Israel has a strategic interest in, and long-standing commitment to, the safety, security, stability and prosperity of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In current times, the relationship is buttressed by a broad-ranging series of cooperative ventures in the strategic, security, diplomatic, economic and energy fields.
By Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror and Col. (res.) Dr. Eran Lerman
BESA Center
Perspective Papers No. 323
Image Attributed: U.S. Secretary
John Kerry speaks with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and King
Abdullah II of Jordan on November 13, 2014, in Amman, Jordan, before the three
began a trilateral meeting about ways to restore calm and deescalate tensions
in Jerusalem. [State Department photo/ Public Domain]
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY:
Israel has a strategic interest in, and long-standing commitment to,
the safety, security, stability and prosperity of the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan. In current times, the relationship is buttressed by a broad-ranging
series of cooperative ventures in the strategic, security, diplomatic, economic
and energy fields.
An important
common thread runs, if sometimes invisibly, through a number of apparently
unrelated policy decisions and actions made by Israel in recent years. All have
to do with Israel's strategic interest in, and long-standing commitment to, the
safety, security, stability and prosperity of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
Among the
decisions and actions that fall under this rubric are the understandings
reached as to the maintenance of the status quo in the Temple Mount/ Haram
al-Sharif compound; strategic advocacy on regional affairs with friends in
Washington (particularly on Capitol Hill) and elsewhere; the stance taken by
Israel towards the challenge posed by the so-called "Islamic State";
actions taken to prevent Iran and Hizbullah, directly or by proxy, from gaining
a steady hold in the Golan, particularly in its southern parts; and the
construction of a physical barrier along segments of Israel's border with
Jordan.
It also includes
economic policy matters such as the Netanyahu government’s often bitter
political struggle (against a rising tide of populist resistance) to ensure the
ability to export gas from Israel's offshore fields; maritime trade
arrangements with Turkey and new provisions for traffic at border crossings, as
well as Israel's over-flight policy; ongoing policy on water allocation to
Jordan, well beyond the requirements of the Israel-Jordan peace treaty; and a
move to implement the Red-Dead (Red Sea to Dead Sea) water carrier plan,
including a planned large desalinization plant in Aqaba (which would facilitate
mutual water supplies).
The stability
and prosperity of Jordan has been a central element of Israeli national
security policy for three generations of Israeli leaders – despite the wars of
1948 and 1967, and despite other times of tension.
In 1958, David
Ben-Gurion facilitated steps taken by the West to help the Kingdom resist the
pressures of Nasserist radicals. In 1970, Golda Meir – in close coordination
with the US – was willing to risk war in order to compel Soviet-backed Syrian
forces to reverse their invasion of Jordan. (This move was successful).
Similarly,
Yitzhak Shamir reached understandings with King Hussein during the Desert Storm
crisis of 1990-1991, despite Jordan's ambivalent position towards Iraq at the
time. The peace treaty of 1994, under Yitzhak Rabin's leadership, brought into
broad daylight what already had been an enduring relationship.
Today, Israeli
policy makers are better positioned than ever to translate this pillar of
national policy into practical and positive measures, as listed above.
Despite visible
signs of Jordan-Israel tensions during the troubled summer of 2015, new and
concrete understandings between the two countries recently have been reached at
the highest political level (with the US Secretary of State in the loop). This
includes an understanding to uphold the status quo on the Temple Mount/ Haram
al-Sharif Compound and to curb and reduce the impact of provocateurs. Despite
efforts by Palestinian Authority elements to subvert these arrangements,
Israeli-Jordanian cooperation has led to a reduction of tensions surrounding
the compound, even if Palestinian violence (and PA incitement) has yet to
abate.
This should come
as no surprise. A persistent and profound recognition of mutual interests (and
mutual enemies) has led both countries – regardless of who has been in power in
Israel at any given time – to seek strategic understandings and remove causes
of tension.
Moreover, this
has been translated over the years into a systemic commitment by Israel – and
by Israel's friends, in Washington (particularly in Congress) and in other
Western capitals – to advocate on behalf of Jordan's military capacity, social
stability and economic prosperity.
While the
Israel-Jordan QIZ (Qualified Industrial Zones) have became mostly irrelevant
since Jordan concluded her own free trade arrangement with the US, Israeli
assistance to Jordan in other forms – above all, helping Jordan cope in recent
years with the immense influx of Syrian refugees – remains crucial, and recent
allocations in the US budget reflect this understanding.
Significant
segments of Israeli society are aware of, and engaged in meeting, this
challenge. Several Israeli NGOs as well as youth movements are playing a role –
never overt, but still symbolically significant – in providing elementary
support for Syrian refugees in Jordan.
The remarkable
achievements of Jordan, despite severe limitations, in tending for the refugees
deserves global support, and Israel's own response serves to emphasize this
point. (Jordan is handling its more-than-one-million Syrian refugees far better
than European countries are handling their much smaller refugee influx!)
Amidst all this,
Jordan has been able to play a major role, both as a participant and as a host
country, in coalition efforts against the so-called "Islamic State"
(IS). The horrifying execution of the captured Jordanian pilot, Mu'az
al-Qasasbah – one of the most graphic demonstrations of IS disdain for the
common values of humanity – did not deter Jordan's king or people.
Israel, for
obvious reasons, plays no direct role in these ongoing efforts. Yet it is safe
to say that the benefits of cooperation under the Israel-Jordan peace treaty
make it possible for Jordan to make this vital contribution to the global
effort against IS.
However, the
"Caliphate" of the man who calls himself Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is not
the only common enemy. Iran's ambitions for revolutionary (and Shi'a) hegemony
encompass a directive by Supreme Leader Ali Khamene'i to turn the West Bank
into "the next Gaza", i.e., a terror camp, in active pursuit of
Israel's destruction.
For this to
happen, it is necessary first to infiltrate Jordan and turn her territory into
"the new Sinai", an open conduit (as has been the case until recent
Egyptian actions) for the supply of arms, explosives and munitions. It is thus
a mutual interest to do all that can be done to ensure that Iran and her
proxies gain no stable foothold on the Syrian side of the Golan.
High policy and
security cooperation need to be complemented by closer Israel-Jordan ties in
other fields. Over the last decade in particular, the benefits of the peace
treaty (the "Peace Dividend") have became more visible. The growing
needs of Jordanian society (and the swelling wave of refugees) require better
infrastructure, especially energy and water supply.
Water already is
supplied to Jordan by Israel well beyond the amounts stipulated by the Arava
Valley Peace Treaty. Once the February 2015 "Red-Dead" plan is fully
implemented, nearly 100 million cubic meteres (mcm) of water will be provided
from Israeli sources in the north – which is double the present amount, and a
significant part of Jordanian consumption. Half of this will be supplied in
return for water to Israel’s Eilat area which will come from a planned 65 to 80
mcm desalinization plant in Aqaba.
Indeed, a vision
of cooperation drove the leadership on both sides (– credit is due here to
outgoing Deputy Prime Minister Silvan Shalom) to finalize the plans to connect
the Red Sea with the Dead Sea by a saltwater carrier. (This also will help save
the receding Dead Sea). Part of the plan is the construction in southern Jordan
of a major desalinization plant, serving people on both sides of the border –
and by freeing-up water supplies in the north, enabling Israel to provide water
also for Palestinian needs.
By now, gas
supply is also within reach, with a small Israeli supply line already being
completed to the Jordanian Dead Sea Works; to be followed by a major line for
general consumption. Part of the fierce internal debate in Israel over the
"outline" for use of Israel’s offshore gas fields involved the
strongly-held position of the government in favor of exporting gas to
neighboring countries and peace partners, with Jordan at the top of the list.
There are
additional arrangements under discussion to enhance stability and prosperity in
Jordan. The conflict in Syria has made overland traffic from Jordan through
Syria to Turkey and Europe all but impossible. Jordan's trade and economic
growth has suffered tremendously. So Israel is investing in a large-scale trade
route from Turkey to Jordan (and points beyond) through the Israeli port of
Haifa.
While some
technical difficulties remain, the initiative to enable this route has overcome
various bureaucratic and operational barriers, in line with the realization
that this is a vital Jordanian interest (and despite serious tensions in
Israeli-Turkish relations). Similarly, provisions have been made for Royal
Jordanian and other airlines to use Israeli airspace, greatly simplifying
traffic to Amman.
It is against
this general background of cooperation and commitment that the decision by
Israel to build (in a modular manner) a fence, along segments of the border
with Jordan, should be read and interpreted. Israel is not turning its back on
its neighbor, nor is this an indication that Jordan is a danger of collapse.
Rather, it is another tool designed to enhance mutual security.
By severely
reducing the temptation to use Jordanian territory as a route of infiltration –
now that the direct route from Sinai has been all but hermetically closed –
this new barrier will actually help Jordan cope even more effectively with
African migrant workers, drug traffickers, and others who abuse the present
conditions. Israel’s experience along its relatively new barrier with Egypt
indicates that cooperation actually has been enhanced with the Egyptians,
rather than eroded, since the barrier construction.
Overall, it is
safe to say that Israeli-Jordanian relations, despite some points of friction
and the pressures of "anti-normalization" groups, will continue to
thrive, and the mutual interests will continue to be translated into practical
aspects of cooperation. Hopefully, over time – and certainly, if and when the
Palestinian position will once again make peace negotiations possible – this
strategic building block can find its proper place in a broader regional
security architecture.
About The Authors:
Maj. Gen. (res.)
Yaakov Amidror is the Anne and Greg Rosshandler Senior Fellow at the BESA
Center, and former National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister. He is also
a fellow at JINSA's Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy.
Col. (res.) Dr.
Eran Lerman is a senior research associate at the BESA Center, and former
deputy for foreign policy and international affairs at the National Security
Council.
BESA Center
Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg
Rosshandler Family. Download the PDF
This article was
originally published at BESA Website December 27, 2015
All rights reserved by
Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Israel
