Afghanistan’s security situation remains precarious. The surprise takeover of the Kunduz city in North Afghanistan by the Taliban in late September 2015 marks the culminating point in a series of insurgent push backs following the drawdown of the coalition forces. The Taliban combat capability which was largely diminished to IED and suicide attacks following the 2009 US military surge, drove Afghan security forces out of the provincial center in a matter of hours.
By Kambaiz
Rafi
Afghanistan’s security situation remains precarious. The surprise takeover of the Kunduz city in North Afghanistan by the Taliban in late September 2015 [1] marks the culminating point in a series of insurgent push backs following the drawdown of the coalition forces. The Taliban combat capability which was largely diminished to IED [2] and suicide attacks following the 2009 US military surge [3], drove Afghan security forces out of the provincial center in a matter of hours. Kunduz city still remains gripped by firefights after the Afghan Army and police forces, aided by NATO air strikes, re-entered the city and are struggling to regain full control[4]. Coordinated insurgent attacks in Badakhshan, Takhar, Faryab and Baghlan provinces have also been reported, causing many to flee [5] their homes [6].
Image Attribute: Bamiyan Buddha Site in Afghanistan / Source: Wikimedia Commons
In recent
months the Taliban were grappling with divisions following the confirmation of
their elusive leader, Mullah Omar’s death in early August [7]. Omar died two
years ago in April 2013, an incident known only to his family and a close circle
of associates. Mullah Akhtar Mansour, officially second in command, was chosen
as leader of the Taliban following the news, an event that sparked fierce
disagreements from influential Taliban members, including Omar’s son Mullah
Yaqoub whose allegiance to Mansour was announced by the Taliban spokesperson
only in mid-September. The Al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri and the Pakistani
cleric Maulana Sami-ul Haq – dubbed the father of the Taliban – have also
thrown their support behind Mansour.
However, a recent statement [8] by
Mansour urging insubordinate Taliban members not to deny their cooperation,
indicates that the rift between him and some of his important opponents remains
unresolved. The so-called impartial council of religious elders that was tasked
to settle differences between Mansour and his opponents declared in late
September that its efforts have been unsuccessful.
Mansour swiftly appointed his
deputies from members of the Haqqani network which strengthens his position.
Nonetheless, it stirs another more deep-rooted confrontation with his
leadership. His first deputy, Mawlawi Haibatullah, a cleric known for issuing fatwas
in favor of terrorist activities, is an Ishaqzai like Mansour himself. This can
enrage rival tribes, among them the Alizai whose members have been in slugfest
with the Ishaqzais since the 1980s [9]. Former Taliban senior commander Abdul
Qayoum Zakir – a prominent challenger of Mansour’s authority – also belongs to
the Alizai tribe.
Moreover, the founders of the
Taliban movement, including Mullah Omar, have mostly belonged to the Ghilzai
confederation of Pashtun tribes. Mansour is not a Ghilzai and even among the
archrival Durani confederation of tribes, his Ishaqzai tribe is seen as a
marginal one. The rivalry [10] between the Ghilzai and Durani confederations
sometimes define the very Taliban insurgency, placing one against the other
with the latter having usually dominated the central government. Placed at the
top of a movement that Ghilzais have traditionally prided on leading, it
remains to be seen to what extent Mansour can resort to religious piety rather
than tribal affiliation to gain acceptance among the Taliban leadership.
So far Mansour has proven his knack
for leadership in overseeing the takeover of Kunduz, the single most important
achievement of the Taliban since their regime fell 14 years ago. The Kunduz
onslaught can also be seen as a desperate attempt by Mansour to reinvigorate a
movement that was on its way to disintegration. What the ISIS did to regroup
and revitalize Al-Qaida in Iraq by flooding into Northern Iraq under a new
banner, Mansour is trying to do in Northern Afghanistan although with much less
success.
Peace talks with the Afghan
authorities have been pushed to the margins at the moment. ISIS involvement in
Afghanistan[11]–officially announced in early January 2015 – and the leadership
struggle in the Taliban movement with risks of further fragmentation, makes the
Taliban wary of losing its support base among extremist elements if they talk
peace.
ISIS in Afghanistan cannot be seen
as a potential threat on par with the far extensive Taliban insurgency, despite
the recent UN report indicating recruitment by the group in 25 out of 34
provinces of the country [12]. The group remains largely confined to the
eastern province of Ningarhar where, for the first time, it conducted a series
of largely unsuccessful attacks on several security checkpoints in the same
week of the Kunduz takeover by the Taliban [13]. However, the mere presence of
ISIS adds a new dimension to the overall Afghan insurgency. The vicious
hostility shown by the ISIS in eastern Afghanistan has become a cause for worry
to none other than the Taliban itself.
The Taliban leadership went far
enough as to write a letter to Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi in June 2015, urging him to
avoid meddling in Afghanistan. The plea was not heeded by Al-Baghdadi, as is
seen by the escalation of violence between the Taliban and the ISIS affiliated
militants in Ningarhar. In one show of defiance, ten Taliban members accused of
apostasy by the ISIS were placed on explosives and blown up while the incident
was being filmed in the typical ISIS style of brandishing its brutality.
Agreeing to a political settlement
would also raise the dilemma of preserving Taliban’s Jihadi cause. Though less
pronounced as of late, the Taliban rank and file have always had the ambition
of creating a Jihadi caliphate and revere their supreme leader accordingly.
They called Mullah Omar Emir al-Mominin (Arabic for ‘leader of the faithful’)
and now call Mansour the same. Opting for peace talks might drive away many
seasoned zealots who justify their Jihad based on this notion and are vital for
the group’s survival at the moment.
Though Mansour initially endorsed
the first round of Pakistan brokered peace talks with an Afghan government
delegation for the first time in early July 2015, he quickly sidetracked once
rumors of Mullah Omar’s death started circulating. As a leader, his message was
to first disown ever having sanctioned the talks and secondly, asking his
militants to fight on [14].
He might return to talks in the
future if changing dynamics on the battlefield compel him to look for political
alternatives rather than managing an endless insurgency–something that he has
already implied in his first message as leader when he points out that “the
doors for indirect meetings with the enemy in regards to independence of Afghanistan
… still are open”. If that is what he is aiming for, the recent wave of attacks
in the north can be understood as his strategy to both assert his leadership of
the Taliban and, if he resumes talks with the government, walk to the table
with a heftier bag of achievements.
Meanwhile, pressures on Mansour from
influential opponents of peace talks among the Taliban cannot be ruled out. In
a meeting [15] of Taliban members in Islamabad this year, Mansour has
reportedly favored direct talks with the Afghan government but has seen
opposition from Abdul Qayum Zakir who supports continued militancy. Zakir was
initially believed to replace the Pakistan detained Taliban No. 2, Mullah Abdul
Ghani Beradar, a position that eventually Mansour usurped in a power struggle.
Zakir was also the main challenger to Mansour’s dictates during the long
absence of Omar — who was revealed to be dead — more recently defying Mansour’s
statement of April 2014 that dismissed Zakir as the senior Taliban battlefield
commander. Zakir started demanding evidence regarding whether Omar himself has
ordered his dismissal, giving rise to speculations regarding the misuse of his
authority by Mansour. Zakir has many thousands of loyal militants in eastern
Afghanistan and after the announcement of Mullah Omar’ death, reports of his
disagreement with Mansour's appointment as leader surfaced. A statement [16] on
the Taliban website shortly after denied Zakir’s disagreement with Mansour’s
leadership, but any certainty on this issue is yet to be brought to light. It
is also possible that in return for Zakir’s much needed loyalty, Mansour has
turned away from peace talks, at least till the time when Zakir can be pushed
aside completely.
Another important Taliban commander
in Helmand province, Mansour Dadullah [17] has officially parted ways with the
group and has openly accused Mansour of orchestrating [18] Mullah Omar’s death,
also condemning him for becoming a Pakistani stooge.
Two scenarios can emerge out of the
recent events pertaining to the Taliban movement. Either Mullah Mansour asserts
himself as the supreme leader of the Taliban after decisive victories on the
battlefield, bringing provincial centers under his control and maintaining them
through fierce resistance against the ANSF. The Taliban offensive in Kunduz is
the defining moment whether this scenario will ever be realized. So far, the
offensives in all the northern provinces, including Kunduz have been repelled
by the ANSF while being backed by local population and NATO air support, although
reports from the field do not offer clarity as to who will deal the final blow.
The second scenario also begins with
Kunduz and stretches over northern Afghanistan where the Taliban have put their
focus for their Summer offensive. Following the drawdown of the coalition
forces and the political squabbles among the leaders of the Afghan Unity
Government, this year was a good opportunity for the Taliban to make use of a
weakened Afghan State. In case of failure, the Taliban’s Mullah Mansour will,
with Pakistan’s [19] blessing, have to re-evaluate his belligerent approach.
For Mansour, the currently (still limited) success in Kunduz provides him with
a sudden rise in popularity which he can use to subdue his opponents within the
Taliban. This may not be so if and when the ANSF deals the Taliban a few
defeats and the Kabul government manages to ratchet up its security apparatus.
The first scenario is already
stopping short in its tracks. What is more likely to follow from the second
scenario is that Mansour’s leadership will be brought under further
questioning, increasing doubts regarding him in the ranks of the Taliban. He is
already accused of duping other Taliban members, allegedly in close cooperation
with the Pakistani intelligence agency, the ISI, by misusing Mullah Omar’s
authority for two years. His likely move toward peace will further discredit
him and lead to deeper fragmentations around the figures opposing talks, giving
the ISIS and other Taliban splinters groups a chance to swell their ranks with
new recruits.
About
the Author:
Kambaiz Rafi is a political economy analyst and researcher, writing on issues ranging from political Islam to Human Rights
and counter-terrorism strategies. He has a Master of International Political
Economy from King’s College London.
End Notes
[1] For a
detailed report, follow the link: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/29/world/asia/taliban-fighters-enter-city-of-kunduz-in-northern-afghanistan.html?_r=0
[2] IED =
Improvised Explosive Device.
[3] For a
detailed report, refer to the Operation Enduring Freedom casualties
chart on the following link: http://icasualties.org/oef/ .
[4] According
to recent media reports, the Taliban have claimed recapture of large parts of
the city from ANSF’s control. Read more: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/10/taliban-claims-recapture-afghan-city-kunduz-151004132211450.html .
[5] According
to a report by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA), close to 20,000 families have been reportedly displaced in Kunduz,
Badakhshan, Faryab, Baghlan and Badghis provinces by June 2, 2015.
[6]
Preliminary information from Kunduz published on UN Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan (UNAMA) website on 30th September, 2015, indicate that 100
civilians have reportedly been killed during the current fighting in Kunduz
while 6,000 have fled the city. Exact casualty numbers remain unknown due to
ongoing combat operations.
[7] Read more: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/afghan-sources-taliban-leader-mullah-omar-dead-150729092917870.html .
[8] The
statement can be accessed through the following link: http://www.shahamat-farsi.com/?p=11921 .
[9] Read more: http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/PDF-TAC/Ishaqzai.pdf .
[11] Hereby
referred to as the ISIS.
[13] Read
more: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/as-taliban-take-key-city-kunduz-isis-attacks-afghan-troops-in-achin-district-nangarhar-province/ .
[14] Read
more: http://www.dw.com/en/new-taliban-chief-mullah-akhtar-mansoor-vows-to-fight-on/a-18621756 .
[15] Read
more: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/12/us-afghanistan-taliban-talks-idUSKBN0M81A720150312 .
[16] Read
more: http://shahamat-english.com/letter-of-clarification-by-the-respected-mullah-abdul-qayyum-zakir-a-member-of-leadership-council-of-islamic-emirate-of-afghanistan/ .
[17] Mansour
Dadullah is a brother to the Taliban senior military commander Mullah Dadullah
who was killed by the British and American Special forces in 2007 (read more: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dadullah)
.
[18] Read
more: http://www.bbc.com/pashto/multimedia/2015/08/150804_gn_mansoor_dadullah .
[19] For a
detailed account of Pakistan’s involvement with the Taliban, refer to the
following report: http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/download/dp/dp18%20incl%20Dari.pdf .
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Publication Details:
This Policy Brief was first originally published at Perspective on Terrorism Website
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