Taking into account the high level of political tensions and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh, one must also be aware about potential impacts on the polarisation of state and society and how far international acting terror groups like Islamic State can instrumentalize the on-going struggle over war crime justice.
By Dr. Siegfried O. Wolf
Introduction
After Bangladesh's
Supreme Court rejected final appeals against death sentences on November
22, two oppositional figures got hanged. Ali
Ahsan Mohammad Mujahid and Salahuddin Quader Chowdhury were accused for atrocities
committed during the 1971 war of independence. Mr. Mujahid (age 67) was
secretary general and official
number two of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) party and served as Member of
Parliament as well as social welfare minister in the BNP-led government from
2001-2006. He was found
guilty in July 2013 on five charges including torture and the murders of
intellectuals and minority Hindus. Mujahid was a leader of religious
radicalized students in 1971 (Islami Chhatra Sangha, the student wing of JeI)
which supported the unity of Pakistan and commanded Al Badr, an
auxiliary force of the Pakistani army, during Bangladesh’s war of independence.
While Salahuddin Quader Chowdhury
(Age 66), also known as
Saqa, was one of the most senior
figures in the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) who served six terms as
legislator. He was a very close aide of current BNP leader and former Prime
Minister Khaleda Zia's (BNP). Chowdhury was convicted
in October 2013 for nine out of 23 charges including genocide, arson and
persecuting of people on religious and political grounds, abduction and torture
during the war. He and
his father (Fazlul Quader Chowdhury), Speaker of the National Assembly of
undivided Pakistan in 1965, rejected vigorously the break-up of Bangladesh from
Pakistan.
In order to maintain public safety
and law and order, the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) tightened
security by deploying extra forces in Dhaka and other parts of the country.
Similar
judgments in the past triggered large scale street accompanied with massive
violence that left
around 200 dead, mainly organised by Jamaat and BNP activists. Until today,
a total of 18
people have been convicted, but only two had been sent to the gallows
before the hanging of Muhajid and Chowdhury. Two
Jamaat leaders got executed before, Muhammad
Kamaruzzaman in April 2015 and Abdul Kader Mullah in
December 2013. Actually Mr. Muhajid is the first former minister while
Chowdhury is the first BNP leader in the country’s troubled history who had to
face capital punishment. The enforcement of the death sentences evoked not only
domestic but also international criticism questioning the fairness of the
trials.
Furthermore, taking into account the
high level of political tensions and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in
Bangladesh, one must also be aware about potential impacts on the polarisation
of state and society and how far international acting terror groups like
Islamic State can instrumentalize the on-going struggle over war crime justice.
It will be argued that it is crucial for Bangladesh to end the culture of
impunity and to bring the 1971 war criminals finally to justice. Otherwise, the
South Asian country will experience never peace and stability but the further grow of
Islamic fundamentalism and related militancy.
Bangladesh’s Troubled Political
History
Political development and
democratization in Bangladesh have been largely determined by the way in which
the country came into existence- a result of two traumatic events. The first
one was the partition of British India in 1947 as a consequence of the transfer
of power from the colonial ruler to the newly created states of India and
Pakistan, as the latter was caused by the geographical separation of Western and Eastern part. The second one was
the War of Liberation, in which East-Pakistan successfully
fought against the West Pakistani armed forces for secession. Soon after
independence, Bangladesh underwent a variety of regime changes, from a multi-party
democracy to a one-party system (BAKSAL/Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami
League). The growing
authoritarianism evolved into a praetorian polity with periods of direct
and indirect military rule and then reverted several times to a democratic form
of government. At last, after the downfall of General Hussain Muhammad Ershad
in 1990 and the subsequent 1991 elections, Bangladesh transformed from the primarily
authoritarian presidential system back to its original democratic parliamentary
system.
In this context, one can state that
the years 1990 and 1991, which saw one of the largest political movements since
Bangladesh’s independence, are essential elements of the most significant
political event in the country’s history. It initiated a process of democratic
stabilization and consolidation that is still continuing today. However, this
transition process has been challenged by various political and socioeconomic
factors and historical
legacies on several occasions. Of which, the most notable is the deeply
entrenched political polarization of state and society. Throughout the country’s
history, polarisation has hampered political institution building, which in
turn, hindered the democratization process. This raises the challenging
question of how such tremendous antagonism and hostility could have developed
in a society that is generally known for its high degree of ethnic, cultural
and religious homogeneity, and which shares a collective memory of
socioeconomic and political suppression, genocide, war atrocities and other
related crimes. The Bangladesh Liberation War created a socio-political
cleavage within the Bengali society. Wherein, rather than bringing the Bengali
people together, the societal divide was only reinforced after the end of the
war.
The process of post-war factionalism finds its first
and most momentous expression in the conflict between the ‘Freedom Fighters’ and
the ‘Returnees’; a confrontation between those who were directly involved in
combating the Pakistan Armed Forces and those who remained in West-Pakistan for
whatever reason and returned to the East after Bangladesh’s successful
secession. The deep conflict between these two groups derived from the fact
that the freedom fighters received more favourable socio-economic treatments,
benefits and privileges from the newly established independent government
because of their active participation in the war. This confrontation peaked
with the state’s portrayal of the freedom fighters as ‘war heroes’ and the
returnees as ‘collaborators’. This is an equation which not only casted a dark
shadow over the build-up
of the Bangladesh Armed Forces but also created disturbances within the
country’s bureaucracy and other political institutions, in which returnees and
freedom fighters struggled for influence and control over resources.
This internal conflict still
persists and gets reflected in an unrestricted struggle between the two leading
political parties, Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh National Party (BNP),-splitting
the country in two antagonistic camps. Keeping this in mind, it is important to
note that this schism was further enforced by the culture of impunity, the lack
of justice for victims of the liberation war, and the rise of Islamic
fundamentalism. Therefore, in order to adequately understand today’s political
polarization and the significance of the war trials one needs to realize that
the existing seed of disharmony is a result of the British colonial rule and
the West-Pakistani government, its security forces and East-Pakistani
collaborators.
The War Trials and Fairness of
Justice
Being set-up in 2009, the International Crime Tribunals (ICTs) which are currently
being conducted in Bangladesh, are attempts to expose genocide, preserve human
rights and guarantee justice for the victims of the Bangladesh War of
Liberation. These tribunals were established for the express
purpose of exposing and prosecuting those who organised the systematic
killing and rape of millions of Bangladeshis during the 1971 War of Liberation.
In this context, the ICTs
investigate and prosecute suspects for the genocide and crimes against humanity
committed in 1971 by the Pakistani Army and their local collaborators,
Razakars, Al-Badr and Al-Shams. Latter groups functioned as auxiliary forces which helped the Pakistani
military to identify and kill pro-independence Bengali activists and religious
minorities, especially Hindus.
Under the leadership of Salahuddin Quader Chowdhury, Al-Badr was also accused
of forcefully converting
a number of Hindus to Islam. Some human rights organisations as well as the
opposition BNP and Islamist parties question the fairness of the trials.
Here the critics of
the trials using following arguments posit: (1) the aim of the Court is
political, since those who stand accused are members of the political
opposition. As such, the trials and subsequent executions are portrayed as ‘political
motivated killings’; (2) the number of victims, the motivations for the
genocide, the nature of the conflict, although previously well established and
overwhelmingly accepted by the international community, are being portrayed as
major sources of controversy. In other word, to split the country and to
discredit the opposition in general and Islamist parties in particular; (3) the
number of years passed does not justify the continuation of the procedures; and
(4) the fact that Bangladesh still uses capital punishment discredits the
process in its entirety. Although the trials are being discredited by the BNP
and Jamaat internally, as well as externally, the procedures have been
supported by many high profile international observers and stakeholders,
even when they make punctual criticisms. One can state that the foundation of
these proceedings
is sound and stable and they should continue until justice is served for
the people of Bangladesh.
War Trials and the Political
Polarization of Bangladesh
The executions on last Sunday
sparked different reaction. Awami League supported the death sentences by
celebrating street parties. In contrast, the opposition spearheaded by BNP and
JeI activists called for a nationwide general strike. This phenomenon does not
come by surprise if one recalls that already the formation of ICTs created strong
reaction among
the opposition camp and international community. The second largest party in
the opposition camp, JeI is directly linked with war crimes during the
Liberation War in 1971. Top leaders of JeI have been charged with war crimes
over the past four decades. The triggering incident was the verdict against a
central leader of JeI, Maulana
Delwar Hossain Sayedee.
Following the verdict in February
2013, the Party unleashed
massive violence throughout the country especially in their strongholds – mainly
border districts. In this context it is interesting to note, although street
violence might indicate a strong opposition to the ICT trials, the opposite is
the case. An opinion
poll from April 2013 conducted by the Nielsen
Corporation shows that 86 per cent of Bangladeshis are in favour of the trials
and want them to proceed. In addition, annual polls indicate that the genocide
trials rank among the top three positive steps that the government has taken.
Furthermore, the proceedings of the trials have reinforced civil resistance
against perpetrators of crimes committed against humanity.
On February 5, 2013, the so called Shahbag
protest movement was born to demand justice, often led and organised by neglected
sections of society such as women and minorities. In sum, one can argue that
the latest execution will not
further polarize the country but it will entrench the existing cleavages
and getting instrumentalized by the BNP opposition and Islamic fundamentalists
to undermine the current government, democratic consolidation, and the
liberal-secular foundation of Bangladesh.
Increasing Leverage if International
Jihadist Organizations
The political
polarization in Bangladesh goes hand in hand with the systematic, persistent
Islamisation of the country. The breeding ground for this process was
prepared by the country’s military rulers, General Ziaur Rahman (1975-1981) and
General H.M. Ershad (1982-1990). During both autocratic governments, far
reaching constitutional amendments were introduced which undermined the
institutional bulwark, i.e. the principles of secularism and democracy, against
a potential Islamist takeover. More concretely, Ziaur and Ershad diluted the
secular principles in the constitution in order to gain legitimacy by playing
the religious card. They were undoubtedly inspired by their Pakistani peer,
General Zia-ul Haq (1977-1988), under whose dictatorial regime Pakistan
descended into a marsh of Islamic fundamentalism.
By anchoring Islam
in the constitution and putting religion at the centre of the political discourse,
Bangladesh was effectively transformed into an Islamic state. As a result,
Islamist parties have been able to incrementally appropriate room
in the political arena, despite the fact that they did not enjoy much
general public support. It is interesting to mention, that in this direction
Pakistan serves as a crucial point of reference. For the fact that Islamist
parties do not get many votes, and percentage-wise it does not automatically
imply that they are marginalised when it comes to exercising political
influence and access to state resources. Here, aggressive political behaviour
combined with extra-judicial measures (e.g. black mailing, target killings,
major terrorist activities) are used to compensate for the lack of electoral
support. The high level of Islamist penetration of state and society was
further enhanced during the Bangladesh
Nationalist Party (BNP) governments (1991–1996,
2001–2006) of Begum Khaleda Zia. Not only were using state resources to promote
their ‘anti-secular revolution’ but also to push the entrenchment of Islamic
fundamentalist elements deeply into the political-administrative structure of
the country.
Today, Islamisation is
not a silent process anymore as it is a loud, aggressive and has reached the centre of power politics in
Dhaka. Such an environment
will be most favourable for international terrorist groups like Islamic
State (IS) to take root in Bangladesh. They will take up the course of the
persecution of war criminals associated with Bangladesh’s Islamist parties,
describing it as ‘crusade against Muslims’ supported by hostile, anti-Islamic
western states- have to be rejected.
Latter one serves as rationale and justification to conduct further militant
activities to disturb public order and to win over new recruits.
However, today there are sever
attempts by the Awami
League government, especially since Jihadists have directly
threaten Prime Minister Ms. Sheikh Hasina, to take on the task of dealing
with the growing Islamist challenge. The ban
on some Islamist terror outfits as well as the conducting the war trials
must be seen in this light too. But more has to be done in order to avoid that
Bangladesh drifts more into the global Jihadist movement. It will be crucial to
stop the policy of
public denial of the existence of international terror groups in Bangladesh
and follow a comprehensive counterterrorism approach including the consequent
search for justice for victims of religious fanatics.
The Significance of the War Trials
for Peace and Stability in Bangladesh
It is important to remember why
these tribunals are so necessary. Basically, there are two major reasons:
First, it determines the collective memory of the Bangladesh people, which is
leading to a deep polarization of Bangladesh’s society and also the state. As
such, the repercussions are hampering the democratic consolidation as well as
the political-administrative structure since the country came in existence. Of
which, the latter one determines the second reason for the importance of the
war trials as there is a need to finally end the culture of impunity in
Bangladesh.
During the liberation struggle, an
appalling loss of life resulted because of a genocide perpetrated by the occupying
Pakistani military forces, which were aided by local collaborators. Armed
military crack downs such as the ‘Operation
Searchlight’ were carried out to suppress the Bangladeshi national
independent movement and eliminate all political and military opposition. These
operations resulted in systematically
killing of approximately three million Bengalis. The relevance of combating
impunity
in international human-rights jurisprudence has been recognized and promoted on
a global scale. Unfortunately, Bangladesh has been and still is one of the
world‘s worst
examples of impunity. Responsibilities from the main perpetrators of the
genocide, Pakistani military personnel, were the first to be exempted from
prosecution in a political deal that allowed Bangladeshi hostages in Pakistan
to be exchanged with them. The local political force that internally organised
most of the genocide, survived as a legal, political party (JeI) running in
elections until Bangladesh‘s High Courts Court barred them from partaking in
the electoral race in 2013.
In sum, the perpetrators of violence
of the past are once again distorting civic
peace in Bangladesh today. Most of them, still maintain or establish new
links with Pakistan based terror groups as well as international Jihadi
organisations such as the Islamic State and Al Qaeda. Hence, without bringing
them to justice, a solution towards peace and stability cannot be found.
About The Author:
Dr. Siegfried O. Wolf, is Senior Researcher (member) at the South Asia Institute (SAI), Heidelberg University, and Director of Research at SADF (Coordinator: Democracy Research Program). He was educated at the SAI and Institute of Political Science (IPW) in Heidelberg. Additionally he is a visiting fellow at the National University of Science and Technology (NUST, Islamabad), affiliated researcher at the Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU, Durham University), and a former research fellow at IPW and Centre de Sciences Humaines (New Delhi, India).
Dr. Siegfried O. Wolf, is Senior Researcher (member) at the South Asia Institute (SAI), Heidelberg University, and Director of Research at SADF (Coordinator: Democracy Research Program). He was educated at the SAI and Institute of Political Science (IPW) in Heidelberg. Additionally he is a visiting fellow at the National University of Science and Technology (NUST, Islamabad), affiliated researcher at the Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU, Durham University), and a former research fellow at IPW and Centre de Sciences Humaines (New Delhi, India).
He is the co-author of 'A Political and Economic Dictionary of South Asia' (Routledge; London 2006), co-editor of 'Politics in South Asia. Culture, Rationality and Conceptual Flow' (Springer: Heidelberg, 2015), 'The Merits of Regionalisation. The Case of South Asia' (Springer: Heidelberg, 2014) and 'State and Foreign Policy in South Asia' (Sanskriti: 2010), and Deputy Editor of the 'Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics' (HPSACP).
Furthermore, he has worked as a consultant for the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Germany, and is member of the external group of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force, Federal Foreign Office, Germany.
He can be reached at his official email id: swolf@sai.uni-heidelberg.de
AIDN: 001-11-2015-0475
Cite This Article:
Wolf, Siegfried O. "FEATURED |
Bangladesh War Trials: The Need to Stop the Culture of Impunity and the Rise of
Islamic Fundamentalism." IndraStra 1, no. 11 (2015): 0475. https://www.indrastra.com/2015/11/FEATURED-Bangladesh-War-Trials-Need-to-Stop-Cultural-Impunity-and-Rise-of-Islamic-Fundamentalism-0475.html.
|ISSN 2381-3652|