Central Asia is a complex geopolitical region that has significant implications for global security. With a population of 66 million, it lies at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East and Asia, and has vast natural resources, many of which are only beginning to be explored. Historically, these advantages have placed it at the heart of tensions between some of the world’s most powerful states and contributed to an array of thorny trans-boundary security issues. This article introduces Central Asia’s geopolitical significance and explores current status of nuclear security in the region.
By Jacqueline Lopour
Central Asia
is a complex geopolitical region that has significant implications for global
security. With a population of 66 million, it lies at the crossroads of Europe,
the Middle East and Asia, and has vast natural resources, many of which are
only beginning to be explored. Historically, these advantages have placed it at
the heart of tensions between some of the world’s most powerful states and
contributed to an array of thorny trans-boundary security issues. The
governments of the Central Asian states have identified several main themes as
key security priorities: water security and trans-boundary water management;
energy security; terrorism; narco-trafficking; migration and human trafficking;
border management and nuclear security. This article introduces Central Asia’s
geopolitical significance and explores current status of nuclear security in the region.
Central Asia
has vast uranium resources and is a top supplier of uranium for nuclear energy.
Kazakhstan is the world’s leading uranium producer and as of 2013 provided 38
percent of the global supply (World Nuclear Association 2015a). Uzbekistan is
the seventh-largest supplier and is increasing production (World Nuclear
Association 2015c). Kyrgyzstan has signed agreements with foreign companies to
explore uranium reserves and Tajik officials claim the country has huge uranium
reserves, the size of which are classified as a state secret (Kassenova 2010;
Nuclear Threat Initiative 2014; World Nuclear Association 2015b). Kazakhstan
recently has moved beyond exporting raw material and built a plant to process
raw material into nuclear fuel pellets, an endeavour that promises even greater
economic return (Kassenova 2010; World Nuclear Association 2015a).
Additionally, the government of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy
Agency agreed in April 2015 to establish a low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel bank
in Kazakhstan, which would ensure that nuclear power plants have a steady
supply of LEU if the commercial market were somehow disrupted (World Nuclear
Association 2015a).
Map Attribute: Radioactive,
Chemical and Biological Hazards in Central Asia (2006),
Philippe Rekacewicz, UNEP/GRID-Arendal. www.grida.no
Historically,
Central Asia played a pivotal role in the Soviet Union’s nuclear ambitions, but
the region has since become one of the greatest success stories in nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation. The Soviets mined and milled significant
amounts of uranium ore across Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan inherited 1,410
nuclear warheads and repatriated all of them to Russia by 1995. Kazakhstan also
worked closely with the US government in the mid-1990s to remove half a ton of
highly enriched uranium from a poorly secured facility in a classified mission
dubbed “Project Sapphire” (Hoffman 2009).
There is
little to no risk that the Central Asian governments will attempt to
proliferate or militarize their nuclear programs, given the states’ strong
commitment to nonproliferation. All five Central Asian countries signed the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. In a rare show of regional unity, in 2006 the five
countries also signed the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-FreeZone (CANWFZ)
treaty, which prohibits developing, acquiring, testing or possessing nuclear
weapons. The CANWFZ treaty was ground-breaking in that it created a
denuclearized area in the middle of several powerful nuclear countries: Russia,
China, Pakistan and India. The CANWFZ treaty could serve as a model for future
efforts to increase regional cooperation, because the five Central Asian states
successfully navigated and resolved significant disagreements during the treaty
negotiations (Kassenova 2010).
Many of Central Asia’s nuclear waste sites lack sufficient security measures, however, raising the prospect of terrorists drawing from the region’s vast nuclear waste to obtain material for a “dirty bomb.” International security agencies and experts repeatedly have warned of ISIS and al-Qaeda’s interest in dirty bombs and efforts to use nuclear material in improvised explosive devices (Blake and Hope 2011; Withnall 2015). The late al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Ladin even advised the late Taliban leader Mullah Omar to look toward Central Asia for “nonconventional military industries” — a reference to nuclear expertise and resources (bin Ladin 2002).
In Central Asia, there are significant amounts
of uranium tailings or other nuclear waste stored in poorly secured sites or
abandoned mining facilities (see the above figure). The United Nations in 2012 warned
that there was nearly 55 million tons of radioactive waste in Tajikistan that
was stored in sites with inadequate security measures (Agence France Press
2012). Similarly, the Nuclear Threat Initiative in 2009 expressed concern that
many sites in the Kyrgyz Republic “have no security measures, allowing the general
population to scavenge for radioactive metals and other waste” (Humphrey and
Sevcik 2009). Additionally, the proximity of nuclear waste sites to densely
populated areas and the threat of natural disaster (such as earthquakes, floods
and landslides) pose significant environmental and health risks (ibid.). The
five Central Asian states are aware of these threats and take them seriously,
but most still lack the necessary resources needed to mitigate all risks and
ensure comprehensive nuclear safety and security programs (Kassenova 2010).
About The Author:
Jacqueline
Lopour is a research associate in CIGI’s Global Security & Politics
Program. At CIGI, her research interests include exploring major security
challenges in Central Asia. She also works on CIGI’s Fixing Climate Governance
project, which is designed to generate fresh ideas on how to more effectively
approach climate change negotiations. Prior to joining CIGI, Jacqueline spent
10 years as a political and leadership analyst at the Central Intelligence
Agency in Washington, DC. She provided numerous written and verbal briefings to
top United States government officials and participated in meetings with
various international leaders and government representatives. Her main areas of
focus were political developments in South Asia and the Middle East, and she
has lived in and travelled extensively throughout the region. Jacqueline holds
a B.A. with Honors in English Literature and History from the University of
California, Los Angeles.
Publication Details:
Copyright ©
2015 by the Centre for International Governance Innovation This an extract from
a a publication titled – “Geopolitics at the World’s Pivot – Exploring Central
Asia’s Security Challenges by Jacqueline Lopour” and opinions expressed in this
publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the Centre for International Governance Innovation or its Board of Directors. Download the CIGI PAPER, NO. 80 —
NOVEMBER 2015, - LINK
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