutting off relations with their former patrons in Tehran.
Most significantly, Turkey – facing growing
friction with Russia over Syria and the need for a general review of her priorities,
given the extremely poor results of past policies – also has strongly indicated
an interest in closer association with the Saudis and their camp. In this
context, interestingly enough, Ankara has openly raised the proposition of
improving relations with Israel.
This new reality has thus become so distinct
so as to force Turkey and Qatar to consolidate their bilateral cooperation,
including unprecedented plans to station Turkish forces in Qatar, as well as to
reconsider their priorities in the regional game.
It would be premature, and at this stage
unwise, to speak of the emergence of a coherent and strong camp of stability,
acting in close cooperation. The Saudis seriously differ with Egypt over Syria,
and the Israeli relationship with Abbas’ regime in Ramallah, despite common
perspectives on the broader regional challenges, has suffered a severe
regression in recent months as the Palestinians latched on to a wave of terror
as a political tool. Turkey's shift has yet to mature, and Erdogan's intentions
(and his continued commitment to Hamas) still arouse suspicions in Jerusalem,
and in Cairo.
But given the potential rise of Iranian
power, alliances which until recently seemed unlikely may well become the
building blocks of new realities. This is exactly what already has happened in
the Eastern Mediterranean, where the interests of Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Greece
and Cyprus, as well as Italy and other European powers who are waking up to the
dangers of the present situation – now cohere.
About The Author:
Col. (res.) Dr. Eran Lerman is a senior
research associate at the BESA Center, He has Ph.D. London School of
Economics) Member of Faculty, Shalem Academic Center. Former deputy for foreign
policy and international affairs at the National Security Council in the
Israeli Prime Minister's Office. Held senior posts in IDF Military Intelligence
for over 20 years. Also served as Israel director of the American Jewish
Committee.
BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published
through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family. PDF
This article was originally published at
BESA Website, February 17, 2016
All rights reserved by Begin Sadat
Center for Strategic Studies, Israel
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