Reprinted with permission from the Author who is associated with the Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, ...
Reprinted with permission from the Author who is associated with the Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, U.S. Army War
College.
By Dr. R. Evan Ellis
In February 2015, Russian
Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu traveled to Latin America to meet with leaders
and defense officials in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Although the visit
included Russian participation in a Venezuelan military exercise, the focus of
the meetings in all three countries was on access to ports and airfields in the
region in order to support Russian military operations in the vicinity of the
United States.1 The discussions bore the most fruit in Nicaragua, where
Minister Shoigu signed an agreement to facilitate Russian access to the ports
of Corinto and Bluefields, as well as strengthening counter drug cooperation
and discussing weapons sales.
 |
| General Sergei Shoigu, Minister of Defense, Russian Federation |
Although much attention has been
given to Chinese activities in Latin America and the Caribbean during the past
decade, it is arguably Russia whose activities in the region most openly
challenge U.S. national security. In addition to seeking access to ports and
airfields, Russian leaders have also expressed interest in military aircraft patrols
in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico, reopening the Russian Signals Intelligence
collection facility at Lourdes, Cuba, and providing “security” for the
transoceanic canal that possibly may be constructed across Nicaragua.
Russian submarines, ships, and
other military assets have increasingly operated in the Caribbean in recent
years, with the signals intelligence ship Victor Leonov putting into
port in Havana the day before a team from the U.S. State Department arrived for
talks to their Cuban counterparts.
In October 2013, Russian nuclear-capable
bombers violated the airspace of Colombia, a U.S. ally.5 Moreover, Russia’s
expanding military presence and political engagement with four states
surrounding that country (Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Ecuador) is seen in
Colombia as a security concern.
Russia has also become a primary
weapons supplier to the region, particularly for regimes opposed to the United
States. Between 2001 and 2013, Russia sold $14.5 billion of weapons to the
region, of which $11 billion went to Venezuela, with significant quantities
also going to Peru and Brazil. Most recently, Russia entered into negotiations
with Argentina to sell those country Su-24 long-range fighter-bombers,
representing a potential threat to the defense of the British-owned Falkland
Islands (Malvinas).
The current Russian attempt to
secure access to facilities in the region that permit its warships and military
aircraft to operate close to the United States, its declared interest in
reopening the signals intelligence collection facility at Lourdes, and flying
long-range patrols into the Gulf of Mexico are arguably strategic moves
designed to enhance Russian freedom of action in its own region by forcing a
U.S. response, as much as impacting Latin America and the Caribbean per se.
 |
| Infographic by Natalia Mikhaylenko / COURTESY: RUSSIA DIRECT |
Such moves are, in part, the
continuation of a strategic global “game” that the Soviet Union played with the
United States during the Cold War, and which its successor, Russia, resumed in
2008 in the context of escalating tensions with the West over the civil war in
Georgia. During that crisis, Russia responded to U.S. deployment of warships in
the Black Sea in close proximity to its own shores by sending nuclear capable
Tu-160 long-range bombers to Venezuela in the Caribbean. Three months later, a
four-ship Russian naval flotilla arrived in Venezuela before conducting
manoeuvres in the Caribbean. Both moves sought to warn the United States that
Russia was capable of projecting military forces into the U.S. “back yard,”
just as the United States had done with Russia. Now, as in 2008, such Russian
moves appear designed to present a strategic threat in the Caribbean that
distracts the United States from pressuring Russia in its own “neighborhood.”
Neither have Russian actions
been limited to military and diplomatic realms. When, in August 2014, the
United States and Europe imposed sanctions on Russia in response to its actions
in the Ukraine, Russia responded by suspending purchases of European
agricultural goods and turned to Latin American countries, such as Argentina,
Brazil, and Ecuador to make up the difference.
The Nature of Russian
Engagement:
 |
| Anti-U.S. ALBA Exclusie Econimic Zones in LATAM & Carribean |
Russian decisions regarding
where, and how to pursue its re-engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean have
been shaped by its current relationships and historical legacy with each of the
countries involved. To date, Russia’s re-engagement has primarily focused on
the anti-U.S. Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA)
regimes, although Peru, Argentina, and Brazil have also been objects of Russian
attention.
In Nicaragua and Cuba, Russia
has attempted to reactivate political-military networks created during the Cold
War. In the former, the rebuilding of the relationship was facilitated by the
return to power in 2007 of Sandinista leader and Cold War partner Daniel
Ortega, and Ortega’s unexpected gesture of comradery in 2008, when his government
became the second United Nations member country to recognize the pro-Russian
breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia during the Georgian civil war.
Russia-Cuba relations were
somewhat more difficult to repair, since many Cuban’s felt that the island had
suffered undue hardship due to Russia’s abandonment of the island as it
withdrew from region following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
Nonetheless, the historically close ties between the two countries, in
combination with Cuban pragmatism and Russian forgiveness of 90 percent of its
$35 billion in outstanding debt, have helped to improve the relationship.
 |
| Salvador Sánchez Cerén, President of El Salvador with Marxist inclination. he ran as the candidate of the left-wing Farabundo Martà National Liberation Front (FMLN) and was elected as President. He took office on June 1, 2014. |
Most recently, the election of a
former hard-line Marxist guerilla leader, Salvador Sanchez Ceren, to the
presidency of El Salvador has opened up new doors for Russia to build on the
relationship forged during the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the then
insurgent group Farabund Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) to expand its engagement
with the current FMLN regime.11
In the case of Venezuela,
although the current leadership is not connected to Russia by Cold War Marxist
ties, the desire of then Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez to escape from
dependence on Western nations and institutions positioned Russia as the
nation’s logical weapons supplier after 2005 when the United States refused to
sell it spare parts for its F-16s. From that time to the present, Russia sold
Venezuela $11 billion in arms, including Kalishnikov rifles and ammunition,
helicopters and fighter aircraft, tanks, armoured vehicles, missiles and air
defense systems, among other goods.
In the case of Brazil, Russia
has maintained a strategic relationship with the country since 2005, as well as
a special tie as a fellow major rising power through the Brazil, Russia, India,
China, and South Africa (BRICS) forum, yet Russia’s arms sales to and political
relations with Brazil have arguably fallen short of its expectations. In 2013, Russia
officially lost a bid to sell its Sukhoi Su-35 fighter to Brazil as part of the
latter’s fighter modernization program, compounding its previous failure to
prolong a sale of 12 Mi-35 attack helicopters into a more extended procurement.
 |
| Pantsyr-S1 SA-22 Greyhound Air Defense System |
In the relationship, Russia has
also been limited by Brazil’s favoritism toward its own national arms industry,
with the Brazilian Defense Ministry, for example, preventing the country’s
federal police from buying the Russian TiGR light armored vehicle in favor of Brazil’s
domestic alternative, the Guarani. Nevertheless, Russia and Brazil continue to work
together in both military and economic spheres, as evidenced by the likely acquisition
by Brazil of the Russian Pantsir-S1 truck-mounted air defense system—a contract
that could be worth $1 billion.
In the case of Argentina, Russia was
considered an adversary by the military governments that dominated the country
during the Cold War, however, since that time the two nations have maintained a
positive and pragmatic relationship. Russia has been a significant purchaser of
Argentine agricultural goods since the Cold War, despite opposing ideological
positions. Then, as now, Russia’s support for Argentina’s claim to the
Falklands/Malvinas islands has created an opening for building stronger
relations. Russia has also provided options for Argentina as it has sought to
distance itself from the West, most recently entering into negotiations to sell
Argentina Su-24 fighters which could potentially threaten Great Britain’s
defense of the Falkland Islands, although the deal currently appears to be on
hold.
Russia has also taken a page from the
United States in using counter-narcotics activities as a vehicle for conducting
security engagement with the region. The growing flow of cocaine and other
drugs to Europe from countries such as Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia has created
a rationale for Russia-Latin America law enforcement cooperation. Yet, such engagement
has also become a platform for expanded Russian security cooperation. In both
Peru and Nicaragua, Russian and partner nation governments share intelligence
and have conducted joint counter-narcotics operations. Indeed, in Nicaragua,
President Daniel Ortega has gone even further, inviting Russian warships to
perform counter-drug patrols off the Caribbean coast of the country in waters
which, prior to a 2012 International Court of Justice decision, were claimed by
Colombia. Russia is similarly constructing a counter-narcotics facility in
Managua which, if completed, will serve as a vehicle for Russian agencies, such
as the Russian Federal Service for Drugs Control (FSKN), to engage with
visiting police and military personnel from across the region.
Interaction of Russia and China
in Latin America and the Caribbean:
The character and significance of Russian
engagement with the region should not be considered in isolation. There is a
complex inter-dependency and competition between Russian activities in the
region and those of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The principal vehicle
for sustaining the economic and political solvency of the states that serve as
Russia’s primary point of entry into the Americas is, ironically, the PRC.
Between 2005 and 2013, 75 percent of the $100 billion that Chinese banks loaned
to Latin America and the Caribbean went to the ALBA regimes, and to Argentina.
The PRC has become one of the principal investors in, and purchasers of
Venezuelan and Ecuadoran oil. It has also become the principal client for
Argentine and Brazilian soy, as well as Brazilian and Peruvian mining products,
indirectly providing revenues for those countries to buy Russian arms.
Yet, not all aspects of the PRC engagement
in Latin America and the Caribbean are consistent with Russia’s strategic
objectives there. In recent years, China’s arms industry has made significant
advances in the region, encroaching on Russia’s market share in product areas
such as mid-range fighter aircraft, transport helicopters, armoured personnel
carriers, trucks, and offshore patrol vessels. In February 2015, for example, Argentine
president Cristina Fernandez signed agreements to buy up to $1 billion in Chinese
military hardware, including possible co-production of the JC-1 fighter, potentially
competing with the previously-mentioned Russian sale to Argentina of the Su-24.
Neither are Russian activities in Latin
America always compatible with PRC strategic objectives in the region. For the
PRC, the previously mentioned Russian pursuit of access to facilities to
service its military aircraft and warships in anti-U.S. countries in the Caribbean
basin, in combination with proposed aircraft patrols and other aggressive actions,
risks leading the United States to view both China and Russia in more
adversarial terms, drawing it into a confrontation with the United States which
could damage fragile PRC economic development.
Limits of Russian Engagement:
 |
| An Old Soviet-Cuba Friendship Propaganda Poster |
For the United States, the challenge
presented by Russia in Latin America and the Caribbean is of a more limited
scale and less enduring than that of the PRC, although in the short term, it
may pose greater risks. By comparison to China, the economic dimension of
Russia’s engagement with the region is modest, with only $18.4 billion of Russian
bilateral trade with Latin America and the Caribbean in 2013, compared to $288.9
billion between the PRC and the region during the same period.That commerce,
moreover, involves only a limited number of industries in which Russia is
competitive, including arms sales, nuclear energy, gas and oil, mining, and
construction (particularly hydroelectric projects). By contrast to the PRC,
which, as noted earlier, is a significant trade partner for almost every Latin
American and Caribbean country, Russian engagement in Latin America is
concentrated on a small number of countries, with six states accounting for 75
percent of Russian trade with the region in 2013: Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina,
Ecuador, Panama, and Mexico.
In addition, Russia’s ability to launch
major new activities in the region, or sustain existing ones, continues to be
limited by international sanctions against the country, complicated by
sustained low international prices for gas and oil, whose export is a key driver
of the Russian economy and a source of revenue for the Russian state. For the foreseeable
future, Russia will not have the capital to loan money to, and invest in, the region
on the scale that that China, the United States, and others do. Neither will
the size of the Russian market attract Latin American businessmen in the way
that the Chinese economy does. Even those states which ally with Russia for
ideological purposes will find the relationship limited by its lack of
resources to provide arms and developmental assistance, or to project
significant military force into the region for a sustained period.
Recommendations:
Although the strategic challenge that
Russian poses to the United States in Latin America is limited in breadth and
persistence, Russia is a nuclear power with a capability to inflict damage on
the United States that cannot be ignored. The United States must communicate in
unequivocal terms that it regards Russian military activities in the region as
potentially hostile acts. The United States must also indicate that it will
consider Latin American and Caribbean regimes that support Russian activities,
by re-fueling and resupplying Russian military assets so that they can operate
better against the United States, as complicit in such expressions of
hostility.
Russia’s expanding presence also
highlights the need for the United States to expand its security cooperation
with the region, including drug interdiction, intelligence and surveillance
support, and in-region training. Such support, including a greater military component
in the “Alliance for Prosperity” initiative for Central America, would help the
United States to remain the partner of choice for counter-narcotics
collaboration, while reassuring U.S. allies, like Colombia, of the U.S.
commitment to their security against actions by Russia-backed neighbors, the
collateral effects of criminal and terrorist groups operating in those
countries, or the chaos associated with the potential violent collapse of Russian-armed
Venezuela.
At the same time, the United States should
work quietly with partner nations such as Brazil to counsel Russian restraint
in expanding its military activities in the region. Doing so would serve U.S.
interests, since the combination of an expanded Russian footprint, and the
possibility of an expanded U.S. presence in response, would dilute their own influence
in the region.
The United States may also be able to
involve the PRC in persuading Russia to lower its military profile in the
region, since, as noted earlier, Russian provocation could increase the U.S.
focus on, and military presence in, the region in a manner prejudicial to PRC activities
there. Finally, the United States should expand coordination between Europe-facing
and Latin America-facing organizations, including U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern
Command, and U.S. Southern Command, to provide greater visibility regarding how
the evolving conflict in the Ukraine might stimulate future Russian actions in
the Western Hemisphere.
Although dangerous, Russia’s high-profile
actions in Latin America are also useful, since they remind U.S. policymakers
and defense planners that, in today’s complex interdependent world, future
conflicts with Russia or other geopolitical rivals will not likely play out
comfortably on the other side of the planet. Determined adversaries will seek
to engage the United States globally, including in Latin America and the
Caribbean, seeking to exploit vulnerabilities that arise from U.S. geographic
proximity to, and economic and financial interdependence with, the region. Now
is the time for the United States to think, and coordinate with its partners in
the hemisphere, regarding how best to meet that challenge.
The views
expressed in this Strategic Insights article are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the
Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This article is
cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.
END-NOTES:
1. “Rusia afirma no tener planes de bases militares en América Latina”
(“Russia Affirms that It Doesn’t
Have Plans for Military Bases in Latin America”), La Prensa, February
15, 2015, available from
www.laprensa.com.ni/2015/02/15/internacionales/1782885-rusia-afirma-que-no-tiene-planes-deemplazar-base-militares-en-america-latina.
2. “Ministro de Defensa de Rusia termina visita oficial en Nicaragua”
(“Russian Minister of Defense
Completes Official Visit to Nicaragua”), La Prensa, February
12, 2015, available from
www.laprensa.com.ni/2015/02/12/politica/1781314-ministro-de-defensa-de-rusia-visita-nicaraguapara-hablar-de-cooperacion.
3. Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russian Bomber Patrols to Reach Gulf of
Mexico,” MSN, November 12, 2014,
available from www.msn.com.
4. “Rusia reabrirá su centro de inteligencia electrónica en Cuba” (“Russia
Re-Opens Its Signals
Intelligence Center in Cuba”), Infodefensa, July 18, 2014,
available from www.infodefensa.com.
5. Caitlin Lee, “Colombia Rebukes Russia for Airspace Incursion,” IHS
Jane’s 360, November 5, 2013,
available from www.janes.com.
6. “Venezuela Contracts Worth $U.S. 11 Billion to Russia,” Jane’s
Defence Weekly, May 15, 2013.
7. “Argentina negocia la compra de 20 poderosos aviones que podrÃan
llegar a Malvinas” (“Argentina
Negotiates the Purchase of 20 Powerful Aircraft that Could Reach the
Malvinas”), Infobae, February 15,2015, available from www.infobae.com/2015/02/15/1626950-argentina-negocia-la-compra-20-
poderosos-aviones-que-podrian-llegar-malvinas.
8. “La lÃnea roja” (“The Red Line”), El PaÃs, February 10,
2015, available from
internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2015/02/10/actualidad/1423597614_775184.html.
9. “Russian Food Embargo Smells Like Opportunity for LatAm,” The
Global Post, August 17, 2014,
available from www.globalpost.com.
10. “Russia Cuts Cuba’s Debt to US $3.5 Billion,” Havana Times,
July 4, 2014, available from
www.havanatimes.com.
11. Douglas Farah and Liana Eustacia Reyes, “Russia in Latin America:
The Strategic Challenge,”
Miami, FL: University of Miami, Center for Hemispheric Policy, January
15, 2015, available from
https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/hemisphericpolicy/Perspectives_on_the_Americas/Farah%
20-%20Final.pdf
12. “Russia Seeks New Arms Deals on Growing Latin American Market,” RIA
Novosti, May 18, 2013,
available from www.ria.ru.
13. “Militares brasileños evalúan en Rusia el Pantsir-S1” (“Brazilian
Military Officials in Russia EvaluatePantsir-S1”), Defensa, September 1,
2014, available from www.defensa.com. See also “El contrato
rusobrasileño por los ‘Pantsir’ y la futura planta de producción en Brasil
superarÃa los 1.000 millones de dólares” (“The Russia-Brazil Contract for the ‘Pantsirs’
and the Future Production Plant in Brazil Will Exceed $1 Billion”), Defensa,
July 22, 2014, available from www.defensa.com.
14. Direction of Trade Statistics, Quarterly, Washington, DC:
International Monetary Fund, June 2014.
15. Calculated from ibid.
16. Office of Management and the Budget, Fiscal Year 2016 Budget of
the U.S. Government,Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2015, available from
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2016/assets/budget.pdf.
