Cost is largely absent in the key debates around the use of unmanned drones in war, even though drones are a cost-effective way of achieving national security objectives.
By Wayne McLean
Cost is largely
absent in the key debates around the use of unmanned drones in war, even though
drones are a cost-effective way of achieving national security objectives.
Image Attribute: Soldier with Drone. Photo By: The Christian Science Monitor
Many of the common
objections to drones, such as their ambiguous
place in humanitarian law, become second-tier issues when the cost benefits
are laid out. For strategic military planners, cost efficiencies mean that
economic outputs can be more effectively translated into hard military power.
This means that good intentions concerned with restricting the use of drones
are likely to remain secondary.
This pattern of
cost-trumping-all has historical precedents. The cheap English longbow rendered
the expensive (but “honourable”) horse-and-knight combination redundant in the
14th century. Later, the simple and cost-effective design of the machine gun
changed centuries of European military doctrine in just a few years.
Drones are Cheap
These basic
principals are visible in the emergence of drones. For example, according to
the American Security Project, unclassified reports show that the MQ-9 Reaper
drone used for attacks in Pakistan has a single unit cost of US$6.48 million
and an operational cost of close to US$3 million.
This latter
figure is deceptive, however, as a full drone “system” requires a larger
infrastructure to operate. Therefore, a typical reaper drone in a group of four
on an active mission requires two active pilots, a ground station, and a
secured data link. However, even with this significant infrastructure
requirement the end cost is US$3250 per hour of flight time.
In contrast,
the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter – which the Australian government recently
announced it will buy 58 more of – costs nearly US$91 million per unit, almost
US$5 million per year to operate and $16,500 per hour of flight.
While drones
will never completely replace soldiers, this debate is becoming less important
in the current strategic climate. The operating environments where drones are
deployed – countries such as Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen – do not emphasise
“hearts and minds” strategies where the human element has traditionally been
valued as a force multiplier.
Instead,
objectives in these countries involve attacks on specific individuals, with
operational data obtained by signal intelligence beforehand. Human contact
becomes even less desirable given that a key tactic of combatants in these weak
states is attrition with the aim of creating low-level civil conflicts. The end
goal of these actions is to inflict high economic costs to the adversary.
As a result,
this remote and analytical method of engaging militarily leads to substantial
cost efficiencies.
Soldiers are Expensive
While military
budgets get smaller, the cost of the human soldier remains expensive. For
example, each US solider deployed in Afghanistan in 2012 cost the government
US$2.1 million.
These costs
are only part of the picture, though. Thanks to medical advances, soldiers are
now more likely to survive catastrophic battleground injuries than in the past.
For instance, during the Iraq and Afghan operations there were seven injuries
to each fatality compared to 2.3 in World War Two and 3.8 in World War One.
This
increasing likelihood of survival means a greater need for long-term support of
veterans. US operations in the Middle East over the past 13 years have resulted
in 1558 major limb amputations and 118,829 cases of post-traumatic stress
disorder. There have also been 287,911 episodes of traumatic brain injury,
often caused by a soldier’s close proximity to mortar attacks.
Soldiers are
now more likely to survive catastrophic battleground injuries than in the past.
US Air Force/Staff Sgt. Bennie J. Davis III
The most
serious of these injuries can incur more than 50 years of rehabilitation and
medical costs, with most victims in their early 20s. For example a typical
“polytrauma”, where a soldier has experienced multiple traumatic injuries, has
a calculated annual health care cost of US$136,000.
When
rehabilitative hardware such as bionic legs is added – which can cost up to
US$150,000 – the expeditures are considerable over a lifetime. These costs also
peak 30 years after conflict and therefore are rarely viewed in context of
current operations.
Less severe
and less obvious disabilities are even more frequent. Towards the end of 2012,
50% of US veterans from Iraq and Afghanistan (over 780,000), had filed
disability claims ranging from military sexual trauma to mesothelioma.
On top of this
there are further hidden social costs: veterans account for 20% of US suicides,
nearly 50,000 veterans are at risk of homelessness, and one in eight veterans
between 2006 and 2008 were referred to counsellors for alcohol abuse.
When these
costs are combined, future medical outlay for veterans of the Iraq and Afghan
missions are estimated to be US$836.1 billion. In this context, the benefits of
solider-less modes of operation to military planners are clear.
Clear Choice
From this, we
can see how the move towards drones is driven by cost. The US in particular is
aware of the danger of choosing “guns over butter”, the economic analogy where
there is always a trade-off between investment in defence and domestic
prosperity. The US used this to its advantage in the Cold War when the Soviet
leadership leaned too heavily towards “guns” by spending around 25% of its
budget on defence in the early 1980s. As a result, the domestic economy
collapsed and any defensive gains from increased spending were lost.
America’s
adversaries are also acquainted with this economic tactic. Osama bin Laden and
al-Qaeda’s broader strategy was not to inflict damage to the US for the sake of
damage itself. Rather, terrorism was part of a larger strategy of “bleeding
America to the point of bankruptcy”.
At the same
time, China has been careful not to engage the US in a game of defence
spending. It has been prudent in its expenditure, outlaying only 2.2% of its
GDP on defence compared to 4.4% for the US. It is also focusing on a steady,
rather than rapid collection of “traditional” defence tools, such as a blue
water navy. This is because China is emphasising modernisation using new
technology rather than the old metric of simple platform numbers.
From this
perspective, it seems US military planners have realised the perils of
overspending. Drones are viewed as the remedy. Whether this contributes to or
harms international stability is yet to be seen.
About The Author:
About The Author:
Wayne McLean is an
Associate Lecturer and doctoral candidate in the Politics and International
Relations Program at the University of Tasmania. His current research explores
the role of ‘pivotal’ middle powers in the international system using security
driven neo-classical realist frameworks. This research reveals congruence
across certain regional and international themes (such as balancing, hedging
and activist foreign policies).
His research
interests include foreign policy analysis of Australia, Turkey, Mexico and
Central Asia, alongside international relations theory, securitization
discourse and the revolution in military affairs.
These compliment
his current role as a lecturer on political issues including party politics,
electoral processes and campaign strategies in Tasmania, Australia and the US.
This article was originally published at The Conversation under Creative Commons License 3.0
