By Mark Amaliya and Michael Nwankpa Abstract: In terms of the current terrorist organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa, Boko Haram is...
By Mark Amaliya and Michael Nwankpa
Abstract:
In terms of
the current terrorist organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa, Boko Haram is
undoubtedly one of the most high profile and among the more long-established.
Following a panel session on the group at the 2013 conference of the Society
for Terrorism Research at the university of East London, two of the panelists
discuss the conceptualization of the group, the nature and scale of the threat
posed by the group, and what responses might offer a viable route away from the
violence that has affected particularly Northern Nigeria since the onset of the
Boko Haram insurgency.
Image Attribute: A screengrab from
July 13, 2014, shows the leader of the Nigerian Islamist extremist group Boko
Haram, Abubakar Shekau (C)., Source: AFP PHOTO / BOKO HARAM
In terms of
the current terrorist organisations in Sub-Saharan Africa, Boko Haram is
undoubtedly one of the most high profile and among the more long-established.
Following a panel session on the group at the 2013 conference of the Society
for Terrorism Research at the university of East London, two of the panelists
discuss the conceptualization of the group, the nature and scale of the threat
posed by the group, and what responses might offer a viable route away from the
violence that has affected particularly Northern Nigeria since the onset of the
Boko Haram insurgency.
Q1. Briefly, How would you describe Boko Haram as a group?
Mark Amaliya: Typical of any
group engaged in political violence, the radicalization, de-radicalization and
re-radicalization of its group identity, ideology and modus operandi changes
over time. In describing Boko Haram, two factors are worth noting. From 2002 to
present, the sect’s modus operandi and ideology have shifted to reflect
emergent changes in the geo-political setting of the country. Boko Haram
represents a modern reincarnation of the historical clash of civilizations
between Traditional Islamic jurisprudence in the North of Nigeria and its
amalgamation into the secular Nigerian nation state of 1914 interred in the
colonial legacy of British rule.
The sect can
thus be viewed as a conservative, fanatical Islamic sect, fundamentally opposed
to secular statehood and western political ideology by engaging in a
Jihad-inspired perpetuation of terror as its principal means to establish a
Nigerian state rooted in Salafist proselytism. In terms of its structure and
modus operandi, the organization could be categorized as amorphous (combining
sophisticated combat techniques and technology with a variety of target
victims), anonymous (due to the lack of an organised group of interlocutors
with whom, policy agencies could engage), and internally fragmented without a
centered leadership. From a strategic point of view, the sect depends heavily on
media publicity and sporadic strikes in order to remain relevant as a
counteractive force to the secular status quo. By so doing, its action align it
to more established jihad networks such as Al-Qaida and its affiliates in
Africa with a potential to evolve into a much greater threat across the
continent.
However, Boko
Haram’s radicalization owes directly to the securitization and kinetic posture
of Nigeria’s state security services towards its membership in particular and
the North in general, which has lent the group leverage to constitute itself as
a de-facto pro-Northern militia, drawing sympathy from families of victims and
empathy among the elite for what is generally considered a failure of the
federal government to address inequality gaps in the north and improved public
welfare.
Michael
Nwankpa: Mark’s
observation about the evolutionary nature of extremist groups’ ideologies and
motives is consistent with views in the extant literature. However, the popular
view about Boko Haram (BH) as “a conservative, fanatical Islamic sect,
fundamentally opposed to secular statehood and western political ideology”, a
view supported by Mark, is just one slice of the cake, and may even be a misleading
way of viewing BH. First, it is important to recognise that the project of
imposing an Islamic social and political system in the secularised state of
Nigeria - what is supposedly the political project of BH - is one that is not
so far removed from some parts of the political mainstream. It is also an
agenda that has been promoted by Northern leaders starting from General Murtala
Muhammed (1975) and carried on by successive Northern heads of state such as
Shehu Shagari (1979), General Buhari (1983), Ibrahim Babangida (1995), General
Sani Abacha (1993), and, in a less clear way, by President Olusegun Obasanjo
(1999) (Omoruyi, 2001). This itself raises a critical question: To what extent
is BH operating alone or in alliance with those parts of the Northern
leadership supportive of this broad political and social agenda?
This leads to
a second point. If the motive of BH is or was ever to impose a Sharia political
system on the secularised Nigerian state, that motive is now being relegated
and supplanted by more pressing economic and political objectives. On the
economic front, there has been the turn by some BH elements to what we might
talk about as rogue or criminal BH activities akin to those used by the Niger
Delta militants - in the kidnapping of foreigners and ransom-seeking from
foreign governments (such as the alleged $3m ransom paid for the release of the
kidnapped French family of 7 in April, 2013). It is this rogue BH element that
is likely to have engaged the Nigerian government in dialogue and talk about
amnesty. Underlying these criminal activities is the political goal of creating
a vacuum or political space where northern leadership can emerge. Following the
direct and indirect indictment of several members of the Northern leadership,
such as Senator Ali Ndume (Borno), Senator Khalifa Zanna (Borno), former
governor of Borno (Ali Modu Sheriff), and late Saidu Pindar (Nigeria’s former
ambassador to Sao Tome & Principe) as financial supporters of BH (The
Nation, 2012) it is not far-fetched to argue that BH’s main motive is to tilt
the balance of power or guarantee the control and domination of power by the
north.
Mark Amaliya: Michael makes
a salient point in noting that an Islam-centric characterization of BH risks
undermining other intrinsic and less manifest motives of the sect. While
noteworthy, it is however equally critical to note that an interpretation of BH
that centres on political motives may also lose sight of the fluid interaction
between the economic, political and ethno-religious aspects of this conflict. I
would propose that any attempt to view the specific dominance of any one of
these aspects (the political or economic), at any given evolutionary stage of
the sect as opposed to its self-proclaimed objective of establishing an Islamic
State and countering western political hegemony may lead to a reductionist
analysis of the group’s ideology. Furthermore, one ought not to conflate the
sect’s operational means with its desired end. The argument that BH’s
anti-secular fascism is being supplanted by economic crime and political
sponsorship confuses the sect’s modus operandi with its primary end of
disenabling the status quo.
In his
submissions, Michael cites in the first instance, an upsurge in kidnappings and
ransom claims by the sect as an ideological shift from anti-secularism without
acknowledging the larger domain of subaltern economic crime in the country
where kidnappings and celebrity abductions thrive independent of Islamic
political extremism. I would also question the argument of northern political
sponsorship to the group as a strategy to create a power vacuum to be filed by
Northern political elite. There exist notable cases that contradict such a
linear progression. The most iconic being the fact that the greatest crackdown
on BH occurred in 2009 during the tenure of President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua , who
hailed from northern Nigeria. At this critical moment one could label the
incident as a Northern insurgency against a Northern incumbent. The sect has
also targeted Northern political elites including the Sarduana of Sokoto and
has been ruthless in bombing northern mosques, schools and security
installations believed to be unsympathetic to their course. Thus any semblance
of northern political alliance in the Boko haram struggle should be seen more
as a marriage of convenience and less an ideological shift.
Michael
Nwankpa: Mark’s
argument is compatible with my views that the activities of BH are motivated by
a combination of several factors including politics, economics and ethno-religion,
and that any attempt at elevating one factor above the others may undermine,
rather than help our understanding of the group. Yet he still appears to hold a
preference for an explanation based on an Islamist motivation, while I would
emphasise a strong political undertone. Further evidence for this position
would seem to come from the fact observed by the late General Owoeye Azazi,
National Security Adviser to President Jonathan, that “the issue of violence
did not increase in Nigeria until there was a declaration by the current
President that he was going to contest” (Channels, 2012). In other words, the
increase in violence coincided with and might even be read as a response to
wider political developments.
Q2: What, in
your assessment, is the scale of threat posed by Boko Haram to the Nigerian
state?
Michael
Nwankpa : In order to
develop an analysis of the threat posed by BH to the Nigerian state, it would
be wise to break this down into a discussion of the different types of threat
that the group might be seen to pose: economic, socio-political and
security/counter-terrorism.
From an
economic perspective, BH does not pose a serious direct threat to the Nigerian
state, particularly when compared to the Niger Delta insurgency (which impacts
directly on the country’s economic mainstay, oil). It does however pose an
indirect economic threat, as the state of insecurity it creates discourages
potential local and foreign investors from investing in the northern as well as
other parts of Nigeria.
The most substantial
threat posed by BH is a socio-political threat. First, BH’s agenda (if it is to
Islamise Nigeria) is incompatible with the secular nature of the Nigerian
state. Secondly, its disproportionate attacks on peoples and properties of
other religion (faith) and ethnicity can fuel ethno-religious sentiments and
conflicts. Such ethnic and religious sentiments and conflicts can turn into
sectarian war (evident in the reprisal and/or threat of reprisal attack from
the Christian Association of Nigeria [CAN]) or a large scale civil war similar
to the Nigeria-Biafra Civil War of 1967–1970.
From a
counter-terrorism perspective, BH can also be seen to pose a substantial
threat, albeit one that would appear to be relatively concentrated
geographically: with the exception of the suicide bombing attacks on the police
headquarters, United Nations building, and a newspaper [ ThisDay ] property in
Abuja-the capital city, BH’s coordinated attacks have been largely confined to
the northern region, or even some northern states such as Borno, Yobe and
Adamawa. Yet in spite of the opportunities that BH’s limited operational space
would seem to offer for the Nigerian government to concentrate its full
resources geographically in order to curb the situation, the Joint Task Force (JTF)
has been unable to disband BH, and BH has been able to maintain vigorous and
sustained attacks on its victims
Mark Amaliya: Boko Haram’s
ability to challenge the State’s monopoly over the use of force constitutes its
greatest threat. This threat poses both a physical challenge to the survival of
the Nigerian state, and a psychological challenge that threatens to undermine
civic engagement. Physically, Boko Haram represents a challenge to the
underlying political principles of political autonomy and territorial
inviolability. The present security standoff, along with a history of economic,
political and institutional ineptitude has led some observers to categorise the
country in the family of fragile states, or even to call it a ‘dysfunctional
state’ (Lewis 2006). Any advancement in Boko Haram’s lethal attacks and
operational scope would arguably risk the country sliding into the pariah
category of ‘failed states’, in particular as such a development might
establish a condition for an infiltration of violent allies such as Al Qaida,
thus leading to a similar scenario as that which developed in Somalia.
Psychologically,
the persistence and lethality of the sect’s attacks has created an atmosphere
of insecurity and uncertainty in civic life and social congregation, which has
done much to disrupt the activities that comprise Nigeria’s public sphere.
Failure to contain and control the attacks by Boko Haram has left a community
subjected to fear, hindering political organization and stifling private sector
activity.
The physical
and psychological dimensions of the threat posed by BH have combined to
generate a toxic context of suspicion and distrust of the state and its
authority. This has manifested in several ways. We have seen the emergence of a
number of self-help community initiatives including the formation of vigilante
militia groups in Maiduguri, there have been repeated charges of vested
partisan interest and sponsorship of the sect’s activities by political
parties, as well as a more general inflaming of ethnic tensions regarding
issues of Islamic fanaticism in the north and concentrations of oil wealth in
the south. Furthermore, the conduct of the State Security Services (SSS) has
done little to inspire public confidence in the authority of the state. Following
reports of corruption, human rights abuses and extra judicial killings (see
Human Rights Watch Report 2013), operations of the JTF have increasingly
tarnished its professional image and raised questions regarding the
disproportionality of force being expended.
Michael
Nwankpa : Yet the fact
is that the scale of casualties and property losses associated with the current
conflict with Boko Haram is not as great as those associated with the wider
wave of ethno-religious violence that has taken place in the North of Nigeria
in recent years. In Jos alone, the deadly cycle of violence has claimed,
besides damaged properties, more than a conservative figure of 5000 lives in a
decade (2000–2010).
This raises
the crucial question of why Boko Haram has received so much attention in
comparison with the wider violence. There would appear to be a few reasons for
this. One of these is arguably the fear that the group may be particularly
susceptible to infiltration by, and provide a vehicle for, more dangerous global
terrorist organisations (that is if this has not already taken place) such as
Al Qaeda and Al Shabab. Related to this is the group’s increased targeting of
foreign nationals and the damage that Boko Haram is able to do to Nigeria’s
relations with other countries whose business and personal interests are
affected negatively by the conflict. In addition, the failure of the Nigerian
state to curb the activities of BH in spite of an apparently significant
investment of resources means that BH has been capable of inflicting
particularly significant symbolic damage on the Nigerian state apparatus both
in domestic and international arenas.
Q3: What are
the potential avenues towards a solution to the violence and hostilities
associated with Boko Haram? What are the key issues that need to be addressed?
Michael
Nwankpa : In spite of
the wide range of counter-terrorism measures (including direct force,
declarations of a state of emergency, curfews and counter-narratives), the end
of the conflict seems far away (even though the Nigerian military’s public
relations department would have us think otherwise).
What seems
clear is that military force, and especially military force alone, is not the
solution to the violence and tension associated with BH. There is no doubt that
the Nigerian military is overwhelmingly more powerful than BH, but what is
doubtful is how well suited it is to overcome a force like the BH insurgents.
The loose and hilly spatial character of the northern states and the porous
borders between the northern states and neighbouring countries such as Chad and
Cameroon make it possible for the insurgents to retreat and engage the military
using guerrilla tactics. The federal composition of Nigeria’s force and the
history of deploying soldiers from separate ethnic groups to quell crises in
other ethnic regions make it difficult for the force to overcome BH, as they
most times do not understand the terrain better than the local insurgents.
Given the
limitations on the use of large-scale military force, there is a clear need for
the adoption of intelligence-led responses - responses that will help the
military achieve precise and accurate targeting, avoiding the kind of
collateral damage that can play into the hands of the insurgents. Yet to date,
Nigeria lacks a suitable counter-terrorism intelligence structure. The three
Intelligence structures - Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) National
Intelligence Agency (NIA) and State Security Service (SSS) - created in 1986 by
Babangida to cater for military, foreign and domestic intelligence respectively
do not have the capacity to engage the terror posed by BH. The mandate of the
SSS leans more on the protection of public officials. One way forward could be
the development of a dedicated counter-terrorism centre (similar to the Joint
Terrorism Analysis Centre [JTAC] in the United Kingdom). This should not be
confused with the Nigerian military’s endorsement of a civilian Joint Task
Force (a civilian arm of the military JTF, comprising of little more than local
youth vigilante groups).
More broadly,
any more targeted response to BH violence needs to go hand in hand with a
serious and credible effort to improve the living standards of the people of
the region. This could take the form of Government investment in
infrastructure, education, in creating job opportunities for the largely
impoverished populace of the Northern states, and ought also include a
programme of improving the provision of social welfare, respect of human rights
and fight against corruption among public officials. This will help mitigate
the attraction of BH to young people, who make up a large number of the group’s
recruit.
Mark Amaliya : The main
avenue towards a lasting solution is for the state to prioritize and broaden
non-violent approaches. Among some of the nonviolent counter terror-initiatives
already implemented by the government, the following are noteworthy: the
passing of the Terrorism Prevention Amendment (TPA) in February 2013, a
directive for judicial clarity on competency issues between State and Federal
courts regarding their jurisdictional powers over crimes committed by members
of the sect and the expeditious prosecution of suspects (OTP-ICC report 2013).
Also, the president set up the Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of
Security Challenges in the North (OTP-ICC report 2013: 50).
While
laudable, most of these interventions have either stalled in the process of
implementation or failed to command authority on the ground, not helped by
allegations of extra judicial killings and the unlawful release of arrested
suspects. Furthermore, only marginal gains have been achieved in the area of
negotiations as the work of the committee on dialogue failed to engage the
leadership of Boko Haram in dialogue until the submission of its report to the
president on November 12, 2013. The committee also suffered the early
withdrawal of a key negotiator, Dr. Ahmad Ibrahim Datti, President General of
the Supreme Council for Sharia in Nigeria (SCSN), who cited a lack of trust in
government’s commitment to implement committee findings following his previous
experience serving on a similar panel (Binnyat 2013).
The search for
a reliable exit out of conflict requires coherency in terms of policy
objectives and their respective strategies of implementation. The need to
maintain consistency begins with the language of political leaders. To demonstrate
such consistency, epithets like ‘faceless cowards’ and ‘ghosts’ which have
repeatedly been used by President Goodluck Jonathan to describe the sect should
be avoided, since they undermine efforts at building trust between the
government and the leadership of the sect.
Secondly, a
unified and channel of consultative engagement with Boko Haram is necessary.
Past forms of engagement with Boko Haram, have been characteristic by a
multiplicity of bodies and individuals striving to negotiate with the sect, resulting
in disparate proposals without a clear strategy. For instance, Coalitions such
as the Forum of Northern Governors, whose attempts in the past to localize
dialogue and explore ceasefire incentives for the group risked impeding the
efforts being formulated at the federal level in terms of a duplication of
functional roles and authority.
Other
important target groups include CSOs, researchers and multilateral partners.
CSOs mainly in the areas of governance and advocacy should work to address
problems of illiteracy, youth unemployment and good governance. In addition,
the government should allocate more funds towards research and development in
the field of domestic radicalism and security in the north. Some essential
focal areas include research on the evolution of traditional and
post-independence Muslim cultures, exploring avenues of cultural integration
and setting up a national centre for the study of radicalism.
Finally,
domestic counter-terrorism measures should be complemented with an effective regional
and global collaborative strategy. Noting the challenges associated with border
security, money laundering and trans-border crime, the ECOWAS sub-region must
prioritize strengthening trans-border security, intelligence gathering and
sharing across neighbouring countries. However, in taking steps towards such
coordination, it is important to be wary of the tendency for the undue
securitization of domestic threats from the transnational level. For instance,
the recent designation of Boko Haram and its spinoff group Ansaru as Foreign
Terrorist Organizations by the USA on November 13th 2013 and the release of an
ICC report indicting boko haram for committing crimes against humanity and
classifying the armed violence between Boko Haram and Nigerian security forces
as an ‘armed conflict of non-international character’ (OTP ICC report 2013)
present an opportunity for a heavy handed global response to the sect’s
activities. The real challenge for the Nigerian state is how to synergise
cooperation between the various actors, maintaining the state as the principal
protagonist on the ground and exhausting all avenues to peaceful resolutions
before resorting to drastic humanitarian interventions.
About the Authors:
Mark Amaliya
Anyorikeya holds a Master of Public Policy degree from the Willy Brandt School
of Public Policy at the University of Erfurt, Germany. His current area of
research includes; Terrorism in Africa and the rise of Violent Non State Actors
within the ECOWAS sub-region. He is also a
Michael
Nwankpa is a PhD candidate in the University of Roehampton, London. He is an
expert on counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency in Africa. He is presently
working on the application of development and human rights approaches to the
Boko Haram and Niger Delta Conflicts in Nigeria.
References:
- Binnyat L. (2012, April 17); Nigeria: Boko Haram - Ahmed Datti Withdraws From Committee, Vanguard. www.allafrica.com/stories/201304190264.html
- Channels (2012, April 17), Azazi blames Boko Haram attacks on PDP , http://www.channelstv.com/home/2012/04/27/azazi-blames-boko-haram-attacks-on-pdp/ Accessed on (9.08.2013)
- Lewis M.P (2006): The Dysfunctional State of Nigeria : cited in Ayres L.R., Birdshall N and Vaishnav M. (EDs): Short of the Goal, US Policy and Poorly Performing States: Centre for Global Development: Washington D.C.
- Human Rights Watch Report (2013, October 17), “Nigeria UPR Submission March (2013)”: http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/17/nigeria-upr-submission-march–2013 (Accessed on 17.10.2013).
- Office of the Prosecutor -International Criminal Court (2013, August 5), “Situation in Nigeria Article 5 Report”. < http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/docs/SAS%2520%2520NGA%2520%2520Public%252 version%252Article%25205%2520Report%2520-%252005%2520August%25202013.PDF > (Accessed on 25.11.2013).
- Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court (2013, November), “Report on Preliminary Examination Activities” . < http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Documents/OTP%20Preliminary%20Examinations/OTP%20%20Report%20%20Preliminary%20Examination%20Activities%202013.PDF > (Accessed on 25.11.2013)
- Omoruyi, O. (2001). An Appeal to President Olusegun Obasanjo: Nigeria: Neither an Islamic nor a Christian Country. http://www.biafraland.com/Islamization%20of%20Nigeria.htm
- Taylor M. (2013): Expert Interview; Jacob Zenn on Terrorism and Insurgency in Northern Nigeria: African Arguments: http://africanarguments.org/2013/10/24/expert-interview-jacob-zenn-on-terrorism-and-insurgency-in-northern-nigeria/ . (Accessed on 24.10.2013)
- The Nation (2012, October); published on AfricanSpotlight.com, ‘PDP, Senator behind Boko Haram’ - Ex-Borno State Governor’. http://www.africanspotlight.com/2012/10/25/pdp-senator-behind-boko-haram-ex-borno-state-governor/ (Accessed on 30.10.2013)
______________________________
Publication Details:
Published by
Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St
Andrews
E-ISSN: 2049-7040
DOI: http://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.832
Volume: 5, Issue: 1
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