By Roger S. Farhat and Carl Yonker In April 1920, Great Britain was awarded the mandate over Iraq at the San Remo Confere...
By Roger S. Farhat and Carl Yonker
In April 1920, Great Britain was awarded the mandate over Iraq at the San
Remo Conference. Not a month had passed before peaceful protests, encouraged by
Sunni and Shiite ulema, against British rule occurred in Baghdad and
eventually transformed into a widespread, popular armed revolt in the
mid-Euphrates region against British rule that transcended tribal and sectarian
lines. Though the British ultimately put down the insurrection with ease and
went on to enshrine Sunni dominance over the political and military
institutions of the nascent state, the event, with the passage of time, has
been transformed by some Iraqis into a foundation, albeit contested, myth of
non-sectarian Iraqi national identity. Today, an amalgam of Iraqi armed groups,
including Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Kurdish Peshmerga, Shiite militias,
Sunni tribes, and the Shiite-dominated Hashd al-Shaʿbi (Popular
Mobilization Units, PMU), are cooperating in the battle to rid Iraq the Islamic
State and reestablish Baghdad's sovereignty over its territory, an effort that
may provide the opportunity to reshape Iraqi national identity in a way that
would serve as a foundation for building a more cohesive Iraq.
Despite steady progress against the Islamic State, the ISF and the central
government in Baghdad suffered a major setback on May 17 when provincial
capital of Anbar, Ramadi, fell to the Islamic State. As in Mosul last year, ISF
forces simply failed to put up any real defense of the city, fleeing in droves
and leaving their weapons and advanced weaponry to be seized by IS. Though IS
has been trying to take Ramadi since late 2013, the rapid fall of the city was
facilitated as much by a wave of 30 SVBIED (Suicide Vehicle-borne IED) and the activation of the
sleeper cells that followed as it was the decision of Iraqi Prime Minister
Haidar Abadi, under US influence, to heed the initial call of Anbar Sunni
politicians and keep the PMU from aiding the ISF and Sunni tribesmen in
defending the city. Yet, in the aftermath of stunning defeat, Abadi and the
Sunni elite in Anbar, as well as the US, have changed their positions on
allowing the Shiite-dominated PMUs to mobilize forces in the province.
In response, a massive call for reinforcements was sent out by Shiite militias,
which urgently recalled fighters on leave.
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| 8th Iraqi Army Compound in Ramadi, Iraq |
The defeat in Ramadi was a severe blow to great strides Iraq has made in
recent months in rolling back the advance of the Islamic State, including
important victories in Amerli in August 2014 and the Sunni Jurf al-Sakhar area
in late October, followed by several other key victories in the areas of
Jalawla, Baiji and Sinjar (retaken by Kurdish forces) and most recently the
city of Tikrit. These victories have been achieved, in no small part, thanks to
the critical participation of Shiite militias, such as the Iran-backed Badr
Organization, ʿAsaʾib Ahl al-Haq, Kataʾib Hizballah, and Kataʾib
Sayyid al-Shuhadaʾ, and the Kurdish Peshmerga, forces that stood in the gap
after the collapse of the ISF last summer amid the onslaught of the Islamic
State. Though Shiite militias continue to take the lead in the battle of the
Islamic State, and the performance of the ISF has steadily improved, considerable
efforts have been made to recruit Sunni tribes and Sunnis into the effort to
dislodge the Islamic State from Iraq.
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| Nawar Mohammed, one of the Sunni residents of Al-Alam who joineda Shiite militia to battle the Islamic State group, stands in Al-Alam after it was retaken from IS on March 11, 2015 (AFP Photo/W.G. Dunlop) |
The fruits of these efforts were borne out in part in Tikrit and in several
battles preceding its liberation in which military advances were accomplished
with the symbolic or significant contributions of Sunnis. Indeed, 250 Sunnis,
led by Sheikh Khaled al-Jbara of the Juburi tribe, joined ʿAsaʾib Ahl al-Haq,
an Iranian-backed militia who is responsible for numerous sectarian kidnappings
and killings, forming ʿAsaʾib al-Alam, the first Sunni unit of its kind.
Though the establishment of such a unit within an established Shiite militia
can easily be dismissed as propaganda and an effort to mitigate the
organization's sectarian history, it nevertheless represents an important development
in Sunni-Shiite relations in the country. Iraqi Christians have also become
more involved in the fight as IS threatens their continued existence in the
country and have formed several Christian
battalions which are currently fighting within the PMU.
Yet more efforts must be made by all of the political actors involved to build
trust and cooperation in order to transcend the ever-hardening sectarian
divides in the country and repair a severely broken national Iraqi identity.
Against the Tide of Sectarianism
The predecessor to the Islamic State, then known as al-Qa'ida in Iraq
and led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, ignited a sectarian war in the mid-2000s,
carrying out indiscriminate attacks against Shiites and Sunnis alike, including
the 2006 and 2007 bombings of the Imam al-ʿAskarī Shrine in Samarra, which provided a symbol around which
radical Shiʿi Islamists mobilized. Now, just as it tried then, the Islamic
State has sought to provoke and reignite sectarian war in Iraq through its
massacres, executions and campaign of wanton violence, such as the execution of
1,700 Shiite Iraqi Army cadets at Camp Speicher in 2014. However, instead of igniting a widespread sectarian conflict, it provoked
a popular mobilization of Iraqi Shia and Kurds, who have been joined by a
growing number of Sunnis who have realized that, their grievances and
misgivings notwithstanding, a future under the rule of the Islamic State is far
worse than a future under the rule of Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad.
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| Grand Ayatollah 'Ali al-Sistani |
In June 2014, Grand Ayatollah 'Ali al-Sistani issued a fatwa calling
on all Iraqis to exercise restraint and defend Iraq and the holy sites in
response to a declaration made by Islamic State spokesman Abu Mohammad
al-Adnani, in which al-Adnani threatened to not only attack Baghdad but to take
the battle to two of Shiʿi Islam's holiest cities, Najaf and Karbala. This
followed previous threats and actual military move to attack the city of
Samarra and the Imam al-ʿAskarī Shrine once again. Sistani, through his spokesman Abdu al-Mahdi
al-Karbalai, urged Iraqis, Sunni and Shia, to support the ISF and volunteer to
defend the state because "the threats posed obligate the volunteering of
those who are capable of carrying arms to defend the homeland and it is a duty
on [them]." While Sistani explicitly called on Iraqis, particularly
Shiites, to support the government, his fatwa was used by Iranian-backed
militias in their own campaigns to mobilize their followers and recruit new
volunteers.
Nevertheless, Sistani's fatwa was a watershed moment in Iraq, as it
was a call on all Iraqis, regardless of sectarian or tribal affiliation, to
rise in defense of the Iraqi State. Though predominately Shiite, as the
fighting continues, more and more Sunnis, as well as Christians, are joining
the ranks of or fighting alongside the Hashd al-Shaʿbi, a positive
development as Iraqis of various backgrounds fight and shed their blood
together in defense of their country.
However, no sooner had the battle for Tikrit began than a series of reports
surfaced in international media outlets warning of revenge attacks and
misconduct by Shiite forces against Sunnis. While Western reports ranged
from sounding a pre-emptive tone to agenda-driven propaganda, those from
Sunni Gulf states, particularly from Saudi Arabia and Qatar, tended to be
sectarian invectives embellished with exaggerated claims of campaigns by the
ISF and Shiite forces to cleanse areas of Sunnis. Sunni religious institutions
and sheikhs further promoted widespread Sunni objections, particularly that
promulgated by al-Azhar,
which strongly condemned what it characterized as the "slaughter and
violations" committed by the "Popular Mobilization Militias"
against Sunni Iraqi citizens in Tikrit. One of the notable replies to
al-Azhar's allegations came from a highly respected Sunni religious figure in
Baghdad, Sheikh Adnan,
who slammed al-Azhar's Mufti al-Tayyib, charging that he "was quiet until
we began to win and ISIS was losing then he spoke against us." Al-'Ani
further accused Saudi Arabia of orchestrating religious bigotry.
The accusations and information campaign undermined the momentum of Iraq
forces and prompted the Iraqi government to forcefully, albeit defensively,
state that it will ensure all civilians are evacuated from the city and that
its forces act to protect civilian life and property. To be sure, the offensive
was primarily slowed due to stiff resistance by the Islamic State and the
soaring number of ISF and Hashd al-Shaʿbi causalities. In addition to the Iraqi
government, Ayatollah Sistani urged,
once again, fighters in the PMU to refrain from inflicting harm on
non-Muslims and take precautions to avoid harming innocent civilians,
protecting their rights and the even the rights of those who they are fighting
against because they are "victims who have been led astray by
others." Moreover, he urged PMU fighters to only raise the Iraqi flag when liberating an
area, an explicit call to avoid sectarian symbols in favor the national symbol
of the Iraqi flag.
News of human rights violations attributed to Kataʾib Hizballah (KH)
and, on occasion, to the Hashd al-Shaʿbi, including extrajudicial
executions, looting, and burning of houses and property, were strongly denied
by KH’s spokesman, who called these reports
"a smear campaign." In confirmed cases, these abuses are no less
serious than some of the crimes perpetrated by the Islamic State, and should
not be tolerated by the Iraqi government. However, attempts to brand Shiite
militias of the PMU as no better than the Islamic State misses the raison
d'être of the Hashd al-Shaʿbi: to serve as a non-sectarian popular
force under the central government's auspices whose objective is to aid the ISF
in defeating the Islamic State. While such a force is in danger of ultimately
being hijacked for sectarian purposes and while this force currently fights
under Shiite religious banners, there are signs of wider cooperation between
Shiites and Sunnis, who are advancing together towards Islamic State positions.
To dismiss this popular mobilization as "a sectarian force" with
little possibility for transformation into a wider, non-sectarian popular
movement is premature. While forging such a non-sectarian movement is not
without serious challenges, such challenges do not, in themselves, preclude the
establishment of such a movement.
Challenges to Forging a New
National Identity
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| Iraqi Army / Photo Courtesy : |
The growing participation of Sunnis in the Iraqi offensive against the
Islamic State is a positive development for Iraqi unity. A joint victory in
Tikrit by the forces representing Iraq's diverse communities, followed by
expanded Sunni participation in the offensive against the Islamic State, and a
successful joint operation to reclaim Mosul, will be historic events that may
serve as the basis for creating a new Iraqi national myth and more cohesive
Iraqi national identity. Such an outcome is contingent on several important
factors: Iraqi Sunnis ceasing to view ruling Iraq as their communal patrimony
in perpetuity; developments in Iraq's political culture and system that ensures
the voice and rights of all Iraqis; and, Iraqi Shia refraining from conducting
retribution whether politically or militarily on Sunnis.
This is a tall order, and though it may appear far-fetched at first glance,
an opportunity to promote Iraqi unity and peace among its various communities
is one that should not be wasted. As
such, the United States and its allies must continue and expand their efforts
to not only support the central government in Baghdad, but work to develop
leverage so that it can have a positive influence on the development of a more
pluralistic Iraqi political culture. The desired role of the US should not be
restricted to airstrikes, arms shipments to Baghdad and logistical support. In
addition, inserting more special forces on the ground is indeed a required step
if the U.S. wants to be taken seriously in the war against the Islamic State,
and if it wants to restore some of its lost credibility among Iraqis. However,
any such attempt will be ineffective as long as the geopolitical context of the
unresolved regional conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran continues to
manifest itself in Iraq.
The nuclear negotiations between the West and Tehran and the positive
atmosphere surrounding the talks, is negatively perceived by wary Saudi eyes.
Riyadh fears losing its status as a top US-ally to its regional nemesis in the
event a deal is reached. Together with Qatar, Saudi Arabia controls the most
dominant media outlets and mouthpieces in the region, and influences numerous
anti-Shiite hardliner preachers from the Maghreb to the Persian Gulf.
Undermining their role in favor of Iran means both intensified sectarian
incitement against Shiites and elevated anti-Western sentiments. Hence, the US
should demonstrate unwavering leadership in decisively curbing its Gulf allies
from hampering the efforts to liberate Iraq from the nightmare of the Islamic
State and give the country a chance for peace and stability. While an Iraqi
victory over the Islamic State offers an opportunity, however limited, for
Iraqis to establish a new national myth and forge a more cohesive national
identity, the success of such an endeavor is, perhaps, far more dependent on
actions taken by Riyadh and Tehran, rather than those taken in Iraq itself.
Iraq, like Syria and Yemen, is merely a sphere of influence over which the
main regional players seek to extend their hegemony with little concern for the
local populations and will happily exploit religious, tribal and ethnic
tensions for their own gain. If Iraq's stability and integrity will continue to
be affected by undeterred negative regional meddling, then perhaps it is better
that Iraqi leaders seriously consider reorganizing the government and state
institutions into a more federalist system.
The views expressed are the authors'
alone.
